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Violence Between Equals. An Investigation on the Ontological Concept of Change.
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Concept of violence is usually presented in the field as a concept closely related to power (Sorel 1976, Harendt 1972, Betz 1977, Dewey 1980, Graver 1970, Morriss 1987, or Paul Wolff 1969 among others). Nonetheless, after examining the existing bibliography, there is no consensus over the concept itself and there is no clear definition of it , beyond some more recent contributions (Bufacchi 2005, 2007) relating the concept of violence to social justice, dignity and human rights. After contrasted the fact of a gap or lack in the field with regards to this politically, socially and philosophically important concept, it remains relevant the relation of violence with power. After researching over recent French thinkers (Derrida 1978, Foucault 1968, Levinas 1994, Deleuze 1983, Badiou 2001, Lacan 1956-1959), I can establish a logical and formal relation between violence and power that is able to tackle any ethical debate surrounding both concepts. This approach elucidates the ethical problem, posing the political dimension as the one that can be solely evaluated ethically, and defining violence as a function of change. The conceptualization of violence at this respect leads to a determination within three degrees - absolute, hegemonic and universal- according to the level of change that operates. Notwithstanding, this stratification responds to quality considerations, making it possible an analytical approach to the redefined concept of violence. It is concluded how violence, as a function of ontological change in the most condensed sense of the term, has aesthetical means that are more notorious and self-evident in revolutionary processes. In addition, this approach opens the politically relevant question of the ontological status of modern states, since violence is able to operate over and beyond them, altering at the same time the subjectivity (capacity to act) and their nature as the only monopoly of force within the commons or people.