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University of Nevada, Reno

Impact of Human Rights on U.S. Trade Practices

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and the Honors Program

by

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December, 2010

**UNIVERSITY
OF NEVADA
RENO**

THE HONORS PROGRAM

We recommend that the thesis
prepared under our supervision by

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entitled

Impact of Human Rights on U.S. Trade Practices

be accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

BACHELOR OF ARTS, POLITICAL SCIENCE

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December, 2010

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to identify important political and economic factors that affect human rights conditions. In conjunction, it is also important to identify common themes in human rights studies, particularly emphasizing the role of regime type. Lastly, this study's primary focus is to answer the question: do human rights have any impact on U.S. trade? The end result shows that human rights are not an important factor to U.S. trade.

The U.S. is balancing trade and human rights. Often, these ideas are in conflict. This study will examine the U.S. political, economic, and strategic motives in the context of human rights, particularly focusing on bilateral trade engagement with other countries. The use of a cross-sectional time series analysis will be applied to examine trade and human rights from 1981-2007. These results will provide an important empirical contribution to the literatures and methodology in the social sciences regarding the relationship between human rights and trade.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the following people:

- My mentor, Dr. Robert Ostergard, for his support and guidance through this research process.
- The Director of the Honors Program, Dr. Tamara Valentine, for her advice and assistance throughout this project.
- My family, especially to my loving parents Vincent Tien Vu and Mary Kim Thanh Pham, for their continuing support and encouragements throughout my undergraduate years at UNR.

This work is dedicated in memory of Mary Kim Thanh Pham, a beloved mother and a great wife.

I appreciate the assistance that I receive from the TRiO and McNair Scholars Program for their aid throughout my undergraduate years. In addition, I want to thank the Honors Program and the Office of Undergraduate Research for awarding me the Honors Undergraduate Research Award to have the opportunity for this research experience.

Lastly, I want to acknowledge all my friends for their encouragement and help in getting me through this thesis.

Table of Contents

Abstract	i
Acknowledgements	ii
Table of Contents	iii
List of Tables	iv
List of Figures	v
Introduction	1
Literature Review	4
Methodology	20
Results	34
Findings/Interpretations	40
Conclusions	55
Future Roadmap	59
Appendix A	61
Works Cited.....	64

List of Tables

Table.1 Deleted Island Entity.....	24
Table.2 List of variable name and their description.....	26-27
Table.3 Table Summary of Each Model.....	29
Table.4 U.S. Exports with Entire Model, 1981-2007.....	34
Table.5 U.S. Imports with Entire Model, 1981-2007.....	35
Table.6 Total U.S. Trade with Entire Model, 1981-2007.....	36
Table.7 U.S. Exports excluding Canada, 1981-2007.....	37
Table.8 U.S. Imports excluding Canada, 1981-2007.....	38
Table.9 Total U.S. Trade excluding Canada, 1981-2007.....	39

List of Figures

Figure 1: U.S. Exports vs. Total life expectancy for FY 2005.....	61
Figure 2: U.S. Imports vs. Total life expectancy for FY 2005.....	62
Figure 3: Total U.S. trade vs. Total life expectancy for FY 2005.....	63

Introduction

Why is the study of human rights so fascinating, interesting, and challenging? Who is responsible for protecting the rights of individuals? The answer seems like it should be simple because one would think that human rights is guaranteed by the nation. In the U.S. and other western countries, it is an accepted idea that human rights are protected, but in all these countries there still exists governmental violations of human rights to this very day. The study of human rights is challenging because it is difficult to come up with a tool to measure human rights violations. There is no one solution to account for all human rights challenges that exist. Rather, human rights have many dimensions that must be examined and considered in order to grasp the complexity that makes the issue of human rights unique. In the examination of human rights, scholars tend to focus on government repression and how to respect certain rights, whether they are civil and political liberties from Freedom House or physical integrity rights from CIRI Human Rights Data Project. This study focuses on physical integrity rights or a government's physical acts and treatments upon its citizen.

What are human rights? Jack Donnelly noted that “[human] rights, are, literally, the rights that one has simply because one is a human being” (Donnelly 10). Donnelly explained the definition of human rights in the following passage:

Human rights are equal rights: one either is or is not a human being, and therefore has the same human rights as everyone else (or none at all). They are also inalienable rights: one cannot stop being human, no matter how badly one behaves nor how barbarously one is treated. And they are universal rights in the sense that today we consider all members of the species *Homo sapiens* “human beings,” and thus holders of human rights...Human rights are not just abstract values such as liberty, equality, and security. They are rights, particular social practices to realize those values. A human right thus should not be confused with the values or aspirations underlying it or with enjoyment of the object of the right (Donnelly 10-11).

Donnelly argues that human rights is a universally accepted idea and such idea is engrained in

our society. The significance of human rights becomes important when the state exercises its responsibility to protect the human rights of its citizens.

Freedom House is a “watchdog organization that supports the expansion of freedom around the world.” This organization believes that political rights are important because they “enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate.” In conjunction with political rights, this organization also promotes civil liberties, which “allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state” (<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm>).

Physical integrity rights primarily focuses on government use of extrajudicial killings, disappearances, political imprisonment, and torture. Physical integrity rights data can be obtained through the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. CIRI defines individual physical integrity rights in the following passage:

Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials. Torture includes the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards that is cruel, inhuman, or degrading. Political imprisonment refers to the incarceration of people by government officials because of their ideas, including religious beliefs; their nonviolent religious practices, including proselytizing; their speech; their nonviolent opposition to government policies or leaders; or their membership in a group, including an ethnic or racial group. Individuals who are imprisoned because they have committed violent acts, regardless of the reason they committed those acts, are not considered political prisoners...Extrajudicial killings are killings by government officials without due process of law. They include murders by private groups if instigated by government. Disappearances refer to the unresolved cases in which political motivation appears likely and in which the victims have not been found (Cingranelli & Richards “Respect” 517-518).

Empirical research is more concerned with the nation's treatment and respect for the rights of its citizens, particularly human rights practices that are displayed by the government. Human rights have many dimensions because there are multiple and different type of rights and each right captures unique conditions and situations.

The purpose of this research is to identify important political and economic factors that affect human rights conditions. This study's primary focus is to find out whether or not human rights have any impact on U.S. trade? Through my research I have discovered that human rights is not an important factor to U.S. trade.

Empirical research in human rights focuses particularly on trying to explain the link of economic and political phenomena to human rights. Part of this research tries to identify economic and political factors that are relevant in human rights literature. Statistical analysis is used to determine what factors are significant. Statistical analysis is an important part because it can help explore our theories on possible relationships between U.S. bilateral trade engagement and human rights will be tested with statistical analysis. Another important part of the research is to link theories to the statistical analysis and come up with possible explanations of the relationship of economy and politics to human rights. Human rights studies is a new and constantly evolving field with continuous contributions by scholars to provide better understanding and ways to improve research methodology.

Congressional mandates in the mid 1970s helped spur interest to protect human rights and incorporate such consideration in U.S. foreign policy, particularly focusing on foreign aid allocation (Mitchell & McCormick 482-483; Apodaca & Stohl 186). The study of human rights has primarily focused on U.S. foreign policy, immigration policies, and empirical research on the "human rights abuses" and U.S. policy prescription to handle such violations (Poe, Tate, and

Keith 291). Much empirical research has examined the link between globalization and economic development to human rights. These studies examine whether economic development could lead to better human rights practices and whether globalization might lead to more governmental repression. Other studies such as Apodaca (883-905) and Younas (661-674) focus on the effect of bilateral and multilateral aid allocations on human rights practices, but there has not been much study focusing on human rights and bilateral trade flows. There is a need to examine the impact of human rights on bilateral trade, particularly focusing on U.S. trade practices. This study hopes to contribute to the continual expanding knowledge of human rights literature.

In order to understand the link between human rights and trade, the literature review process will examine political and economic factors that are important and relevant in human rights literature. I will also include important themes that are discussed throughout human rights and trade studies. A key concept that is highlighted in human rights literature would be regime type, particularly focusing on democratic governance, the examination of the role of democracy in promoting better human rights practices. This study proves that human rights, particularly physical integrity rights, is not a major determinant in U.S. trade.

Literature Review

The study of human rights has been primarily concerned with empirical research and implementation of U.S. foreign policy that seeks to protect human rights in determining foreign aid allocation. Some human rights research is not focused on the philosophical debate but rather focuses on the empirical and theoretical approach and analysis. In order to determine if human rights has a possible impact on U.S. bilateral trade, it becomes necessary to identify political, economic, and strategic factors that affect the relationship between these two concepts.

Human rights and trade are complex issues and trying to tie together economic processes

and political processes is not a simple task. Trade and human rights are interconnected with other issues such as poverty, economic development, globalization, and governmental repression that are relevant to understanding the big picture. The literature review is designed to identify the economic and political processes that link human rights to trade, but at the same time encompassing other possible links that are intractably associated with processes such as globalization and democratic governance. Globalization, economic development, trade, and poverty are all irrefutably linked. It must be examined if these phenomena support better human rights practices, and human rights abuses are unfortunate consequences of often successful business models. Businesses have to maintain a positive image and such images involve an opportunity cost between two things: doing business with countries that violate human rights or the possibility of losing potential profits in order to promote better human conditions.

One of the most relevant political factors that is used in both trade and human rights literature is a regime type particularly focusing on democratic governance. Democratic institutions are more inclined to respect human rights because of "institutional constraints" that depend on building mutual relations that promote cooperation over conflict (Polacheck 55-78; Pollins 737-761; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 477-513; Apodaca 883-905; Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 143-158; Hafner-Burton, 2005b, 593-629; Cox & Drury 709-722; Blanton & Blanton 100, 108; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36). Regime type matters, particularly democratic regimes that play a role in respecting human rights and building cooperation. This is important because countries that tend to enter conflicts might increase human rights abuses and produce an environment that is detrimental to trade and building better relations (Polacheck 55-78; Pollins 737-761; Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 143-158; Hafner-Burton, 2005b, 593-629; Cox & Drury 709-722; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36). The regime type, particularly democratic

governance, spurs from the "democratic peace theory," which contends that "spreading democracy will make the world peaceful" through the use of economic sanctions as a threat to provide incentives to alter behavior (Cox & Drury 712). This argument suggests democracy brings peace, and with the help of globalization, brings about political and economic changes through the installment of the democratic system and capitalism. Globalization phenomena force players to take into consideration human rights because active participants of the international system follow international standards. International trade seems to play multiple roles to promote human rights practices and indirectly force other participants to comply with democratic principles (Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 144). Countries that are active participants in the international system must follow norms by forcing regimes to recognize human rights and provide incentives to alter behavior, such as influencing trade practices (Cingranelli & Richards 531; Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 143-158; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 477–513; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36). Regime type does play a role, but it is important to examine the extent of such an effect on human rights.

Mansfield et al. (143-158) suggest that democratic regimes have a better chance of completing a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTAs) than autocratic regimes because they share similar political institutions. Democratic regimes can be held accountable for their actions by the voters, so there is enormous political pressure at the domestic front to negotiate a trade agreement because it can affect an incumbent election outcome. For example, President Bill Clinton faced tremendous political pressure to pass NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) because the failure to deliver NAFTA through Congress could have lost voter confidence and faith in his ability to govern and manage controversial issues. Internal domestic politics influence treaty agreements because they benefit society overall, particularly democratic

regimes, and in the international front build better relations with other democratic partners (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 477–513). This shows that regime types do matter in trade agreements because these regimes share similar values and are least likely in conflict with one another shaped by their institutional design.

A common theme in the study of human rights and trade is cooperation and conflict. This is a very important theme in human rights studies, but this theme is not the focus of this thesis. However, I think further examinations into this matter are important and would yield interesting and fascinating insights linking human rights violations to conflict areas. Some scholars would measure conflict by looking at civil war and international war (which can also be considered domestic and interstate conflict), and the idea of conflict does have an effect on trade or human rights (Polacheck 55-78; Pollins 737-761; Cingranelli & Richards 512; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 477–513; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36). Polacheck suggests trade can bring peace through "mutual dependencies," which would make "conflict more costly, thereby increasing the incentives toward cooperation, and hence peace" (Polacheck 56). Interstate conflict and cooperation play a role in bilateral trade flows because both interstate conflict and cooperation have an impact on the amount of commerce flowing into a country (Pollins 757). Stability of political ties is important in the sense that it will help limit exposure to risk and "minimize the possibility of economic disruption" (Pollins 741). Pollins examines import-export relations in dealing with bilateral trade. Importers are less likely to engage in trade practices with countries that tend to be in conflict while trade will increase for importers if they engage with countries that cooperate (Pollins 741). Bilateral trade can affect respect for human rights by encouraging cooperative outcomes that create stability of trade flows and bilateral relations. Therefore, bilateral trade can suppress interstate and domestic conflicts.

Bilateral trade can accommodate and promote human rights especially when exporting countries that share compatible interests and political structures with both conditions met. Bilateral trade and similar interests can provide incentives that appeal to a state to improve human rights practices (Greenhill & Prakash 2). An exporting country with a high level of respect for human rights tends to be effective at influencing its export partners to adopt tougher standards of human rights to maintain better trade relations (Greenhill & Prakash 2). The spread of human rights is more effective when both the individual export country and its recipient have tough human rights practices that can illustrate an appealing bilateral trade environment (Greenhill & Prakash 2). Human rights standards establish an informal norm on how countries should do business and place expectations that respect human rights as a partial criterion for building a better bilateral trade relationship for exporting countries (Greenhill & Prakash 4). International trade serves a dual purpose for human rights by establishing a reward and punishment system to influence states to change their behavior and promote better human rights practices (Harrelson -Stephen & Callaway 145-146). Trade can accommodate and promote human rights by forcing states to adopt the standard norms of participating in the global economy and indirectly install democratic principles through trade (Harrelson -Stephen & Callaway 144). Therefore, this shows that international trade tends to lead to better human rights practices.

Political factors that influence trade would be “interstate cooperation and conflict, regime type, common organizational membership” and “international institutions” (Blanton & Blanton 99). Common organizational membership like Regional Trade Arrangements and NAFTA are agreements that can influence trade and human rights. International institutions like the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank have a role in the trade debate

and discussions (Pollins 737-761; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36; Mansfield, Milner, Rosendorff 477-513). These organizations play a role in the trade discussions and participants of the international community must have consideration for human rights so one can expect reduction in the level of repression of a state's citizens. International institutions function and operate similarly to a private business which has an image to maintain. They are obligated to manage and mediate disputes when an issue such as human rights can stir disagreements among its members and participants. If external issues such as human rights permeated trade discussions, individual states must adhere to international demands and standards.

Other political factors are relevant in the literature, and some of these factors are used as explanatory variables in other studies to measure robustness. The most common identifiable variable in the human rights and trade literature is population, geographical proximity (also known as distance in some studies), common language, and shared colonial heritage (former western colony). Population also can be referred to as density (a state population density). Scholars who analyze governmental repression on human rights violations hypothesize that with a bigger population there might be greater propensity to violate human rights (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 617; Poe, Tate, and Keith 294). Other scholars contend that population has negative association with trade because "countries with large populations have larger internal markets and may thus be less reliant on external trade" (Blanton & Blanton 105). Common language and geographical proximity are two variables that are identified in the economic literature (Blanton & Blanton 105). Distance relies on the Gravity Model, which is used in bilateral trade flow studies and other economic studies that try to link foreign aid allocation to human rights (Pollins 749-750; Deardorff 4; Mansfield, Milner, Rosendorff 497; Neumayer 510-527; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36; Younas 661-674). The distance variable is negatively associated with trade

because the farther the distance between one country to another, the higher the cost of transportation. Distance is more of an economic factor, but at the same time it can incorporate political concerns that must be considered in transportation and movement of goods and services across national boundaries. Common language "serves as a proxy for cultural similarities and a colonial legacy, both conditions encourage trade" (Blanton & Blanton 105). Colonial history or heritage suggests that past influence might affect the individual state behaviors and its treatment of human rights. In foreign aid allocation studies, a country with a colonial background can impact how much it receives because of cultural and past affiliations (Mitchell & McCormick 480; Mansfield, Milner, Rosendorff 497; Neumayer 524; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36; Younas 661-674). These variables are commonly used as explanatory variables to measure robustness. Population and geographical proximity are important because they are a measure of market size, and market size captures economic phenomena that have possible impacts on trade and human rights. Common language and colonial history show that past political and social experience can be beneficial for a country to obtain more foreign aid funding. Past affiliation establishes relations between donors and recipients. Donors have a vital interest in providing more assistance to their former colony, which helps to develop better relations between donor and recipient. A good example is the United Kingdom's former colonization of Africa. South Africa's development is crucial to the U.K. and if South Africa performs well economically it will benefit both sides. The United Kingdom would have a vested concern to South Africa's economic growth by ensuring that this developing nation receives the necessary aid to progress.

There are also other political factors that scholars use. Brian Pollins examines political factors that look at concepts such as political alignment, political climate, and conflict to see how these factors can affect trade. He suggests that trade can be utilized as a tool to assert political

influence and, therefore, trade can play a role in political alignment (740). Political climate is important because it helps to create stabilities which establish the necessary environment for secure relations between two countries to negotiate and do business (Pollins 741). In order to test his political factors, Pollins examines export and import behaviors between countries. Brian Greenhill and Aseem Prakash examine political openness and political space by investigating a nation's ability to hold the necessary amount of export capacity (1-36). In order to measure political openness they used the Polity IV measurement. The Polity IV project rates a country's political system on a scale of -10 to 10, with -10 being the least democratic to 10 the most democratic. One study looks at six industrialized and democratic countries and examines factors that support trade liberalization (Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 829-851). Kaltenthaler et al. (829-851) explore political factors at the national level such as income distribution, cognitive mobilization, and geographic orientation. They found that their economic indicators such as education were more significant than political indicators (Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 845). All of these studies suggest that political systems that exist within a country are important factors in trade matters because democratic countries can face voters in the election, therefore major incentives exist for leaders in these countries to negotiate successfully for an agreement. Trade agreements provide employment opportunities and build long-term relations that can benefit incumbents and favor the incumbent in an election year. It can be inferred that democratic countries tend to trade with their democratic counterparts more than their autocratic regimes. Autocratic regimes do not have to face voters, so there is little accountability for leaders in these countries (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 476-498). Therefore, political climate and political alignment become necessary components in successful bilateral trade relations. Some studies look at political factors that reside in the focus of foreign aid allocation with respect for

human rights. They use dummy variables in order to measure the influence of a country's impact on aid or when measuring cultural and religious differences. Neumayer uses socialist countries as a foundation to measure if aid allocation is affected if a country were to be socialist. He uses Egypt as a dummy variable for the level strategic significance to the U.S. (Neumayer 510-527). Neumayer focuses on socialist countries in order to see if there were any differences in foreign aid allocation due to political systems that exist within a country. Younas follows a similar procedure to Neumayer, but he includes Israel and Egypt for their strategic significance and foreign aid allocation differences between Muslim or Roman Catholic nations (Younas 661-674). Israel would obtain more aid than other nations because of their close ties to the United States. Younas also wanted to examine if religion plays a role in the determination of aid allocation in order to analyze possible motives that donor countries might have. The studies mentioned above show that political factors do indeed affect the amount of foreign aid allocation and bilateral trade relations.

Important variables that are frequently used in human rights literature are focused upon human capital such as governmental spending on education, literacy, and the infant mortality rates. These factors are considered in order to examine the relationship between human rights and aid allocation or the relationship of globalization, which is accompanied by economic development and investment (Meyer 368-397; Apodaca 892-893; Tuman and Emmert 22; Younas 672). Social indicators, such as governmental spending on education, literacy, and the infant mortality rates, are linked to human rights and trade because it is believed that countries that respect human rights would likely have high levels of human capital and would improve the quality of the workforce in the country (Blanton & Blanton 103). Education spending, literacy rates, and infant mortality are sometimes measured by FDI flows into a country in order to

measure the development and investment of a country. Improvement in human capital could have possible implications such as building a better civil society, which could decrease conflict and promote a stable environment that is attractive for trade and investment. The need of improvement in human capital is particularly true for developing countries. Countries in Africa, Afghanistan, and other third world nations need improvement in their education system.

Other factors that are relevant to human rights and trade are the involvement of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) within a particular country. Oxfam, an NGO, plays a role in promoting equity by improving human rights, decreasing poverty, and impacting development through the trade discussion (Aaronson & Zimmerman 998). Aaronson & Zimmerman show that not only government plays a role in the discussion that shapes trade and human rights, but non-state actors can also play a role into how trade policies can be shaped (Aaronson & Zimmerman 998-1030). Government actions and response to certain issues such as human rights can be restricted by diplomatic relations with its trading partners. NGOs do not have to be concerned with the legal binding contracts and act on their own accord, so therefore NGOs can promote important issues without the worries of diplomacy. Oxfam shares different priorities compared to WTO (World Trade Organization), but it forces WTO to recognize important issues at hand. Oxfam continues to be the voice of the poor and underrepresented for developing nations (Aaronson & Zimmerman 998-1030). IGOs (intergovernmental organizations) such as the United Nations (U.N.) play a role in the human rights debate because in order to be part of the international system, countries must adhere to international norms, so one would expect IGOs to play a role in promoting better human rights practices. Greenhill & Prakash use IGO and INGO (non-governmental organization) in their measurement between bilateral trade and human rights (Greenhill & Prakash 1-36). Non-state

actors do not have to be concerned about political pressures so they can be effective in addressing issues such as human rights and poverty. NGOs can be helpful in stirring public support on important issues and public concerns can force government leaders to take necessary actions at the international arena.

Greenhill & Prakash use logged GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. Dollars to measure economic development and see if there is a connection to improve human rights practices where there "exists between poverty and political conflict" (Greenhill & Prakash 15). Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway (2003) use economic standing as their variable by using GNP per capita as their economic predictor to see if personal integrity abuses are linked to economic standing, and they found it to be statistically insignificant (Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 150-151). These two different variables measure similar concepts using different methods. Despite these differences in method, the selection of variable is based on the preference of the individual researcher. For the analysis of bilateral and multilateral aid allocation with respect for human rights, Neumayer uses GDP per capita in PPP (Price Purchasing Parity) for his economic variable; other possible variables include recipient need and donor interest (Neumayer 510-527). Mansfield et al. (477-513) use GDP to measure economic development. They employ GDP for country i compared with GDP for country j, then measure the change of GDP for country i and the change in GDP for country j. Apodaca uses GDP per capita to measure total output, which is the "dollar value of finished goods and services" in attempting to look at economic development (Apodaca 891). In evaluating human rights and U.S. foreign policy, Apodaca & Stohl use economic interest and needy people as their economic indicators. Economic interest is the amount of U.S. exports to a country and needy people is measured by GNP per capita to assess recipient need (Apodaca & Stohl 188). The Gravity Model (commonly used in the study of

bilateral trade flows) identifies that market size can be measured by using GDP and population (Blanton & Blanton 103). Blanton & Blanton use market size as one of their variables to measure the effect of this concept on trade and hypothesize that market size indeed plays a role in trade. Countries with large markets engage actively in trade and "conduct more cross-border transactions" (Blanton & Blanton 105). Population has a negative association with trade because countries with sizable populations tend to have large markets that minimize trade impact on their economy because they are not dependent on trade (Blanton & Blanton 105).

Foreign aid is an economic factor that seeks to address development, and often studies examine the effect of bilateral and multilateral aid allocation (Meyer 368-397; Apodaca & Stohl 185-198; Apodaca 883-905; Neumayer 510-527; Younas 661-674). These indicators seem to be used often to measure economic development, which could be represented by GNP per capita. For some scholars such as Apodaca (883-905), GDP per capita is used to measure their economic phenomena. Younas looks at bilateral aid allocation (bilateral real aid capita) to explore possible motives that donors have in aid allocation: these donors may gain better trade advantage by exporting capital goods to countries that use such assistance (Younas 662). Some economic variables that he looks at are income per capita, multilateral aid per capita, reserves per capita, and domestic PP (per dollar) (Younas 661-674).

The relationship between foreign aid and human rights is another aspect that some studies consider. Important determinants in aid allocation that are considered are recipient need and donor interest. Part of the analysis is to examine bilateral and multilateral aid distribution effects (Apodaca 883-905; Neumayer 510-527; Younas 661-674). Apodaca examines the effects of globalization on human rights standards in East and Southeast Asia by looking at 11 countries in the region from 1990 to 1996 (Apodaca 883-905). Apodaca concluded:

Bilateral aid is good for economic development, insignificant for infant mortality, and bad for physical integrity rights, while multilateral aid is good for physical integrity rights and bad for both infant mortality rates and national wealth. Trade, on the other hand, has a positive consequence for decreasing infant mortality rates while increasing national wealth (Apodaca 905).

Multilateral aid plays a role in the improvement in human rights, in particular in physical integrity rights, but multilateral aid may not be helpful in advancing human capital characteristics by lowering infant mortality rates. Neumayer reaches similar conclusions about the role of multilateral aid in improving human rights practices (Neumayer 510). However, Apodaca suggests that trade can have an impact on decreasing infant mortality rates; therefore, trade can probably improve a nation's human rights practices and promote better conditions (Apodaca 905). Meyers suggests that there is a possible link to "development/aid/debt" with "civil-political rights" (Meyer 368-397). The economic development process requires that developing countries that are more active in the world economy show their commitment to development. Such commitment requires large amounts of aid and borrowing enormously, which can improve human rights—particularly civil and political rights (Meyer 368-397). Countries that demonstrate their development to commitment adhere to international standards. As Apodaca notes, trade has an impact on decreasing infant mortality rates, which is a positive sign for improvement in human capital (Apodaca 883-905).

Foreign direct investment is another dimension to consider in the link between human rights and trade. This concept was used in past studies, particularly in the context of globalization and economic development, with respect to human rights practices. Foreign direct investment is a double-edged sword because it can provide many benefits as well as drawbacks. Benefits from investments consist in providing capital funding for roads, buildings, and other infrastructure projects necessary to build a better society. However, investments have drawbacks

because they are often based on calculated business decisions that are focused on profit motives. A problem that often arises with an investment is whether or not it is going into projects that will allow for a better quality of life to citizens by providing essential life resources. These projects may improve water quality, but the money may still not help to create better job opportunities. The International Monetary Fund and developed nations provide foreign aid with strategic motives give such assistance with certain conditions and stipulations. These stipulations would require a developing nation to undertake construction projects (for instance, designing a well project that delivers service to local residents for a cheap price), but the these projects can become costly: local residents may be charged outrageous prices that make purchasing such goods and services difficult. The developing nation would continue to be in debt and the projects that were designed to help local residents would, on the contrary, have unexpected, adverse consequences. The people in the developing nation would then be forced to pay at a higher price in order to use the water from the well that was built.

Investments are one of the most important aspects to examine in the study of human rights, and oftentimes the choice of score used to link human rights and investment matters in the analysis (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 687). Hafner-Burton (2005a) describes the problems that must be considered in the study of human rights, especially measurements with investment and trade indicators:

The problem is that we are not adequately theorizing our links between the scores, indicators, and globalization concepts we think we are measuring, and we are not even aware that we are avoiding the issue. We use different indicators to make contradictory claims about the same concepts, but the score we use to quantify our indicators are often measuring different empirical facts (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 687).

Clearly, each indicator and score being used must capture what it is we are trying to measure.

Hafner-Burton looks at five specific investment indicators: FDI net inflows (current US\$), gross

FDI (% GDP, PPP), net FDI (BoP, current U\$), FDI net inflows (% GDP), and FDI net inflows (% GCF). She found that gross FDI and FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP were "strongly robust" (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 685, 693). Greenhill & Prakash use FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP in their analysis of human rights and bilateral trade (Greenhill & Prakash 1-36). Hafner-Burton used the "sum of absolute values of inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment recorded in the balance of payments financial account" for her investment indicator (Hafner-Burton, 2005b, 617). For the purpose of this study, FDI is taken into consideration because FDI is supposed to be used to help address issues like economic development and poverty. By addressing these issues, the result would hopefully lead to improvement in human rights practices and provide an attractive environment for trade and investment. Meyer suggests that multinational corporations (MNCs) can play a role in promoting better human rights. In his analysis, he used U.S. FDI, so it would be more appropriate in this study to consider U.S. FDI (Meyer 368-397). The use of different indicators by scholars to measure similar concepts could be problematic—they might provide different and contradictory results that can lead to spurious conclusions.

The primary focus of this study is to examine whether or not U.S. bilateral trade has any effect on human rights practices. A common indicator concerning this would be trade openness, which is measured by using "the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP." This can be rewritten as the "sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP" (Apodaca 893-894; Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 148; Hafner-Burton, 2005b, 617). Hafner-Burton (2005a) looked at five specific trade indicators: Export of Goods and Services (% GDP), Imports of Goods and Services (% GDP), Exports as a Capacity to Import, Trade (% Goods GDP), Trade (% GDP) (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 686). She found that

[t]rade (% goods GDP) exhibits a significant and negative effect on government repression over 80% of the time, as do imports and exports of goods and services. This suggests a very strong partial correlation in support of the proponents' generalized claims that more trade, by and large, has a positive influence on governments' protection of human rights (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 691).

Clearly, then, Trade (% goods GDP) does matter in the analysis of human rights. Surprisingly, however, Hafner-Burton (2005a) found that Trade (% GDP) was robust but statistically "weak" (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 692-693). As Hafner-Burton suggests, which trade indicator is used is important and will naturally have an effect on results and analysis. Hafner-Burton shows that scholars should be cautious when using different variables to measure similar concepts; each variable can affect the results because they all have different statistical relationships (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 692-693).

Human rights and trade literature are oftentimes at odds and provide contradictory conclusions. This problem exists due to the variation of theoretical frameworks scholars use to define economic and political indicators, as well as the application of different methodologies and statistical models employed to measure the phenomena of trade and human rights (Blanton and Blanton 97-117; Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 679-698). There are two main problems identified with the literature: measurement issues and model specification errors that do not take into account how politics work. Part of the current debate asks whether or not governmental repression on human rights has an effect on trade and investment. If there is an effect, then what are the factors associated with governmental repression, the use of violence, and torture? John Tuman and Craig Emmert conclude in their studies that "more repressive political regimes in Latin America received more U.S. FDI" from 1979-1996 (Tuman and Emmert 23). Bohara et al. (15) notes that the act of signing international human rights treaties is not enough; in order to safeguard basic human rights, it would require "an active civil society." Part of the reason why

measurement and models draw contradictory conclusions about political and economic indicators relating to human rights is due to the manner in which data is gathered. The State Department and Amnesty International (AI) are different institutions that are set up differently and possibly contain some biases. The State Department is concerned with sovereignty issues, diplomatic relations, and strategic interests, so their Annual Country Report might provide some leeway to some countries. Alternatively, AI is concerned with only the worst violators of human rights (Poe, Carey, and Vazquez 650-677). "Our research supports the conclusions that the bias that appeared in the initial State Department Reports in the 1970s and early 1980s tended to disappear over time. Some serious causes for concern remain, though, since the results also suggest that just as the biases related to strategic and political interests faded, a new bias relating to US trading partners might have emerged" (Poe, Carey, and Vazquez 677). Hafner-Burton (2005a, 683) raises an interesting question that must be considered in empirical analysis: she looks to see if the economic measurement of trade and foreign direct investment could be linked with human rights indicators, which are commonly used by scholars in human rights literature. Hafner-Burton suggests that "[i]n short, our theories about which specific causal mechanisms to measure...are often imprecisely linked to our economic data" (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 683). In empirical analysis, one must take into consideration the robustness of economic, political, strategic, and human rights indicators.

The purpose of this literature review is to examine common themes that are relevant in empirical research and to identifying political, economic, and social factors that impact human rights. Human rights research contains many focus areas, and the literature review is designed to identify areas that are important and relevant within human rights studies. Human rights studies referenced in this thesis show that regime type plays an important role in decreasing human

rights violations. This reasoning can be supported by analyzing social indicators and economic conditions that exist within a country. The literature review identifies economic growth and the condition of a country by using GDP as a measurement. Economic development can be captured by using FDI to show the level of development that exists within a country. Along with economic growth, we can understand the general social conditions of a country by applying social indicators, such as total life expectancy, infant mortality rates, and secondary school enrollment. The literature review identifies each variable that captures relationships linking human rights to economic, social, and political phenomena.

Methodology

Indicators of human rights that are commonly used in the literature consist of political and civil liberties from Freedom House, the Political Terror Scale (PTS) provided by Amnesty International-the US State Department, and the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. Trade indicators primarily focus on economic variables obtained from transnational agencies like the World Bank (World Development Indicators), International Monetary Fund, or IMF (Direction of Trade Statistics). My analysis covers data from 1981 to 2007. My empirical model contains dependent variables measuring U.S. export to a country, U.S. Import from a country, and the total U.S. trade affecting the human rights conditions. The use of control variables is important to measure political, economic, and social phenomena. Political factors that are important in this thesis and relevant to human rights research is the examination of regime type. In order to measure the concept of regime type, I used the polity2 variable in the Polity IV project as an indicator for Democracy (polity2 is renamed as Democracy). Economic conditions can be analyzed by looking at the market size concept, which includes logged total population represented by the variable $\ln(\text{Population})$ and GDP per capita in constant U.S.

dollars (2000) (represented by the variable GDP). The World Bank defines total population by “[counting] all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship—except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates” (*Population, total*). According to the World Bank,

GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant U.S. dollars (*GDP per capita*).

Social conditions can be inspected through the use of total life expectancy at birth (represented by the variable Expectancy). The World Bank suggests that “[life] expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life” (*Life expectancy at birth, total*). Economic development and investment can be captured by looking at Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US\$) (represented by the variable U.S. Aid), the sum of Debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US\$) and Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US\$), which is represented by the variable Debt, and Foreign Direct Investment, Net inflows (% of GDP) (represented by the variable FDI). The World Bank describes Debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US\$), Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US\$), and Foreign Direct Investment, Net inflows (% of GDP) definitions in the following passages below taken from the website:

Total debt service is the sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in foreign currency, goods, or services on long-term debt, interest paid on short-term debt, and repayments (repurchases and charges) to the IMF. Data are in current U.S. dollars (*Debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US \$)*).

Public and publicly guaranteed multilateral loans include loans and credits from the World Bank, regional development banks, and other multilateral and intergovernmental agencies. Excluded are loans from funds administered by an international organization on behalf of a single donor government; these are classified as loans from governments. Debt service payments are the sum of principal repayments and interest payments actually made in the year specified. Data are in current U.S. dollars ("*Multilateral debt service (TDS, current US\$)*").

Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net outflows of investment from the reporting economy to the rest of the world and is divided by GDP ("*Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP)*").

All the control variables listed above, with the exception of the “Democracy” variable, were obtained through the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator>). I was unable to locate the definition for Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US\$). The three dependent variables—U.S. Export, U.S. Import, and total U.S. trade—were obtained through the International Monetary Fund through IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. The variable Democracy was acquired through the Polity IV project, which rates a country’s political system on a scale of -10 to 10, with -10 being the least democratic to 10 the most democratic. Countries that would receive a 10 are the United States, Canada, and other western European nations. Countries that are scored a -10 would be Swaziland, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Middle Eastern nations. There are other repressive nations that score in the high end of the negative range are Cuba, Iraq, and Uzbekistan.

In order to obtain my variable, I worked with three datasets: World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI), CIRI Human Rights Dataset, and the International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). I merged these three datasets by using a single identifier: usually it contains the country name coupled with a single year. For my single

identifiers, I used the 3 letter country abbreviation with the unique CIRI code and the individual year. For example, Afghanistan's country abbreviation is AFG and Afghanistan's CIRI code is 101. If it is 1981 my single identifier for Afghanistan would be AFG1011981. In order to merge the three datasets successfully, each country's single-identifier was unique. Once the merge was successful, I checked to make sure that the merge was correctly done by picking a country randomly and making sure that all the variable numbers were correct and matched with the original dataset. The Polity IV dataset was also merged, and for this dataset I concatenated the unique country assign polity code with the year. I repeated the same process for the Polity merge, such as making certain it was successful by checking a country at random and ensuring that the variables matched with the original dataset.

Once it was successfully merged, I made changes to the WDI-CIRI-DOTS-POLITY dataset by taking out any entity that was not considered a state. Rather, these entities are territories belonging to a nation. These territories were from WDI dataset. The table below lists the island entities deleted from the dataset, and it includes a list of which nation holds authority over a specific territory.

Table.1 Deleted Island Entity	
Entity	Territory controlled by
American Samoa	Territory of U.S.
Aruba	Territory of the Netherlands
Bermuda	Territory of the UK
Cayman Islands	Territory of UK
Channel Islands	Archipelago by Britain and Normandy
Faroe Islands	Part of Denmark Kingdom
French Polynesia	Territory of France
Greenland	Part of the Kingdom of Denmark
Guam	US Territory
Hong Kong, China	Special administrative region of China
Isle of Man	British Crown Dependency
Macao, China	Special administrative region of China
Mayotte	Collectivity of France

Netherland Antilles	Part of Kingdom of the Netherlands
New Caledonia	Self governing territory of France
Northern Mariana Islands	Commonwealth in political union with the U.S.
Puerto Rico	Territory of the U.S. with common wealth status
Virgin Islands	U.S. Territory
West Bank and Gaza	

Source: World Bank's World Development Indicators.

These entities hold special territorial recognition and have a certain designation (because they are not sovereign nations) that do not allow them recognition by the international community.

The human rights variables are obtained through the CIRI Human Rights Dataset, which measures physical integrity rights that consist of disappearance, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and torture. There is also a variable called (physint) that includes the total score of the four physical integrity rights combined (<http://www.humanrightsdata.org>). In my analysis, I did not include civil and political rights from Freedom House or the Political Terror Scale (PTS), which are frequently used in other studies. Human rights information is primarily obtained through the "Amnesty International's yearly Annual Report and the US State department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" (Cingranelli & Richards 517-518). There may be differences in procedure and the rating of an individual country between the State Department report and AI. However, independent coders from CIRI minimize these differences by working out and agreeing upon what the appropriate rating would be. Cingranelli and Richards commented that "[i]t has become standard procedure in the systematic study of human rights to check these two sources of information against each other...When conflicts occurred, Amnesty International's position was coded as 'correct'" (Cingranelli & Richards 517-518). CIRI coded physical integrity rights on a three point ordinal scale. If there are more than 50 "confirmed violations of a right" in a country, it would be rated as "zero" in the category of "frequent violations." If a country received between 1 and 49 confirmed violations, it would receive a

score of “one,” which falls into the "some violations" category. A country that receives a score of “two” suggests that there are "no confirmed violations of a right," which qualifies under the "no violations" category (Cingranelli & Richards 517-519).

For my analysis, I excluded two social indicators that are commonly used in the human rights literature: infant mortality and school enrollment. School enrollment, secondary (% gross) and the infant mortality rate provide a general idea of the social conditions that exist in a country. These two variables were excluded due to a lack of information available to make any meaningful inferences. The infant mortality rate data was available in five-year intervals and sometimes between 2-3 year intervals, which becomes problematic for regression analysis. When performing a scatter plot of my dependent variables (U.S. trade variables) and social indicators, such as the infant mortality rate and school enrollment, I discovered that the majority of those which reported this information on a yearly basis were developed nations. As mentioned previously, the infant mortality rate data is available for every five years only, and school enrollment is similarly problematic when trying to obtain data. Possible explanations could be that developing nations do not have the infrastructure and capital to collect such information and report it to the World Bank. Another explanation could be that some countries choose not to report it because it could provide a grim assessment of a country's social conditions and could possibly hurt a country's development.

The social indicator on which I have settled is total life expectancy. It yielded a much higher number of observations, which hover at 1215 for U.S. exports models and total U.S. trade models, and 1212 for U.S. imports models coupled with the total life expectancy. This captured the general social condition similar to infant mortality rate and school enrollment. The number of observations for the infant mortality rates is at 540, while secondary school enrollment yields a

much higher value of 1101 for all three dependent trade variables. When including the infant mortality rates, secondary school enrollment, and total life expectancy, the number of observations hover at 540, which is a very low estimate and not representative of the dataset. This may suggest that there is some type of multicollinearity problem that arises. All three social indicators were run individually, and the results indicate that total life expectancy yields a higher observation. Therefore, infant mortality rates and secondary school enrollment have been dropped in the analysis, while total life expectancy remains.

There will be three dependent variables (U.S. Export, U.S. Import, total U.S. trade), and below is a summary table that contains all the independent variables and dummy variables used in this analysis.

Variable name	Variable Descriptions
Y_{i1}	U.S. Export
Y_{i2}	U.S. Import
Y_{i3}	total U.S. trade
Democracy	Democracy variable measured by Polity IV measurement
ln(Population)	total population in the ith country (logged)
Expectancy	life expectancy of the ith country; Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
GDP	GDP per capita measures poverty and economic development in the ith country; GDP per capita (constant 2000 US\$)
U.S. Aid	Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US\$)
Debt	the total amount of debt owed by the ith country, the sum of Debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US\$) and Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US\$)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment, Net inflows (% of GDP) and measured influence of MNCs on a country
Physint	the combined score of physical integrity rights in the ith country; Physical Integrity Rights Index

Disappearance	disappearance in the <i>i</i> th country
Kill	extrajudicial killings in the <i>i</i> th country
Polpris	political imprisonment in the <i>i</i> th country
Torture	torture in the <i>i</i> th country
China	a dummy variable if the country is China (China = 1, others = 0)
Mexico	a dummy variable if the country is Mexico (Mexico = 1, others = 0)
Canada	a dummy variable if the country is Canada (Canada = 1, others = 0)

Based on Table 3 on the following page, 12 models are included and each dependent variable contains a set of analyses: one model measures individual physical integrity rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture), while the other model measures the combined score for physical integrity rights represented by the variable Physint. The analysis is divided into two parts: the first part consists of Model 1 through Model 6, and these models contain the entire model that includes all the countries in the analysis. The second part includes Model 7 to Model 12, excluding the country of Canada and the dummy variable Canada from the analysis. Each model and variable will be listed and described, and the different variations between individual models will be presented in a table summary. Model 1 is the U.S. Exports model measuring individual physical integrity rights and including all countries. Model 2 is the U.S. Exports model measuring the combined physical integrity score and containing all countries. Model 3 is the U.S. Imports model measuring individual physical integrity rights and including all countries. In addition to Model 3, Model 4 is U.S. Imports model measuring the combined physical integrity score and considering all countries. Model 5 is the total U.S. trade model measuring individual physical integrity rights comprising of all countries. Model 6 is the total U.S. trade model measuring the combined physical integrity score and including all countries. Model 7 through Model 12 exclude Canada from the analysis. Model 7 is the U.S. Exports model

measuring individual physical integrity rights with Canada's exclusion from the analysis. Model 8 is the U.S. Exports model measuring the combined physical integrity score with Canada's exclusion from the analysis. Model 9 is the U.S. Imports model measuring individual physical integrity rights with Canada's exclusion from the analysis. Model 10 is the U.S. Imports model measuring the combined physical integrity score with Canada's exclusion from the analysis. Model 11 is the total U.S. trade model measuring individual physical integrity rights with Canada's exclusion from the analysis. Model 12 is the total U.S. trade model measuring the combined physical integrity score with Canada's exclusion from the analysis. Below is the table summary of the above information concerning each variable and the different variation within each model. Another way to interpret this is that there will be three dependent variables which consist of U.S. export, U.S. import, and total U.S. trade within each dependent variable. There is a set of analysis: one model measures individual physical integrity rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture) and the other model measures the combined score of physical integrity rights represented by the variable (physint). Altogether, there are a total of 12 equations: the first six models (1 through 6) include the entire set of countries in the analysis, also including the dummy variable for Canada. The second six models (7 through 12) exclude the country of Canada in the regression analysis and the dummy variable for Canada. Therefore, another way of putting it is that Model 7 through Model 12 exclude Canada from the analysis as a means of comparison and measure Canada's effect on other independent variables. It also analyzes possible implications that Canada has on U.S. bilateral trade.

Table.3 Table Summary of Each Model		
Part One Analysis:	Entire country analysis	
Dependent Variable	Model	Human Rights
U.S. Exports	Model 1	Individual physical integrity rights (disappearance, kill,

		polpris, and torture)
U.S. Exports	Model 2	Physint (combine physical integrity rights score)
U.S. Imports	Model 3	Individual physical integrity rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture)
U.S. Imports	Model 4	Physint (combine physical integrity rights score)
Total U.S. Trade	Model 5	Individual physical integrity rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture)
Total U.S. Trade	Model 6	Physint (combine physical integrity rights score)
Part Two Analysis:	Canada's exclusion from analysis	
U.S. Exports	Model 7	Individual physical integrity rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture)
U.S. Exports	Model 8	Physint (combine physical integrity rights score)
U.S. Imports	Model 9	Individual physical integrity rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture)
U.S. Imports	Model 10	Physint (combine physical integrity rights score)
Total U.S. Trade	Model 11	Individual physical integrity rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture)
Total U.S. Trade	Model 12	Physint (combine physical integrity rights score)

For the physical integrity rights, each set of analyses contains one model that measures individual physical integrity rights and the other model examines the combined physical integrity rights score. There is a multicollinearity problem that exists if I run the combined score together with the individual physical integrity rights. Multicollinearity exists when a change in one "explanatory variable" affects how other explanatory variables behave (Studenmund 246, 248). If I run the variable physint, which is the combined physical integrity right score, together with the individual physical integrity rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, torture), STATA automatically drops one of the individual physical integrity rights variables. In order to solve the

multicollinearity problem, for each set of analyses I include one model measuring individual physical integrity rights. Furthermore, I include another model to see the combined score measured by the variable *physint*. It makes sense to perform two sets of analyses because the variable *physint* is the combined score of the four individual physical integrity rights.

When I graphed the three dependent variables along with individual independent variables, a common trend was exposed: there is a unifying message that Canada, China, and Mexico are major U.S. trading partners and have major influences on U.S. trade. Canada, China, and Mexico are considered outliers and can skew the standard deviation toward one side, which can affect Beta coefficients in the regression equations. If the regression equations were run without considering the three biggest players in U.S. trade, the results would have been biased and would not have captured the entire picture. In order to control the effect of Canada, China, and Mexico in the regression analysis, dummy variables were created for the three countries. Studenmund stated that "a dummy variable takes the values of one or zero depending on whether a specified condition holds" (Studenmund 69). In this case, Canada, China, and Mexico are given the value of 1, while other countries are given a value of 0. Dummy variables allow us to control the time and panel effect for Canada, China, and Mexico. These countries were visible throughout each graph plotted. When including the dummy variable for these three countries, the R-squared and adjusted R-square increased, and the coefficients and the t-value of the dummy variable of Mexico and China became significant. However, there was an issue when running the dummy variable of Canada, China, and Mexico in the regression analysis. The dummy variable Canada continued to drop out of the analysis, and it turned out that there was no data available for Canada for the Debt and U.S. Aid variable. Substitute data had to be procured for these two variables in order to allow Canada's dummy variable run in the regression analysis.

The United States, Canada, Australia, and mainly developed western European countries are part of a panel of countries known as the "22-Development Assistance Committee (DAC)." Their task is to provide foreign aid to developing countries with the intent to "[reduce] poverty and [promote] economic development" (Younas 661-662). There was no data available for Canada for the sum of debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US\$), and Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US\$), which affected the regression analysis. In addition, there was also no data available for the Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US\$) for Canada which influences the results. This suggests that the entire country models show identical results to the models that excluded Canada from the analysis.

There are possible reasons why there is no data for the sum of debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US\$), and Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US\$), and the U.S. Aid variable for Canada. A possible reason is that Canada did not have total debt service on external debt and multilateral debt service owed to a multilateral agency like the World Bank. It is important to keep in mind that these figures were reported and obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). Canada is a DAC member, so they do not necessarily need to receive U.S. aid to fight poverty or assistance in economic development. In order to solve this problem, substitute data was located to replace the missing data for Debt and U.S. Aid. Canada's missing data for Debt variable was replaced by using figures provided from the <http://www.tradingeconomics.com>, and the substitute for Canada's general government net debt was obtained from (<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/canada/general-government-net-debt-imf-data.html>). The definition of net debt in the passage below is taken from the website:

Net debt is calculated as gross debt minus financial assets corresponding to debt instruments. These financial assets are: monetary gold and SDRs; currency and deposits; debt securities; loans; insurance; pension; and standardized guarantee schemes; and other accounts receivable

<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/canada/general-government-net-debt-imf-data.html>).

The net debt figures were provided in Canadian currency measured in billion units, which was adjusted to U.S. dollars. It must be taken into consideration the fluctuation in currency and changes in time because the value of currency changes daily. In order to adjust for the fluctuation in currency, I have to find the real interest rate provided by the Federal Reserve in order to convert Canadian currency to U.S. dollars taking into consideration the changes in time. Real interest rate is provided on a quarterly basis by the Federal Reserve. I used the last quarter (quarter four) of every year with the exception of Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 because latest figures were reported in the third quarter of that year. I multiplied real interest rate with Canada's net debt in order to obtain the Debt figures. I inputted these figures into the sum of debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US\$) and Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US\$) for Canada. From both of these sources, data was available from 1980 to 2009, so I replaced the missing data with information obtained through Federal Reserve's Industry Specific Exchange Rates and www.tradingeconomics.com. The exchange rates used by the Federal Reserve were gained through the U.S. International Trade Commission (<http://www.usitc.gov/>) and Feenstra's Trade Database (<http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzfeens/>). In formulating a solution for the Net DAC donor flows, the United States (current US\$) variable, information about whether or not Canada has received any type of U.S. economic assistance was researched. The U.S. provides aid mainly in terms of defense and military matters, which is found under program names such as "Department of Defense Security Assistance" program, "Inactive Programs," and "Other Active Grant Programs" (<http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/>). The sum of the three programs was used to obtain figures to replace the missing data in the Net DAC donor flows variable. There was no data available from FY 1980 to 1998, so zero was put in place of the

missing data. This decision was made because other countries were reported as zero in the World Bank WDI. Data was available for FY 1999 to FY 2008, so I input these values into the dataset to obtain data for Net DAC donor flows variable.

Results

Independent Variables	Concepts	Models	
		1	2
Democracy	Regime Type	27.200 (38.840)	22.398 (34.400)
ln(Population)	Market Size	257.268* (106.602)	282.193** (106.594)
Expectancy	Social Conditions	-102.502* (44.672)	-107.954* (48.498)
GDP	Market Size / Economic Growth	1.739** (.612)	1.755** (.627)
U.S. Aid	Economic Development	1.81e-06* (7.27e-07)	1.78e-06* (7.03e-07)
Debt	Economic Development	1.52e-07*** (1.97e-08)	1.52e-07*** (1.99e-08)
FDI	Economic Development	105.270* (50.574)	105.250* (49.116)
Physint	Physical Integrity Rights		-327.099** (105.806)
Disappearance	Physical Integrity Rights	132.133 (273.443)	
Kill	Physical Integrity Rights	-757.442 (431.947)	
Polpris	Physical Integrity Rights	-505.01* (255.468)	
Torture	Physical Integrity Rights	-19.602 (323.359)	
China		14581.67** (4954.028)	14617.54** (4948.242)
Mexico		57453.75*** (8150.459)	57319.52*** (8143.497)
Canada		12183.87 (8183.875)	12049.75 (8149.571)
Constant		883.290 (2233.599)	1053.4 (2290.631)
Number of observations		1241	1241
F-Statistics		63.21	78.73
R-squared		0.8525	0.8523

The dependent variable is the U.S. Exports to a country measures in millions of dollars. Cell value is slope coefficient and robust standard error, which are reported in parentheses (); all estimates rounded to three significant figures in the thousandths. Significant when * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Analysis covers from 1981-2007. Model 1 measures individual human rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture), while Model 2 uses the total score for the physical integrity rights measures by the physint variable in bold.

Table.5 U.S. Imports with Entire Model, 1981-2007			
Independent Variables	Concepts	Models	
		3	4
Democracy	Regime Type	20.659 (61.123)	37.883 (49.210)
ln(Population)	Market Size	676.788** (194.794)	687.997** (200.941)
Expectancy	Social Conditions	-152.969* (62.614)	-169.067* (66.615)
GDP	Market Size / Economic Growth	2.873** (.839)	2.934** (.859)
U.S. Aid	Economic Development	2.19e-06 (1.34e-06)	2.10e-06 (1.32e-06)
Debt	Economic Development	1.85e-07*** (2.74e-08)	1.85e-07*** (2.75e-08)
FDI	Economic Development	193.733** (73.982)	190.661** (71.310)
Physint	Physical Integrity Rights		-850.7276*** (216.509)
Disappearance	Physical Integrity Rights	-539.421 (765.978)	
Kill	Physical Integrity Rights	-1688.787* (754.774)	
Polpris	Physical Integrity Rights	-690.808 (489.035)	
Torture	Physical Integrity Rights	-149.583 (563.964)	
China		85923.97** (31438.12)	86181.09** (31486.49)
Mexico		72295.94*** (12672.7)	72144.74*** (12640.02)
Canada		5343.494 (10484.55)	4853.468 (10429.29)
Constant		-1570.306 (3936.446)	-769.436 (4048.079)
Number of observations		1238	1238
F-Statistics		43.27	53.29
R-squared		0.7426	0.7422
<p>The dependent variable is the U.S. Imports to a country measures in millions of dollars. Cell value is slope coefficient and robust standard error, which are reported in parentheses (); all estimates rounded to three significant figures in the thousandths. Significant when * p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Analysis covers from 1981-2007. Model 3 measures individual human rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture) while Model 4 uses the total score for the physical integrity rights measures by the physint variable in bold.</p>			

Independent Variables	Concepts	Models	
		5	6
Democracy	Regime Type	44.975 (98.470)	57.995 (83.060)
ln(Population)	Market Size	930.521** (290.182)	966.287** (294.781)
Expectancy	Social Conditions	-254.621* (106.272)	-276.293* (114.318)
GDP	Market Size / Economic Growth	4.607** (1.445)	4.685** (1.479)
U.S. Aid	Economic Development	4.00e-06* (1.96e-06)	3.88e-06* (1.91e-06)
Debt	Economic Development	3.37e-07*** (4.67e-08)	3.37e-07*** (4.69e-08)
FDI	Economic Development	298.068* (123.144)	294.893* (119.090)
Physint	Physical Integrity Rights		-1174.015*** (308.329)
Disappearance	Physical Integrity Rights	-410.973 (988.071)	
Kill	Physical Integrity Rights	-2450.464* (1151.945)	
Polpris	Physical Integrity Rights	-1176.766 (722.256)	
Torture	Physical Integrity Rights	-163.818 (861.120)	
China		100492.9** (36286.84)	100786.2** (36330.14)
Mexico		129769.3*** (20745)	129485*** (20704.83)
Canada		17586.38 (18296.39)	16954.33 (18202.59)
Constant		-669.958 (5991.63)	308.49 (6149.93)
Number of observations		1241	1241
F-Statistics		51.48	63.68
R-squared		0.7994	0.7991
<p>The dependent variable is the total U.S. trade measures in millions of dollars. Cell value is slope coefficient and robust standard error, which are in parentheses (); all estimates rounded to three significant figures in the thousandths. Significant when * p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Analysis covers from 1981-2007. Model 5 measures individual human rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture) while Model 6 uses the total score for the physical integrity rights measures by the physint variable in bold.</p>			

Independent Variables	Concepts	Models	
		7	8
Democracy	Regime Type	80.839*** (22.188)	64.350*** (14.459)
ln(Population)	Market Size	-578.433** (198.299)	-570.561** (192.373)
Expectancy	Social Conditions	-9.226 (9.654)	-3.422 (6.744)
GDP	Market Size / Economic Growth	-.106 (.116)	-.127 (.118)
U.S. Aid	Economic Development	1.75e-06** (6.47e-07)	1.76e-06** (6.62e-07)
Debt	Economic Development	5.24e-07*** (9.33e-08)	5.21e-07*** (9.24e-08)
FDI	Economic Development	-2.029 (9.112)	-3.653 (8.521)
Physint	Physical Integrity Rights		-94.722 (57.046)
Disappearance	Physical Integrity Rights	-120.491 (232.419)	
Kill	Physical Integrity Rights	149.575 (234.522)	
Polpris	Physical Integrity Rights	-364.638 (238.037)	
Torture	Physical Integrity Rights	-116.749 (139.990)	
China		11954.48** (4281.882)	11872.59** (4276.134)
Mexico		53656.45*** (7394.766)	53746.27*** (7411.096)
Canada			
Constant		9944.75** (3440.604)	9482.644** (3261.732)
Number of observations		1215	1215
F-Statistics		32.81	38.54
R-squared		0.8000	0.7996
<p>The dependent variable is the U.S. Exports to a country measures in millions of dollars. Cell value is slope coefficient and robust standard error, which are reported in parentheses (); all estimates rounded to three significant figures in the thousandths. Significant when * p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Analysis covers from 1981-2007. Model 7 measures individual human rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture), while Model 8 uses the total score for the physical integrity rights measures by the physint variable in bold.</p>			

Independent Variables	Concepts	Models	
		9	10
Democracy	Regime Type	85.305 (44.172)	77.381** (27.302)
ln(Population)	Market Size	-1134.768* (470.177)	-1156.021* (471.231)
Expectancy	Social Conditions	-28.160 (21.945)	-26.197 (17.529)
GDP	Market Size / Economic Growth	-.102 (.244)	-.102 (.244)
U.S. Aid	Economic Development	2.89e-06* (1.43e-06)	2.86e-06* (1.43e-06)
Debt	Economic Development	9.94e-07*** (2.11e-07)	9.92e-07*** (2.11e-07)
FDI	Economic Development	22.974 (22.349)	14.890 (20.408)
Physint	Physical Integrity Rights		-478.023** (162.164)
Disappearance	Physical Integrity Rights	-921.638 (726.744)	
Kill	Physical Integrity Rights	-261.661 (533.532)	
Polpris	Physical Integrity Rights	-583.735 (505.145)	
Torture	Physical Integrity Rights	-156.714 (365.749)	
China		80789.96** (29203.51)	80839.39** (29234.2)
Mexico		60621.75*** (11572.38)	60747.97*** (11606.21)
Canada			
Constant		21604.52** (8073.033)	21460.32** (7943.679)
Number of observations		1212	1212
F-Statistics		22.26	26.42
R-squared		0.6261	0.6259
<p>The dependent variable is the U.S. Imports to a country measures in millions of dollars. Cell value is slope coefficient and robust standard error, which are reported in parentheses (); all estimates rounded to three significant figures in the thousandths. Significant when * p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Analysis covers from 1981-2007. Model 9 measures individual human rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture), while Model 10 uses the total score for the physical integrity rights measures by the physint variable in bold.</p>			

Independent Variables	Concepts	Models	
		11	12
Democracy	Regime Type	165.210* (63.969)	140.999*** (40.006)
ln(Population)	Market Size	-1708.407** (638.073)	-1722.211** (631.968)
Expectancy	Social Conditions	-36.793 (29.956)	-29.156 (22.601)
GDP	Market Size / Economic Growth	-.209 (.348)	-.230 (.349)
U.S. Aid	Economic Development	4.63e-06* (1.96e-06)	4.62e-06* (1.96e-06)
Debt	Economic Development	1.52e-06*** (2.95e-07)	1.51e-06*** (2.94e-07)
FDI	Economic Development	20.854 (29.908)	11.167 (27.556)
Physint	Physical Integrity Rights		-570.544** (206.900)
Disappearance	Physical Integrity Rights	-1035.302 (910.577)	
Kill	Physical Integrity Rights	-115.799 (733.700)	
Polpris	Physical Integrity Rights	-943.674 (724.958)	
Torture	Physical Integrity Rights	-269.805 (475.868)	
China		92717.42** (33252.57)	92687.66** (33279.2)
Mexico		114285.9*** (18703.86)	114499*** (18752.94)
Canada			
Constant		31428.68** (10998.99)	30840.21** (10683.84)
Number of observations		1215	1215
F-Statistics		27.28	31.96
R-squared		0.7021	0.7018
<p>The dependent variable is the total U.S. trade measures in millions of dollars. Cell value is slope coefficient and robust standard errors, which are in parentheses (); all estimates rounded to three significant figures in the thousandths. Significant when * p < .05; ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Analysis covers from 1981-2007. Model 11 measures individual human rights (disappearance, kill, polpris, and torture), while Model 12 uses the total score for the physical integrity rights measures by the physint variable in bold.</p>			

Findings/Interpretations

The analysis was begun with two parts: part one contained models that included Canada and all of the countries in the analysis, and part two contained models that excluded Canada from the analysis. Within each set of analyses, one model measured the individual physical integrity rights and the other model measured the variable called physint, which is the combined physical integrity rights score. The results from the tables above provide some startling answers and insights into the manner in which U.S. trade was affected by human rights when taking into consideration social, economic, and political circumstances.

There were four variables that were significant in all 12 models: the sum of debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US\$), and Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US\$) represented by the Debt variable, Population, and the dummy variable for China and Mexico. The sum of debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US\$), and Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US\$) was greatly significant with the t-value hovering at a range from 4.70 to 7.68. The sum of debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US\$), and Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US\$) was statistically significant below the .001 level for all 12 models. The range of the slope coefficient was between .994 and 1.51 in millions of dollars for U.S. Exports, U.S. Imports, and total U.S. trade models that included and excluded Canada from the analysis. The results from each model are as follows: Model 12 suggests that a one-unit change in Debt leads to an increase of 1.51 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model when excluding Canada from the analysis. Model 9 shows that a one-unit change in Debt leads to an increase of .994 in millions of dollars of the total U.S. trade model when excluding Canada from the analysis. Models 1 and 2 demonstrate that a one-unit change in Debt leads to an increase of .152 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports model including all countries. Model 3

and Model 4 imply that a one-unit change in Debt leads to an increase of .185 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model including all countries. Models 5 and 6 indicate that a one-unit change in Debt leads to an increase of .337 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model including all countries. Models 7 and 8 reveal that a one-unit change in Debt leads to an increase of .521 to .524 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports when excluding Canada. Models 9 and 10 signify that a one-unit change in Debt leads to an increase of .992 to .994 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model when excluding Canada. Lastly, models 11 and 12 suggest that a one-unit change in Debt leads to an increase of 1.51 to 1.52 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model when excluding Canada. These numbers suggest that the more debt a country has, the more the U.S. is willing to engage in trade. However, these Debt results have a minute impact on U.S. trade despite the fact that they are statistically significant at the .001 level.

The sum of debt service on external debt, total (TDS, current US\$), and Multilateral Debt Service (TDS, current US\$) contains a positive coefficient sign, which suggests that the U.S. is willing to trade more with countries that are in debt. Countries that are indebted to the U.S. are dependent and rely on U.S. trade to support their society and economy. Wheat and grains are agricultural products, an example of a trade product that the U.S. supplies to other countries to support their economy and society. In developing areas such as Africa, there is a dependency on U.S. agricultural products to relieve problems like hunger and famine caused from an inability to produce crops due to infertile land.

The logged variable, total population, provides fascinating and interesting results. Models that include Canada in the analysis have positive sign coefficients, while models that exclude Canada from the analysis contain negative sign coefficients. These coefficient sign changes indicate that any inference drawn from these results must be carefully examined. Another

interesting observation was the drop in t-value when the coefficient sign turns from positive, when including Canada in the analysis, to negative when it is removed, particularly in the cases of the U.S. Imports and the total U.S. trade. However, the U.S. Export model provides contrary implications because the positive coefficient sign with Canada's inclusion has a lower t-value compared to the negative coefficient sign without Canada. Models that include Canada appear to have much lower coefficient values and robust standard errors than those that exclude Canada, which have higher coefficient values and robust standard errors. A possibility for the difference could be a lack of control for countries with big populations, such as India, and their enormous populations which could be considered as outliers for population. Another explanation for these coefficient sign changes, lower coefficient value, and lower standard errors could be the possibility that Canada is the driving force for these changes.

The statistical significance for the total population varies only slightly for models 1 through 6, which each contain the entire set of countries. The statistical significance of models 2 through 6 is at the .01 level, while Model 1 is fairly close at the .05 level. Models 1 and 2 suggest that a one-unit change in total population leads to an increase of 257.268 to 282.193 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports model including all countries. Models 3 and 4 imply that a one-unit change in total population leads to an increase of 676.788 to 687.997 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model including all countries. Models 5 and 6 indicate that a one-unit change in total population leads to an increase of 930.521 to 966.287 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model including all countries.

Models 7 through 12, which exclude Canada from the analysis, are all statistically significant. Model 7 and Model 8 with the U.S. Exports model, and Model 11 and Model 12 with the total U.S. trade model, are statistically significant at the .01 level, while the U.S. Imports

model for Model 9 and Model 10 are statistically significant at the .05 level for total population, and come fairly close to becoming significant at the .01 level. Models 7 and 8 suggest that a one-unit change in total population leads to a decrease of -578.433 to -570.561 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports model by excluding Canada. Models 9 and 10 reveal that a one-unit change in total population leads to a decrease of -1134.768 to -1156.021 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model by excluding Canada. Models 11 and 12 indicate that a one-unit change in total population leads to a decrease of -1708.407 to -1722.211 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model by excluding Canada. Scholars who analyze governmental repression on human rights violation hypothesize that with a bigger population there might be a greater propensity to violate human rights (Hafner-Burton, 2005a, 617; Poe, Tate, and Keith 294). Furthermore, other scholars contend that population has a negative association with trade because "countries with large populations have larger internal markets and may thus be less reliant on external trade (Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny, 2004)" (Blanton & Blanton 105).

The dummy variable for Mexico and China are statistically significant for all 12 models, though Mexico appears to contain a higher t-value and has a greater significance than China. The dummy variable Mexico is statistically significant at the .001 level for all 12 models, while the dummy variable China is statistically significant at the .01 level for all 12 models. However, the dummy variable Canada is not significant for all the 12 models, which is quite surprising because Canada is a large U.S. trading partner, so one would expect the Canada dummy variable to be significant. A possible explanation could be that Mexico has a geographical advantage and is within close proximity of the United States. When it comes to the matter of trade, the U.S. benefits with trading partners that are in close proximity because it is easier to transport millions of goods from Mexico to the U.S. and vice versa. When compared to China, however, goods

must be shipped with large boats carrying large containers. Thus, it is not surprising that Mexico benefits more when it comes to distance and transportation of goods.

The Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US\$), which was represented by U.S. Aid variable, is statistically significant for U.S. export and total U.S. trade models including all countries models and excluding Canada. It is also statistically significant when Canada is excluded from the analysis in Model 9 and Model 10 for the U.S. Imports model. However, it is statistically insignificant for the U.S. Imports models that included all the countries, which are Model 3 and Model 4. Model 9 and Model 10 are significant because of Canada's exclusion from the analysis. It should be noted that only when control for robustness in the Net DAC donor flows is the United States (current US\$) statistically significant. With controls for robustness, the coefficients essentially remain the same as in the regular regression models; the only difference is that the standard error is adjusted in the regression analysis.

For models with all countries (Model 1 through Model 6), Model 1 and Model 2 of the U.S. Exports model and Model 5 and Model 6 of the total U.S. trade are statistically significant at the .05 level, while the U.S. Imports model for Model 3 and Model 4 are statistically insignificant at the .05 level for the Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US\$). Models 1 and 2 imply that a one-unit change in U.S. Aid leads to an increase of 1.78 to 1.81 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports model including all countries. Models 5 and 6 indicate that a one-unit change in U.S. Aid leads to an increase of 3.88 to 4.00 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model including all countries.

Models 7 through 12, which exclude Canada from the analysis, are all statistically significant for the Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US\$). Model 7 and Model 8 of the U.S. Exports model were statistically significant at the .01 level, while the U.S. Imports

model for Models 9 through 12 of the total U.S. trade model are statistically significant at the .05 level for Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US\$). Models 9 and 10 come fairly close to being significant at the .01 level for the total U.S. trade. Models 7 and 8 suggest that a one-unit change in U.S. Aid leads to an increase of 1.75 to 1.76 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports model by excluding Canada. Models 9 and 10 imply that a one-unit change in U.S. Aid lead to an increase of 2.86 to 2.89 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model by excluding Canada. Models 9 and Model 10 show that a one-unit change in U.S. Aid leads to an increase of 4.62 to 4.63 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model by excluding Canada.

The results indicate that the more U.S. aid a country receives, the more the U.S. is willing to trade with a country, particularly when it came to U.S. export and total U.S. trade. Younas suggests that developed nations such as the U.S. have extensive amount of capital goods that developing countries need in order to assist in the development process (Younas 661-674). It should also be noted that aid from the U.S. and other developed nations have a “conditionality” that forces developing nations to obtained goods only from a country that is providing goods and services. A clear example illustrating conditionality can be seen in the purchase of U.S. products from U.S. companies instead of using the funds to create local jobs for that country. If a developing nation were able to obtain aid from the U.S., foreign aid contains stipulations that only allow that country to buy U.S. products from U.S. companies and businesses. This conditionality may be wasteful and can cause inefficiency, as it forces a country to build a project that they might not necessarily need. However, in order to obtain the aid a country must meet certain conditions, such as only using the funds to build a well to access drinking water for local residents. The Net DAC donor flows, United States (current US\$) is statistically insignificant for Model 3 and Model 4 of the U.S. Imports model including all countries. A

reason for this may be that developing countries in need of aid may have relatively little to offer the U.S. It could also be that the U.S. does not need imports from most developing nations. On the contrary, these developing nations require U.S. assistance.

A possible explanation could be that developing countries such as Mexico, Belize, Honduras, and other third world nations that need U.S. aid also rely heavily on U.S. export and trade to sustain economic development. Donors like the U.S. have certain objectives for providing aid. Younas looks at bilateral aid allocation (bilateral real aid capita) to explore possible motives that donors have in aid allocation, such as using foreign aid as a tool to gain better trade advantages by exporting capital goods to countries that need aid (Younas 662). Countries requiring aid usually need capital goods to grow, and often developed nations have a surplus of capital goods and thus can inject capital into these developing nations. There are strategic motives involved here because developed nations obtain many benefits for providing aid to developing nations. It can be viewed as a good gesture and can provide a positive image to developed countries that provide aid. At the same time, developing countries that require aid are dependent and rely upon DAC donors like the United States. This dependency provides an opportunity for the U.S. to inject capital goods and make a profit. Sometimes this aid is intended to be used for a good purpose, but there are unintended consequences with adverse effects, as has been discussed. The use of foreign aid can be beneficial and/or detrimental depending on the manner in which it is being used.

In Models 1 through 6, which include Canada in the analysis, these variables are statistically significant: the variable Expectancy is represented by the total life expectancy; GDP, which stands for the GDP per capita in constant U.S. dollars (2000); and FDI denoted by the Foreign Direct Investment, Net inflows (% of GDP). It is interesting to note that when Canada is

excluded from the analysis all three variables become statistically insignificant for Models 7 through 12. All three variables were found to be statistically significant for the U.S. Export model, the U.S. Import model, and the total U.S. trade model (from Models 1 through 6 when Canada is included in the analysis). A possible reason why the total life expectancy, the GDP per capita, and FDI (% of GDP) are statistically insignificant is because Canada is the driving force that compels the result to be insignificant.

The GDP per capita is found to be statistically significant at the .01 level for Models 1 through 6, which includes all countries in the analysis. The result is fairly consistent and the relationship between the GDP per capita and U.S. trade is significant. Models 1 and 2 suggest that a one-unit change in GDP leads to an increase of 1.739 to 1.755 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports model including all countries. Models 3 and 4 imply that a one-unit change in GDP leads to an increase of 2.873 to 2.934 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model including all countries. Models 5 and 6 indicate that a one-unit change in GDP leads to an increase of 4.607 to 4.685 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model including all countries.

The total life expectancy is found to be statistically significant at the .05 level for Models 1 through 6 including all countries in the analysis. It is interesting to note that the total life expectancy is almost statistically significant at the .01 level for Models 3 through 6. Models 1 and 2 suggest that a one-unit change in total life expectancy leads to a decrease of 102.502 to 107.954 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports model including all countries. Models 3 and 4 indicate that a one-unit change in total life expectancy leads to a decrease of 152.969 to 169.067 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model including all countries. Models 5 and 6 imply that a one-unit change in total life expectancy leads to a decrease of 254.621 to 276.293 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model including all countries.

The Foreign Direct Investment, Net inflows (% of GDP) is found to be statistically significant for Models 3 and 4 of the U.S. Imports model at the .01 level. Models 1 and 2 of the U.S. Exports and Models 5 and 6 of the total U.S. trade are statistically significant at the .05 level. Models 1 through 6 include all countries in the analysis. Models 1 and 2 suggest that a one-unit change in FDI net inflows leads to an increase of 105.250 to 105.270 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports model including all countries. Models 3 and 4 imply that a one-unit change in FDI net inflows leads to an increase of 190.661 to 193.733 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model including all countries. Models 5 and 6 indicate that a one-unit change in FDI net inflows leads to an increase of 294.893 to 298.068 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model including all countries.

The results indicate a country's social conditions affect U.S. trade. This suggests that there are consistencies in the models. I was somewhat surprised by the result for the total life expectancy, because I expected it to have a positive association with trade. I was anticipating that social indicators such as the total life expectancy, school enrollment, and the infant mortality rates have a positive association with trade. The more a country engages in bilateral trade, the more likely these social indicators will increase in promoting better human rights conditions. The U.S. is more likely to engage in trade with countries that have a low life expectancy record, as revealed by the results. Models 2, 4, and 6 suggest that a country with horrible life expectancy track record tends to also have an awful human rights record as well. Countries that have low total life expectancy and poor human rights records tend to have an unattractive and unappealing trade environment for the United States. Trade relations are dependent upon how stable a country is socially. If a country engages in external and internal conflict, it does not benefit the U.S. to engage with a trade partner that participates in these activities. Bilateral trade flows might be

affected because conflict requires extensive resources which divert precious resources from trade. Bilateral trade flows can be disrupted and detrimental to the U.S. interests especially when countries have horrible human rights records and low life expectancy.

Another inference about the relationship between total life expectancy and U.S. trade is that the U.S. engages in trade with countries that have terrible life expectancy, particularly for strategic reasons. The U.S. was willing to engage in trade with countries despite what the life expectancy record indicated. This suggests that some of the U.S. trading partners have natural resources like petroleum, which is considered a vital asset that the U.S. does not necessarily have. Countries with total low expectancy such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and other African states have natural resources that the U.S. requires. Therefore, trading with these countries benefits the United States despite what the terrible life expectancy record might reveal.

On the other hand, the GDP per capita and FDI are found to be positively associated with U.S. trade and concur with expectations for coefficient signs. Countries that engage in trade should be active participants in the global system and, as such, should have higher human rights practices. Countries that have a higher level of GDP per capita and an increase in FDI should have better human rights practices. Blanton and Blanton use logged GDP and population as a measurement for their “market size” concept and propose that “market size will positively influence trade, as larger countries conduct more cross-border transactions” (Blanton & Blanton 105). However, they also note that population would be detrimental to trade, especially countries with large population base (Blanton & Blanton 105). This explanation is plausible because countries with fairly large population bases tend to trade significantly with the U.S., countries such as China, Mexico, India, Russia, Japan, or South Korea. An inference that could be drawn

could be that the U.S. has an interest in trading with countries that are doing well economically. It also provides a favorable trade environment for the U.S. to conduct business. Bilateral trade relations are dependent upon a country's commitment to economic growth and development. This demonstrates that a country could be a reliable partner and improving bilateral trade relations could benefit both countries in the long term. I think that GDP per capita could become more statistically significant if I use the log function to measure GDP. Blanton & Blanton uses logged GDP as a measurement for their market size and their results indicate that logged GDP is statistically significant at the 1% level (Blanton & Blanton 105, 109).

Similar arguments about GDP can be made for FDI because the results suggest that the U.S. is more likely to engage in trade with countries that use FDI. The GDP per capita is considered a prerequisite for a country's economic condition. Countries that are growing require investment to help their economy develop. Countries that use FDI provide an attractive business environment and demonstrate a potential for economic growth and development. A country that is performing well economically shows that it can be a reliable partner and that the U.S. can benefit through trade. Investment can be risky and developed nations can expect some type of gain in return for their investment from developing nations. Therefore, a country that has the potential to grow demonstrates that it deserves the investment. Countries that desire FDI want to be active participants in the global system and such participation requires the adoption of international norms, such as promoting better human rights practices. Countries that have investment interest would prefer a politically and economically stable nation to do business. FDI net inflows can be a determinant of U.S. trade just like the GDP per capita and the total life expectancy. Maintaining good trade relations requires abundant time commitment so the U.S. wants to make sure that their trade partners are reliable and good business partners.

Political imprisonment was found to be statistically significant for Model 1 of the U.S. Exports model at the .05 level including all countries. Extrajudicial killing is discovered to be statistically significant for Model 3 of the U.S. Imports model, and Model 5 of the total U.S. trade model at the .05 level including all countries. It should be noted that the individual physical integrity rights (disappearance, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killings, and torture) are not statistically significant for Model 7 of the U.S. Exports, Model 9 of the U.S. Imports, and Model 11 of the total U.S. trade, when Canada is excluded from the analysis. Model 1 suggests that a one-unit change in political imprisonment leads to a decrease of 505.01 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports model including all countries. Model 3 implies that a one-unit change in extrajudicial killings leads to a decrease of 1688.787 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model including all countries. Model 5 indicates that a one-unit change in extrajudicial killings leads to a decrease of 2450.464 in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model including all countries.

The variable Physint, which is represented by the combined score of physical integrity rights, is found to be statistically significant at the .05 level for every models that contains the variable Physint, with the exception of Model 8 of the U.S. Exports model by excluding Canada from the analysis. For models including all countries in the analysis (Model 1 through Model 6), Model 2 of the U.S. Exports, Model 4 of the U.S. Imports, and Model 6 of the total U.S. trade is found to be statistically significant at the .05 level for the combined physical integrity rights score. Models 7 through 12 excluded Canada from the analysis. Model 10 of the U.S. Imports and Model 12 of the total U.S. trade are statistically significant at the .05 level, the combined physical integrity rights score. Model 2 suggests that a one-unit change in the combined physical integrity score (Physint) leads to a decrease of 327.099 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports

model including all countries. Model 4 implies that a one-unit change in the combined physical integrity score (Physint) leads to a decrease of 850.7276 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model including all countries. Model 6 shows that a one-unit change in the combined physical integrity score (Physint) leads to a decrease of 1174.015 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model including all countries. Model 10 indicates that a one-unit change in the combined physical integrity score (Physint) leads to a decrease of 478.023 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model by excluding Canada. Model 12 hints that a one-unit change in the combined physical integrity score (Physint) leads to a decrease of 570.544 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model by excluding Canada.

The results indicate that the U.S. is willing to engage in trade with countries even though these countries have a terrible human rights record. Physical integrity rights like political imprisonment are found to be negatively associated with U.S. exports, while extrajudicial killings are discovered to be negatively associated with U.S. import and total U.S. trade. Based on Model 1, an inference that could be made is that the U.S. will export to countries despite their terrible records in political imprisonment. The U.S. is willing to engage in exporting goods to countries despite their terrible political imprisonment records. The result of Model 3 suggests that the U.S. is willing import from countries despite their record on extrajudicial killings. The result of Model 5 provides an interesting implication about overall U.S. trade: the U.S. is willing to trade with countries even though there are poor extrajudicial killings records in these countries that engage in trade with the United States.

As for the combined physical integrity rights score represented by the variable Physint, 5 out of 6 models are statistically significant with the exception the U.S. Exports model (#8). The U.S. Export model (#2) includes all countries and is statistically significant at the .01 level.

While Model 8, the variable Physint, becomes statistically insignificant. This means that dropping Canada from the analysis may be responsible for making the Physint variable statistically insignificant. The interpretation of such results implies that U.S. trade is not dependent upon a country's human rights record. The U.S. is willing to engage in trade with a country despite a country's poor physical integrity rights record. The U.S. is willing to export, import, and trade with a country that commits human rights violations. The results are fairly consistent throughout most of the models that contain the combined physical integrity rights score. Whether it is the analysis of all countries or analyses that excluded Canada, models of the U.S. imports and models of the total U.S. trade are found to be statistically significant. This suggests that overall U.S. trade and U.S. imports is not dependent upon a country's physical integrity rights record. Similar inferences can be drawn from Model 2 of the U.S. Exports that contains all the countries, which implies that the U.S. is willing to export to a country despite a country's poor human rights record. The results provide an important implication: when it comes to trade matters, human rights is not an important determinant of U.S. trade.

One of the main arguments within human rights and trade literature is that democratic nations tend to trade more with their democratic trading partners, compared to autocratic nations trading with other autocratic states. This preference in trade arrangements is partly due to domestic politics pressures that could help the democratic country to benefit from engaging in trade (Mansfield, Milner, & Rosendorff 477–513). For models 7 through 12, which excluded Canada from the analysis, models 7 and 8 of the U.S. Exports and Model 12 of the total U.S. trade contains the Physint variable which is found to be statistically significant at the .001 level. Model 10 of the U.S. Imports contains the Physint variable, which is discovered to be statistically significant at the .01 level for the Democracy variable. Model 11 of the total U.S.

trade contains individual physical integrity rights, established to be statistically significant at the .05 level for the Democracy variable. Model 9 of the U.S. Imports includes individual physical integrity rights coming fairly close to becoming significant at the .05 level. It should be noted that Models 1 through 6 contain all the countries not statistically significant for the Democracy variable, which measures regime type produced by Polity IV project. The significance of the Democracy variable's result could be driven by Canada being excluded from the analysis.

Models 7 and 8 suggest that a one-unit change in polity leads to an increase of 64.350 to 80.839 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Exports model by excluding Canada. Model 10 suggests that a one-unit change in polity leads to an increase of 77.381 in millions of dollars in the U.S. Imports model by excluding Canada. Models 11 and 12 imply that a one-unit change in polity leads to an increase from 140.999 to 165.210 measures in millions of dollars in the total U.S. trade model by excluding Canada. Caution is necessary when making inferences from these results because analyses of all countries are found to be statistically insignificant for Models 1 through 6. However, the results become statistically significant when Canada is excluded, so Canada may be the driving force making this variable statistically significant. The interpretation of such results from Models 7 through 12 implies that the U.S. is willing to engage in trade with countries that are more democratic. This line of reasoning makes sense: when I performed a two-way graph with the three dependent variables for U.S. Exports, U.S. Imports, and the total U.S. trade compared to the independent variables, I then saw a clear picture, which suggests that major U.S. trade partners are western European nations. These countries tend to be traditionally democratic nations and the U.S. trades extensively with allies because these nations share similar political and "institutional constraints." Democratic institutions are more inclined to respect human rights because of "institutional constraints" that depend on building mutual relations that

promote cooperation over conflict (Polacheck 55-78; Pollins 737-761; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 477-513; Apodaca 883-905; Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 143-158; Hafner-Burton, 2005b, 593-629; Cox & Drury 709-722; Blanton & Blanton 100, 108; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36). The regime type, particularly democratic governance, spurs from the "democratic peace theory," which contends that "spreading democracy will make the world peaceful" through the use of economic sanctions as a threat to provide incentives to alter behavior (Cox & Drury 712). This argument suggests that democracy brings peace, and with the help of globalization, brings about political and economic changes through the installment of the democratic system and capitalism. Globalization phenomena force players to take into consideration human rights because active participants of the international system follow international norms. International trade seems to play multiple roles, which are to promote human rights practices and indirectly force other participants to comply with democratic principles (Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 144). Countries that are active participants in the international system must follow norms by forcing regimes to recognize human rights and provide incentives to alter behavior, such as influencing trade practices (Cingranelli & Richards 531; Harrelson-Stephen & Callaway 143-158; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 477-513; Greenhill & Prakash 1-36). However, this study could not find a correlation in the link that democracy influences U.S. trade. I could not find support that democracy plays a role in promoting better human rights practices. Rather, democracy has no influence and is not a determinant of U.S. trade.

Conclusions

The results from Tables 4 through 9 provide some answers to the primary question of this thesis: Does human rights matter when it comes to U.S. trade? Overall, human rights does not play a role in U.S. trade. The results and findings from this research suggest that human rights is

not an important determinant when it comes to U.S. trade. Human rights seems to matter very little when it comes U.S. trade because, as shown, the U.S. is willing to trade with a country despite its poor human rights record and terrible total life expectancy. When it comes to individual physical integrity rights such as disappearance, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killings, and torture, the U.S. is willing to export to a country even though a country might have an awful political imprisonment record. Overall, the U.S. will trade and import from a country regardless of a country's extrajudicial killing record. This exertion can be explained by the fact that Latin American countries with repressive regimes maintained trade relations with the U.S. in the 1980s, which is within the scope of analysis. In the 1980s, Latin American countries experienced internal political issues—political imprisonment was a tool utilized by the government to maintain stability and order by engaging in such behaviors. These findings are fairly consistent with the fact that total life expectancy is also found to be negatively associated with U.S. trade. This explanation can be confirmed and justified by performing a two-way scatter plot graph that shows that the U.S. will trade, export, and import to countries that have appalling life expectancy records. Figures 1-3 in Appendix A show that the U.S. trades with countries like Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and other African nations that are usually anticipated to have a low life expectancy. Nigeria and the DRC are two countries that are plagued by civil and internal war, which plays a role in contributing to the low life expectancy. It should be taken into consideration that AIDS also plays a role in the decline of the population in African countries.

A theme that is often discussed in human rights literature is that democracy tends to play a role in promoting better human rights practices. The result in this research provides contradictory implications. Models that contain all the countries in the analysis are represented

by Models 1 through 6, which are found to be statistically insignificant in the Democracy variable. However, Models that exclude Canada show that democracy does play a role in U.S. trade. But so far, Models that excluded Canada seem to provide fairly consistent results because these Models are statistically significant. There is, of course, the exception of the U.S. import Model (#9), which almost becomes statistically significant at the .05 level. The inclination is that U.S. trade is affected by regime type, so the more democratic a country is, the more the U.S. is willing to engage in trade. But it should be noted that any conclusion drawn might be spurious and should be taken with great caution before any claims are made. Further examination into this matter is needed in order to know with certainty that U.S. trade is affected by democracy.

Trade is also dependent upon a country's commitment to economic growth and developmental process. The GDP per capita and FDI are found to be positively associated with trade, which implies that, as a country is growing economically, it provides a favorable environment for trade and investment. Both the U.S. and its trading partners benefit from such exchanges and build trade relations that provide gains to both sides. With any commitment to economic growth, a country must accrue debt; and the more debt a country has, the more the U.S. is willing to engage in trade. Debt is statistically significant for all 12 Models in the analysis and contains significance level of less than .001. The more debt a country has, the more dependent and reliant that country becomes. The debt is also accompanied by an increase in U.S. aid, so the U.S. provides foreign aid to assist countries in their developmental process. Debt and U.S. Aid were positively associated with U.S. trade. Economic factors and conditions dictate whether the U.S. is more likely to engage with a country in trade.

Younas suggests that developed nations, such as the U.S., have an extensive amount of capital goods that developing countries need in order to assist in the development process

(Younas 661-674). It should also be noted that aid from the U.S. and other developed nations have “conditionality” that forces developing nations to obtain only goods from the country that is providing goods and services. However, this conditionality could be wasteful and cause inefficiency, as it forces a country to build a project that it may not necessarily need. The results from this research suggest that U.S. commitment to human rights has been mostly rhetoric. A good example that supports such a conclusion is the U.S.-Sino relations. The United States makes public comments condemning actions taken by the Chinese government to crack down on Buddhist monks who spoke out against government policies. The United States continues to trade enormous amount of goods with China despite its awful human rights record. The United States’ harsh remarks and criticism on human rights violations are symbolic gestures. These gestures show the public that the U.S. government does take human rights violations seriously. The bold comments made by the United States are certainly not supported by actions that would punish its trading partners for engaging in human rights violations. Sudan is another case of the U.S. outwardly condemning a country while still maintaining trade with them. The United States and other countries in the United Nations voice concerns about the civil war raging in Sudan. The civil war has horrific repercussions for the citizens, such as rape, genocide, and human rights violations. However, the tough rhetoric was backed by the passage of many failing U.N. resolutions that condemn the situation in Sudan, but no military actions were taken to prevent further tragedy. Thus, this shows that the United States relies on diplomacy to address human rights matters.

The implications of this research show that there are strategic motives when it comes to U.S. trade. Human rights violations are a public concern that cannot be ignored and the failure to address human rights issues has political consequences for U.S. leaders. There is an incentive for

U.S. lawmakers and leaders to condemn human rights violations, particularly for political reasons. The U.S. is an important player in international trade, and the U.S. maintains trade relations with every country in the world despite a country's terrible record of human physical integrity rights. It takes an extensive amount of time to build trade relations between the U.S. and other countries. It appears that the U.S. prefers to condemn other countries' human rights violations in speech alone rather than to actually change trade policy. Making actual changes to trade policy could strain bilateral trade relations.

This means that the U.S. must rely on other approaches to handling the issues of human rights. The best approach to deal with human rights issues is through diplomacy and negotiations. It is detrimental to U.S. interests to cease trading with a country based on a country's human right record. The U.S. must be very cautious in the positions that it takes in condemning a country because a nation can view the U.S. as intrusive in other nations' domestic politics. This means that it is very unlikely to expect a proactive government response for human rights protection; intervening in other countries' domestic politics through military actions would put the U.S. in a tough position. Thus, human rights violations are not a factor that influences U.S. trade policy.

Future Roadmap

A common theme in the study of human rights and trade is cooperation and conflict. This is a very important theme in human rights studies, but I did not focus on this topic in my thesis. However, I think further examinations into this matter are important and would yield interesting and fascinating insights linking human rights violations to conflict areas. I believe that it is important for future works to include conflict impact on human rights and such a link is crucial to understanding the complete picture in empirical research.

Since my research is to look at U.S. bilateral trade relations, another focus that would be relevant to this research would be to examine Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Trade contains strategic motives, and RTAs are certainly connected to the argument that democracy plays a role in promoting better human rights practices (Hafner-Burton, 2005b, 593-629). The argument contends that democratic nations tend to enter trade agreements with other democratic countries; therefore, countries that trade with a democratic country tend to contain better human rights practices (Hafner-Burton, 2005b, 593-629). I believe it is important to examine the possibility that RTAs can have an impact on U.S. foreign policy to promote better human rights practices. I also want to examine if the U.S. can impact other countries through the WTO because the WTO establishes the norms and settles disputes over trade matters. I am curious to explore the relationship between the WTO and the promotion of human rights. I think examining these two factors would also provide a complete picture in empirical research.

This research project is relevant to the field of human rights studies. Human rights and trade are not only relevant to academia, but they could further provide policy implications that affect U.S. interactions with other countries. Trade plays a huge role in the world economy, so identifying relevant variables is important to establishing connections on how trade is possibly affected by human rights treatment. This project will contribute to a field that is continuously growing as more empirical research is being done.

Appendix A

Figure 1: U.S. Exports vs. Total life expectancy for FY 2005




Figure 2 shows U.S. export and total life expectancy for FY 2005 four countries that export with the U.S. for less than 10000 (in millions of dollars).

Figure 2: U.S. Imports vs. Total life expectancy for FY 2005




Figure 2 shows U.S. import and total life expectancy for FY 2005 for four countries that import with the U.S. for less than 1000 (in millions of dollars).

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