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Equality Creates Restraint: Examining the Effect of Women’s Political Participation on Internal Conflict across Africa

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in International Affairs, French, and the Honors Program

by

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Abstract:
Africa experiences more intense and deadly internal conflict than any other region in the world (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). One of the structural effects of internal conflict has been an increase in women’s political participation and representation (Hughes 2009; Tripp 2010). I seek to discover what impact this increase in women’s political participation has had on African states engaging in internal conflict. I do this using a robust logistic regression model with time varying covariates across a base model of 29 African nations from 1995 to 2010. I have found that increased women’s political participation does not have an effect on the likelihood of a state engaging in intrastate war, but does have a negative effect on the likelihood of a state using violent force against civilians. These findings are then supplemented by a case-study analysis of other forms of political participation the Republics of Liberia, Rwanda, and Uganda.
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Introduction
Worldwide, the outbreak of all forms of conflict has been on the decline since the end of World War II (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). The literature regarding armed conflict indicates that internal conflict remains the most prevalent form of violence still experienced by countries (Buhaug 2006; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Goldstein 2011; L. Harbom and Wallensteen 2007; Hegre 2006; Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). The research presented in this paper focuses specifically on these experiences within the context of the African continent, which experiences a proclivity to intense internal conflict, in particular intrastate disputes, beyond that of other regions (Elbadawi, Sambanis, and Elbadawi 2000; Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009; Turshen 2001). While the world has experienced the dramatic decrease in the outbreak of conflict since 1990s and the end of the Cold War, most of the intrastate conflicts that have erupted in Africa in the last thirty years are still ongoing (L. Harbom and Wallensteen 2007). States with a recent history of intrastate conflict are at a higher risk of entering into another conflict (Collier 2007). Even when a state has not recently experienced conflict, economically underdeveloped nations still risk falling into armed conflict as a result of their inability to provide basic public services and protection (Azam 1995; Bussmann and Schneider 2007; Collier 2007; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Taydas and Peksen 2012). Paul Collier has described this phenomenon as “the conflict trap (Collier 2007).” In Africa, incidents of intrastate war and armed conflict have been some of the most deadly and violent. To place this into a global context, nearly half of the world’s battle deaths between 1989 and 2009 have occurred in Africa (Lotta Harbom, Havard, and Havard 2009). Violence of this magnitude has resulted in long-term changes to population demographics and structural changes to existing and restructured governments, which has increased the number of women representatives and women’s political organizations and
movements (Hughes 2009; Tripp 2010).

Feminist\(^1\) international relations theorists have explored whether women’s unwillingness to use force coupled with the advancements of women’s access to political processes have constrained states from engaging in interstate militarized disputes (Caprioli 2003; Gold 1974; Hill 2003; Marshall and Ramsey 1999; Tripp 2010). While internal conflict may have been the casual mechanism for increasing women’s political representation in some post-conflict societies, their political empowerment has had a stabilizing effect on peace-building and reconstruction. Using a combination of logistic regression models and case study analysis, this paper examines the effect of the distribution of power to women within decision-making bodies and their political mobilization in grassroots organizations on the state’s use of force in militarized internal conflict. This project’s contribution focuses specifically on the effect that this increased political participation has had on states engaging in these various types of internal conflict: all out intrastate war as defined by the Correlates of War Project (COW), smaller armed conflict scenarios such as the ones captured by the Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset (PRIO), and the use of force by the state against civilians, defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s one-sided violence variable (UCDP).

\(^1\) The term feminist is used throughout this paper in reference to the movement that seeks to establish equality among the sexes and to redefine gender roles in society. Due to the complexity of contemporary feminism and the unfortunate development of exclusionary practices by feminists in developed societies against feminists in developing societies, the distinction is worth making. For further research on this matter, see “Being Lovingly, Knowingly Ignorant: White Feminism and Women of Color” Marina Ortega, Hypatia vol. 21, no. 3 2006
Literature Review:
Understanding the causes and motivations of intrastate conflict has been the primary focus for scholars regarding conflict and peace research. By understanding and directly addressing the causal mechanisms at work underlying internal conflict, it may become possible to prevent the violence from occurring in the first place. Scholars have suggested that levels of economic development (or lack thereof) may be responsible for inciting conflict (Bussmann and Schneider 2007; Ganegodage and Rambaldi 2014; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004), particularly when resources are made scarce (Hendrix and Glaser 2007; Ross 2004; Suliman and Friedensstiftung 1992). The presence of political dissidents or refugees seeking asylum may also fuel political instability or unrest that could spur violence, as has been the case in countries like Chad and Pakistan, where neighboring violence has result in an increase in civil unrest (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Weiner 1997). Increasing focus has been paid in recent literature on the inability of the governments to provide structural security and welfare services resulting in increased levels of internal violence (Azam 1995; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Taydas and Peksen 2012).

Women and Conflict:
This specific role women might have in ending armed conflicts is of particular interest to scholars who are studying Africa considering the historical phenomenon of the sheer number of African nations affected by intrastate war over the last forty years (See Table 1). Admittedly, internal conflict patterns have shifted as many of the longest running civil wars have ended and there has been a significant decrease in the eruption new civil wars (L. Harbom and Wallensteen 2007). In a regional context, scholars have asserted that the continued occurrence of internal conflict stems not from an inability to efficiently suppress rebellions, but rather results from the
habitual failure of governments to provide the expected public services, like health care and education (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Hughes 2009; Taydas and Peksen 2012). As the level of government expenditure on social welfare policies increases, civil conflict decreases (Taydas and Peksen 2012). These types of policies directly affect women, who suffer disproportionately from the lack of these services (Topouzis 1990). The causes of civil conflict vary across economic and political discord, but recent studies have indicated that nations with low levels of female parliamentarians and a disproportionate number of women in the informal economy are more likely to resort to the use of force (Caprioli 2000; Hill 2003; Tripp 2010). The ability of a state to use force to deter violent challenges to the it’s authority has long been a measurement of the capacity of a state to assert its power (Taydas and Peksen 2012). The most recent literature suggests that the state’s use of force does not incite violence itself, but rather the inability of a state to provide the services and protections expected incites violent action (Azam 1995; Levi 2006; Taydas and Peksen 2012). Investment in social welfare can decrease the likelihood of a state engaging in or experiencing internal conflicts (Taydas and Peksen 2012). Studies have also verified women as more likely to support and promote spending for social welfare over military expenditure and investment in military expansion (Beswick 2014; Caprioli 2000; Gold 1974; Northrup 1994; Swers 2013). Additional studies have discovered that nations that do not actively seek full social equity institutionalize militancy and violence, inhibiting development and posing a threat to their own security and stability (Caprioli 2005; Hill 2003; Hudson et al. 2012; Marshall and Ramsey 1999).

Women in Government and Civil Organization

The G8, in a statement released in July of 2001, acknowledged the unique role that women contribute to conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building, calling for the advancement of opportunities for women to provide their alternative perspectives in areas prone to this particular
kind of violence (Hill 2003; Mckay 2004; Ochieng 2012). Research in post conflict societies has found that the ability of the state to maintain peace hinges on the state’s ability to increase economic development and decrease scarcity immediate following the end of a conflict (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Providing basic rights and entitlements to women results in positive effects on economic development (Barro 1991; Byrne 1996; Sen 1999) and the prioritization of female political empowerment reflects a domestic capacity, partly independent of, economic development as per capita income (Caprioli 2003). Generally, in societies where women do better, peace building operations have an increased likelihood of success (Gizelis 2009). In fact, women often organize grassroots campaigns to promote peace before, during, and after conflict (Gizelis 2009; Ochieng 2012).

This is not the only role women have had historically in conflict. Women have, after all, also been soldiers in combat throughout history all around the world. During the Ethiopian civil war of the 1980s, roughly one-third of the rebel fighters were women (Sørensen et al. 2003). This can lead to an empowering sense of identity for women, allowing them to see themselves as contributors to liberation, rather than passive members or causalities (Hughes 2009). In the aftermath of conflict, women may be unwilling to relinquish this newly obtained aspect of their identities. This temporary suspension of gender roles may be just that, temporary. While many women have been combatants in the revolutionary movements of Algeria, China, Nicaragua, Rhodesia, Russia, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and the United States, in every case, women were to return to their previous roles in society and were excluded from the political restructuring of their new governments (Carothers and Reis 2013; Geisler 1995; Goldman 1982; Pauw 1981). So effectively, institutionalized discrimination largely prevents women from participating in politics and in conflict, and can limit any impact their participation may otherwise have if those
institutional barriers were removed. It is the purpose of this study to determine if any such influence has in anyway been pacifying or has in part continued to contribute to the pattern of behavior that follows internal conflict.

Since the passing of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security in October of 2000, many African nations emerging from intrastate conflict have focused on the inclusion of women in their new or restored parliaments as a result of increasing international recognition of the untapped potential preventative capacity of women (Cohn, Kinsella, and Gibbings 2004; Hill 2003; Morna 2004; Tripp 2010). Historically, attention to societal enfranchisement has not been prioritized in the development or reconstruction process, so the trends in Africa over the last twenty years provide a unique opportunity to study women in political positions of power and what effects this may have had in the prevention of cyclical internal conflict (Marshall and Ramsey 1999). Post-conflict societies in Africa now rank amongst the Nordic states in levels of female representation, who have long been cited as the most socially progressive nations regarding the promotion of political gender equality (QuotaProject 20014). The likelihood of success for aspiring female representatives increases when women are not competing against entrenched male incumbents, who have either been killed during the conflict, been imprisoned for their involvement in the conflict, or have lost their seats as a result of a restructuring of the government (Tripp 2003). Much of the research surrounding the impact of the legacy of conflict has focused primarily on the negative backlash women suffer in the immediate aftermath (Mazurana and McKay 2001; Pankhurst 2003; Staub 1996; Tripp 2010; Turshen 2001; Vlachova 2006). Focusing on the opportunities made available to women as a result of internal conflict in no way intends to downplay the physical and psychological trauma experienced by the majority of women and girls during internal conflict.
The evidence presented here merely attempts to reinforce a perspective that looks beyond the victimization of women and provides a more differentiated idea of the dynamics gender plays in post-internal conflict societies.

Countries emerging from these conflict situations have the highest proportion of women in various levels of government (Hughes 2009; Morna 2004; Tripp 2010). This phenomenon is one of the many structural effects of internal conflict. Men are much more likely to die in combat, making women more likely to outnumber men in post-conflict societies (Kang and Tripp 2007; Tripp 2010; Yoon 2001). The Rwandan genocide and the consequential shift in population demographics created space within the existing political infrastructure for women to assert themselves as leaders. If women outnumber men in the pool of possible candidates for elections, the competition for political power may be in their favor (Hughes 2009; Powley 2005; Tripp 2003). Even when accounting for the adoption of electoral institutions favorable to women (i.e. gender quotas), the end of an armed conflict increases women’s legislative presence beyond the expectations of electoral changes alone (Tripp 2010). Figure (1) summarizes the various structural changes internal conflict causes that serve as mechanisms for facilitating women’s political inclusion (see Hughes 2009). Recent research suggests that the resolution of several of these conflicts have had a positive effect on increasing women’s political representation, as their previous exclusion from power may be of a possible benefit to women in post-conflict societies (Ballington and Matland 2004; Hughes 2009; Powley 2005; Tripp 2010; Yoon 2001). During reconstruction, those who were disassociated with the previous regime or who were underrepresented are viewed as less corrupt and as more likely to provide significant change (Hughes 2009). Internal conflict specifically may positively affect women’s political and social emancipation.
At the 489th session in 2004 of the Commission on the Status of Women, the Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs to the United Nations convened to discuss "the enhancement of women’s participation in the electoral processes in post-conflict countries” to assist in understanding the effect of “women’s equal participation in conflict prevention, management and conflict resolution and in post-conflict peace-building (Ballington and Matland 2004).” The exclusionary practices of current political institutions have resulted in the under-representation of women (Hughes, 2009). The most common tools used to facilitate this inclusion into the public sphere have been gender quotas.

The literature on gender quotas has only recently begun to show the influence that these quotas have had on adequately introducing and strengthening women’s political representation and participation (Goulding 2010; Mazurana and McKay 2001; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003; Tripp 2003, 2010). For example, in South Africa where the ruling party was initially reluctant in the adoption of gender quotas, the debate surrounding their inclusion into law resulted in significant changes in the way that men perceived the capabilities of women. As a means of introducing women into the political sphere, gender quotas maybe one of the strongest tools available to post-conflict states and transitioning democratic governments and may serve as a means of measuring gender equality.

Deeper analysis of the extent to which gender quotas are responsible for this increase in female political participation has not yet examined other possible contributing factors to increased women’s participation, such as improved access to education, health, changing cultural perspectives, or economic development. Several countries in Africa included legislated gender
quotas in new constitutions immediately following conflict e.g. Rwanda, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Eritrea (QuotaProject 20014). Other nations have added gender quotas to existing constitutions e.g. Kenya and Lesotho, or electoral law, including legal sanctions for non-compliance e.g. Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia (QuotaProject 20014).

What links gender parity to the political process of a state engaging in internal conflict is the different approach women and men traditionally take on the use of force. Women are widely perceived as more peaceful and cooperative when compared to men and this perception can be used to the advantage of women in parliament to push for cooperative governmental policies (Tripp 2010). The existence of this gender gap is well noted. Virtually all existing studies show that women are less supportive of going to war than men, even when controlling for factors like political partisanship, income, education, political interest, and age (Bloomfield, Allamani, and Beck 2006; Brooks and Valentino 2011; Caprioli 2003; Conover and Sapiro 1993; Eichenberg 2003; McAlister, Bandura, and Owen 2006). This gender gap exists in the use of force as a foreign policy tool where no gap exists regarding foreign policy goals (Brooks and Valentino 2011; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003). Whether this gap exists regarding the use of force as a tool to achieve domestic goals is determined by the statistical models presented in the quantitative chapter.

The actual impact of female parliamentarians is restricted by ‘institutional masculinity,’ wherein women, after having been elected, must learn how to operate within a system created for and by men (Marshall and Ramsey 1999). Established and therefore subsequent legislatures are a product of exclusively male political societies, leading to the embedded male-dominated procedures of parliament. Removing these formal barriers cannot adequately ensure equality for women. Some pseudo-democratic/authoritarian regimes have supported women’s political
inclusion in order to create a larger, more loyal party base (Uganda, Egypt, and South Africa). The “equality of result” which arises from the active application of quotas and support of other forms of female political empowerment might compensate for “institutional masculinity,” at least in so far as they can enter into the political realm (Marshall and Ramsey 1999). Whether or not they can overcome this institutional masculinity in their influence towards policymaking is one of the many aims of this paper. While democratic processes in the African context are still developing and unstable, the transition ought and has included debate and the implementation of gender quotas in the attempt to provide fair and balanced representation (Gizelis 2009).

Democratization has resulted in a decrease in female representation in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and as Yoon has found, in Africa. Yoon’s 2001 findings support the effect gender quotas have had in securing women’s representation where they exist. This transition period offers women’s organizations a unique opportunity to voice concerns and encourage women candidates to stand for election (Karam 1998). In 2002, special campaigns and workshops for the sensitization of gender equality in Lesotho were prepared for the elections. In Burundi and Rwanda, women parliamentarians participated in public debates and campaign rallies with donor support, which offered these women the opportunity to directly address the concerns of their constituents. In conclusion, democratization must be accompanied by these additional measures. The continuation of female representation will undoubtedly change the political institutions in favor of enhanced gender equality. Between 1960 and 2012, the number of women-held seats increased 3300%, where the most significant change occurred in the years between 1990 and 2010, when the rates tripled (Tripp 2010). By 2012, in post-conflict societies the trends were even more pronounced, women made up 27 percent of the national legislative seats, compared to the 13 percent in other countries (Tripp 2010). For a more complete picture of
the use of gender quotas in Africa, see Tables 2 and 3 in the appendix. For a Western context, women in the United States currently compose only 18 per cent of the national legislative seats. Conflict, specifically intrastate conflict, creates a social interruption in gender relations as women adopt traditionally male roles in society to compensate for the males who are or were directly involved in combat (Tripp 2010). Many women become political active as a result of conflict through becoming involved in social movements or forming women’s organizations. Even during conflict, women organize to bring about the end of the ongoing conflict, creating demonstrations and campaigns to lobby for ceasefires and negotiations, building networks to provide care for victims and refugees (Bauer 2009; Hughes 2009). Women who were socially active during South Africa’s anti-apartheid movement later become members of the new government (Hughes 2009). Most notably in recent years, the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a longtime advocate and organizer of grassroots political and social groups, as president of Liberia in 2005 (Bauer 2009).

**Methodology, Measures, and Data**

*Estimation Strategy*

Using a series of three logistic regression models through STATA, I examine the relationship between female political representation and various forms of internal conflict. This equation models the dependent variable directly to produce an estimation of the probability that \( Y = 1 \) and to model the binary conflict variables more appropriately. The advantage to running this model with the binary variables included in my data is that this function guarantees the probability ranges from 0 to 1 as the regression equation predicts values from negative infinity to positive infinity (Hoffmann, 2004 p. 47). This advantage that the logistic regression model provides creates a better estimation for the distribution of my binary variables than a simple linear
The logistic regression model includes time varying covariates and is as follows:

\[
P(Y = 1) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp\left[-(\alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \ldots + \beta_k X_k)\right]}
\]

First, I apply the logistic regression models across a base model of 29 African countries within the timeframe of 1995 to 2010. The restriction of my sample to this fifteen-year period is due in part to the availability of recent data. By restricting my sample size to this particular fifteen-year period, this study includes the most data available for the most recent period of time. Out of the 55\(^2\) recognized states in Africa, I was able to collect the most data for these 29 countries to create a representative sample: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Several of these countries have no recent experiences with the specific types of conflict coded for in this study (Botswana, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, South Africa) but that does not mean that the structural effects of these types of conflicts are not still being experienced, a point explored more in depth within the qualitative aspect of this paper.

Due to the limitations of quantitative analysis for investigating the effect of women’s political participation beyond the number of women elected into office, I augment my discussion of the statistical results with a qualitative investigation of the following republics: Liberia, Rwanda, and Uganda. Each case study examined illustrates a different type of internal conflict and each has adopted different methods of facilitating women’s political representation and political participation. To conclude, I review the role that women have played ending internal

\(^2\) 56 if Somaliland is included.
conflicts, and in the peace and reconciliation process through their participation in political parties, organizations and lobbying groups.

**Dependent Variables**

Internal conflict exists on a continuum from low levels of internal violence to full-scale intrastate war (Caprioli 2005). Therefore, the variability and complexity of internal conflict cannot be adequately captured with the use of a single variable. Internal conflict occurs at varying degrees of intensity, usually measured by length of time of the conflict and the total number of combatant related battle deaths that occur within the outlined period of time. Therefore, where intrastate war captures the violence of situation at total of 1,000 battle deaths (Sarkees 2010), the armed conflict measurement qualifies a conflict with a total of 25 battle deaths (Lotta Harbom, Havard, and Havard 2009). A series of armed local conflicts may then result in an intrastate war when no effective means of preventing the escalation of violence is implemented. Governments have used violence against civilians as a means of preventing this escalation, as was the case in Kosovo or Rwanda (Moller, Melander, and Oberg 2007). These measurements are not mutually exclusive from one another. If intrastate war measures for all out civil war within a nation, the inclusion of internal conflict measurements for smaller forms of violence may result in more specific understanding as to the extent of the impact of women’s political participation.

In the post-9/11 context, internal conflict patterns have shifted. While the UCDP does not categorize any specific type of violence as terrorism, as an organized act of violence an act of terrorism may fall under two of the included datasets: armed conflict and one-sided violence against civilians (Lotta Harbom, Havard, and Havard 2009; Kreutz et al. 2008). The intended target of the attack and the attacker thus determines classification within either of these datasets. For example, on September 11, 2001 three planes crashed in the USA. The two planes that
crashed into the World Trade Center are coded as acts of one-sided violence, as the World Trade Center was not a part of the military or US governmental infrastructure, whereas the third plane that crashed into the Pentagon has been coded as state-based violence as the Pentagon is the center of the US military infrastructure (Lotta Harbom, Havard, and Havard 2009; Kreutz et al. 2008).

State-Based Violence:
In using the armed conflict and one-sided violence measurements, I have more specific and accurate variables that control for violence conducted by the state against non-state entities and civilians. The UCDP’s one-sided violence against civilians variable is defined as “the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths (Kreutz et al. 2008).” Noting that extrajudicial killings in custody have been excluded from this dataset, I have coded the data as a binary variable (1 if the action occurred, 0 if no action occurred and blank if no data is available) only in those cases in which the actor is the government of the state, using the best estimate of fatalities, provided by UCDP. By excluding cases in which the perpetrator is a formally organized group outside the control of the state, I isolate the dependent variable as a measurement for the use of force by only the state. For example, the Janjaweed is coded in the dataset as a formally organized group independent from the state, as Khartoum withdrew its informal support for the actions of the Janjaweed after their 2001 designation as a terrorist group. Prior to this time, the Janjaweed’s actions would have been included in the designation as a state sponsored act of violence against civilians.

Intra-state Conflict:
According to COW, the intrastate war classification focuses specifically on wars fought within either of these three general types: civil wars where the state is acting against a non-state entity,
regional internal wars where a subunit of the government is acting against a non-state entity, or inter-communal wars wherein combat occurs between two or more non-state entities (Sarkees 2010). According to the COW typology: “an intra-state war must meet same definitional requirements of all wars in that the war must involve sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities within a twelve month period (Sarkees 2010).” In contrast, an armed conflict as defined by UCDP and PRIO is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle deaths (Gleditsch et al, 2002).” Where intrastate war measures conflict at the national level, armed conflict measures the effectiveness of a government to maintain control over the state at the local level. Additionally, as there has been a decline in the outbreak of civil wars within the last fifty years (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011), it may be that states are using force more pointedly and sooner in the outbreak of conflict. By including both measurements, I can determine if the independent variables operate differently depending on the extent of the conflict. By disaggregating the various forms of internal conflict, it becomes possible to determine at what level women’s political influence or other explanatory variables may or may not have in specific violent situations.

*Independent Variables of Interest*

**Women’s Political Influence: Percentage of Seats Held**

To measure women’s political influence, I have logged the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments in a single or lower chamber held by women as a percentage (The World Bank 2014). This is the creation of a new variable, which the natural log is generated on the independent variables to avoid skewing the data; this has no impact on the results of the models. Women’s political inclusion has only been taken into serious consideration in Africa within the
last twenty years, since the adoption of the Program of Action at the 1995 World Conference on Women held in Beijing. Prior to this point in time, few countries worldwide had committed themselves through legislation or policy to actively incorporate a female presence within their parliaments and legislative bodies. As this only captures the extent to which women are included into the formal political institutions, it will be necessary to further assess the other various ways women become political engaged through qualitative means. This variable captures political influence only insofar as women work together to achieve common political goals and interests. If women can achieve a critical minority, the effect of their influence becomes measurable. The willingness of states to include quotas into the constitution or electoral law may indicate an increase in the prioritization of women’s political representation and participation.

All three variables for internal conflict have been coded to reflect internal conflicts that occur between governments and armed combatants vying for control or between governments and civilians. Using the variable of women’s proportional representation in national parliaments measures the extent of their political influence within these governments and thus over the internal conflicts their respective governments are engaged in.

**Hypothesis:** The increase in women’s political representation in national parliaments has had a statistically significant, negative effect on states engaging in all three measurements for internal conflict.

**Control Variables:**
The subsequent control variables are all derived from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2014). As noted in the literature review, there are several possible competing explanations for the cause of internal conflict, but more importantly controls for the likelihood of internal stability being compromised. The inability of the state to provide basic services, such as
food or health care access, may be the root cause of civil strife and may be more likely to lead to revolt or civil conflict. The focus on violence and conflict in this paper is centered on the conflict involving the state; I have included two measurements reflective of the state’s ability to provide these services. The logged depth of the food deficit as kilocalories per person, per day, which is calculated as the number of calories it would take to lift the undernourished from their status, all other factors being constant (World Bank 2014). This calculation is “the average intensity of food deprivation of the undernourished, estimate the difference between the average dietary energy requirement and the average dietary energy consumption of the undernourished population, multiplied by the number of undernourished to provide an estimate of the total deficit in the country, normalized by the total population (World Bank 2014). Public health expenditure is defined as the “recurrent and capital spending from government (central and local) budgets external borrowings and grants (including donations from international agencies and nongovernmental organizations) and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds (World Bank 2014).” The inclusion of the logged public health expenditure as a percentage of the total government expenditure addresses the possibility that increases in social welfare spending can result in pacifying effects on civil conflict (Taydas and Peksen 2012).

Additionally, the inclusion of the combined polity scores from the Polity IV Project dataset. The combined polity scores are calculated by subtracting a government’s autocracy score from its democracy score. Higher polity scores indicate high levels of democracy and lower scores indicate greater autocracy. Democracy scores are measured on a scale of 0 to 10, 10 indicating a “general openness of political institutions” while the autocracy scores measure the “general closedness of political institutions (Codebook for Polity).” The indicators used within this measurement to create a combined polity score are based on six different indicators
measuring power and authority of the executive, as well as the degree of competition within the political system. In nations like South Africa, where democratic institutions have been successful, competition scores are low due to the inability of competing political parties to establish themselves in systems where the ruling party has remained in power for more than 20 years (Goetz 1998).

To capture whether or not the government’s development of a standing military may have an effect on the likelihood of that military being deployed internally against civilians or non-state organized armed combatants, I have included the variable of armed forces as percentage of the total labor force. To measure for the possibility of competition over natural resources as an explanatory factor for civil tensions (Collier and Hoeffler 2002) I have included the logged total natural resource rents as a percentage of the state’s gross domestic product. I also include logged gross domestic product (GDP) as a variable for the wealth and stability of the state, which might render it less likely to have civil war within its borders (Hughes 2009). To control for the effect of foreign interests, directly or indirectly, I have included the net financial flow of non-concessional loans provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in current US dollars. These loans are provided to members of the IMF so the balance of payment can be met but also hint at external stabilizing forces (World Bank 2014). I have also included concessional debt as a percentage of the total external debt, which is defined as loans with an original grant of 25 percent or more. The presence of these variables indicate development and conditional situations that qualify the recipient state for these specific types of loans or debts, which may also represent a harbinger of internal stability. The ability of a state to absorb refugees seeking asylum can indicate economic and governmental stability, or it could reflect the accepting country’s political sympathies. Large refugee populations could cause civil conflicts to erupt into large,
international wars (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). I have included the logged refugee population by country or territory of asylum, where the country of asylum is the country where the asylum was filed and granted (World Bank 2014).

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients/z-statistic</th>
<th>Model (1)</th>
<th>Model (2)</th>
<th>Model (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intra-state War (COW)</td>
<td>Armed Conflict (PRIO)</td>
<td>One-sided Violence Against Civilians (PRIO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Seats Held by Women</td>
<td>-1.04 (-1.86)*</td>
<td>0.45 (1.58)*</td>
<td>-3.38 (-4.87)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concessional Debt (% of Total External Debt)</td>
<td>-0.01 (-0.75)</td>
<td>-0.00 (-0.06)</td>
<td>0.03 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Financial Flows, IMF Nonconcessional Debt (NFL, current US $)</td>
<td>0.00 (1.78)*</td>
<td>-0.00 (-3.31)***</td>
<td>0.00 (2.23)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) (log)</td>
<td>0.85 (2.27)**</td>
<td>0.99 (4.36)***</td>
<td>2.45 (2.91)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Personnel (% of Labor Force)</td>
<td>-0.27 (-1.99)*</td>
<td>0.03 (0.19)</td>
<td>0.54 (2.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product (log)</td>
<td>-0.89 (-3.27)***</td>
<td>-0.05 (-0.18)</td>
<td>0.45 (1.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Asylum (log)</td>
<td>1.30 (4.28)***</td>
<td>0.55 (4.34)***</td>
<td>2.10 (4.45)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure (% of Government Expenditure) (log)</td>
<td>1.57 (3.21)***</td>
<td>1.86 (2.92)**</td>
<td>0.17 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Expenditure (% of Government Expenditure) (log)</td>
<td>-0.86 (-3.05)***</td>
<td>1.51 (2.40)**</td>
<td>-0.46 (-0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depth of the Food Deficit (Kilocalories Per Person, Per Day) (log)</td>
<td>0.78 (1.76)*</td>
<td>0.37 (1.00)</td>
<td>4.24 (3.59)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combine Polity Score</td>
<td>-0.02 (-2.14)**</td>
<td>-0.02 (-1.96)*</td>
<td>-0.06 (-3.80)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Pseudo Likelihood</td>
<td>-69.11</td>
<td>-99.70</td>
<td>-36.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55 African nations examined over the timeframe of 1995 to 2010. Coefficients are significant at 1% (***) , 5% (**), and 10% (*) z-values in parentheses.
**Quantitative Findings:**
In Table 4, I present the results from my logistic regression models, estimating the impact of women’s legislative representation on the three binary measures of conflict: intrastate war, smaller scale armed conflict, and the use of violence against civilians by the state. Each model is presented with its coefficients, which is the value assigned by the logistic regression model for predicting the dependent variables from the independent variables (Hamilton 2013). All models also include the z-statistic in parentheses with an asterisk to indicate visually at what point the coefficients become statistically significant: three for a significance measured at one per cent, two for a significance measured at five per cent, and one asterisk to indicated significance at ten per cent (Hamilton 2013). Also presented in the table are the log pseudo likelihood statistics, which present an approximation to the joint probability distribution of each model (Hamilton 2013). The inclusion of the pseudo $R^2$ is a loose approximate for the R-squared found in OLS regression models which indicate the proportion of variance explained by the predictors within the model. Model (1) was restricted to 269 observations and both models (2) and (3) were restricted to 287 observations. The restriction of observations from the total number of observations results from missing values in the included variables used in the logistic regression. STATA uses a list-wise deletion by default resulting in the dropping of cases where values are missing, reducing the overall observations used in each model. This had no abnormal effects on the results presented here.

Model (1) explores the relationship between increased women’s political representation and intra-state war. As model (1) indicates, the proxy for women’s political representation showed minimal statistical significance towards intrastate conflict. The relationship discovered

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3 It is important to note in interpreting the results that logistic regressions models do not have this equivalent and should be interpreted with caution.
in model (1) does indicate that the hypothesis was correct; women do have a negative influence on the state engaging in intrastate war, however this influence is restricted. Female parliamentarians influence is only significant with a z-value measured at 10 percent. Due to the changing trends in internal conflict, specifically in Africa where all ongoing conflicts of this size are still on-going, women within legislative bodies may not have been presented with the opportunity to voice their concerns regarding the use of force (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). The role that civil led governments and legislative bodies take in the declaration of war, even intrastate war, occurs when war begins. The ability of legislative bodies to influence military decisions after this critical point limits any effect that female parliamentarians might have on intrastate conflict. As the case study in Liberia will show, women may not had success in influencing decisions to engage in intrastate conflict, but they can pass legislation that redefines the control of the civil government over the military to affect possible future conflicts.

Model (1) reaffirms the findings of Paul Collier regarding economic development’s effect on civil war, where the log of GDP had a statistically significant negative effect at one percent on intrastate conflict. The more economic development a state can procure, the more stability a state can feasibly provide. According to this model, the economic development captured by the GDP variable has not been offset by concessional or non-concessional debt. This indicates that the extent of a state’s debt, regardless of the terms, has not had an impact on intrastate conflict in Africa.

Military expenditure has been strongly (with a z-value at one per cent) statistically significant only in this first model, as it positively relates to intrastate war. Intuitively, this relationship appears to be descriptive, a state will invest heavily in its military if the authority of the state is threatened. During civil conflict, states will spend as much as double the military
budget (Collier 2007). States often keep up abnormally high military expenditure rates immediately following the experience of conflict in an attempt to maintain security and stability through military means (Collier 2007).

Model (2) and (3) explore the potential relationship between the use of force and women’s political representation on a smaller scale of internal conflict. Model (2) tests hypothesis in the cases of internal conflict that do not reach the minimum required to complete the definition of all out civil war. In the case of model (2), the three most statistically significant variables were the proxy for natural resource use, the amount of asylum-granted refugees within the country, and net financial flows of non-concessional debt. The results of model (2) indicate that women’s presence has a positive, minimally significant relationship with armed conflict. This may be indicative of a changing international interpretation of internal armed conflict battles and their impact on global security. The declaration of “war on terror” on October 8, 2001 resulted in an exogenous change in international policy against internal insurgencies (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2011). Under intense international pressure, primarily driven by the adoption of the US PATRIOT ACT and its designation of foreign terrorist organizations, many African nations (Kenya, South Africa, Morocco, Ethiopia, Eritrea, etc.) passed anti-terror laws (Kraxberger 2005). Foreign terrorists are subject to US jurisdiction and are extradited from the United States, subject to “extraordinary rendition” or even killed by drone strikes (Printer 2003). In this political environment post-9/11 where the standard response to the threat of terrorism is non-negotiation, the state may have little choice, ideologically or politically, other than to use force against organized groups.

The relationship between the log of military expenditure and armed conflict is not as strong as the relationship that exists between the log of military expenditure and intrastate war.
The designation of rebel groups as terrorist organizations qualifies governments combating these organizations for additional international support, militarily and monetarily (Nielsen and Findley 2011). This interpretation is supported in part by the negative impact net financial flows of non-concessional on the dependent variable of model (2), as IMF loans of this kind can be granted to states that recently experienced armed conflict (Bussmann 2005).

Model (3) tests the hypothesis in instances when the state uses violence against civilians. The results of model (3) find that women’s political representation does have a profound statistically negative impact on the use of force by the state against civilians. For a one per cent increase in the number of female legislators, there is a corresponding 90.57 per cent decrease in the state’s use of violence against civilians. The strong relationship between women’s political representation and the occurrence of this particular form of internal conflict affirms the hypothesis that the incorporation of women into democratic systems has decreased the experience of violence by the state against its constituents. Not only does this prove the hypothesis correct in regards to this type of internal conflict, but also it proves women have enough political influence to yield specific results. Importantly, model (3) suggests that women’s political representation changes the way that the state interacts with citizens. The use of force when applied to civilians becomes an unacceptable tool for achieving a domestic goal.4

Other statistically significant findings discovered by this model indicate a decline of the occurrence of one-sided violence against civilians overall with increased stability of democratic institutions as measured by the combined polity score. This is reinforced by the finding of the significance of depth of the food deficit, which likely captures a form of violence against civilians where famine is the means of perpetrating the violence. The use of famine as a tool of

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4 Research should be conducted to determine what effect this may have on civilian trust and national sense of security.
oppressive and authoritarian regimes is well noted in conflict literature (Chamberlin 1934; Devereux and Berge 2000; Macrae and Zwi 1994; Waal 1993).

The findings from both models suggest that causes for internal violence and conflict are more closely related to what the government does not do, such as provide food or distribute resources efficiently, than to wealth, size of the military, or extent of debt. Additionally, the proxy for the use of natural resources, asylum granted refugee population and the depth of the food deficit all had a positive and significant relationship with the dependent variables. Of all the findings presented across all three models, the most significant and profound has been the positive effect that refugees granted asylum has on internal conflict in Africa. Internal refugee patterns in Africa make up some of the largest movements of displaced in the world (Cernea 1990). The findings presented here regarding internal conflict positively effect the occurrences of all forms of internal conflict reflect the most recent trends of internal conflict, were in all active forms of internal conflict have become internationalized (L. Harbom and Wallensteen 2007; Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). The picture presented here of the relationship between the various causes of internal conflict does little to simplify the existing literature, but does provide evidence of a gap in the literature where state-based violence against civilians is concerned. The gender of their representatives plays an important role in providing restraint in the use of force domestically.
Qualitative Findings:
Given the results of the logistic regression models, it is necessary to determine whether women’s political participation is causally related to the decline in the experience of internal conflict in Africa. I assess the impact of women’s political participation on the use of force by the state in greater detail for three countries: Liberia, Rwanda, and Uganda. Each country examines a different type of internal conflict with varying degrees of women’s political representation and activism. In some cases, like that of Liberia, women’s political groups wield enough influence to play have played a pivotal role in ending the Second Liberian Civil War. Rwandan women and their political associations and groups now conduct workshops in successful reconciliation tactics and methods (Newbury and Baldwin 2000) and in some countries, like in Uganda, the political emancipation and participation of women has been exploited by authoritarian regimes to promote political party agendas.

Liberia:
The political empowerment of women can result in successful civil-led peace movements, even in the face of all out intrastate war, as the case of Liberia demonstrates. Civil unrest in Liberia includes several violent coups, election fraud, and outright civil war (Bauer 2009). As previously mentioned, internal conflict is not mutually exclusive, and often manifests in various forms within increasing levels of intensity and duration. Intrastate war is preceded by armed conflict and is entirely composed of a series of armed conflicts, sometimes with armed combatants and other times with civilians. In the case of Liberia, all three types of internal conflict have been identified and coded, but the focus of this case study will be the role women played in ending the intrastate war and rebuilding the nation afterwards.

The modern state of Liberia was founded as a settlement for freed slaves from the Americas in 1822 (Onoma 2014). The True Whig Party (TWP) ruled Liberia from 1878 to 1980
and was overthrown in a military coup by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe. When Charles Taylor invaded Liberia under the banner of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the country was primed for civil war, as various factions of warring armed political parties began vying for power (Onoma 2014). During the first civil war, women formed the Women in Peacebuilding Network or the WIPNET (Bekoe and Parajon 2007). Throughout 1991, WIPNET organized and staged protests and public marches advocating for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, attending the first round of peace talks in 1993 (Bekoe and Parajon 2007). When the 1996 peace agreement failed to prevent the war from resuming in 2000, WIPNET intensified its efforts. Developed by WIPNET, the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace Campaign became a tool of disarmament for the new government as women involved in the campaign confronted and engaged rebels directly, encouraging negotiations among the warring parties (Bekoe and Parajon 2007). Once the Accra 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, WIPNET organized five-day intensive workshops designed to facilitate the implementation of the CPA, focusing on empowering the civilian population by disseminating clear and accurate information to the Liberian public (Bekoe and Parajon 2007). When the disarmament process outlined by the CPA proved slower than anticipated, WIPNET members traveled to disarmament camps to convince fighters to lay down their weapons (Bekoe and Parajon 2007; Gbowee 2009). Liberian women not only assisted in the demilitarization of rebel and warring parties, but engaged in several socioeconomic and political mobilization projects to benefit and assist women in their new positions in Liberian society.

During the reconstruction, women organized co-religious groups amongst Christians and Muslims to provide training in different areas of trade. The development of the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET) provided training as seamstresses and an opportunity
to earn government contracts for school uniforms for children in Bomi County (Bekoe and Parajon 2007). Providing services like these not only economically empower women with tools for sustainable independence, but improves gender equality in a post-conflict Liberia (Bekoe and Parajon 2007). As the statistical model (1) in the previous section indicated via the proxies for government services, polity, and economic development, the more developed a state becomes, the less the state will experience the threat of civil war. The services provided by MARWOPNET help negate the lack of services that the state fails to provide. As noted in the quantitative section, one of the most significant indicators of internal conflict across all the models were the proxies measuring for the services that the government provides, or lack thereof.

The entire state structure devolved during this fourteen-year period into several rival armed groups competing for control over the government. The 2005 elections created a means for massive change to the security institutions which had failed to maintain control over the fracturing armed rebels (Onoma 2014). To ensure women’s participation in the electoral process, WIPNET mobilized a coalition of 200 women to provide transportation, childcare, and supervision of market stalls to allow women both the means and peace of mind to register to vote (Bekoe and Parajon 2007). After five days of intense campaigning, more than 7,400 women had registered (Bekoe and Parajon 2007). The 2005 election warranted attention from the international and academic community when Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was the first woman to ever be elected president of an African nation (Bauer 2009). The number of women elected to seats in parliament fell short of the 30 percent goal, at 12.5 percent, but considering that Liberia has neither voluntary political party quotas nor any legislated gender quotas, this accomplishment places Liberia on par with most developed societies in respect to women’s political
representation (Bauer 2009).

Security sector reform has seen some improvement since this time, including the passing of both the Defense Act 2008 and the National Security Sector Reform and Intelligence Act 2011 that directly addressed the issue of democratic civilian oversight for the first time in Liberia’s history. Section 8 of the National Security Sector Reform and Intelligence Act specifically calls for all security agencies to be subject to legislative oversight. This commitment to reformation has been underlined by Ellen Johnson’s administration in its National Security Strategy 2008, which stated:

Civilian democratic management and oversight of the security sector has been weak in Liberia, especially over the past quarter-century. Thus, all new security legislation will take this weakness fully into account. The transformed institutions must and will be fully subjected to civilian management and oversight, especially legislative oversight. (Governance Commission 2008).

The sheer length of the peace process in Liberia (from 1990 to 2005) and the absence of conventional, male dominated political structures has provided women in civil society the opportunity and space to mobilize as a constituency, so that they may advocate for female representatives. Liberia is unique in that it has a population of well-educated women with experience in the process of peace, and has begun to tear down the structures of male domination that will further enable women’s participation (Bauer 2009). While women have undoubtedly made great progress healing and moving forward in the aftermath of a devastating war, they still have much work ahead of them.

Rwanda:

Genocide by definition is the most extreme form of one-sided violence against civilians that the state can perpetrate. Historically, genocide has been executed within the context of war\(^5\), as in the case of Rwanda, where the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi minority and Hutu moderates by

\(^{\text{5 World War I and the Armenian Massacres, World War II and the Holocaust, Kosovo}}\)
Hutu extremists resulted in the death of one tenth of the population. The end of the genocide coincided with the end of the civil war in July of 1994 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) secured military victory over the Hutu regime of President Juvenal Habyarimana (Powley 2005).

While the 1994 genocide was not included within the time scope of the quantitative analysis, the societal effects of the genocide have resonated well into the twenty first century (Clark 2014). Much of the governmental infrastructure had been destroyed during the fighting, economic productivity had ceased, and public servants under the Hutu-dominate regime had either been murdered or fled the country. Tens of thousands of genocidaires escaped into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), forming rebel groups in the eastern part of the DRC (Clark 2014). As a result, the transitional government established by the RPF prioritized security, reconstruction of national infrastructure, and forming political and judicial institutions to secure post-conflict justice (Clark 2014).

The consequential population change following the internal conflict resulted in a female to male ratio of 7:3 (Mattina 2012). In light of this fact, the success of Rwanda’s incorporation of women’s role in peace building appears to be the result of necessity, with the majority of the country’s population now composed of women, the responsibility of reconstruction and reconciliation falls to those who survive the conflict. The incorporation of women’s political organizations in the aftermath of the violence in Rwanda, with support from international aid groups, played an important role in the rebuilding and reconciliation process (Hughes 2009). These political and social organizations sought to provide the services that the transitional government could or did not. In the capital Kigali, for example, women who had participated in national women’s organizations before 1994 began to meet again, offering each other emotional and psychological support, while voicing concerns about the conditions that they and their
children faced. In what started as women consoling each other through a devastating experience evolved into a political movement. They began rebuilding the organizations within the Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe association (Newbury and Baldwin 2000). By the end of 1994, these women had drafted a “Campaign for Peace,” focusing on the needs of women and children, proposing various ways of including women in the reconstruction process (Newbury and Baldwin 2000). This included a blueprint for the reconstruction process, which emphasized four main goals: 1) encouraging a culture of peace, 2) combating gender discrimination, 3) promoting socioeconomic reconstruction and 4) reinforcing the institutional capacity of Pro-Femme and its member associations. The proposed programs promoted respect for human life, tolerance, collaboration, open discussion and negotiations over the use of the force (Newbury and Baldwin 2000). This program provided the country with counseling services, public education campaigns in the media, and training programs promoting tolerance and forgiveness (Newbury and Baldwin 2000). The success of this campaign in the years since 1994 has been recognized by the international community, having won the UNESCO Mandajeet Singh Prize for Tolerance and Nonviolence in 1996 (Newbury and Baldwin 2000) and the prestigious Terrance award in 2000 (Mutamba 2005).

The effectiveness of women’s solidarity and subsequent organizations in Rwanda resulted in part from external pressures on the post-genocide government from international women’s groups and institutions like the World Bank, which recognized the previously untapped resource of women’s potential (Newbury and Baldwin 2000). Bilateral and multilateral donors influenced by the lobbying of Rwandan women’s groups and leaders and with the support of the transitional government, invested in grass-roots development of women’s organizations, which used those resources to rebuilding initiatives previously established by Rwandan women’s
organizations at the national level (Newbury and Baldwin 2000). The government created the Ministry of Gender and Promotion of Women’s Development, to support these organizations by establishing a ministry representative in each prefecture and commune (Newbury and Baldwin 2000). This placed additional pressure on the local government authorities to focus on women’s issues. This resulted in an increase in women’s organizations, of each of Rwanda’s 154 communes, an average of 100 women’s organizations had been created by 1997 (Newbury and Baldwin 2000). As the number of women’s organizations continued to grow following the years of the genocide, so too did the scope of the needs they addressed. Duhozanye, a nonprofit organization (NGO) in Butare developed as a local resource for rebuilding damaged houses in rural areas for the increased number of households led by women (Newbury and Baldwin 2000). Seruka and Deterimbere are Pro-femme associate organizations that developed during this transitional period that offer microcredit loans to rural and urban women (Newbury and Baldwin 2000). By providing training, advice, technical assistance and resources to women, they help stabilize a newly reconstructed economic foundation.

The efforts of the hundreds and thousands of women’s organizations in Rwanda since the end of the 1994 genocide and civil war resulted in women taking a leading role in the reconstruction and rebuilding process, as well as in their government.

Uganda:

The Republic of Uganda has a long-standing history of internal ethnic conflict since its independence in 1962. This section will focus primarily on the most recent, intense, and persistent of perpetrator of internal conflict within Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2011). The National Resistance Movement (NRM), Uganda’s current ruling party led by Yoweri Museveni, has maintained control of the government since 1985 deposing the northern Acholi officer Tito Okello (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2011).
This led to political opposition and armed rebellions in Acholiland, where the LRA remained active until 2006 and near the border with the DRC, where an insurgency led by the ADF remained active until 2004 (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2011). Initially, the LRA was composed of northern Acholi ex-officers and soldiers of the Ugandan army, evolving into a more persistent rebel movement than the ADF (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2011). The declaration on the “war on terror” had a direct effect on the internal armed rebellions by both groups, as the US Patriot Act declared the LRA and the ADF terrorist organizations (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2011). The LRA, who had been receiving sanctuary and military support from the Sudanese National Islamic Front up until this point, was forced to retreat into the neighboring DRC after Museveni’s government troops cracked down with all the new impunity labeling the enemy terrorist can provide (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2011). In the years prior to 9/11, the international community had encouraged Museveni’s government to negotiate settlements over the conflicts (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2011). Museveni’s government, following the US government’s designation of the LRA as a terrorist organization, launched “Operation Iron Fist” against the LRA rebels, driving them back into South Sudan (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2011). The LRA retaliated by attacking villages and government forces in Northern Uganda (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2011). Rebel reprisals and military activity peaked in 2003, and by 2005 the LRA was forced to relocate its headquarters to the DRC (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2011). In September of 2006, a cease-fire was declared between the Ugandan government and the LRA, mediated by the autonomous government of South Sudan (Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2011).

Women’s organizations under the Museveni regime have played a significant role in shaping a broader political context within Uganda. Uganda’s current political system operates as
a no-party system, where political parties outside of Museveni’s National Resistance Movement cannot put forward party platforms, organize rallies, or even hold meetings (Tripp 2001). This regime may not be open to political competition, but the regime has been largely supportive of women’s political mobilization and visibility, facilitating their entry into the formal political infrastructure by including constitutionally mandated gender quotas, which reserves one seat in every district for female representatives who are directly elected from women only lists (QuotaProject 2014). These affirmative action policies have resulted in dramatic increases in women’s representation at the national and local levels. In 2001, Tripp reported that women held 19 per cent of seats in the parliament and 30 per cent of local governmental positions. As of the 2011 election cycle, women hold 35 per cent of the seats in the national parliament, 11 seats which were won in the general election (QuotaProject 2014). This indicates that in the case of Uganda, the use of gender quotas has begun to facilitate women’s inclusion beyond the legal requirements. However, female representative’s ability to exercise any political influence contrary to the NRM’s position regarding internal conflict maybe severally limited. Voting patterns of women demonstrate strong support of the NRM, which scholars have cited as evidence that the NRM is manipulating the adoption of women’s political emancipation for self-serving purposes.

The changing perceptions of the capabilities of women throughout Africa can be seen in Uganda, where women’s movements and organizations are perhaps the most organized sector of civil society in Uganda (Tripp 2001). These organizations and groups have been successful in exerting political influence in Uganda in part thanks to the autonomy granted by the Museveni government. Under previous authoritarian regimes in Uganda, women’s independent organizations were completely banned and their mobilization was limited to within government
controlled national organizations like the National Council of Women under Idi Amin (Tripp 2001). Tripp has demonstrated that women have been able to take advantage of the political space afforded them by the authoritarian regime to support their own political and social agendas. Tripp argues that women’s political mobilization and organization has resulted in enough autonomy from the state that they can and have lobbied for legislation to improve the lives of women. For example, women’s organizations pressed for the inclusions of women’s specific rights in the 1995 Constitution (Morna 2004). Women’s groups have been vocal in major pieces of legislation such as the Land Bill and Domestic Relations Bill, both of which address issues of property rights. They have effectively lobbied for reforms regarding police procedures, female genital cutting, and the civil liberties of the disabled, children, women, orphans, and domestic servants. By bring awareness these issues they are concerned with, they help contribute to the stability of the government. Securing property rights secures underlining democratic principles, reinforcing the stability of democratic systems (Leblang 1996). While women in representative positions within Museveni’s government may not be able to exert an influence over the use of force against the LRA, women’s political movements in Uganda have been able to assist in the development of the country.
Discussion, Conclusions and Further Research:
More research must be conducted examining the affect women are making as they become more politically active and aware in bodies of government. This study has demonstrated how complex this relationship of gender on preventing or decreasing internal conflict has become in Africa. The overall findings from the statistical analysis show that while women may have an effect on internal conflict, the most significant means of decreasing conflict is economic development and increasing the assimilation and transition of asylum granted refugees by their host states. Further research into the causal reasons these particular types of refugees have such a profound impact on these types of internal conflict International recognition of the need to incorporate women into the formal economic sector and state development programs underlines the importance of including women into post-conflict and transitioning democratic states to assist escape from the “conflict trap.”

The case studies demonstrated the complexity of internal conflict, particularly that the internal conflicts a state can experience is nearly always composed of several different manifestations of violence. While the statistical models presented in this paper proved that female representatives in of themselves have an effect on only one manifestation of state-based violence, the case studies demonstrated that their mobilization and activism as civilians can affect all forms of state-based violence.

Where conventional wisdom exists, the development of policies relies on the resources the academic community provides. As the development of women and its effects on stability and security becomes ever more defined and understood the importance of research conducted in this field of study enriches the quality of action taken by informed governments and international actors. This research provides evidence that women are having a specific impact various levels
of internal conflict. Women appear to be making more deliberate choices as to when the use of force by the state appears justified, and in so doing may impact the overall experience of internal conflict. Further field research is needed to determine the degree that women’s political participation is occurring at municipal levels of government, considering the highly localized variables used to measure their possible effect on internal conflict.

Internal conflict specifically may positively affect women’s political and social emancipation, but clearly should not be the primary means through which women should attempt to emancipate themselves, as women are more likely to suffer crimes of war during conflict than men (Buhaug 2006; Felicity 2003; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Turshen 2001). From the worst possible situations, opportunities for progress and advancement can be found.
Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: List of civil and intrastate conflicts in Africa over the last forty years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrean Split of 1972-1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Burundi War of 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia War of 1972-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola Guerilla War of 1974-1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibian War of 1975-1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War over Angola of 1975-1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara War of 1975-1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angolan Control War of 1976-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Ogaden War Phase 1 of 1976-1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Ogaden War Phase 2 of 1977-1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Shaba War of 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda-Tanzanian War of 1978-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique War of 1979-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Chad War of 1980-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria-Muslim War of 1980-1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tigrean and Eritrean War of 1982-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second South Sudan War of 1983-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy Spirit Movement War of 1986-1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War over the Aouzou Strip of 1986-1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkatha-ANC War of 1987-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Somalia War of 1988-1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Chad War of 1989-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First Liberia War of 1989-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Sierra Leone War of 1991-1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA Division War of 1991-1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian Islamic Front War of 1992-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Burundi War of 1993-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Rwanda War of 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Liberia War of 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth DRC War of 1996-1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Rwanda War of 1997-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Congo Brazzaville War of 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Sierra Leone War of 1998-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badme Border War of 1998-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau Military War of 1998-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Chad War of 1998-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Angolan War of 1998-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Congo War of 1998-1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Nigeria Christian-Muslim War of 1999-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromo Liberation War of 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hema-Lendu War of 1999-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Burundi War of 2001-2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fourth Rwanda War of 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Liberia War of 2002-2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopian Anyuua-Nuer War of 2002-2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire Military War of 2002-2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Darfur War of 2003-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Nigeria Christian-Muslim War of 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Chad War of 2005-2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third Somalia War of 2006-2008</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(Diehl 2007)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of quota</th>
<th>% Women mandated by quota</th>
<th>Year quota introduced</th>
<th>% Women in legislature in 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Legislated Candidate</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso***</td>
<td>Legislated Candidate</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Reserved seats</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Reserved seats</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Reserved seats</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Special seats**</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Executive nomination</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Legislated Candidate</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritanai***</td>
<td>Legislated Candidate/Reserved seats</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Women-only national list*</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger***</td>
<td>10% elective</td>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25% nominative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Reserved seats</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia Transitional National Government</td>
<td>Women-only lists*</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal**</td>
<td>Legislated Candidate</td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Reserved seat</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Special seats**</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia***</td>
<td>Legislated Candidate**</td>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Reserved seats</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Reserved seats**</td>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only women can vie for these seats regardless of party affiliation, not based on constituency as with reserved seats.
** The special seat quota for women is allocated to political parties based on the proportional number of parliamentary seats won in an election.
*** Election not yet held under new quota arrangement.
Table 3: Countries with Voluntary Party Quotas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Details, Quota Provisions</th>
<th>Year quota introduced</th>
<th>% Women in legislature in 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria**</td>
<td>National Liberation Front (FLN)</td>
<td>2 out of 5 names on the list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement of Society for Peace (HMS)</td>
<td>One-fifth of candidates at the regional level</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana**</td>
<td>Botswana Congress Party (BCP)</td>
<td>30 percent electoral list</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Botswana National Front (BNF)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (RDPC)</td>
<td>25-30 percent electoral list</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Democratic Front (SDF)</td>
<td>25 percent quota</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Ivorian Popular Front (FPI)</td>
<td>30 percent quota</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA-PASJ)</td>
<td>30 percent quota</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO)</td>
<td>40 percent of candidates</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia***</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO)</td>
<td>50 percent zebra system</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa**</td>
<td>African National Congress (ANC)</td>
<td>50 percent quota</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe***</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)</td>
<td>One-third candidate list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T)</td>
<td>50 percent of elected positions</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The special seat quota for women is allocated to political parties based on the proportional number of parliamentary seats won in an election.
** Only political parties represented in parliament are included
*** Election not yet held under new quota arrangement.

Notes on Tables (2) and (3):

Senegal is also not included in the list above, as the only quotas that the Republic has legislated only that reserved seats be granted to women’s political groups at the local level, with no legal sanctions for non-action (Powley 2005). Zimbabwe is also excluded from these charts, as the
new system adopted in 2013 combining both types of quotas, legislated and voluntary political party quotas, have not yet been systematically applied and is outside the timetable of this study (QuotaProject 20014). Prior to the new system, Zimbabwe was among the list of African nations that had no legislated quotas. Of the data examined in this paper, only Zimbabwe and Liberia have no listed gender quotas within the given time frame. Liberia has no current legislation to implement gender quotas (QuotaProject 20014).
References:


http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=pyTN1mIk88oC&oi=fnd&pg=PA183&dq=bad+neighbors,+bad+neighborhoods&ots=jaBUsgh8jU&sig=H9w8u__o-TUBhFz2XqnsHBDEXTA (May 7, 2014).
