

University of Nevada, Reno

**“To yield would mean our end”:  
The Political Repression of Chinese Students after Tiananmen**

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in  
History

by

Katherine S. Robinson

Dr. Hugh Shapiro/Thesis Advisor

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**KATHERINE S. ROBINSON**

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The Political Repression Of Chinese Students After Tiananmen**

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Hugh Shapiro, Ph.D, Advisor

Barbara Walker, Ph.D., Committee Member

Jiangnan Zhu, Ph.D, Graduate School Representative

Marsha H. Read, Ph. D., Associate Dean, Graduate School

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## ABSTRACT

Following the military suppression of the Democracy Movement, the Chinese government enacted politically repressive policies against Chinese students both within China and overseas. After the suppression of the Democracy Movement, officials in the Chinese government made a correlation between the political control of students and the maintenance of political power by the Chinese Communist Party. The political repression of students in China resulted in new educational policies that changed the way that universities functioned and the way that students were allowed to interact. Political repression efforts directed at the large population of overseas Chinese students in the United States prompted governmental action to extend legal protection to these students. The long term implications of this repression are evident in the changed student culture among Chinese students and the extensive number of overseas students who did not return to China. Although some of the issues concerns raised during the Democracy Movement have been alleviated through economic reforms and moderate political concessions, implications of the post-June 4 political repression continue to resurface in current events over twenty years later. While the means of repression have changed, the contention surrounding pro-democracy activism largely remains the same.

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## Introduction

Hu Shi, the eminent intellectual of the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement<sup>1</sup> and a professor at Beijing University said, “Now some people tell me that you must sacrifice your individual freedom so that the nation may be free. But I reply, the struggle for individual freedom is the struggle for the nation’s freedom....”<sup>2</sup> This struggle was manifested during the Democracy Movement; an unprecedented mass movement of anti-government sentiment which began among the students at China’s elite universities. Modern technology and world media coverage of the movement allowed the world to follow the movement from its genesis to its termination in June 1989. The movement ended in bloodshed when the People’s Liberation Army forcibly cleared their way to Tiananmen Square to clear the protesters. Thousands of people were killed in the process of the military suppression, including protesters, sympathizers and soldiers.

A plethora of historical works have been written about the democracy movement, from its origins to its end. What has not been discussed at length, however, is the political repression that followed the June 4 suppression. Following the government-ordered military suppression, political and intellectual life was significantly more repressive than before the movement. The state owned media attempted to promulgate an “official” interpretation of events that was contradicted by eyewitness accounts and by the information which was carried outside of the People’s Republic through modern communications technology and extensive foreign media coverage.

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<sup>1</sup> The May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement was a cultural and political movement that grew out of student demonstrations on May 4, 1919 that protested the Chinese government’s weak response to the Treaty of Versailles and territorial concessions in China being given to imperialist Japan.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in “A U.S.-China Partnership” *Vital Speeches of the Day* Vol. LXIV No. 19 (July 15, 1998), 581 (Address by Bill Clinton, President of the United States, Delivered to students and community of Beijing University June 29, 1998).

One of the hardest hit communities in the post-Tiananmen political repression were those people associated with universities, particularly students. Political repression was especially potent at the elite universities which had been the original base of the Democracy Movement. Beijing University was put under particularly intense political scrutiny because many of the student leaders of the Democracy movement had been enrolled there. In an effort to prevent future movements like the Democracy Movement, the Chinese government enacted a series of policies restricting the activities of students in conjunction with a political purge of those within the university system and party ranks who expressed sympathy for the Democracy Movement and its participants.

Repressive policies also extended to Chinese students living outside of mainland China. The Democracy Movement had supporters among overseas Chinese students; students who were encouraged by student leaders to remain abroad post-crackdown. Some student leaders and other dissidents fled China after the June crackdown and made their way to the United States and Western Europe seeking protection. In the year following the movement's suppression, the United States government was involved in extensive condemnation of the intensified political repression in China and efforts to extend protective status to Chinese nationals and students. In these instances, the post-Tiananmen repression became a quandary in U.S –China foreign relations.

In the decades following the suppression of the Democracy Movement, the consequences of the post-Tiananmen political repression have not been extensively examined. In this text, the post-Tiananmen political repression in China will be examined, with a particular emphasis on how the Chinese government's political

repression policies affected university students in China and overseas. The examination of repression directed at overseas students will include a discussion of United States governmental actions relating to Chinese students and the relationship of these actions to U.S.-China foreign relations in the years following the crackdown. The final section will discuss the Chinese government's more recent policies towards students and policies regarding the return of former overseas students to mainland China.

There are an extensive number of historical works examining the genesis and termination of the Democracy Movement.. Many early works are accounts from the perspective of the students and are generally heavily based on memoirs of witnesses and participants gained through written submissions or personal interviews. Later works transition to the government perspective and examine motives behind government actions. The evolution of the historiography on Tiananmen Square and the Democracy movement seems to hinge largely on the availability of sources. Early works on the Democracy Movement focus on a combination of oral history accounts from eye witnesses and some available Chinese government documents.

An example of a primary source compilation is *Voices from Tiananmen Square: Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement*, edited by Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison. This text largely comprises primary sources, but in contrast to the later discussed *Tiananmen Papers*, Yu and Harrison's work focuses on primary sources from Democracy Movement participants rather than government officials.<sup>3</sup> Yu and Harrison's primary sources consist of translations of pamphlets and wall posters contributed by

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<sup>3</sup> Mok Chiu Yu and J. Frank Harrison, *Voices from Tiananmen Square, Beijing Spring and the Democracy Movement* (New York: Black Rose Books, 1990).

numerous individuals credited by the editors as information gatherers, and interviews with witnesses. While the content of the sources is informative, this work faces the challenge of corroboration. Many of the authors are anonymous for understandable reasons, but this makes it difficult to verify the original sources of the documents.

Timothy Brook's, *Quelling the People*, is an examination of the ways in which the Chinese state employed violence to suppress popular support for the Democracy Movement.<sup>4</sup> Like *Voices from Tiananmen Square*, Brook's work relies heavily on eyewitness accounts of the military suppression of the movement in June 1989. Brook's work chronologically spans from April to June 1989. He argues that Chinese government ultimately utilized the Army to suppress the Democracy Movement because the government had "lost the allegiance" of the Beijing populace and could not envision any other means of reestablishing government authority in the city. Party leadership therefore used military means to resolve a crisis of political legitimacy.<sup>5</sup> He writes that violence was accepted as a means to suppress the movement because no other options were available after the Party had closed all negotiations on political claims.<sup>6</sup>

Many of Brook's primary sources were obtained through the China Documentation Project (CDP), a research group focused on collecting all types of documentation from the Democracy Movement and the Beijing Massacre. Some sources were gathered as part of the CDP's oral history efforts, and other autobiographical

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<sup>4</sup> Timothy Brook, *Quelling the People; the Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), xiii.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 7-8.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 201.

accounts were written down and sent in to the CDP by eyewitness.<sup>7</sup> Although these sources are better documented and the document collects are accessible for verification, the testimonies provided in retrospect suffer from inconsistencies of perception. For example, Brook acknowledges that many testimonies of the same event vary slightly because of individual perception and the imperfect inferences formed by first impressions.<sup>8</sup>

*Black Hands of Beijing* by George Black and Robin Munro is a biographical work on three of the Democracy Movement leaders: Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao and Han Dongfang. These three were labeled as “black hands” behind the protests in Tiananmen Square. The authors explain that “black” is the antithesis of “red” in the Chinese Communist Party lexicon. The term was a blanket term for those considered “bad elements”. “Black hands” was the term given to said “bad elements” that rose high enough to manipulate others.<sup>9</sup> The book chronicles their involvement in the Democracy movements, their arrests, imprisonments and trials.

*The Struggle for Tiananmen* by Nan Lin is a secondary analysis of the Democracy Movement. Lin argues that the “struggle for Tiananmen” was a mass movement with a diverse group of participants, not just students, which was affected by external environmental factors that provided various opportunities and constraints.<sup>10</sup> Lin also addresses how authorities engaged in the conflict in her chapter about Party reactions and

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 215.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 219-220.

<sup>9</sup> George Black and Robert Munro, *Black Hands of Beijing: Lives of Defiance in China's Democracy Movement* (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1993), 4.

<sup>10</sup> Nan Lin, *The Struggle For Tiananmen: Anatomy of the 1989 Mass Movement* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), vii-viii.

resolutions.<sup>11</sup> She also emphasizes that the student protestors relaying information outside of Tiananmen Square via messengers, runners, foreign mass media, fax machines and telephone was important to sustain the movement and maintain effective communication between groups. She argues that effective communication between groups allowed for coordinated blockades against troops attempting making their way to the square starting at the end of May.<sup>12</sup> Lin's book moves away from the previous focus on the participants directly in Tiananmen Square by expanding the narrative to include government authorities, city residents and foreign journalists.

*Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989*<sup>13</sup> is a compilation of articles which examine various aspects of the Democracy movement such as ideological origins, military involvement and the role of the state media. Editors Roger Des Forges, Luo Ning and Wu Yen-bo divided the articles into three main sections. The first section places the events on 1989 in the historical context of Chinese history from the earliest philosophers to the 1980 reforms.<sup>14</sup> The second section analyzes the rise and fall of the movement during the spring of 1989 with consideration given to the roles of various groups. The final section addresses issues of culture and the role of the media, and examines the "shift in consciousness which lay behind the movement and which may well have survived its demise."<sup>15</sup> The volume provides insightful analysis numerous questions surrounding the

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 89-100.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 147-151.

<sup>13</sup> Roger V. Des Forges, Luo Ning and Wu Yen-bo, eds., *Chinese Democracy and The Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections* (Albany: State University of New York, 1993).

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 3.

historical analysis of the Democracy Movement and incorporates a range of disciplinary approaches.

Jing Lin's book, *The Opening of the Chinese Mind: Democratic Changes in China Since 1978* examines changes in the values, beliefs and behaviors of Chinese citizens from the end of the Cultural Revolution through the 1989 Democracy Movement. Lin attempts to place these societal and behavioral changes within the context of China's changing political, cultural, economic and educational norms during this time period.<sup>16</sup> This text contributes to the historiography by providing a broader analysis of the societal and cultural changes which contributed to the demands of protesters in the Democracy Movement in 1989.

*The Tiananmen Papers*, a primary source collection compiled by Zhang Liang and edited by Andrew Nathan and Perry Link uses a copious number of primary sources to create a chronological narrative of events which details the highest level processes of decision making by Communist Party leaders in reaction to the Democracy Movement.<sup>17</sup> This text returns to the previous style of primary source compilations, but it is unique in the sense that it focuses entirely on a top-down analysis of government decision making and actions against Democracy Movement participants. Nathan states that the purpose of the text is to "challenge the official story that Tiananmen was a legitimate suppression of an anti-government riot." He states that many of the documents included in the text were only available to a handful of individuals and had to be carefully obtained and smuggled

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<sup>16</sup> Jing Lin, *The Opening of the Chinese Mind: Democratic Changes in China Since 1978* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), xiii.

<sup>17</sup> Zhang Liang, comp. *The Tiananmen Papers*, eds. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (Public Affairs: New York, 2002), xxxvi.

out of China by the compiler. The compiler described the necessity of publishing the effectively classified documents as “loyalty to the truth of history”.<sup>18</sup>

The end result is a narrative which transitions through hundreds of primary sources which chronologically span from April to June 1989. *The Tiananmen Papers* devotes its final chapter to discussing events following the military suppression. The documents included detail party meetings in which Jiang Zemin was chosen as the new Party General Secretary and the discussion of reform measures.<sup>19</sup> Many of the primary sources are transcriptions of minutes from meetings between high-level party officials or intradepartmental communications, and the editors acknowledge that “no one outside of China can completely vouch for the authenticity of these transcripts”. However, the editors felt that the primary documents provided to them were authentic.<sup>20</sup> The source-driven narrative provides a compelling presentation of events, conversations and decisions involving high-level political leaders which were arguably never intended for public consumption.

Although a great deal of historical effort has been made to reconstruct and analyze the events of the Democracy Movement, little has been written about the political repression that followed the Chinese government’s decision to terminate the movement. A few texts on modern China briefly mention the subsequent political repression. Immanuel Hsu’s text, *The Rise of Modern China* devotes only a single page to the repercussions of the crackdown, which he describes as “staggering”. He primarily argues

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid, xxxix.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 419.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 474.

that the crackdown and the resulting political repression negatively affected the “image of the Chinese Government as an increasingly responsible member of the international community.”<sup>21</sup>

Maurice Meisner’s text, *Mao’s China and After* is another text which briefly discusses political repression. He states that “political and intellectual life was markedly more repressive” and that the punishment for political dissent was harsher.<sup>22</sup> He also makes a brief argument that the urban working class bore the brunt of the post-1989 political repression because political leaders feared an alliance between intellectuals and workers. Repressive action was taken against workers who showed the slightest signs of unrest or dissent.<sup>23</sup>

Edwin Moise includes a short section on regarding post-Tiananmen political repression in his text, *Modern China*. He discusses reform efforts by what he terms “hard-liners” within the Chinese Communist Party to combat “spiritual pollution” from foreign ideals. Such efforts included restricting foreign tourists and journalists, closing “English Corners” in various cities, and curtailing the number of students studying abroad. He briefly mentions the new policy of mandatory military service for Beijing University freshmen. He concludes by mentioning that some of the political leaders who

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<sup>21</sup> Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 940.

<sup>22</sup> Mark Meisner, *Mao’s China and After*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York: The Free Press [Simon & Schuster], 1999), 511.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, 542-543.

had helped to organize the military suppression of the Democracy Movement were promoted to high positions in the process of the reforms.<sup>24</sup>

Suzanne Pepper's book, *China's Education Reform in the 1980s* is a monograph about educational reforms "of the post-1976 Deng Xiaoping administration with the context of its historical antecedents and political parameters."<sup>25</sup> Pepper covers the origin of the "two line struggle" in Chinese educational reform tradition, one line being continued socialist development and the other a transition to capitalism. Her section on higher education examines the higher education reforms contemplated in the 1980s. She argues that Deng Xiaoping was misled by "two line struggle" logic because he made no distinction between a radical political agenda and the more positive educational reforms that were designed to reconcile long standing divisions in 20<sup>th</sup> century Chinese society, "between elites and masses, between city and countryside, and between the outward-looking coastal areas and the inward looking hinterland."<sup>26</sup> Pepper wrote shortly after the Tiananmen crackdown, and describes the newly announced educational reform policies of that period as being politically defined and "part of the leftist backlash against the urban-based, Western-oriented wing of China's political and intellectual establishment." She predicts that those reforms which have educational merit will be jettisoned for political reasons, like other reforms in the past, when the balance of political power shifts again in the future.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Edwin Moise, *Modern China: A History*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (Harlow, England: Pearson Education Limited, 1994), 224-225.

<sup>25</sup> Suzanne Pepper, *China's Education Reform in the 1980s: Policies, Issues and Historical Context* (Berkeley: Institute for East Asian Studies, 1990), 6.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, 188.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, 194.

Documentation for this research heavily utilizes primary sources, since secondary source material on this topic is extremely scarce. Primary sources utilized for this research include English-language newspaper articles; translations of press releases by Chinese state media; Congressional hearings, legislation and testimony. Some translated Chinese government documents are also utilized. News articles are largely from foreign press sources such as the *New York Times*, written by journalists stationed in mainland China at the time. Information included from Chinese state media sources is mostly from translated sources such as BBC World Reports, or quoted in part in foreign news reports.

Overall, the documents substantiate the argument that the Chinese government worked to suppress the student movement in an effort to retain political control. After the suppression of the Democracy Movement, Deng Xiaoping outlined his long term policy plan to the Party Central Committee. He asserted, “Only socialism can save China and turn it into a developed country.” He further stated that the “riots [meaning the Democracy Movement protests] have actually taught us something: They’ve been a huge wake-up call.” Deng argued that if China did not “stick to the socialist road and the leadership of the Party,” then the country would always be “somebody’s satellite country.”<sup>28</sup> A few days later, Li Peng stated in a report to the Thirteenth Central Committee that “reform and opening are the route to a powerful nation and must be carried out with the firmest resolution.” In the same report, he also stated that “we must pursue the work of ferreting out the counterrevolutionary elements to the end. We

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<sup>28</sup> Deng Xiaoping’s statement in excerpts from the Party Central Office Secretariat, “Minutes of the CCP Central Politburo Standing Committee meeting,” June 16, 1989. In *The Tiananmen Papers*, 428.

absolutely must not be soft.”<sup>29</sup> This statement is representative of the policies enacted against university students in Chinese universities domestically and overseas.

University students, who were the major participants and leaders of the pro-democracy movement, became the target of politically repressive policies intended to, as Li Peng described, “ferret out” elements in the population that the government considered counterrevolutionary. This involved targeting students internally and externally through reform policies that discouraged participation in pro-democracy activities and encouraged what the government considered “correct” political attitudes. As Li Peng further stated, goal was to “attack resolutely every kind of harmful activity by enemies inside or outside the country” and “strengthen Party building, strengthen political thought work, and conscientiously open up the educational struggle of opposing bourgeois liberalization.”<sup>30</sup> Support for pro-democracy reforms was equated to conspiring to subvert the government, and those who advocated for or participated in pro-democracy activities were considered counterrevolutionary and political enemies of the state. After the termination of the Democracy Movement, the sociopolitical climate of China was pervaded by an intense emphasis on the correlation between the political control of individuals and the control of the government by the Communist Party. This correlation between political control and the maintenance of Party rule formed the basis for the political repression that followed the military suppression at Tiananmen Square.

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<sup>29</sup> Excerpts from Li Peng’s “Report on Mistakes committed by Comrade Zhao Ziyang during the anti-Party and anti-socialist turmoil”, report to the Forth Plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee June 23, 1989. In *The Tiananmen Papers* (2002), 440.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

Although numerous texts acknowledge the post-1989 political repression, there has not been an extensive analysis of the content or effects of these repressive policies. Lack of research on this topic may be the result of several possible factors. First, the topic may be considered politically sensitive and is avoided for this reason. Another possibility is the lack of Chinese government sources. A search of the *People's Daily* or *Xinhua* archives yields nothing with regards to the political repression of students. Chinese government documents on the subject seem to be limited to those smuggled out of the country by dissidents and defectors. This lack of sources may be alleviated over time, and there may be more extensive scholarship on the topic as more sources become available. A third possibility is that the topic has been overlooked as an important part of the development of China in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century because of its relative recentness.

There is extensive academic examination of economic reforms during the same time period as the political repression. Scholarship on the economic development indicates the historical importance of the post-1989 time period in terms of social change in China. It is equally important that the concurrent political repression is examined. Huang Yasheng's book *Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics* demonstrates a connection between the political issues raised during the Democracy Movement and the direction of economic reforms following 1989. He demonstrates that while rural areas grew during the 1980s; after 1989 the government shifted investment from rural areas to urban areas as a means of attempting to address the economic concerns that drove citizens to support the students of the Democracy Movement. As a result, in the 1990s

rural areas became poorer while urban areas were economically more successful.<sup>31</sup> It is arguable that the Chinese government chose to address the political unrest of 1989 by favoring economic reforms over political reforms.

Examination of the political repression following June 4 is imperative to a broader understanding of how the lives of Chinese students were affected after 1989. This text will contribute to the historical discussion by examining the forms and extent of repressive measures enacted against university establishments and the students who attended there. Particular consideration will be devoted to Beijing University because of its prominent association with the Democracy Movement, which made it the subject of intensified reform measures in the years following movement's forcible suppression. There will also be an examination of policies enacted against Chinese students studying overseas in the United States, and how the US Government became involved in efforts to safeguard overseas Chinese students. Examination of the post-Tiananmen political repression reveals the long-term consequences of the crackdown on the Democracy Movement, such as how the lives of students were shaped by the changed political policies.

An analysis of the political repression demonstrates both the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist Party. On one hand, the repression efforts were successful in more or less silencing dissident groups within Chinese society. However, the efforts were not completely successful because dissent persisted at universities and among underground groups within China. The Public Security Bureau successfully arrested thousands of people associated with the Democracy Movement, but some of the

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<sup>31</sup> Huang Yasheng, *Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

most wanted movement activists were able to flee the country and make their way to countries that sheltered them.

Perhaps the most prominent example of the limitations of the government repression efforts was the inability to silence Chinese students overseas, particularly those in the United States. Despite efforts by the Chinese Consulate to threaten and coerce overseas Chinese students to abandon their pro-democracy activities, the majority of students did not comply. Some students were cowed by threats of reprisals against family members in China, but others still refused to comply with consulate demands for confessions and compliance. The face of authoritarianism is evident in the harassment of overseas students, but so are the limitations of its reach. The simplest explanation for this limitation is distance. While the Chinese government was able to exert its authority within China, it was unable to exert the same level of pressure overseas.

Examination of the political repression following June 4 also demonstrates the evolution of intervention by the Chinese government. The political repression of students serves as a case study for the different means through which the Chinese government sought to intervene within political culture in order to prevent future demonstrations like the democracy movement. By examining the intervention of the Chinese government into the lives of Chinese students, we also see how these students lived out the conditions of the repression imposed upon them.

The implications of the post-June 4 political repression continue to resurface in current events over twenty years later. Although the means of repression have changed, the issues of pro-democracy activism largely remain the same. In one sense, the Chinese

government has successfully elided the Democracy Movement from the political consciousness of the next generation of Chinese students. Few students today know about the student movement of the 1980s, and those who do know about it often ridicule student leaders as opportunists with “hidden objectives.”<sup>32</sup> Despite this apparent success the issue of Democracy Movement leaders continues to be a tense subject.

To understand many of the current events of China today, we must examine the changes in political policy that occurred after June 4. The effects of political repression did not end when the PLA cleared Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989 or when the government lifted martial law in Beijing in January 1990. The persistence of the effects of political repression into the current century invites an analysis of how and why this political repression occurred in the first place.

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<sup>32</sup> Erik Eckholm, “At China’s Colleges, a Rush to Party, as in Communist” *New York Times* (January 31, 1998), A1.

### After Tiananmen: Political Repression

The political repression that pervaded Beijing after the suppression of the Democracy Movement was in part a continuation of repressive policies that had been put in place during the student protests. Decisions made by Party leaders during the spring movement had lasting effects on the treatment of student activists and other pro-democracy supporters. Tactics to repress student protestors and their sympathizers were put into place weeks prior to the forcible military suppression on June 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup>, 1989.

One of the initial attempts to repress the student movement was the declaration of martial law, which was initially declared in Beijing on May 20, 1989. Martial law orders were resisted by thousands of Beijing residents who blocked the streets and surrounded the military vehicles. Many made appeals to the soldiers to support the students.<sup>33</sup> The first issued martial law restrictions prohibited strikes, speeches, handing out leaflets and use of any method to “concoct and spread rumors.”<sup>34</sup> Additional martial law orders were released shortly thereafter that prohibited foreigners from being “involved in Chinese citizens activities that are against martial law”<sup>35</sup> and reporters were “strictly prohibited from instigative or demagogic reporting in the name of covering stories.”<sup>36</sup> A spokesman from the Beijing municipal government stated that martial law was instated in response to

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<sup>33</sup> Daniel Southerland, “Protestors Block Chinese Troops in Beijing; Citizens Defy Martial Law Orders; Moderate Party Chief Loses Power” *New York Times* (May 20, 1989), A1; and Jack R. Payton, “Martial Law Declared in Chinese Capital” *St. Petersburg Times* (May 20, 1989), 1A; and Mary Dejevsky and Catherine Sampson, “Martial Law in Peking to crush protest” *Times (London)* Issue 63399 (May 20, 1989)

<sup>34</sup> “Peking Martial Law Order No 1”, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 22, 1989) FE/0463/B2/1. Originally broadcast on Beijing television 0127 GMT on May 20, 1989.

<sup>35</sup> “Peking Martial Law Order No 2” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 22, 1989) FE/0463/B2/1. Originally broadcast on Beijing television at 0155 GMT on May 20, 1989.

<sup>36</sup> “Peking Martial Law Order No 3” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 22, 1989) FE/0463/B2/1. Originally broadcast on Beijing television at 0155 GMT on May 20, 1989.

the increasing severity of “the state of anarchy” in Beijing. He was also adamant that rumors purporting that the army had been sent to suppress the student movement were “completely groundless.”<sup>37</sup> Time would show that his assertion was incorrect.

Officials made repeated assertions that martial law had been enacted to restore order to Beijing. On May 21, 1989 the People’s Liberation Army issued the following statement to the residents of Beijing: “The PLA resolutely supports the demands of the broad masses of people in punishing the bureaucratic racketeers, opposing corruption, promoting socialist democracy, and developing the legal system. It is precisely for the purpose of creating the social environment needed to fulfill the aforementioned tasks that we are here to enforce martial law and restore normal order in the capital.” The PLA acknowledged some concerns of the protestors, but the clause to “restore normal order” did not offer any specifics on how the PLA was to accomplish this. The statement further said that the troops sent to enforce martial law would refrain from “doing anything that will harm the relations between the army and the people, which is as close as fish and water” and their “actual deeds” would be “to safeguard the interests of the nation and the people.”<sup>38</sup> A spokesman for the martial law commented that misgivings about martial law were “caused by a handful of persons with ulterior motives who have been spreading rumors and sowing dissention among the people.” Once again, assertions were made that

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<sup>37</sup> “Peking Government Spokesman on Martial Law” *Xinhua* (May 20, 1990) in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 22, 1989), FE/0463/B2/1.

<sup>38</sup> “PLA Issues Notice to Peking Residents” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 22, 1989), FE/0463/B2/1. Originally broadcast on Beijing home service at 0930 GMT on May 21, 1989.

rumors circulating that PLA troops would suppress the students in Tiananmen Square were exactly that, “sheer rumor.”<sup>39</sup>

The decision to use force to suppress the movement was arguably considered by Party leaders to meet the terms of the PLA notice, in that the suppression safeguarded the interests of the nation.<sup>40</sup> President Yang Shangkun stated that allowing the Democracy Movement to continue would “mean the destruction, over-night, of the People’s Republic and of the achievements that are the result of decades of war and blood that was shed by thousands of revolutionary martyrs. It would mean a denial of the Communist Party of China... To yield would be our end.”<sup>41</sup> The same day, a published open letter to troops enforcing martial law in the Beijing area stated that the turmoil in the capital has been “stirred up by a very few people” and reiterated Yang’s stance that “should their conspiracy succeed, the fruits of the decade-long reform achieved by the people across the country and the socialist modernization drive will be destroyed overnight.” It called on troops to “take a firm and clear cut stance” and to “unswervingly implement” the orders of the Party Central Committee and Central Military Command in “protecting the “vital interests of the masses of the people and waging an unequivocal struggle against the conspiracy of a very few people.”<sup>42</sup>

The “waging an unequivocal struggle against the conspiracy of a very few people” ended in the use of force by the military to suppress the student movement. At

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<sup>39</sup> “Martial law Enforcement Spokesman on People’s “Misunderstanding” of Martial Law” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 25, 1989), FE/0466/B2/1. Originally broadcast on Beijing home service at 0417 GMT on May 23, 1989.

<sup>40</sup> Timothy Brook, *Quelling the People* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 201.

<sup>42</sup> “Open Letter to Troops Urges ‘A Firm and Clear Cut Stand’” *Xinhua* (May 24, 1989) in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (May 26, 1989), FE/0467/B2/1.

6:00 PM on June 3<sup>rd</sup>, loudspeakers at the Great Hall of the People began to broadcast an emergency announcement that urged people to vacate the streets and go home. Anyone found in the street was there at their own risk and the government claimed no responsibility for whatever might happen to those who did not follow the order to vacate. This thinly veiled threat of violence warned that severe measures were now being taken. The Army's offensive against Beijing to retake control of Tiananmen Square was underway and involved more than fifty thousand troops.<sup>43</sup> The military suppression continued overnight and into the next day. The exact number of casualties was hotly contested between official government reports and the accounts of eyewitnesses at Tiananmen Square.<sup>44</sup>

The repression of the Democracy Movement elicited mixed international response. The United States condemned the military action against the student protestors, as did a number of other countries. A Paris conference on human rights declared that it was "impossible to remain silent" about the Chinese government's decision to suppress the movement, and that the "values of liberty and democracy, having been rediscovered on a great wave of hope, had now been 'broken by pitiless repression and executions'."<sup>45</sup> Leaders of some Communist countries, such as Mikhail Gorbachev, expressed sympathy for the student movement.<sup>46</sup> Government officials in Romania and Czechoslovakia reacted in the opposite manner and praised the Chinese government's action against those

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<sup>43</sup> Timothy Brooks, *Quelling the People* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 108-109.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 150-152. Brook's chapter "Spilling Blood (June 3-4)" provides a detailed description of military actions and eyewitness accounts during the PLA offensive to retake control of Tiananmen Square.

<sup>45</sup> Phillip Jacobsen, "Right Challenge to Communists; Paris Conference on Human Rights" *Times (London)* (June 24, 1989).

<sup>46</sup> Richard Bernstein, "Crackdown in China; China's Dual View of Western Ties" *New York Times* (June 17, 1989).

described as “subverting socialism.” The Czech government supported Chinese authorities and actively prevented students from expressing any solidarity with the Chinese student movement or holding demonstrations to protest the June 4 military suppression.<sup>47</sup> After the military suppression of the Democracy movement, Beijing remained in a state of martial law for months. The continuation of the martial law implied that “normal order” had yet to be restored in Beijing. Martial law remained in effect for months, and as a consequence the prohibitions on strikes, spreading “rumors”, handing out leaflets and the restrictions on the actions of foreigners and journalists outlined in the May martial law orders remained in force as well.

Another tactic of repression was the increased use of security surveillance against suspected pro-democracy students. Security surveillance was enacted early in the Democracy Movement, and increased as suspected student activists were trailed, filmed, and had their conversations surreptitiously recorded on tape by state security agents. For example, the texts of numerous posters displayed during the Democracy Movement were read into tape recorders by state security officers. Foreign journalists were photographed, recorded and followed by individuals who were presumably state security agents or police officers. Transcriptions of pro-democracy public speeches were filed in dossiers on each of the respective individuals.<sup>48</sup> Increased state surveillance and the compilation of dossiers containing information on the activities of pro-democracy activists became a common practice during the following years.

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<sup>47</sup> Esther B. Fein, “Clamor in Europe; Czech Students Belatedly Assail China Crackdown” *New York Times* (December 4, 1989).

<sup>48</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, “The Eye of Big Brother is Busy Again in China.” *New York Times* (June 23 1989).

After the military suppression at Tiananmen Square, Premier Li Peng called for a “life and death struggle” to defend the Communist Party leadership. This “life and death struggle” targeted dissenting elements throughout Chinese society through propaganda efforts and the arrest of movement activists and sympathizers. Repression efforts were primarily directed at students, because students were the largest group involved in the protests at Tiananmen Square. Worker activists were also targeted for their support of the student protests.

Workers also participated in the protests at Tiananmen beginning in April, although they did not have an amicable relationship with the student protesters early in the Democracy Movement. Han Dongfang and Zhao Hongliang of the Beijing Worker’s Autonomous Federation (BWAFF)<sup>49</sup> were two worker activists that endeavored to coordinate efforts between student activists and worker activists. The worker activists set up a headquarters at Xiguanlitai (“West Reviewing Stand”) across the street from the Party Leadership compound Zhongnanhai. Student protestors largely ignored the worker activists, who were prohibited by student leaders from conterminously protesting Tiananmen Square; although student leaders agreed to help print and distribute pamphlets and posters listing worker’s demands.<sup>50</sup> Workers provided support for student protesters, such as the Beijing Bus Company drivers who drove company vehicles into Tiananmen Square and slashed the tires so that buses could be used as secure quarters for hunger strikers.<sup>51</sup> Beida law student Li Jinjin described Han Dongfang as the Chinese Lech

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<sup>49</sup> Beijing Worker’s Autonomous Federation was the first independent labor organization in China since 1949, convened May 19, 1989 at Xiguanlitai in Beijing.

<sup>50</sup> Black and Munro, *Black Hands of Beijing*, 159-161.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, 181.

Walesa.<sup>52</sup> Li served as legal counsel to the BAAF, and helped write the group's first manifesto which proclaimed, "The proletariat is the most progressive class in society... Through the democracy movement, we have nothing to lose but our chains, but we stand to gain the whole world."<sup>53</sup> Han Dongfang marked himself as a leader of the workers by giving several speeches that implored students and workers to "join forces and stop bickering."<sup>54</sup>

In light of the consequences of worker activism in Poland, Chinese Party leadership was extremely concerned about the potential implications if workers joined forces with the student protestors. Chen Yun, the "godfather" of the Party conservatives, advised Deng Xiaoping to take strong action to suppress the growing movement and warned that "otherwise, it will only grow bigger, and if the workers join in, the consequences will be unimaginable."<sup>55</sup> The Beijing Party Committee issued a directive to all workplaces in Beijing that advised factory managers to take any action they thought necessary to break the link between the workers and the students.<sup>56</sup> The Party wished to avoid a movement like Poland's Solidarity at all costs. Solidarity won the national elections in Poland on the same day as the June 4 military suppression of the democracy movement.

After the military suppression, the names of worker activists were broadcast by the Public Security Bureau as part of the government's "most wanted list." Numerous

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid, 189. Lech Walesa co-founded Solidarity in Gdansk, Poland. Solidarity was the first independent trade union in the Soviet Union.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 201.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, 188.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 148.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, 163.

worker activists from the BWAF were caught and arrested. Han Dongfang, who was at the top of the list, turned himself in to the Public Security Ministry on June 19, 1989.<sup>57</sup> When asked if he intended to confess his crimes, he replied that he had “merely reported to” the Public Security Bureau to “set the record straight.”<sup>58</sup> The Public Security Bureau held Han in prison as a “black hand” for two years, but after an international campaign he was released on medical grounds. In September 1992, he was allowed to travel to the U.S. to receive treatment for the tuberculosis he caught while imprisoned.<sup>59</sup>

After June 4, Party fears of an intellectual-worker alliance prompted repressive action against workers who showed the slightest signs of unrest or dissent.<sup>60</sup> Dissident workers were labeled “hooligans” and many were executed as penalty for their actions.<sup>61</sup> The political repression of workers sought to silence working-class unrest. In December 1989, hard-line Party member Yang Xingfu replaced the more liberal Zhu Houze as the vice president of the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). Yang announced that only “trustworthy Marxists” would be allowed promotions to senior positions, and intensified efforts to remove “disloyal” cadres. The Party concurrently increased recruitment, propaganda and intelligence activities at the shop-floor level in factories. Despite these efforts, underground worker’s groups persisted in multiple provinces.<sup>62</sup> As part of the efforts to regain control of dissenting groups, the Chinese government implemented a nationwide search for the student leaders of the Democracy Movement.

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 264-265.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, 284.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 340.

<sup>60</sup> Mark Meisner, *Mao’s China and After*, 542-543.

<sup>61</sup> Black and Munro, *Black Hands of Beijing*, 284.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, 320-321.

On June 14<sup>th</sup>, a list of twenty-one wanted students was broadcast on national television along with pictures and descriptions of their age and physical appearance. The names of the wanted students were also read on Beijing Radio. At the top of the wanted list were Wang Dan from Beijing University and Wu'er Kaixi and Chai Ling from Beijing Normal University. Citizens were urged to notify police with any information about the whereabouts of the students<sup>63</sup> and information about them was posted at banks, railway stations, airports and border crossings to “keep them from escaping.”<sup>64</sup>

Shortly after the broadcast of the “most wanted” list, two student leaders were arrested. Zhou Fengsuo, a twenty-two year old physics major and leader of the independent students’ union, was turned into to authorities by his older sister and brother-in-law within ninety minutes of the broadcast, leading to his arrest in Xian. Xiong Yan, a twenty-five year old law student, was caught on a train near the northeastern city of Datong.<sup>65</sup>

The culpability of Zhou Fengsuo’s sister in his arrest was considered by many to be a symbol of the relentlessness of the Government’s repressive policies and prompted criticism of how someone could turn in their own family to the police. However some residents of Xian, where Zhou was arrested, maintained that the sister had not intentionally turned in her brother. One neighbor stated that all the neighbors knew that Zhou was staying with his sister, and his sister was afraid that one of them would report

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<sup>63</sup> John Gittings, “Chinese begin hunt for student leaders” *Guardian (London)* (June 14, 1989); and D. Costello, “Wanted List of Students Broadcast on TV” *Courier-Mail* (June 14, 1989)

<sup>64</sup> Jan Wong, “Manhunt for students starts, China seeks 21 leaders” *Globe and Mail (Canada)* (June 14, 1989).

<sup>65</sup> Jan Wong and Bryan Johnson, “Student Leaders snared after ‘most-wanted’ list aired on Chinese TV” *Globe and Mail (Canada)* (June 15, 1989); and “Wanted Students Captured” *Sydney Morning Herald (Australia)* (June 15, 1989), 13.

him, which would have been terrible for her and her husband's careers. The neighbor maintained that his sister had only meant to get him some counseling and try to convince him to turn himself in. Regardless of this account, residents expressed contempt for her actions. One woman said, "Everybody hates her...She is afraid to go out on the street because of all the threatening letters she has received." The issue represents an example of the complex conflict between interpretations of government propaganda regarding the Democracy Movement and its suppression.<sup>66</sup>

In the weeks following the crackdown at Tiananmen Square, the Chinese government made repeated public exhortations for citizens to denounce student activists and other leaders. During this time, the government asserted that it had received thousands of letters from citizens that "help to identify thugs". Newspapers printed articles by professors and students criticizing the democracy movement.<sup>67</sup> Arrests were frequently broadcasted via television, and showed "thugs" – as many involved in the protest movement were labeled – being led away by police.<sup>68</sup> Another wanted "rumor-mongered" was turned into the police by two shop assistants. Two foreigners who were seen asking questions in Beijing suburbs were turned in by the local peasants and workers.<sup>69</sup>

The arrests of pro-democracy activists continued with mixed results. Soldiers who enforced martial law in Beijing searched regularly vehicles and checked identity papers as part of the intense search for pro-democracy activists, particularly those on the most-

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<sup>66</sup> Nicholas Kristof, "Chinese Tale of Betrayal, With a Twist" *New York Times* (September 10, 1989), 14.

<sup>67</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, "The Eye of Big Brother is Busy Again in China." *New York Times* (June 23 1989).

<sup>68</sup> Richard Bernstein, "Beijing Memo; Is the Crackdown a Legacy of Traditional China or of 20<sup>th</sup> Century Communism?" *New York Times* (June 21, 1989).

<sup>69</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, "The Eye of Big Brother is Busy Again in China." *New York Times* (June 23 1989).

wanted list who had not yet been caught. Many people speculated that those on the highly publicized list who had managed to avoid detection had either gone into hiding or fled abroad.<sup>70</sup> Thousands of people were arrested throughout the month of June, but as of July over half of those on the most-wanted list still eluded authorities. Wang Dan was arrested in Beijing in July; the eighth individual from the list to be arrested.<sup>71</sup> International news sources reported that other wanted activists, including some of the twenty-one wanted student leaders, managed to leave China and make their way to Hong Kong, France and the United States.<sup>72</sup>

In mid-July 1989, the Beijing Evening News reported that 3,586 people had been sentenced by the end of June. One diplomat stated that he had been told by a “well placed security official” that approximately 4,600 people had been arrested or detained by the authorities in Beijing alone. Higher estimates by human rights groups in the range of 10,000 arrests circulated, despite the official government acknowledgement of slightly more than 2,000 arrests and 29 executions.<sup>73</sup> A majority of university students in Beijing participated in the demonstrations at Tiananmen Square at some point, although most did not have important roles in the protest movement. One such student, who attended the demonstrations but who was not a student leader, described being repeatedly interrogated by authorities and told to write a detailed confession regarding his activities. Many students who took part were allowed to graduate from their respective universities, but

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<sup>70</sup> Richard Bernstein, “Many Wanted Chinese Elude Capture” *New York Times* (June 26, 1989), A8.

<sup>71</sup> Daniel Southerland, “10,000 Chinese Detained in Crackdown on Dissent” *Washington Post* (July 8, 1989), A1. Wang Dan’s arrest is also cited in “China admits most wanted student held” *Advertiser* (July 21, 1989).

<sup>72</sup> Richard Bernstein, “Many Wanted Chinese Elude Capture” *New York Times* (June 26, 1989), A8; “Chinese dissident reaches France” *Toronto Star* (April 4, 1990), A21; Fox Butterfield, “2 Student Leaders in U.S.” *New York Times* (July 27, 1989), A5.

<sup>73</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, “China Said to Continue Arrests Quietly”, *New York Times* (July 17, 1989).

were then assigned jobs in factories rather than in more desirable venues such as joint ventures or government institutions.<sup>74</sup>

The political backlash following the democracy movement also included the removal of numerous public officials from their posts in a campaign against the “bourgeois liberalism of the west.” General Secretary of the Communist Party Zhao Ziyang was removed from his position for sympathizing with the student protesters. The recommendation for his removal presented to the Party Central Committee stated, “Comrade Zhao Ziyang committed the mistakes of supporting turmoil and splitting the Party. The nature of his mistakes and the consequences they brought are both extremely grave. He is no longer fit to go on with the important work that is currently his.”<sup>75</sup> Deng Xiaoping had previously criticized Zhao, stating that “he blocked the Four Basic Principles and opposed Party policy on bourgeois liberalization.”<sup>76</sup> Zhao was placed under house arrest. Shortly after Wan Li and Hu Qili, two other high ranking Party members charged with supporting “bourgeois liberalization”, were also placed under house arrest.<sup>77</sup>

In September 1989 Culture Minister Wang Meng, a novelist who was previously exiled during the Cultural Revolution, was dismissed from his position following a

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Excerpts from Li Peng, “Report on mistake committed by Comrade Zhao Ziyang during the anti-party and antisocialist turmoil,” report to the Fourth Plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee (June 23, 1989), in *The Tiananmen Papers*, Zhang Liang, comp. and eds. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (Public Affairs: New York, 2002), 438.

<sup>76</sup> Excerpts from “Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s June 19 talk at the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo,” Secretariat of the Fourth Plenum of the Thirteenth CCP Central Committee, “Meeting Materials” (June 19, 1989), in *The Tiananmen Papers*, Zhang Liang, comp. and eds. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (Public Affairs: New York, 2002), 432.

<sup>77</sup> Don Kirk, “Top Chinese liberals taken into custody” *USA Today* (May 26, 1989), 4A.

meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The committee also dismissed deputy director of the State Commission on Science and Technology, Yuan Chongwu, and the deputy director of the nation's central bank, Lin Hongru. Governor of Hainan province, Liang Xiang, was relieved of his post after he came under suspicion for being a political ally of Zhao Ziyang.

In a September 1989 interview, Prime Minister Li Peng defended the Chinese government's repressive actions stating, "These two aspects, dissatisfaction and rebellion, must be separated...I think that the danger of action to overthrow the Government has not been totally eliminated neither overseas nor in China itself. I fear that we must still continue the struggle against subversion and infiltrations."<sup>78</sup> The Prime Minister ruled out an unconditional amnesty for those arrested in connection with the demonstrations, saying that "while discontent with the Government was understandable, those who try to overthrow the government could not be forgiven." Li Peng clarified that those with no "leading role in the troubles" would not be pursued by authorities.<sup>79</sup>

At the end of September 1989, General Secretary of the Communist Party Jiang Zemin gave an 80-minute address broadcast on national television that acknowledged some mistakes but called for vigilance against what the Party described as efforts on the part of the West to subvert the Chinese government and institute capitalism. The speech was given as part of the upcoming commemoration of forty years of communist rule in China. Jiang Zemin acknowledged that, "After we became the party in power, some

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<sup>78</sup> Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Li Peng, in Interview, Rules Out General Amnesty" *New York Times* (September 7, 1989).

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

phenomena of bureaucratism , petty tyranny, abuse of power for personal gains, corruption and degeneration, which result in alienation from the masses of the people, have gradually emerged.”<sup>80</sup> He proposed that the solution to these problems was a renewal of extensive ideological education to restore the Communist party spirit and faith in the party. However, he cautioned that, “Hostile forces international as well as internal are still engaged in activities of sabotage and subversion against us.” He described China as engaged in “a serious class struggle” and said that the government would “isolate and attack the handful of hostile elements” behind the democracy movement. He stated, “ The disturbances stirred up by hostile forces, both internal and external, were aimed at overthrowing the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership and subverting the socialist system, at turning China into a bourgeois republic and reducing it once again to a dependency of the Western capitalist powers.”<sup>81</sup>

Jiang Zemin discussed what he described as the “two completely different views” regarding the issue of reform and opening. One view, which was the correct one, would result in modernization and perfection of socialism. On the other hand, he cautioned that “total Westernization...constitutes transformation into capitalism and brings China into the orbit of the capitalist system of the west.” Coupled with his previous comments about the subversion of Western powers into China’s internal affairs, the party was making a correlation between those who supported a more aggressive rate reform and actions committed under foreign influence. This correlation increased the severity of the

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<sup>80</sup> Nicholas D. Kristof, “Chinese Chief Sets Hard Policy Line”, *New York Times* (September 30 1989).

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

accusation that a person favored “bourgeois liberalization”, making it an extremely grave offense.<sup>82</sup>

The ideological study campaign was quickly implemented. The ideological study program, which required people to devote hours of intensive study to party doctrine, was part of a nationwide re-registration campaign for the country’s 48 million party members. The required time commitment of forty full days devoted to political study forced many research projects at universities and government institutions to be temporarily postponed. One doctoral candidate described the priority on the ideological study, “We were told to make political study primary and research secondary.” Prestigious universities and postgraduate research centers that were particularly active in the 1989 protests, such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the University of Politics and Law were deeply affected.<sup>83</sup> A sociology researcher stated, “We have to read speeches by Party Chief Jiang Zemin and other propaganda” and added that her research into the politically sensitive topic of student movements in China had been suspended. The forty day study program also interrupted short-term projects conducted by research institutes that work in conjunction with the government. The State Council’s Research Center for Social, Economic and Technological Development’s policy recommendations during that time were hindered by the political study time commitment and fears of reprisals. The center

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Sarah Lubman, “Many Research Projects in China are Pushed Aside as New Round of Ideological Study is Imposed” *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (July 4, 1990)

also put short-term research projects such as a study of the causes of China's recession on hold because of time constraints.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

### Under Scrutiny: The effects of repressive policies on Chinese universities

Beijing University, also called Beida, was one of the epicenters of the student democracy movement and the source of many of the student leaders. After the army crushed the movement, Beijing University was placed under rigorous party control and the university president Ding Shisun, who was regarded as “a protector of his students”, was replaced by the former vice president of the People’s University in Beijing, Wu Shuqing, who had strong connections with the Communist Party.<sup>85</sup> Control measures were enacted that remained in place for years.

Political programs directed specifically at students were designed to foster patriotism and “correct political attitudes” among students after June 1989. In August, the State education Commission announced a new policy that required most college graduates to work for one to two “at the grass roots”<sup>86</sup> in factories or rural villages before applying to graduate school. The new policy was described by government officials as part of a wider effort to “rekindle communist values” and combat “bourgeois liberalization” by sending students to rural areas to teach them to appreciate the daily difficulties faced by China’s rural population through hard work and enduring hardship. The *China Daily* cited a State Education Commission circular which stated that the program was specifically intended for students planning to attend graduate school in the social sciences, presumably because many of the Democracy Movement student leaders majored in social science programs. A party official commented that college students

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<sup>85</sup> “China Replaces Head of Beijing University” *New York Times* (Aug 24, 1989), A16.

<sup>86</sup> Nicholas Kristoff, “Why China’s Students Aren’t Ready for the Masses” *New York Times* (August 20, 1989), E2.

were “very arrogant” and that the proposed work program would be “very good for them, by teaching them how most Chinese people live.”<sup>87</sup>

This new policy was compared to the re-education program of the Cultural Revolution, during which millions of youths were sent to rural areas for “re-education” through working and living with the peasant proletariat. Similar to the previous re-education program, the new program required that students have their household registrations transferred to the rural area in which they were assigned to work. However, officials contended that unlike the Maoist program<sup>88</sup> students would be allowed to transfer their household registrations back to Beijing after a year to begin a career or graduate program. The exception to this was, in the words of one official, “extreme cases of people who preformed very badly.”<sup>89</sup>

Another program directed at incoming first year students involved compulsory military training. Beginning in the fall of 1989, Beijing University instituted a one year mandatory program of military and political training for all incoming freshmen at the Shijiazhuang infantry academy. This program had to be completed by students before they were allowed to enroll in regular college courses.<sup>90</sup> In April 1990, Chinese authorities announced that they planned to extend the mandatory military and political

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<sup>87</sup> Nicholas Kristof, “China is Planning 2 Years of Labor for its Graduates” *New York Times* (August 13, 1989), A1 and A15.

<sup>88</sup> Under the Cultural Revolution program, young people sent to rural areas for labor re-education had their household registrations (their residency permits) changed from urban areas to the rural areas where they were assigned. This became problematic because after the re-education, those who had their household registrations changed could not return to the cities, so they were stranded in the countryside.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid; and Nicholas Kristoff, “Why China’s Students Aren’t Ready for the Masses” *New York Times* (August 20, 1989), E2.

<sup>90</sup> Daniel Southerland, “China Plans Military Training for Many University Freshmen”, *The Washington Post* (April 18, 1990), A29.

training to several other key universities, including Fudan University in Shanghai, because the party leadership determined that the military training experiment had been a success.<sup>91</sup>

Praise for the military training was abundant in China's state-owned press. The *Beijing Ribao* reported that "after seven months of military training, the right political orientation has been made clear to the students; their collectivist spirits improved; better ideas about discipline established; and their military, political and cultural quality improved, laying a sound foundation for their further development."<sup>92</sup> Several Beijing University freshmen at the Shijiazhuang Military Academy were interviewed by the press and were quoted as proffering positive comments about their military training experiences. One student, Wang Jing, was cited as saying, "I think that I am more mature than before. In the past we used to complain when we came across problems, but now we feel we are duty bound to overcome them." Another student, Huang Weiwei, said, "At the academy all the students were good friends, and we talked about everything with each other. If one was in difficulty, all the others would rally round to help."<sup>93</sup>

Another interesting assessment of the military training was offered in an article by Zhang Yusheng in the *People's Daily*. Zhang wrote that young students in China were "babied and petted" by their parents, making them into "society's pets" with "a marked sense of self superiority". To reverse this trend, he argued that young students need a "shake down" and that military training is but one method to accomplish this. He writes,

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> "Praise for Peking University students undergoing military training" *Xinhua News Agency* (May 23, 1990) trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* FE/0773/B2/1 (May 25, 1990).

<sup>93</sup> "Peking University Students Give Positive Appraisal of Military Service" *Xinhua News Agency* (July 12 1990), trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* FE/0817/B2/1 (July 16, 1990).

“Looking back today, I am all the more convinced that a “shake down” was what they needed most. The “floor on which they slept” was none other than society and life...The lack of knowledge about society and other peoples means not knowing oneself. This Achilles’ heel of young students taught us a painful lesson last fall.”<sup>94</sup>

Despite the copious praise in the state press for the military training program, many upper classmen students at Beijing University did not share the positive state opinion. A Beijing University student asserted that, “The government is trying to break the spirit of Beijing University...but Beijing University can never be defeated.” The student felt that the government was trying to create a gap between the freshmen undergoing military training and the upper classmen.<sup>95</sup> Many older students expressed concern for the new students, who they felt had been “poisoned by the heavy dose of government propaganda to which they were exposed” condemning the previous year’s protests as “counterrevolutionary”.

These students began a quiet campaign to “de-program” the incoming freshman class by making discreet contact and exchanging ideas, and hoped to counteract the effects of a year of political indoctrination. A junior at Beijing University stated, “They’ve had propaganda telling them what to do and what to think. They’ve been told that there’s only one truth, one government and no opposition.”<sup>96</sup> Another student stated, “We’ve vowed to teach these freshmen the true spirit of Beijing University when they

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<sup>94</sup> Zhang Yusheng, “‘Babied’ Peking students benefit from ‘shake down’”, *People’s Daily* (September 10, 1990) trans. in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* FE/0879/B2/1 (September 26, 1990).

<sup>95</sup> Daniel Southerland, “China Plans Military Training for Many University Freshmen”, *The Washington Post* (April 18, 1990), A29.

<sup>96</sup> Sarah Lubman, “Students at Beijing U. Trying to ‘De-Program’ Freshmen Exposed to Year of Indoctrination” *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (October 17, 1990).

arrive here...we'll reverse the government indoctrination.”<sup>97</sup> Campus officials, however, instituted measures to keep the incoming freshmen separate from the rest of the student population. Freshmen students were housed in two separated dormitories, were enrolled in separate classes, and even used a separate student union. These new students were required to get special permission to participate in extracurricular activities outside the scope of the regular activity program. Elements of the prior military training remained, such as a required early morning jog with their supervisor three days a week. Some freshmen students even continued to wear their military uniforms.<sup>98</sup>

On the now-stifled campuses in Beijing, student behavior became a mixture of quiet dissent and cautionary measures. One of Beijing's elite universities required students to attend a screening of the propaganda film *Wei Wei Kumlung* (Towering Mountain), which depicted pre-1949 China. One scene depicted the violent breakup of a demonstration and some students cheered, because no tanks were used against the demonstrators. When party officials questioned the students on their motive for cheering, they simply answered, “Because it was such a good film.”<sup>99</sup> Upper classmen say that they will apply “peaceful evolution” on the freshmen, mocking the party catchphrase that refers to the capitalist undermining of Chinese Communism. One upper classmen, a party member promised to pass on “proper education in the four evils”: overeating, drinking, gambling and promiscuity. Students and teachers interviewed described a campus

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<sup>97</sup> Daniel Southerland, “China Plans Military Training for Many University Freshmen”, *The Washington Post* (April 18, 1990), A29.

<sup>98</sup> Sarah Lubman, “Students at Beijing U. Trying to ‘De-Program’ Freshmen Exposed to Year of Indoctrination” *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (October 17, 1990).

<sup>99</sup> Steven Erlanger, “Beijing Journal; On the Stifled Campuses, Faint Echoes of Dissent” *New York Times* (January 2 1990), A4.

atmosphere of caution, mistrust and depression. Many students implemented a self-imposed restriction on political discussion and increasingly participated in escapist behaviors such as substance abuse and casual sex. One student described the increased isolation of campuses from larger society, stating, “The campus is a very small world. It’s like living in a cage, and you feel watched all the time. People are depressed and discouraged. Life seems meaningless now, and they are cynical.”<sup>100</sup>

Many students expressed that they felt suspicious of others, in part because numerous individuals who participated in the democracy movement shielded others by providing less than forthcoming self-criticisms about their activities. As one student put it, “There are a lot of people who participated and have something to hide, so people don’t trust one another. It is one of the biggest successes of the government.” One faculty member related a meeting with the party secretary during which the secretary complained that the teachers were setting a bad example by not informing on other, as some students had done. Faculty members said that while they were allowed to have political discussion in the faculty rooms, they were under strict orders not to discuss any politics in class or with students.<sup>101</sup>

The deteriorating political control of the Communist party in the Soviet Union brought renewed but quiet protests on campuses. After the execution of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu on Christmas day in 1989, the Politburo called provincial leaders to Beijing to study the party’s new thinking: communism has gravely suffered in the Soviet Union because of Mikhail Gorbachev’s treacherous “subversion of

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

socialism.”<sup>102</sup> The execution of Ceausescu and other events in Eastern Europe regenerated a fear of domestic demonstrations, and the Politburo simultaneously ordered thousands of martial-law troops into full alert while simultaneously issuing congratulatory remarks to Romania’s new leaders. In a dramatic contrast to the political reforms of the Soviet union, General Secretary Jiang Zemin stated in a New Year’s address that, “We will surely be able to grasp the rules of history and win the final victory.” Prime Minister Li Peng told the People’s Armed Police that “China faces a long-term struggle...we cannot afford to slacken our vigilance.”<sup>103</sup>

This emphasis on vigilance, however, did not deter small-scale protests. While students generally agreed that political organization was dangerous, they protested in more symbolic ways, such as throwing bottles from Beijing’s Quinghua University dormitory windows in a figurative call for Deng Xiaoping’s downfall because “Xiaoping” is a homonym for “small bottle”. Students at another university went on a “collective walk” to show their solidarity for the execution.<sup>104</sup> At Beijing Univerity, a protest poster denounced Ceausescu as a “dog.” The poster read, "Someone has lost his dog and its name is Ceausescu. If you find him, please don't let him interact with the dogs Li, Yang, Deng and Jiang . . . ." The poster was removed within an hour and political officers from the university visited the student dormitories to warn students that they could face harsh punishment for expressing support for Ceausescu’s overthrow.<sup>105</sup> One

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<sup>102</sup> C.S. Manegold and Dorinda Elliot, “Nervous Holdouts for a Hard Line”, *Newsweek* (January 15, 1990), 34.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> Daniel Southerland, “China: Beijing Rejects Coverage of Ceausescu’s Ouster” *Washington Post* (December 23, 1989), A23.

teacher who described himself as sympathetic to his student's anger stated that he was concerned that the situation could get worse as it had in the 1950s and 1960s. He said that he admonished his students not to get into trouble over renewed protests. He explained, "The students are impatient and want rapid change, and they have their own ideas. But I don't want them to get into trouble or waste their lives. We've all been inspired by a few demonstrations and by Rumania, but I tell them, 'Right now your lives are more important. Don't throw them away.'"<sup>106</sup>

At the end of 1990, the last government inspection teams concluded their 18-month long cleanup of the Tiananmen democracy movement. Professors were expelled from some faculties at Beijing University, including the history department where student leader Wang Dan majored.<sup>107</sup> The history department and three other departments were closed to incoming students.<sup>108</sup> Over the course of the investigation, a number of people from various other institutions were ousted from their positions, primarily for political reasons. The Chinese Academy for Social Sciences was declared a "disaster center" of democracy movement activism and several department heads were fired. Jiang Ping, president of the Beijing University of Politics and Law was dismissed for being too sympathetic to student demands for political reform.<sup>109</sup>

At the same time, a new educational plan was released that emphasized elementary and vocational schooling over higher education. The new policies announced

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<sup>106</sup> Steven Erlanger, "Beijing Journal; On the Stifled Campuses, Faint Echoes of Dissent" *New York Times* (January 2 1990), A4.

<sup>107</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, "Beijing Journal; The Winter of One Chinese Campus's Discontent", *New York Times* (February 11, 1991), A4.

<sup>108</sup> "China Replaces Head of Beijing University" *New York Times* (Aug 24, 1989), A16.

<sup>109</sup> Sarah Lubman, "Many Research Projects in China are Pushed Aside as New Round of Ideological Study is Imposed", *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (July 4, 1990).

by the State Education Commission called for a rapid expansion of technical and vocational education programs, citing a need for “highly trained, quality laborers to develop the country.”<sup>110</sup> The new policy also included guidelines for instruction in the social sciences and humanities to distinguish clearly, in the words of Education Commission head Li Tieying, “which points of view are bourgeois liberalist” and to help students “to distinguish right from wrong.” Li avowed that China was in need of “red and expert” teachers, referencing Mao Zedong’s preference for political zeal over professional qualifications. Higher education institutions, he argued, “must become gardens of the socialist vanguard and fronts to oppose bourgeois liberalism and peaceful evolution.”<sup>111</sup>

These new educational policies indicated a retrenchment of the social sciences at major Chinese universities such as Beijing University. In 1991, the history department at Beida remained closed to new freshmen for a second year. Authorities cut enrollment in the sociology department by 20 percent. The philosophy department undergraduate enrollment dropped from 60 to 30, with no new graduate students in 1991. The Chinese language department enrolled only thirteen first-year students, compared with a previous annual average of 30 students. Social science departments at other major universities such as Fudan and Nankai were similarly affected.<sup>112</sup>

The ideological repression at Beida continued into 1991. University sources reported that political investigations and personnel replacements were ongoing. In early

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<sup>110</sup> Sarah Lubman, “China to Curb Development of Higher Education in Next 10 Years and Stress Vocational Programs”, *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (February 20, 1991).

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

1991, the Beijing University Communist Party secretary Wang Xuezheng was replaced by Wang Jialiu, a senior party official from the Beijing municipal party committee.<sup>113</sup> Wang had defended the student protestors in 1989 as “patriotic,” and many university staff said that they anticipated that this would prompt his removal. Officials reportedly delayed Wang’s departure for over a year and a half after Beida President Ding Shisun’s forced resignation to avoid the appearance of a purge. Wang’s replacement gave conservative city Party authorities direct control over the university.<sup>114</sup>

Mandatory re-registration of Party members continued in departments considered to be resistive, including Chinese language, history and international politics. Forty-one faculty members and 137 students reviewed “serious warnings”, which are an administrative punishment in the form of a permanent demerit in their personal dossiers. Such demerits could interfere with job opportunities, housing assignments and overseas study. Li Tieying, head of the State Education Commission, visited the university and addressed a select group of students, stating that university should be a “vital ideological fortress” and a “front” for Marxist thought.<sup>115</sup>

The control measures inside Beijing University affected the lives of students even after they left. Many employers would not hire Beijing University graduates because of concerns that the students were too politically active. These diminished job prospects compounded with the increased control measures dissuaded some of the brightest high

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<sup>113</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, “Beijing Journal; The Winter of One Chinese Campus’s Discontent”, *New York Times* (February 11, 1991), A4.

<sup>114</sup> Sarah Lubman, “Air of Repression Pervades Campus of Beijing University” *Chronicle of Higher Education* (April 17, 1991).

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

school students from applying to Beijing University despite its historic prestige. Many prospective students chose to apply elsewhere or made arrangements for study abroad.<sup>116</sup>

The anniversaries of the democracy movement crackdown on June 4<sup>th</sup> became a source of tension between authorities and students. On the first anniversary of the crackdown, about 1,000 Beijing students commemorated the date by marching around, singing the worker's protest song "Internationale", banging on pots and pans,<sup>117</sup> and smashing bottles in to express opposition to Deng Xiaoping. A week later, security forces arrested and imprisoned the organizer.<sup>118</sup> The second anniversary was observed with larger scale protests. A banner reading, "We Will Never Forget June 4" hung briefly from the Beijing University dormitory windows. Leaflets flung from dormitory windows called on students to mourn those killed in the June 4<sup>th</sup> crackdown by wearing white, the color of mourning, and to remember those in jail for promoting the movement. The leaflets specifically mentioned Wang Juntao, who had recently been sentenced to 13 years in prison. The one type of leaflet read, "Two years ago in June, those were the days that awoke the heart and moved the spirit... The hue and cry then became the sounds of suffocation in a pool of blood." The second version of the leaflet, distributed by the Young China United Association proclaimed, "The world no longer pays attention to

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<sup>116</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, "Beijing Journal; The Winter of One Chinese Campus's Discontent", *New York Times* (February 11, 1991), A4.

<sup>117</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, "Beijing Students Issue Leaflets on Democracy", *New York Times* (May 30, 1991), A8.

<sup>118</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, "Beijing University Students Mark the 1989 Crackdown", *New York Times* (June 4, 1991), A12.

Beijing University... We at Beijing University must take care of our own conscience!”<sup>119</sup>  
Police raided the dormitories the following day.<sup>120</sup>

Two days after the anniversary, the government released ninety-seven people who had been previously arrested for involvement in the Democracy Movement including student leaders Zhou Fengsuo and Xiong Wei. Diplomats said that the release of political prisoners indicated a “mild reduction in tensions now that the Government does not have to worry about protests.” With the release of these ninety-seven prisoners, the officially reported total of released prisoners was now 881, leaving an estimated 334 people reported as still “under investigation.” This figure did not include those already sentenced to prison or sent to labor camps, where arrestees could be sent for up to three years before trial under the Chinese penal system.<sup>121</sup>

The release of political prisoners was a mixed signal from the government, which had arrested a small number of students and dissidents who spoke out against the government during the week of the Tiananmen anniversary. Three of these dissidents had been detained after attempting to publicize a petition which called for the release of political prisoners. The same day as the release, security forces had beaten foreign journalists and students in the university district of Beijing. These continued detainments

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<sup>119</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, “Beijing Students Issue Leaflets on Democracy”, *New York Times* (May 30, 1991), A8.

<sup>120</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, “Beijing University Students Mark the 1989 Crackdown”, *New York Times* (June 4, 1991), A12.

<sup>121</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, “Beijing Frees 97 Held in Protests to Try and Ease Domestic Tension” *New York Times* (June 7, 1990), A14; and Daniel Southerland, “China Announces Release of 97 Held in Crackdown” *Washington Post* (June 7, 1990), A34.

indicated that while many considered the release of political prisoners a “good gesture,” it was unclear whether it heralded a relaxation of repressive policies.<sup>122</sup>

Public security was tightened in anticipation of protest movements on the second anniversary, and university authorities warned students not to commemorate the dates or they would be punished.<sup>123</sup> On June 3, approximately 200 students gathered outside the campus library; some wearing white. The students started to sing songs, but they were quickly silenced by plainclothes police officers. Shortly after midnight, students began clapping, cheering and smashing bottles outside three graduate dormitories where police and other security officers were patrolling. Authorities had attempted to limit such demonstrations by gathering up all the glass bottles in the area, increasing police presence and threatening severe punishment for participation in protest activities. Despite these measures, student dissidents smashed nearly 100 glass bottles in a protest that lasted two hours.<sup>124</sup>

Aside from these brief protests, many described a marked change in the atmosphere at the university as a result of the restrictions on political expression and movement. One faculty member at the university said that the impact of the restrictions was more serious than elsewhere “because Beijing University carries so much prestige and influence.” Many practiced self-censorship and seemed to become apathetic about politics and studies. Libraries were deserted, and faculty reported that students turned to

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<sup>122</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, “Beijing Frees 97 Held in Protests to Try and Ease Domestic Tension” *New York Times* (June 7, 1990), A14

<sup>123</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, “Beijing Students Issue Leaflets on Democracy”, *New York Times* (May 30, 1991), A8

<sup>124</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, “Beijing University Students Mark the 1989 Crackdown”, *New York Times* (June 4, 1991), A12.

superficial pursuits instead. Posters now advertised sales instead of lectures, and students pursued “traditional” activities such as sewing, cooking and sports.

Such attitudes were indicative of the effects of what Orville Schell describes as the “dissolution of the realm of the private and of the self.” He describes that many Chinese citizens practiced self-censorship as a method of self defense against state scrutiny. He writes, “So defoliated had the landscape become of trust, that almost any kind of personal friend with whom confidences could be safely shared became suspect.”<sup>125</sup> Self-censorship and distrust of others is described in numerous personal accounts from the years following the port-Tiananmen political repression. However, Schell also points out that many people were willing to speak to him confidentially, even though he was a foreigner and this put them at considerable personal risk.<sup>126</sup> The willingness of university students, faculty and other people to confidentially speak out is evidenced by the volume of statements provided to foreign journalists regarding government policies and social conditions. However, the prevalence of self-censorship is evident in the insistence of sources on anonymity.

Those within China were subject to different restrictions on expression than their counterparts overseas. Overseas Chinese students presented an entirely different problem for government officials, as it was much more difficult to enforce the same politically repressive policies on individuals who were not in the country. The next section discusses

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<sup>125</sup> Orville Schell, “The Re-emergence of the Realm of the Private in China” in *The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen*, ed. George Hicks (Chicago: St. James Press, 1990), 420-421.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 426-427.

Chinese government policies that were specifically designed to address the problems of controlling students overseas and the effects of such efforts.

Not Far Enough Away: Overseas Education and the Harassment of Chinese Students in the U.S.

Chinese students studying were a problematic group for the Chinese government to enforce political repression. Their distance from China and the legal protections offered by some host countries prevented the same level of successful repression enacted by the government at domestic universities and against domestically based students. Despite the distance, the Chinese government made extensive efforts to repress pro-democracy activities by overseas Chinese students. Chinese students studied at universities in numerous foreign countries. For example, France granted political asylum to numerous student leaders, many of whom set up residence in France. However, the overseas Chinese student population was concentrated in the United States, which hosted a population of over 40,000 Chinese students. The critical mass of Chinese students in the United States combined with the extensive U.S. public condemnation of the Chinese government's June 4 suppression made U.S.-based overseas students the target of intensive repression efforts.

In September 1989, the Chinese government announced that it would restrict the number of graduate students sent to the United States and other foreign countries, and would begin producing more members of its intellectual and technological elite in domestic universities. Officials explicitly linked the restriction on foreign study to the crushed democracy movement, arguing that Chinese students have been over influenced by the west. The Vice Minister of Education, He Dongchang, said "Opening to the outside world does not necessarily mean seeking knowledge from only a few Western

countries. He used the metaphor that a “screen” must be placed over China’s “windows to the world” to prevent “flies and worms” from getting in and infesting the country.<sup>127</sup>

The restriction on graduate students studying at foreign universities was part of a larger effort by the Chinese government to reduce dependence on the west. In previous decades, China had depended heavily on foreign technology and educational institutions. He Dongchang emphasized that China would now focus on producing its own doctors in the future rather than sending students overseas for graduate study. Retaining graduate students at domestic universities, however, meant that students would not have access to the same resources offered at foreign universities in high-demand fields such as computer science, physics and engineering. Prime Minister Li Peng acknowledged that retaining graduate students might subsequently have a negative impact on Chinese technological development. For example, he announced to scientists in China’s developing space program that the industry would have to “be developed through self reliance and hard struggle” and urged scientists to use as much domestic technology as possible.

The government did not specify exactly how many students would be granted exit visas. Government officials reported that approximately seven thousand students were doing post-graduate work overseas on government funding prior to June 1989, and another five thousand students were funded abroad by government departments or state-run enterprises. However, a large proportion of students abroad at the time were self-funded or recipients of foreign scholarships. Since these students were not using government money to fund their studies, it was unclear how the government planned to

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<sup>127</sup> David E. Sanger, “China Will Allow Fewer Students to Study in U.S.” *New York Times* (September 3, 1989).

limit exit visas for independent foreign study, particularly in light of the fact that the predominant users of such exit visas were the children of Politburo members, government officials and Communist Party leaders.<sup>128</sup>

The Chinese government said that while the number students send abroad for graduate and doctoral studies would be reduced, the number of “visiting scholars” sent to the United States and other countries for brief periods would be increased. The logic seemed to be that post-doctoral visiting scholars would be older and have more ties in China, such as a spouse or children, and would therefore be more likely to return to their home country once their period of study was completed. He Dongchang also said in an interview with the New China News Service that job placement, pay and quality of housing for returnees would be improved.<sup>129</sup>

The State Education commission announced additional policies pertaining to study abroad, some intended to promote the return of overseas students to China. The commission announced that announced that it planned to limit the number of students allowed to study social sciences and humanities overseas, a reflection of the changed domestic education polices as well as the opinion that these disciplines were politically sensitive. The commission also considered implementing a mandatory national exam on Chinese history, ideology and culture to test how likely students were to return. Another policy required that the student’s employer to reimburse the Government for money spent on study abroad if the student failed to return to China. Even students on foreign

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

scholarships could be considered Government-sponsored for visa purposes if their work unit contributed to any tuition or expenses.<sup>130</sup>

The move to limit study abroad by graduate students also arguably addressed two other issues relating to students abroad: the fact that many students who obtained degrees in foreign countries often did not return to China, and the concern over thousands of Chinese students who organized a democracy movement in exile. More than 70,000 students and scholars had left China over the previous decade to study abroad and never returned. After the Tiananmen crackdown and subsequent political repression, many students had “strong reservations” about returning to China to work.<sup>131</sup>

Shortly after these study abroad restrictions were announced, the *New York Times* reported that the largest obstacle for Chinese students wishing to study in the United States was, ironically, the U.S. Embassy.<sup>132</sup> Approximately half of the students seeking visas were rejected because they failed to meet one of the three required criteria for a visa: that they be well qualified for the program they selected, proof of the necessary financial resources, and that they intend to return to China upon graduation. The “intent to return” requirement seemed to be the largest hindrance. Consulate employees explained that the “burden of proof is on the visa applicant to show intention to return to China, and these days many students find it difficult to sound sincere or enthusiastic when talking about coming back.” Diplomats at the American Consulate in Canton said that they were uneasy about denying visas to students wishing to study in the United States, but they

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<sup>130</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, “China Weighs New Restrictions on Study Abroad” *New York Times* (October 19, 1989), A13.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup> Nicholas Kristof, “U.S. Blocking Chinese from American Study; Students Find U.S. Embassy a Barrier” *New York Times* (January 26, 1990), A1; A9.

were required to follow U.S. law. One Chinese graduate student trying to get a visa to study in the U.S. said, ‘The Chinese government is very clever. They give almost everyone a passport now and let the Americans do the tight screening for them so they don’t get the blame.’<sup>133</sup>

In February 1990, the State Education Commission announced a work requirement for students wishing to study abroad. The new restriction required that students work for five years in China prior to their study abroad. Students who wished to waive the work requirement and go abroad immediately were subject to a fee schedule that entailed paying large sums of money to the government as collateral for their return.<sup>134</sup> The new guidelines required students to pay a fee per year of study they attended: the equivalent of \$530 USD per year for undergraduate students, \$850 USD for master’s degree students and \$1275 USD per year for doctoral students. To put these amounts in scale, typical worker would have to save their entire monthly salary for five years to pay the undergraduate fee for their child. This substantial deposit was intended to be a monetary incentive for students to come back to China. Government officials refused to specify whether these new rules applied only to government-sponsored students or both self-sponsored and government sponsored students.<sup>135</sup> In either case, the fee guidelines were an attempt to address the reality that an increasing number of Chinese students were trying to leave the country, and very few students were coming back.

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Sheryl WuDunn, “China Orders Students Going Abroad to Pay Fees” *New York Times* (February 8, 1990), A16.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

The second concern of the democracy movement in exile was much harder to address. Many students involved with the democracy movement fled China in the weeks following the June 1989 crackdown and lived in exile in Europe or the United States. Leaders of the democracy movement urged Chinese students who were overseas to remain abroad and work together to keep the democracy movement alive.<sup>136</sup> At the opening session of the First Congress of the Independent Federation of Chinese Students in the United States (IFCSS) on July 28, 1989, exiled leaders of the democracy movement told the students that it was in their personal interest, as well as vital to the democracy movement, that they remain overseas. Wu'er Kaixi, one of the “most wanted” student leaders who had successfully fled China, addressed the students. He told students to unite because someday they would all return to China and “re-erect the Goddess of Democracy in Tiananmen Square.” Organizers of the conference stated that their goal was to form an organized, unified opposition to the Chinese government and encourage change. A group of dissidents, including Wu'er, were involved in efforts to organize an international group to help unify the fragmented Chinese opposition called the Front of Democratic China. This group included intellectuals in China and abroad, students and anti-Communists living in the United States and Taiwan. Proposals were also made to publish a Chinese-language newspaper and organize a radio station to carry their message into China.<sup>137</sup>

Overseas Chinese students pressed the United States government to extend their visas for as long as possible. A representative from Immigration and Naturalization

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<sup>136</sup> William E. Schmidt, “Chinese in US Urged to Stay Abroad”, *New York Times* (July 29, 1989).

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*

Service told the students that the United States government would “do everything we can to work with you and for you so you will have a safe haven in the U.S. as long as it is necessary.” The Bush administration proposed a one year extension on all visas held by Chinese students, although some Chinese students felt that this was not an adequate amount of time. Many students favored proposals in Congress that would extend Chinese student visas until 1993 or allow the students to apply for temporary resident status if conditions in China did not improve.<sup>138</sup>

Many Chinese students lobbied intensively for Congress to pass legislation to protect the Chinese student population in the U.S. from being forced to return to China and subjected to repressive political conditions. Three bills were proposed in the U.S. House of Representatives which addressed the immigration status of Chinese nationals, particularly students, in the U.S. All three were initially proposed in June and July 1989. The Chinese Foreign Student and Exchange Visitor Relief Act (H.R. 2722) proposed to grant permanent resident status to PRC nationals who entered the U.S. as students or exchange visitors before June 6, 1989.<sup>139</sup> The Chinese Temporary Status Protected Status Act of 1989 (H.R. 2929) proposed to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to allow eligible aliens temporary protected status in the U.S. and to direct the Department of Justice designate PRC nationals as eligible for this temporary protected status for a period of three years.<sup>140</sup> The third bill was the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989 (H.R. 2712), which sought to allow Chinese students on non-immigrant visas to apply for immigrant status in the U.S. without returning to China for two years as

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

<sup>139</sup> Chinese Foreign Student and Exchange Visitor Relief Act, H.R. 2722, 101<sup>st</sup> Cong. (1989).

<sup>140</sup> Chinese Temporary Protected Status Act of 1989, H.R. 2929, 101<sup>st</sup> Cong. (1989).

normally required under the Immigration and Nationality Act.<sup>141</sup> The House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law held a hearing pertaining to the immigration status of Chinese nationals in the U.S. to consider the three aforementioned bills.

The committee chairman, Bruce A. Morrison, pointed out that the Bush administration had authorized a “deferred departure status under a general claim of executive discretion with respect to deportation” for Chinese nationals in the U.S., many of whom were students. However, the administration program required applicants to declare their unwillingness to return to China and permanently relinquish their current lawful status, even if said status was not expired, in order to gain the deferred departure status.<sup>142</sup> Many Chinese nationals feared that there would be reprisals against their family members in China if they complied with these requirements, and thus few took advantage of the program. Morrison stated that the administration’s actions to protect Chinese nationals were problematic because there was no existing legal framework in which to fit the deferred departure status, and each case would necessitate an “ad hoc determination.” The goal of the subcommittee was to “move toward a regular legal framework into which such emergency populations can be fit.”<sup>143</sup>

The current immigration policy mandated that students return to their home country for two years to meet the foreign residency requirement prior to applying for a change in visa status, which raised concerns for the safety of the thousands of Chinese

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<sup>141</sup> Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, H.R. 2712, 101<sup>st</sup> Cong. (1989).

<sup>142</sup> House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law. *Immigration Status of Chinese Nationals Currently in the United States*, 101<sup>st</sup> Cong. (July 20, 1989), 1. (Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Bruce A. Morrison).

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid*, 2.

students in the U.S. on J exchange visas. These concerns were a primary issue at the hearing. The hearing proceedings included numerous witnesses and statements submitted for the record, many of which attested to the danger Chinese exchange students would face if forced to return to China under the present political circumstances.

Han Lianchao, a representative of the Association of Chinese Students and Scholars at Yale University was one of the many witnesses to provide testimony for the hearing. In his statement, Han said that “the situation that awaits Chinese students returning from the U.S. is far worse than for the average Chinese citizen.”<sup>144</sup> Many Chinese students in the U.S. had been involved in activities that the Chinese government deemed “counter revolutionary”, including participation in protests and demonstrations; denouncement of the Chinese government and its actions; fundraising for the pro-democracy movement and participating in communications networks to provide news after the crackdown. He stated, “In American prisons, the use of solitary confinement is sharply restricted; in China, social isolation is a routinely practiced form of psychological terrorism. Yet every Chinese student returning from the U.S. will be suspect and is likely to be subjected to this fate.”<sup>145</sup>

Han affirmed that most Chinese students wanted to eventually return to China; however they were afraid to return “under the current circumstances.” He contended that while Chinese students were “grateful” for the Extended Deferred Departure program, it required students to make a statement that would jeopardize them with the Chinese

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<sup>144</sup> House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law. *Immigration Status of Chinese Nationals Currently in the United States*, 146. (Testimony of Han Lianchao, representative from the Association of Chinese Students and Scholars at Yale University).

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid*, 146-147.

government. He further argued that seeking political asylum, other than as a last resort, was an equally dangerous option because it would be considered treason in China. He emphasized that in both these cases, friends and family members would be held liable for such actions by a student; placing them at great risk of persecution.<sup>146</sup>

Han stated that granting “temporary sanctuary” to Chinese students and scholars in the U.S. would be a “very effective sanction” against China, because “such a move would deprive the government of China of a half-generation of its brightest and most-able citizenry, the very core of its future leadership.” Allowing these “valuable citizens to hold their services hostage” would place pressure on the Chinese government to reform. He further asserted the legislative proposals under consideration contained measures that would allow Chinese students in the U.S. to “boycott the currently corrupt system by remaining in America,” which he described as one of “the most potent political protests possible.”<sup>147</sup> He stated that measures such as waiving the two year home residency requirement did not give unfair privileges to Chinese students; and claimed that such measures would correct abuses of the J-1 visa status by the Chinese government. He maintained that the Chinese government used the terms of the J-1 visa to “gain the benefits of an American education in technology without the risks of an American education in freedom.”<sup>148</sup>

Dr. Zhao Haichang, a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University, provided additional testimony which further elaborated the risks to Chinese students in the U.S. if

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid, 147-148.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid, 149.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid, 150.

forced to return to China when their J-1 visas expired. He stated, “We do not seek to remain as a guest in this country because we faced repression when we left. Rather it is in large part because we have been guests in this country that we face repression when we return home at this time.”<sup>149</sup> Like Han, he asserted that the waiver of the home residency requirement was crucial to protect Chinese students from political repression and intimidation efforts by the Chinese government. If the residency rule was not waived, he speculated that thousands of students would drop out of their university programs in order to change their visa status without returning to China. He also concurred with Han’s assessment that the requirements of the Extended Deferred Departure program increased the risk of retaliation by the Chinese government against students and their families.<sup>150</sup>

The Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989 (H.R. 2712) was approved by the committee after the hearing. The bill cleared the House and the Senate by late November 1989 and was presented to President George H.W. Bush.<sup>151</sup> Despite overwhelming bipartisan support for the legislation, President Bush pocket vetoed the bill while Congress was in recess.<sup>152</sup> The Chinese government demanded that the Bush administration veto the bill, and threatened to suspend student exchanges if the bill became law. A similar stance was reiterated by administration spokesmen, who stated that the “climate of relations could be damaged” between the U.S. and the PRC if the bill

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<sup>149</sup>House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law. *Immigration Status of Chinese Nationals Currently in the United States*, 153. (Statement of Dr. Zhao Haichang, Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, Harvard University)

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid*, 154.

<sup>151</sup> “Bills and Joint Resolutions Presented to the President”, 135 Cong Rec H 9744, (December 11, 1989).

<sup>152</sup> “Bills and Resolutions Approved After Sine Die Adjournment”, 135 Cong Rec H 9744, (December 11, 1989).

was passed.<sup>153</sup> The president said that he would take “administrative action to give equivalent protection to the students” and that the legislation was “wholly unnecessary”<sup>154</sup> because administrative actions achieved the same “laudable objectives” of the bill while maintaining presidential control over foreign affairs against encroachments by Congress.<sup>155</sup>

Zhao Haichang, chairman of the National Committee on Chinese Student Affairs and one of the witnesses at the Congressional hearing on the legislation, stated that Chinese students in the U.S. were “disappointed, surprised and very puzzled” about President Bush’s veto decision. He expressed concern that administrative regulations would not be sufficient “in terms of fully protecting Chinese students.” Reflecting these same concerns, seventy-one senators and 105 House representatives signed letters to the president in support of the bill.<sup>156</sup>

When Congress returned from adjournment in January 1990, the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989 (H.R. 2712) was returned for consideration. On January 24, the House of Representatives voted to override the President’s veto and pass the legislation in a 390-to-25 vote, clearing the bill for Senate action.<sup>157</sup> An article regarding the House’s veto override in the *New York Times* reported that “most members of Congress simply were not impressed” by the President’s argument and countered that

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<sup>153</sup> “Overriding a Chinese Veto” *New York Times* (November 29, 1989), A30.

<sup>154</sup> Robert Pear, “Bush Rejects Bill on China Students” *New York Times* (December 1, 1989), A24

<sup>155</sup> EMERGENCY CHINESE IMMIGRATION RELIEF ACT OF 1989-MEMORANDUM OF DISAPPROVAL FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 101-132), 136 Cong Rec. H 4 (January 23, 1990).

<sup>156</sup> Robert Pear, “Bush Rejects Bill on China Students” *New York Times* (December 1, 1989), A24

<sup>157</sup> “Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989 – Veto Message from the President of the United States (H. DOC. NO. 101-132)” 136 Cong Rec H 44, 101 Cong. 2d Sess. (January 24, 1990).

“if the Beijing leaders wanted to punish themselves and their country” by preventing Chinese students from studying in the United States, “they can go right ahead.”<sup>158</sup> On January 25, the veto override failed in the Senate in a 62 to 37 vote.<sup>159</sup>

In April, President Bush followed through on his promise to formalize legal protections for Chinese students in the United States. The executive order expanded his previous actions on behalf of Chinese students by suspending all deportation hearings for Chinese students until January 1, 1994 and waiving a regulation under which Chinese students with expired passports or passports revoked by the Chinese government were barred from changing their legal status in the U.S. The executive order also encompassed provisions from his previous instructions to the Justice Department regarding Chinese nationals including an “irrevocable waiver” of the foreign residency requirement through January 1, 1994 and work authorization for all Chinese citizens in the U.S. as of June 5, 1989.<sup>160</sup> The executive order addressed many of the concerns which had been raised in the Congressional hearing for H.R. 2712, particularly the concerns of both legislators and Chinese students about the foreign residency requirement that required them to return to China before changing their legal status in the U.S. Although these visa concerns were alleviated, Chinese students in the U.S. still faced other complications.

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<sup>158</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, “Bush is Set Back by House Override of Veto on China” *New York Times* (January 24, 1990), A1.

<sup>159</sup> “Chinese Student Status Immigration Act” 136 Cong Rec S 335, 101 Cong. 2d Sess. (January 25, 1990).

<sup>160</sup> Andrew Rosenthal, “Bush to Formalize Shield for Chinese in U.S.” *New York Times* (April 7, 1990), 3.

## Harassment

Chinese students in the United States reported that they had been harassed by representatives of the Chinese government and threatened with reprisals if they expressed support for the democracy movement or participated in opposition demonstrations. Students claimed that officials from the Chinese embassies and consulates infiltrated meetings, made threatening phone calls and visited their residences in an effort to deter them from participating in activities opposing the Chinese government. A student at Harvard University said that many students received phone calls informing them that their passports might not be extended or that their relatives back home might suffer if they expressed support for the democracy movement. Merle Goldman, a professor of Chinese history at Boston University, said that many of her Chinese students had received similar phone calls or home visits from members of the Chinese consulate in New York, and were threatened with “repercussions” for their relatives if they did not curb their political activities in the United States.<sup>161</sup>

Reports about harassment were inconsistent. Some students reported that they received phone calls from anonymous callers who asked “a lot of detailed questions” about their activities. Other students received calls from anonymous callers who issued cryptic warnings such as, “don’t do too much” and “be careful about your future.” It was unclear if these calls were being made as veiled threats from Chinese government officials or by other individuals concerned about the students. Some students received direct visits from consular officials. Lan Yishen, a graduate student in history at the State

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<sup>161</sup> Robert Pear, “Chinese in U.S. Report Harassment by Beijing” *New York Times* (September 27, 1989).

University of New York Stony Brook campus, received a visit from a Chinese consulate official. The official asked Lan about his involvement in the organization of the group, Human Rights in China and wanted the names of other students who had participated in the group's demonstrations. Other students received no contact from consular officials, leading to speculation that harassment was targeted at those students who were more likely to be intimidated. Tang Timing, a Columbia graduate student who coordinated student groups in the New York area said, "They dare not call me... They maybe think I am too counter-revolutionary so it's no use to call me."<sup>162</sup>

In response to the reports of harassment, the U.S. State department informed Chinese officials that "harassment of students in the United States is completely unacceptable." Chen Defu, press counselor at the Chinese Embassy, countered that there was no basis for the complaints and that the embassy and consulate had not engaged in such activities. He stated, "Our consistent policy is to oppose monitoring, harassing or intimidating overseas Chinese students." He said that the Chinese government promised to take "a lenient attitude toward students who, without knowing the truth, participate in demonstrations or rallies in the United States."<sup>163</sup> Ye Qiping, an official at the Chinese Consulate in New York, said that contacting students was part of the "normal work" of the consulate and that no one had requested the names of students who participated in pro-democracy demonstrations.<sup>164</sup> Despite the denial of harassing behavior by the embassy, the IFCSS reported that some students who had intended to participate in a

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<sup>162</sup> Constance L. Hays, "Chinese Students in U.S. Say Beijing has Harassed Them" *New York Times* (July 22, 1989), 3.

<sup>163</sup> Robert Pear, "Chinese in U.S. Report Harassment by Beijing" *New York Times* (September 27, 1989).

<sup>164</sup> Constance L. Hays, "Chinese Students in U.S. Say Beijing has Harassed Them" *New York Times* (July 22, 1989), 3.

march from Lincoln memorial to the Chinese Embassy in Washington D.C. on National Day were afraid to take part.<sup>165</sup>

Another aspect of indirect harassment and political repression was the censorship and interruption of mail being sent between the People's Republic of China and the United States. A hearing on mail interruption was held on November 9, 1989 before the Subcommittee on Postal Operations and Services. The committee reported that it had distributed a confidential survey after June 4<sup>th</sup> to Chinese-Americans and Chinese students in the United States regarding the flow of mail between the PRC and the U.S. Of those responding to the survey, 92.3 percent said that mail service had deteriorated. 26.9 percent said that only 80 to 85 percent of the mail sent from the U.S. was getting to recipients in the PRC, and 26.9 percent responded that only 70 to 75 percent of mail sent from the PRC was arriving in the U.S. The problem of mail interruption was not limited to letters. The committee reported that 20 percent of the combined total of parcels sent by respondents to the PRC had been lost en route. An addition 11 percent of those packages had unknown whereabouts.<sup>166</sup> Numerous respondents stated that the recipients of their mail in the PRC received opened envelopes. Others stated that mail intended for them had been returned to the sender from the Chinese Customs office with "labels that these letters were not permitted to be sent abroad." One student respondent wrote that an audio tape sent to his wife and parents was held by the Tianjin Post Office. His father was

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<sup>165</sup> Robert Pear, "Chinese in U.S. Report Harassment by Beijing" *New York Times* (September 27, 1989).

<sup>166</sup> Subcommittee on Postal Operations and Services, *Mail Interruption*, 101 Congress (November 9, 1989), 3.

informed that the tape “must be listened to by officials there, and he must pay a fee for that routine work.”<sup>167</sup>

Li Lu provided a statement for the hearing regarding the interruption of mail to and from Chinese students in the U.S. Li was one of the student leaders on the Chinese government’s “21 Most Wanted list” and one of only two such student leaders to successfully escape the PRC. Li stated that numerous students at universities across the U.S. had their letters and mail confiscated or opened.<sup>168</sup> He provided the following specific examples:

In July, a Ph.D. candidate from Yale mailed his parents a letter in which he enclosed an article about the June 4 massacre. When they received the letter, his parents noticed that it had already been opened. The letter was stamped with the official seal of the Customs Office of the People’s Republic of China informing them that a “counter revolutionary” leaflet had been confiscated... Two students, one from Princeton, the other from Colombia, report that due to their involvement in the democratic movement, both of their families have recently received letters from the Public Security Bureau of the Chinese Government, urging them to write to their children and warn them of their activities. The letter specifically threatened reprisals to their families if they did not comply with these warnings.<sup>169</sup>

Li also provided examples of harassment directed at students. He stated that a student at Northwestern University had received a letter containing an AK 47 machine gun bullet, the same kind of bullet used by the Chinese Army in Tiananmen Square. The student had previously served a five year prison sentence in China, received threatening phone calls and his car has been vandalized twice. Li stated that the student had “reasons

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<sup>167</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid, 31.

<sup>169</sup> Subcommittee on Postal Operations and Services, *Mail Interruption*, 101 Congress (November 9, 1989), 34-35 (Statement of Li Lu, Chinese student leader)

to believe that the bullet was sent by the Chinese consulate.”<sup>170</sup> He also recounted that a Chinese student at the University of Nevada reported that he was contacted by an attaché from the San Francisco Chinese Consulate after he posted a notice for the October 1 demonstration in Washington D.C. at the Autumn Festival on campus. The attaché warned him that “since all his family was in China, he should not organize or join any anti-government activities.” If he did so, he was warned that “his family would pay the consequences.”<sup>171</sup> Li concluded by asserting that he believed the interruption of mail to and from Chinese students in the U.S. was part of a larger effort by the Chinese government to intimidate and harass those who participated in political protests. He said that his own mail to and from his family members had been completely blocked, despite efforts by himself and his parents to send information through various channels like extended family. He stated that mail was a basic privacy, and that harassment and interruption of the mail was a means to intimidate and threaten people “through the very basic things.”<sup>172</sup>

Reports that Chinese students in the U.S. were being harassed and threatened by the Chinese government were widespread. In response to the allegations of harassment, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing on the matter June 19, 1990.

Xu Lin, former third secretary in the Department of Education at the Washington D.C. Chinese Embassy was a key witness at the hearing. Xu left the Chinese Embassy on May 2, 1990 and announced his intention to defect and apply for political asylum in the

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<sup>170</sup> Ibid, 31-32; 35.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid, 36.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid, 40-41.

United States on May 4, 1990 – the 71<sup>st</sup> anniversary of the historic May 4 student demonstrations in China.<sup>173</sup> He stated in a press conference that he decided to defect because he was in a “dangerous situation, personally and politically.” Xu had refused to forward to his superiors reports and denunciations on the activities of pro-democracy Chinese students in the U.S. that had been anonymously sent to the embassy. Friends in China informed him that he had been “blacklisted” and security risk and his superiors notified him that his four year term of service had been shortened to two years, putting him back in China by July.<sup>174</sup> Prior to this notification, embassy authorities had recently initiated extensive investigations of democracy movement sympathizers within the embassy, especially those in the education department.<sup>175</sup> Xu expressed his concern that “Many democracy activists in China are now being persecuted and arrested, and my situation would not be different.”<sup>176</sup> He said that he waited to defect until his wife and daughter were safely out of China.<sup>177</sup> Xu was the 14<sup>th</sup> Chinese official and the 5<sup>th</sup> embassy officer to defect to the United States since June 4, 1989.<sup>178</sup>

Xu was reluctant to testify because of concerns that his relatives in China would be persecuted because of his actions. However, he ultimately agreed because the hearing concerned “the destiny of tens of thousands of Chinese exchange students in the United

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<sup>173</sup> Lena H. Sun, “Chinese Embassy Aide Defects, Student Leader Says” *Washington Post* (May 4, 1990), A16.

<sup>174</sup> “Chinese Diplomat Defects Out of Fear of Being Sent Home”, *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* (May 5, 1990), A2.

<sup>175</sup> Don Oberdorfer, “Chinese Envoy Asks Political Asylum; Embassy Aide Says He is 14<sup>th</sup> Defector from Posts in the United States”, *Washington Post* (May 5, 1990), A9.

<sup>176</sup> Bill Gertz, “Chinese Diplomat denounces Li after Defecting to the U.S.” *Washington Times* (May 7, 1990), A5.

<sup>177</sup> Jim Mann, “Beijing Campaign Against Dissidents in U.S. Disclosed” *Los Angeles Times* (May 11, 1990)

<sup>178</sup> Bill Gertz, “Chinese Diplomat denounces Li after Defecting to the U.S.” *Washington Times* (May 7, 1990), A5.

States.”<sup>179</sup> He provided the following testimony regarding the activities of the Chinese Department of Education:

Since the “June 4<sup>th</sup> Massacre” in Beijing, the Chinese government has redoubled its effort to control and monitor the Chinese exchange students. Although the governments has times and again reiterated that it would not persecute the exchange students who participated in the pro-democracy demonstrations, the clandestine investigations of student activities conducted by the education Department of the Chinese Embassy in Washington D.C. have never ceased. The department frequently engaged itself in threat and intimidation of the students who continued to be involved in the pro-democracy movement and set up a variety of archives to keep track of student leaders, pro-democracy activists and the students who openly renounced their Communist Party membership. The information collected was promptly sent back to China through diplomatic messengers or secret codes.<sup>180</sup>

In his testimony, Xu stated that a meeting of educational attachés had been held in July 1989 to discuss the Chinese student pro-democracy movement overseas. It was decided at this meeting that the embassy and consulate officials in charge of exchange students must monitor and “keep track” of their activities. Embassy and consulate officials were told, “The majority of them should be educated and told not to participate in anti-government activities. As for the small number of anti-government activists, a divide-and-rule tactic should be employed.” Xu explained that in this context, “keep track” meant to conduct investigations, “educate” meant to intimidate and threaten, and “divide-and rule tactic” meant to coerce some activists to withdraw from the pro-democracy movement.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Alleged Intimidation and Harassment of Chinese Citizens in the U.S.* (June 19, 1990), 32 (Testimony of Lin Xu, Former third secretary of Chinese Embassy Education Department)

<sup>180</sup> Ibid.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

He stated that the Embassy had sent people to videotape pro-democracy demonstrators in the United States and monitor their activities. Officials in charge of exchange student affairs had been assigned to “collect detailed information” on the delegates to the previous mentioned First Congress of the IFCSS and attempt to dissuade them from participating. If they were unable to dissuade the delegates from attending they told delegates to “play a positive role to reduce the impact of the convention” and that “they would be responsible for any consequences if they did not take the advice offered.” The Consulate in Chicago sent some pro-government students to the convention and information on all the delegates as well as recordings of all convention speeches were sent back to China by the Chinese Embassy education department.<sup>182</sup>

He also confirmed that the Department of Education had been involved in efforts to sabotage the pro-democracy “Washington March for Democracy in China” on the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the PRC. The department published articles in the *People’s Daily* which condemned the march as a “counterrevolutionary activity” and informed students via student organizations that “the nature of their involvement in demonstrations would change if they participated in the march.” Information on the schools and students who ultimately participated was reported back to China.<sup>183</sup>

The department was also instructed to perform a variety of other tasks in relation to monitoring overseas students. One task was to gather information on students lobbying Congress for protective status for Chinese students. Xu stated that he was personally sent to Utah to collect information on student leaders, lobbying activities, key figures, and the

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<sup>182</sup> Ibid, 33.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

opinions of students.<sup>184</sup> Two Chinese student leaders, Zhang Wei at University of Utah and Peng Yuenlan at Utah State University, befriended Xu and ultimately helped him decide to defect.<sup>185</sup> Other objectives included intervening in the elections and activities of the associations of Chinese students on U.S. campuses;<sup>186</sup> working to reestablish Party branches and restore their activities; and sending “professional students” to top U.S. universities to carry out pro-government activities.<sup>187</sup>

Perhaps the largest project conducted by the Department of Education was the creation of “special archives” of student leaders and students who openly denounced their Communist Party membership. Officials in charge of exchange students at all consulates in the U.S. were instructed to collect information and make periodic reports.<sup>188</sup> Xu explained the serious nature of these archives, stating, “Once in the record, those students will get in trouble after they return to China. Some of them will be refused entry into China, some will have their passports revoked or denied extension, and some others will suffer the separation from their families because their spouses and children will not be allowed to come abroad for visits.” He affirmed that the Department of Education had sent over ten successive packages of information on exchange students back to China since June 4, 1989.<sup>189</sup> Xu concluded his testimony by stating:

The Department of Education at the Chinese Embassy is no longer an institution for the Sino-U.S. exchanges in education. It has become an institution for the purpose of dealing with Chinese students in the United States. Though its

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<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

<sup>185</sup> “2 Chinese Students from Utah Persuade Diplomat to Defect” *Deseret News* (May 5, 1990); Jim Mann, “Beijing Campaign Against Dissidents in U.S. Disclosed” *Los Angeles Times* (May 11, 1990)

<sup>186</sup> Ibid, 34-35.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid, 35.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid, 33.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid, 34.

strategies change from time to time in different situations (sometimes hard, sometimes soft), its activities against Chinese students have never been stopped... Educational Attaché Ni Mengxiong once told Embassy officials that “the work on the exchange students must be viewed in terms of international struggle, diplomatic struggle and political struggle.” From this we can see that the Chinese government has been practicing two sets of policies in dealing with Chinese students: one open and the other secret. Even in the time of its superficial concession and proclamation to improve Sino-U.S. relations, it never stopped its monitoring and intimidation of the Chinese students.<sup>190</sup>

Heping Shi, a doctoral student attending Virginia Tech whose family had been “approached” by government officials, was also a witness at the hearing. He explained that he had recently received a phone call from his sister, who informed him that his wife had gone mad and unsuccessfully attempted to kill herself and their daughter after being confronted government officials because of his involvement in the pro-democracy movement in the United States.<sup>191</sup> His sister begged him to “keep away from politics” and “counterrevolutionary activity”. Shi later received a phone call from his wife, who told him that she had been “approached.” He stated that “from the word approached” he immediately understood “how much pressure had been exerted on her” and that “during the past forty years, hundreds of thousands of people have committed suicide simply because they had been ‘talked to’.” He further explained the negative consequences of having a “counterrevolutionary” in a Chinese family: “It means that friends and neighbors will keep away from you for fear; it means that it is difficult to find a job; it means that you will be treated differently in salary and housing – if you are lucky enough to be given a job; it means that the children of the family will be denied a good education;

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<sup>190</sup> Ibid, 35-36.

<sup>191</sup> House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Alleged Intimidation and Harassment of Chinese Citizens in the U.S.* (June 19, 1990), 42 (Statement of Heping Shi, Ph.D student at Virginia Tech University)

and above all, it means that you are constantly approached and told that your loved one is an “enemy of the people” and that you should “draw a clear line” between you and your loved one.”<sup>192</sup>

After receiving the phone call from his sister, he contacted the Chinese Embassy in Washington D.C. and told them he had decided to stop his pro-democracy activities and requested that his wife and daughter be granted passports, which had previously been denied several times, so that they could come and visit him. The Embassy official informed him that if he signed a written pledge to never be involved in the pro-democracy movement again, they would give him a letter allowing him to return to China and he would be able to see his family again. He did not agree to sign the pledge, and said that his wife and daughter were “still held as hostages” because of his noncompliance.<sup>193</sup>

The hearing concluded with a series of questions from Rep. Stephen Solarz to Xu regarding possible U.S. actions to get China to stop the “campaign of intimidation against Chinese students” in the United States. Xu told the committee, “I think that the Chinese government after the June 4 massacre has lost all its sense of shame and it does not care about the moral condemnation of the international community. The only thing it cares about is economic sanctions.” He cited that the Chinese government had released some political prisoners after proposals were made in Congress earlier that year to not extend the “Most Favored Nation” trade status to China. He suggested a conditional denial of the

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<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid, 42-43.

“most favored nation” status in order to “keep some pressure on the Chinese government.”<sup>194</sup>

The testimonies of Xu Lin and Heping Shi were corroborated by documents smuggled out of the Chinese Embassy by Xu, supplied to the Committee for the hearing and later published in major U.S. news sources. The document stated that the work related to overseas students “is facing an extreme critical and complicated situation” and that it “has become a fierce political struggle and a struggle over human talents.” It stresses that the future emphasis of work with overseas students “will not be the issue of overseas students and scholars returning to China, but on the issue of whether they are patriotic or not.” Relating to pro-democracy activists, the document stated that “when concrete evidence is obtained, their status as overseas students and scholars must be revoked; they are to be ordered to pay back all the expenses related to overseas studies. Their applications for passport extensions must be refused. We can cancel the passports on some of them. They will not be allowed to return to China before they abandon their anti-government position and commit concrete acts of repentance.”<sup>195</sup> These documents evidenced the strict policy standpoint of the Chinese government with relation to overseas students who participated in pro-democracy activities. Some of the repercussions faced by students, such as the cancellation of passports, were temporarily negated by the executive order issued by President Bush which allowed Chinese students to remain in the U.S. until January 1, 1994. Even with these protections in place, many

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<sup>194</sup> House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Alleged Intimidation and Harassment of Chinese Citizens in the U.S.* (June 19, 1990), 43-44.

<sup>195</sup> Jim Mann, “Beijing Campaign Against Dissidents in U.S. Disclosed” *Los Angeles Times* (May 11, 1990)

were still highly critical of the Chinese government's politically repressive policies and legal actions against students and other pro-democracy activists.

Meanwhile, the overseas pro-democracy movement struggled to maintain their influence while in exile. Hua Sheng, who left Beijing before the protests, said that most Chinese students had "become pessimistic about their influence on China. The longer they are away from China, the less confident they feel." Efforts to send information into China were obstructed by the Chinese government's control over the flow of information as well as a lack of support from international governments. Several efforts to send information into the country via fax machine were halted after government officials warned the owners of the machines in China that they would "get into trouble" if copies of the faxes were distributed. As a result, some intellectuals in China saw copies of the faxes, but the majority only heard about the fax campaign from Voice of America broadcasts. The government in Hong Kong refused to let exiles visit or run offices in the territory. Plans collapsed for a radio ship named the "Goddess of Democracy," which overseas groups planned to use to broadcast their views into China, after Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan responded to pressure by China by refusing the ship access to their ports. These types of issues prevented overseas activists and organizations from achieving the level of impact they had initially hoped for.<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Nicholas Kristof, "China Dissident Lose Sway in Exile" *New York Times* (July 4, 1990)

## Not Forgotten: Resurfacing Issues from Tiananmen into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

In the decades following the suppression of the Democracy Movement, it appears that the level of repression in China has decreased. There are numerous potential explanations for this change. One possible explanation for this reduction in tension is that some of the public concerns that served as the impetus for the Democracy Movement have been alleviated. Economic reforms during the 1980s addressed some of the economic issues that motivated Chinese citizens to side with the student movement. After 1989 the government shifted investment from rural areas to urban areas as a means of attempting to address the economic concerns that drove citizens to support the students of the Democracy Movement. As a result, in the 1990s rural areas became poorer while urban areas were economically more successful.<sup>197</sup> The Party targeted political issues such as corruption and allowed an increased degree of political openness. Another explanation is the natural decompression of tension over time. It is possible that, over time, the Chinese government determined that it was unnecessary to continue intensive political repression efforts.

A third explanation is that China decreased its political repression in response to pressure from foreign governments. As an example, President Clinton threatened to cancel China's "most favored nation" trade status, which allowed China low-tariff access to U.S. markets, unless Beijing made "overall significant progress" in human rights. This "significant progress" included the release of political prisoners; Red Cross access to labor camps and detention centers; reduced emigration restrictions and allowance of

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<sup>197</sup> Huang Yasheng, *Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

foreign news broadcasts within the country. President Jiang Zemin promised to “make an effort” to respond to these requirements. Chinese leaders entered detailed discussions with the International Committee of the Red Cross about opening prisons to Red Cross workers. Red Cross workers would be allowed to visit political prisoners and determine whether they were being tortured or mistreated. Information was provided about 235 political prisoners, some of whom were released. Other prisoners were released on “medical parole.” Although these concessions made progress towards reduced political repression, they did not dismantle the state security apparatus that maintained other aspects of repression.<sup>198</sup>

One of the long-term changes to student culture in China is increased nationalism. This increased nationalism can potentially be attributed to the changes in education policies which emphasized Chinese self-reliance for development in place of dependence on western educational and technology exchanges. Many Chinese students overseas repeatedly expressed a desire to return to China and help build the country. This increased nationalism may also explain the increase in Communist Party membership among university students.

Although the Communist Party was widely unpopular among university students in 1989, membership increased at universities in the decade after 1989.. At Beijing University, more than twenty percent of undergraduates sought to join the Party, and ten

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<sup>198</sup> Patrick E. Tyler, “Crossroads for China; With Democratic Stirrings Among Chinese, U.S. is pressing Beijing on Crucial Choices” *New York Times* (January 29, 1994).

percent of undergraduate were already Party members. By contrast, only five percent of undergraduates at Beijing University were party members in 1991. University-wide recruiting increased after 1989 as part of a public Party goal to attract younger and better-educated members. One possible explanation is that the new student Party members grew up in the era of economic reforms, and only know the Party of loosened economic controls. They are too young to remember the events of the Democracy Movement, and many are critical of the student leaders of the 1980s. These students are idealistic about national and socialist goals. Another explanation for the rise in Party membership is the motive of personal benefit. One long time Party member said, "People my age joined the Party for ideals. Now, most of them are joining because they want power and seek personal gain." Party membership confers enormous social advantages. Party membership is required for advancement to senior-level management positions in state-owned companies and it is indispensable for students pursuing a career in the government.<sup>199</sup>

Despite the gradual decrease in political tensions, the issues surrounding pro-democracy students in China and overseas continued to resurface in China during the decades following the initial repressive policies as pro-democracy student leaders continued to make headlines. Wang Dan, one of the original "most wanted" student leaders, was in and out of jail in China before the Chinese government finally exiled him to the United States. After his initial arrest in 1989, he was paroled in February 1993. When he was paroled, he said that he had two goals: to be readmitted as a student at

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<sup>199</sup> Erik Eckholm, "At China's Colleges, a Rush to Party, as in Communist" *New York Times* (January 31, 1998).

Beijing University and to continue working for democracy. He was arrested for a second time in May 1995, held for seventeen months before trial. At trial, he was found guilty of conspiring to subvert the state and sentenced to eleven additional years in prison.

However, he was released in 1998 and exiled to the United States where he enrolled in a Ph.D. program at Harvard University.<sup>200</sup>

The centenary celebration of Beijing University was clouded by the arrest of student leader Wang Youcai and five former university students. Public security officials had tightened surveillance on the campus to avoid potential disturbances during the festivities. Security officials were put on alert about possible infiltration by “troublemakers” and were on the lookout for former student activists who attempted to get together with current students. Students were advised that “activities in the dormitories, as well as self-organized seminars, are being monitored.” Security guards restricted access to the campus by only allowing entry to special guests and people with invitation cards. As an alumnus, Wang Youcai had received an invitation. A university source described the campus atmosphere as “tense despite the approaching festive date” because of the arrest and efforts by eighteen former students in exile to press for the release of those arrested.<sup>201</sup>

Wang later stated that when he tried to enter the centenary celebrations, he was surrounded by police officers who forced him to leave Beijing. The following day, he was escorted onto a plane and held incommunicado for ten days at a hotel in Zhejiang

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<sup>200</sup> Erik Eckholm, “No. 1 on Beijing’s Most-Wanted List” *New York Times* (April 20, 1998), A6.

<sup>201</sup> Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, Arrest overshadows university centenary; Campus tense as exiles seek activists’ release” *South China Morning Post* (April 30, 1990), 9.

Province. Although Wang did not attempt to organize any protests or anti-government activities after his release from prison, he stated that he was still routinely followed and friends are interrogated after meeting with him. Wang's situation indicated that while economic and social controls were being relaxed, political controls were still in effect.<sup>202</sup>

Although the political repression strategy seemed to be successful in silencing public dissent, it also influenced increasing numbers of students at top Chinese universities to leave the country for studies in the United States. As an example statistic, more than one quarter of Beijing University's class of 1996 went to the United States. The government attempted to stem the outflow of students, called the "brain drain", by loosening economic and social controls over the educated elite.<sup>203</sup>

In the past decade, this trend has continued. In 2008, approximately 180,000 Chinese students left China for overseas study. This figure was a twenty-five percent increase over 2007. In the last decade, Chinese government statistics showed that only one in four students returned to China. Students with doctoral degrees in science and engineering were the least likely to return.<sup>204</sup>

However, in the past few years China has attempted to reverse the talent drain by using ample financial resources to entice scientists and scholars home. An excellent example is Dr. Shi Yigong, a molecular biologist at Princeton University who in 2008 resigned from Princeton's faculty and declined a \$10 million research grant to become

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<sup>202</sup> Kevin Platt, "Nine Years After Tiananmen, China's leaders More Lenient" *Christian Science Monitor* (June 5, 1998), 1.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> Sharon LaFraniere, "Fighting Trend, China is Luring Scientists Home" *New York Times* (January 7, 2010)

the dean of life sciences at Tsinghua University in Beijing. As an undergraduate student at Tsinghua, he participated in the pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square. Now back at Tsinghua, he has recruited eighteen postdoctoral fellows, almost all from the United States. Each has since opened an independent laboratory. He predicts that Tsinghua's life sciences department will expand fourfold in the next decade. Another example is Dr. Rao Yi, who left Northwestern University in 2007 to become the dean of the School of Life Sciences at Beijing University. Dr. Rao said that one of the incentives to return to China was the generous financing for science provided by the government.<sup>205</sup>

More than twenty years later, the Democracy Movement continues to be a politically sensitive topic in China. Former activists and student leaders remain in exile, and some still remain in prison. Wu'er Kaixi, one of the "most wanted" student leaders who fled to the U.S. has made numerous attempts in the past few years to return to China. Wu'er had originally expressed his intention to attempt to return to China after his arrest warrant expired in 2004. At that time, he said that if the government wanted to continue opening the country to the international community, it should allow exiled dissidents to return home.<sup>206</sup>

Wu'er flew from Taiwan to Macao on June 3, 2009 – the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Tiananmen suppression – and said that he wanted to surrender to Chinese authorities after two decades in exile. He was detained by immigration authorities in Macao, and he told news agencies that he would only return to Taiwan if he were deported. Wang Dan, a

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> Ambrose Leung, "Student activist says no change since 1989" *South China Morning Post* (January 15, 2004), 2.

fellow exile, described Wu'er's action as "an expression of anger and protest." In a statement, Wu'er said that his effort to turn himself in was "in no way whatsoever an acknowledgement of guilt in the eyes of the law" but that he had made the decision because "China will not let me return and my parents are prohibited from traveling abroad. I have not seen them in twenty years."<sup>207</sup> Wu'er was unsuccessful in his attempt and was deported back to Taiwan.

One year later, on the 21<sup>st</sup> anniversary of the Tiananmen crackdown, he visited the Chinese embassy in Tokyo to turn himself in to Chinese authorities. He told Kyodo News that he would like to insist to the government in court that he is innocent after his return to China. The embassy, however, refused to accept him. Wu'er then climbed over the embassy fence at the entrance and entered several meters onto the embassy premises, where he was caught by an officer and arrested.<sup>208</sup>

The contrasting policies of recruitment of some former Chinese students and the repulsion of others presents the question of why the Chinese government wants some of its former students back, but not others. Former overseas Ph.D. students such as Dr. Shi and Dr. Rao are actively recruited for return to China by offers of government funding for research and job placements at leading Chinese universities. It should be noted that many of those recruited are in science and engineering fields, which are considered essential to building the Chinese economy and expanding research facilities at universities. While former students such as Dr. Shi and Dr. Rao are viewed as beneficial to China, it is likely that former pro-democracy student leaders are viewed as problematic. In effect, the

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<sup>207</sup> Sharon LaFraniere, "Chinese Activist Tries to Surrender" *New York Times* (June 3, 2009)

<sup>208</sup> "Tiananmen student leader Wuer Kaixi arrested in Japan June 4" *Kyodo News Service* (June 4, 2010).

government only encourages the return of students who have not previously been labeled as “troublemakers.”

Another example of the continued controversy over Tiananmen era pro-democracy activists is evident in the contention over the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. The Nobel Committee awarded the prize to Liu in recognition of “his long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human rights in China.” In June 1989, Liu and three others staged a 72-hour hunger strike prior to the military offensive to show solidarity with the students and gain their trust. On the morning of June 4, he negotiated with military commissars to allow student protestors to safely exit Tiananmen Square. Gao Yu, a fellow dissident, said “If not for the work of Liu and the others to broker a peaceful withdrawal from the square, Tiananmen Square would have been a field of blood on June 4.” Liu was arrested in the days following the military suppression and charged with being a “black hand.”<sup>209</sup>

After he was released in 1991, he was arrested in 1995, 1996 and 2008 for pro-democracy activity and criticism of the government in articles online.<sup>210</sup> At the time of the award, Liu was serving an eleven year sentence for his “Charter ‘08” which advocated political reform. At his trial, the government argued that Liu had exceeded his right to freedom of expression by “openly slandering and inciting others to overthrow our

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<sup>209</sup> Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield, “Nobel Peace Prize Given to Jailed Chinese Dissident” (October 8, 2010), 2.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

country's state power."<sup>211</sup> Liu is one of three Peace Prize recipients to receive the prize while incarcerated by their own governments.

The Chinese Foreign ministry denounced the award to Liu as a "desecration" of the Peace Prize and warned the committee's secretary that awarding the prize to Liu would adversely affect Chinese-Norwegian relations.<sup>212</sup> The Chinese government boycotted the ceremony, along with nineteen other governments which declined to send ambassadors to the ceremony. A spokeswoman for the China Foreign Ministry stated that the Nobel Committee was creating an "anti-China farce" and that China would not change its path "because of interference by a few clowns."<sup>213</sup> China further denounced the award as a "political tool of the west" to weaken regimes that do not meet western standards. Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai said that foreign countries had a "stark choice" between criticizing China's judicial system and developing friendly relations with Beijing. He warned that countries or Chinese citizens that acknowledged the honor would "bear the consequences", although he did not elaborate on the consequences.<sup>214</sup>

Liu's wife, Liu Xia, was allowed to visit him in prison the day after prison officials informed him that he won the award. She said that he dedicated the award to "the lost souls of June 4<sup>th</sup>." Liu Xia was placed under house arrest, her internet and telephone access were cut, and state security officials prohibited her from contacting friends and media or leaving the house unescorted by police. The government imposed a

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<sup>211</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid, 1.

<sup>213</sup> Alan Cowell, "19 countries skip Nobel Ceremony, While China Offers its own prize" *New York Times* (December 7, 2010)

<sup>214</sup> Michael Wines, "China Assails Nobel Peace Prize as 'Card' of West" *New York Times* (November 5, 2010)

news blackout on the topic of the award, and police detained twenty individuals who attended a celebratory banquet in honor of Liu.<sup>215</sup> For the first time since 1936, the prize was not handed over because neither Liu nor members of his family were permitted to travel to Oslo to receive it.<sup>216</sup>

In light of continued controversy over past student leaders and pro-democracy activists, it is arguable that many aspects of the political repression enacted immediately following the military suppression of the Democracy Movement are still in place today. The Democracy Movement and the military suppression on June 4 at Tiananmen Square continue to be politically sensitive topics. The examination of the repressive policies enacted against Chinese students and other pro-democracy activists in domestically and overseas offers some insight to the intense emphasis on the correlation between the political control of individuals and the control of the government by the Communist Party that pervaded the sociopolitical climate of China following the Democracy Movement in 1989. The persistence of this correlation seems to be the basis for the continued governmental aversion to political reform and towards those who advocate it.

The continuation of politically repressive policies has prompted many intellectuals and current activists, such as Liu Xiaobo, to advocate for political reforms to complement the economic reforms already in place. In his memoir, Zhao Ziyang emphasized what he considered the necessity for political reform. He wrote:

It would be wrong if our Party never make the transition from a state that was suitable in a time of war to a state more suitable to a democratic society. This

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<sup>215</sup> Sharon LeFraniere, "Wife Detained After Visiting Nobel Winner" (October 10, 2010)

<sup>216</sup> Alan Cowell, "19 countries skip Nobel Ceremony, While China Offers its own prize" *New York Times* (December 7, 2010)

breakthrough must occur... Our hope is for the ruling position of the Communist Party to be maintained for a considerable amount of time, so that the transition can be made under its leadership and preparation made in an orderly manner... If we act with initiative; it will be beneficial to the Party, society and people. Any other approach will be harmful. The trend is irrefutable, that the fittest will survive. As Sun Yat-Sen said, "Worldwide trends are enormous and powerful; those who follow them prosper, and those who resist them perish." I believe the time has come for us to tackle this issue seriously.<sup>217</sup>

When and how political reforms will be enacted is ultimately up to the government and people of China. Perhaps in the future there will come a time when large-scale political reform will no longer be considered as a direct threat or "life and death struggle" to Communist Party rule in China, as it was in May 1989. In the future, political reforms may become a secondary priority to other immediate concerns such as environmental degradation, pollution or energy availability. There is no crystal ball to predict the exact future for reform in China.

Discussion of political repression and political reform in China raises the question of whether there is the potential for another large scale political movement like the Democracy Movement. Many argue that Chinese students have become too nationalistic or too politically apathetic to lead a new political movement. However, the support of pro-democracy activists such as Liu Xiaobo and Du Daozheng<sup>218</sup> who continue to publish articles about political reform in print and online indicates that there is public support for political reform. The recent upsurge in political repression by the Chinese government seems to indicate that there is increased concern about the potential for political unrest, and that the government is attempting to preemptively curb this potential unrest.

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<sup>217</sup> Zhao Ziyang, *Prisoner of the State*, trans. and eds. Bao Pu, Renee Chiang and Adi Ignatius (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 272.

<sup>218</sup> Sharon LaFraniere and Jonathan Ansfield, "Party Elder Still Jousts with China's Censors" *New York Times* (October 17, 2009). Du Daozheng was the former aide of Zhao Ziyang, and assisted in the posthumous publication of Zhao Ziyang's memoir, *Prisoner of the State*.

As previously stated there is no crystal ball; so we must examine the past rather than trying to predict the future. Examination of the political repression following the June 4 suppression of the Democracy Movement through the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century illustrates the long-term social consequences of these repressive policies. The social consequences extend outside of China and continue to influence international perceptions of the country. To understand the China of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is imperative to understand these implications.

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