Impact of Class-based Prejudice toward Defendants and Victims on Mock Jurors’ Decision-Making

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Mauricio J. Alvarez

Monica K. Miller, Ph.D., J.D., Dissertation Advisor

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MAURICIO J. ALVAREZ

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Monica K. Miller, Ph.D, J.D., Advisor

Markus Kemmelmeier, Ph.D., Committee Member

Clayton Peoples, Ph.D., Committee Member

James Richardson, Ph.D., J.D., Committee Member

Greta de Jong, Ph.D., Graduate School Representative

David W. Zeh, Ph. D., Dean, Graduate School
May, 2018
Abstract

This project sought to address the lack of attention paid to social class in the context of juror decision-making. The effect of social class was evaluated using a theoretical framework of justification-suppression of prejudice and intergroup threat. Across two trial simulation studies, the social class of the defendant (Study 1) or victim (Study 2), the availability of justification, and the presence of threat was experimentally manipulated. Participants’ social class was also included as a predictor in the analyses. Results of Study 1 showed that mock jurors, regardless of their own social class, are biased against upper class defendants who are described as representing a realistic threat to the community. This bias is not apparent when there is no threat or a symbolic threat. The justification manipulation resulted in mock jurors expressing bias against upper class defendants described as a symbolic threat and as cold and unfriendly (compared to upper class defendants described as a symbolic threat and as friendly and easy going). The threat manipulation resulted in mock jurors expressing bias in favor of lower class defendants described as a realistic threat and as cold and unfriendly (compared to lower class defendants described as either symbolic or no threat and as cold and unfriendly).

Results of Study 2 showed that the justification manipulation resulted in lower class mock jurors being less punitive toward a defendant who assaulted an upper class victim, but only when justification to express prejudice was present and the victim was described as a threat to the values of the community. The threat manipulation resulted in lower class mock jurors expressing bias toward upper class defendants who were described as a symbolic or realistic threat (compared to no threat). Taken together, the results from both studies show that members of lower-status groups (compared to high-status groups) are
more likely to react to perceptions of threat, that mock jurors express bias against defendants and victims described as low on warmth, and that endorsement of just world beliefs and the Protestant work ethic relates to mock jurors’ decisions when the salient demographic feature of defendants is social class, but neither of these variables influence mock jurors’ decisions based on the social class of the victim of a crime. These results illustrate how the justification to express prejudice and intergroup threat might bias jurors, and suggests potential strategies for prejudice reduction based on the self-regulation of prejudice expression.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

Contemporary political discourse in the United States suggests that the issue of social class has risen to the forefront of the American political consciousness, as demonstrated by the attention given to issues of class in recent political events such as the presidential campaign of Vermont senator Bernie Sanders (Horowitz, 2015) and the public discussion on tax reform (Kurtzleben, 2017). These events brought considerable attention to issues of class and economic inequality by highlighting the growth of income inequality in the United States in the recent past and the importance of taking steps to reduce said inequality.

Social class is one of the most powerful identities that a person can have: individuals’ social class has a profound impact on numerous areas of life such as employment and education, as well as on how individuals interact with others within and between other social classes (Fiske & Markus, 2012; Hout, 2008). Given the profound impact that class has on individuals, the relative lack of attention that social psychologists have given to social class until recently is notable, in particular given the attention given to other social categories such as gender and race (Lott, 2012). This lack of attention is in part because, compared to race or gender, social class can be difficult to measure, with different approaches sometimes yielding considerably different results (Bullock, 1995; DiMaggio, 2012).

One of the areas in which social class can impact individuals’ experiences is law (see, e.g., Baumgartner, 1985; Fukurai, 1996). The first goal of this project focused on the impact that social class has on the outcomes of a criminal trial. Specifically, the project evaluated the impact of defendant’s social class (Study 1), victim’s social class
(Study 2), and mock jurors’ social class (Studies 1 and 2) on mock jurors’ verdict decisions in a criminal trial. Understanding the impact of defendants’, victims’ and jurors’ social class on outcomes in the legal system can raise awareness of issues that can unfairly bias jurors against defendants based on class membership, which can undermine defendants’ right to due process. Similarly, bias against victims based on class membership can undermine victims’ trust in the system, exacerbating the mistrust and general avoidance of the legal system which characterizes members of working and lower classes. These studies also evaluated whether class-based bias operates similarly among defendants and victims, or whether class-based biases only influence trial outcomes under specific circumstances. This helped expand the current understanding on the impact of social class by highlighting under which circumstances class-based bias can influence individuals’ decisions. For example, mock jurors might be biased against lower class individuals only when these individuals are accused of wrongdoing (i.e., defendants), but not when they have been wronged (i.e., victims).

This project also had a theoretical goal: the project evaluated whether an integration of the Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) and the Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) could be applied as a coherent theoretical framework to study intergroup relations. By integrating these two models, I sought a more comprehensive understanding of inter- and intra-group relations by, for example, clarifying the influence of threat on the expression of prejudice. This meant evaluating whether perceived threat influences the expression of prejudice against a stereotyped group (e.g., lower class individuals) or
against an outgroup (e.g., lower class individuals when the participant is part of the middle class).

The study also evaluated the influence of individual differences on psychological constructs which might promote class-based bias. These constructs are legal authoritarianism (Kravitz, Cutler, & Brock, 1993), just world beliefs (Lerner, 1980), the Protestant work ethic (Weber, 1958), and social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). These constructs might be associated with class bias because they are related to support for the status quo. As a result, endorsement of these beliefs should result in bias in favor of high-status groups (i.e., upper class defendants or victims) and against lower-status groups (i.e., lower class defendants or victims).

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the research on social class, including how social class is defined and how social class influences individuals’ experiences. Chapter 3 reviews research specific to the impact of social class as a characteristic of defendants or victims in the context of jury trials. Chapters 4 and 5 describe the development and subsequent research conducted on the two theoretical models underpinning this project: the Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice (JSM; Chapter 4) and Integrated Threat Theory (ITT; Chapter 5). Chapter 6 reviews the literature on psychological constructs (authoritarianism, just world beliefs, Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation) which might influence individuals’ perceptions of members of different social classes. Chapter 7 provides an overview of the project and an outline of the hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 8 describes a pilot study designed to test the materials to be used in the study. Chapters 9 and 10 describe the methods, materials, results, and discussion for Studies 1 and 2, respectively. Chapter 11 describes the results from the
studies and provides a general discussion. Chapter 12 outlines the limitations of the project and presents future directions for research. Chapter 13 presents the conclusion.

Social class has a profound impact on individuals’ experiences and on how individuals are perceived by others (Lott, 2012). The goal of this project was to better understand how social class of defendants, victims, and jurors influence outcomes in the context of jury trials. A first step to understanding the influence of social class is to understand how social class is measured, and what is known about the effects of social class in one particular area (jury decisions).
Chapter 2 – Social Class: Conceptualization and Consequences

Social class is an important dimension of human experience and can have considerable influence on individuals’ outcomes in various aspects of life (Lott, 2012). Poor or working class individuals experience poorer health outcomes, poorer educational and occupational outcomes, and fewer and less safe housing options, as compared to middle and upper class individuals (Bullock & Lott, 2001; Fuller-Rowell, Evans, & Ong, 2012; Lott & Bullock, 2007). These class differences are relatively stable across generations because, despite popular belief, class membership in American society is as stable as in other industrialized nations (Lott, 2012). The stability of class membership further exacerbates the negative impact of lower social class status because individuals are likely to remain within their social class, perpetuating class differences over time (Lott & Bullock, 2007). This chapter provides an overview of how social class is defined, based on objective characteristics across economic, cultural, and social dimensions as well as subjective perceptions. Next, the chapter presents an overview of research findings on the influence that social class exerts on a variety of psychological phenomena such as attributional processes, stereotypes and prejudice, intergroup relations, and support for unequal social arrangements. Following that, the chapter describes description of how social class influences individuals’ location in the social space, and individuals’ experiences in the realms of health, education, and legal participation. The chapter ends with an overview of research on the nature of stereotypes associated with social class and the impact that said stereotypes have on how members of lower social class are perceived, specifically in terms of use of societal resources (e.g., tax revenue).
What is Social Class?

Social class is commonly defined in terms of income, employment, status, or lifestyle practices (Hout, 2008). The specific dimension used to define social class is often chosen as a matter of disciplinary tradition: for example, economists tend to focus on income (e.g., how much money an individual earns) whereas sociologists tend to focus on employment (e.g., the relative prestige associated with a particular job). A focus on practices (e.g., how individuals spend their leisure time) is characteristic of culture-oriented researchers (e.g., Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus”). These different foci highlight different aspects of class differences: a focus on income serves to highlight how class drives policy priorities due to individuals’ ability to afford various services (e.g., lower class individuals tend to express greater concern about legislation regulating minimum-wage; Manza & Brooks, 2008). Similarly, a focus on employment highlights the impact that status has on class relations, such that political interns and medical students tend to have considerably lower income than individuals in blue collar jobs, and yet these interns and students are not considered of a lower class than blue collar workers (Hout, 2008). Finally, a focus on practices reflects the different cultural schemas developed and maintained by individuals based on their social class (Stephens & Townsend, 2013).

Alternatively, social class can be evaluated based on individuals’ subjective perceptions of class membership. This is particularly relevant as objective measures of class membership are weak predictors of individuals’ attitudes and behaviors (Kelley & Evans, 1995). Individuals’ assessment of their position in society tends to be relatively accurate, as individuals’ self-classification into class categories is significantly related to
objective measures of class such as income and education (Hout, 2008). Similarly, cross-national surveys suggest a moderate relationship between objective measures of social class (e.g., parents’ education) and subjective measures of social class (Ekehammar, Sidanius, & Nilsson, 1987). Subjective measures of social class have also been found to be reliable predictors of health (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000; Operario, Adler, & Williams, 2004). Based on these findings, a subjective measure of social class (e.g., asking participants to indicate their perceived social class) should be a viable proxy to evaluate the relationship between participants’ social class and defendant/victim social class on participants’ decision-making.

Social class can be conceptualized in terms of individuals’ subjective perception of their position in society, or in terms of objective characteristics of the individual (e.g., income level). As noted above, subjective measures of social class tend to accurately reflect their objective class position (Hout, 2008), while objective measures of social class tend to correlate more weakly with individuals’ attitudes, compared to subjective assessments of social class (Kelley & Evans, 1995). This suggests that subjective measures of social class are as effective a measure of individuals’ social class as objective measures are, at least in the context of intergroup attitudes between social classes.

**Impact of Social Class on Psychological Phenomena**

The objective circumstances which determine individuals’ social class, as well as individuals’ subjective perception of their position in society, have considerable influence on how individuals experience the world. Social class influences internal states, such that lower class individuals tend to experience greater feelings of inadequacy and non-
belongingness (e.g., in education; Reay, 2005). Lower class individuals also tend to perceive themselves as powerless due to difficulties accessing needed resources (Lott & Bullock, 2007). These experiences might act as self-fulfilling prophecies: these experiences promote beliefs, attitudes, and emotions which might discourage lower class individuals from pursuing avenues of economic development (if available, which might not always be the case; Lott, 2012). This phenomenon, in turn, would reinforce negative stereotypes of lower class individuals as lazy and unwilling to improve themselves. In this chapter, I first discuss how social class membership influences individuals’ perception of the world, with a specific focus on how members of different social class groups vary in terms of how they make situational and dispositional attributions. Then, I discuss research on class-based prejudice. Next, I discuss the relational dynamics that arise when members of different social groups interact with one another. Following that, I provide an overview of how these processes serve to maintain unequal social arrangements centered on class issues.

**Social Class and Attributional Processes**

Social class can influence how individuals perceive the world: belonging to a lower class is associated with access to fewer resources and lower status. Because of this, lower class individuals tend to evaluate and explain perceived events using situational attributions, while middle and upper class individuals tend to explain events using dispositional attributions (Bullock & Limbert, 2003; Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009, 2011). This focus on situational attributions has been linked to greater accuracy in evaluating the emotional states of social others (i.e., *empathic accuracy*) by lower class individuals (Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010). Their subordinate position means that lower class
individuals are more affected by external social factors, which in turn results in a need to be more attentive to the situation in which they are in (both in terms of environmental and social factors).

**Social Class, Stereotypes and Prejudice**

Social class impacts how individuals perceive members of a social class-based outgroup: stereotypes about poor and working class individuals negatively impact how members of these classes are perceived by others (Bullock, 1995; Williams, 2009). Prejudice against poor individuals tends to be focused on beliefs about a “culture of poverty:” a constellation of dysfunctional attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs that poor individuals pass on to their children, including laziness, lack of interest in education, inability to delay gratification, among others (Bullock, 1995). Evidence suggests that the belief that these negative values are prototypical of lower class individuals is shared by both lower and upper class individuals (Bullock & Limbert, 2003; Shildrick & MacDonald, 2013).

Stereotypes portraying lower class individuals as lazy reflect the influence of the Protestant work ethic on American society. The Protestant work ethic (Weber, 1958) represents a set of beliefs that highlight the importance of diligence and hard work as a reflection of godliness and moral character. In addition, Calvinist beliefs about the meaning of earthly prosperity (i.e., that it reflects God’s blessings) combine to form a set of beliefs in which hard work and prosperity are reflective of good moral character, which helps justify inequality as stemming from the assumed moral failings of those who are not prosperous (Jost et al., 2014).
The stereotype of lower class individuals as lazy reflects the fact that stereotypes about social groups exist across two dimensions: competence and warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Lack of competence, specifically, is often attributed to low-status groups (e.g., lower class individuals). Lower class individuals are also seen as lacking warmth (as are upper class individuals; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, 2012), a feature characteristic of groups that are seen as competing for the same resources as individuals’ ingroup (Fiske et al., 2002). Perceiving outgroups as a competitor for limited resources, in turn, can create or increase pre-existing prejudice toward said group (Stephan & Renfro, 2002).

**Social Class and Intergroup Relations**

Social class also impacts how individuals relate to their groups. The most salient example of this phenomenon is the rejection of class consciousness in the United States (Bottero & Irwin, 2003; Reay, 2005). Although social class can be defined as an objective social group, there is no subjective perception of shared group membership. This is one of many ways in which social class differs from grouping by gender or race. Although the lack of class consciousness exists across all class groups, this lack is particularly harmful to lower class individuals. This is due to the notion that social values characteristic of the upper class represent mainstream social values (Bullock & Limbert, 2009), and negative stereotypes of lower class individuals rely on the perception of these individuals as lacking mainstream social values (Bullock, 1995). Despite the lack of a shared class consciousness, lower class individuals are nevertheless highly attuned to their immediate social environment. As a result, lower class individuals tend to focus on their intragroup relationships in response to environmental threats, while upper class
individuals tend to focus on available resources (Piff, Stancato, Martinez, Kraus, & Keltner, 2012). Piff and colleagues found that lower class individuals who were primed to think about the future as chaotic and unpredictable reported stronger endorsement of statements about relying on their community for help, compared to lower class individuals primed to think about the future as stable. Upper class individuals primed to think about the future as chaotic and unpredictable were more likely to choose a higher paying job over a job that provides a close-knit, supportive social environment, compared to upper class individuals primed to think about the future as stable. These diverging responses to environmental threats highlight how individuals’ relationships with their ingroup vary between social classes.

**Social Class and the Maintenance of Inequality**

Finally, the social construction of class has important effects on the creation and maintenance of societal structures of inequality. Endorsement of beliefs about the culture of poverty is particularly salient in political rhetoric about issues of economic inequality. That is, when discussing issues related to economic inequality (e.g., welfare reform), public officials tend to use language that ascribes culture of poverty values to lower class individuals (Lott & Bullock, 2007; Mills, 1996). Similarly, class-based prejudice is reflected in the qualifications and procedures necessary to receive state assistance (e.g., welfare). Policies such as fingerprinting welfare recipients (Murray, 2000) and more recently mandatory drug testing of welfare recipients as a requirement for receiving assistance represent instances of *deniable degradation* (Murray, 2000). Deniable degradation describes procedures that have an instrumental (and therefore justifiable) purpose, such as preventing welfare fraud, but also possess as an implied purpose the
degradation of those who have to undergo these procedures. This degradation occurs because these procedures (fingerprinting, drug testing) implicitly assume that all recipients of welfare assistance can be suspected of trying to cheat the system (e.g., by applying for governmental assistance to maintain a drug habit).

Negative perceptions about individuals who belong to the lower social class are pervasive throughout American society (Bullock, 1995; Lott, 2012). Furthermore, these perceptions can influence phenomena at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and societal levels (Bottero & Irwin, 2003; Piff et al., 2012). This suggests that being identified as a member of the lower class would have stigma associated with it. Furthermore, this stigma might be particularly salient in individuals who confirm negative stereotypes about lower class individuals (e.g., by being unemployed or receiving welfare assistance, as it suggests laziness).

The Impact of Social Class on Individuals’ Life Experiences

Social class can have a powerful influence on an individual’s life. This is in part because social class involves the transference of norms and beliefs which influence how individuals perceive the world (Stephens & Townsend, 2013), and because while self-identification with social class is low, individuals readily classify other people in terms of their social class (Weeks & Lupfer, 2004). In addition, membership in a particular social class impacts resource availability, which then has implications for individuals’ outcomes (Lott, 2012). As a result, social class influences individuals’ experience across several dimensions (e.g., the legal system, health, education).

One approach to understanding the impact of social class on the individual is that of social space (Black, 1979). Social space refers to an approach to social phenomena
which conceptualizes human relationships as occurring in a metaphorical space in which location, direction, and distance illustrate how the phenomena under study influences relationships. In the framework of social space, the greater wealth disparity between individuals (Black’s *vertical dimension*), the “more law” (e.g., longer sentences, higher fines) will be directed toward individuals lower in the social space from those higher in the social space (Black, 1998; Wacquant, 2010). Similarly, individuals’ relationship-based locations (Black’s *horizontal dimension*) can impact individuals’ reliance on formal legal institutions. In other words, individuals who are closer to their communities than to members of the legal system (e.g., police) would be less likely to rely on these institutions to solve interpersonal conflicts. This lack of engagement is expressed by individual’s actions, which include lower likelihood of contacting police among victims of crime (Baumgartner, 1985), lower trust in police (Weitzer & Tuch, 1999; Wilson & Durnham, 2001), and lower reliance on civil law to address interpersonal conflict (Sandefur, 2008).

This lack of engagement can also express itself through actions by the players in the legal system proper. Voir dire procedures (i.e., the process by which a jury is selected for trial), for example, tend to selectively disqualify lower class individuals from serving as jurors (Fukurai, 1996). Similarly, lower class defendants’ lack of resources makes them less likely to obtain legal counsel (Merry, 1986). This combination of individual and legal system-driven effects have the end result of lower overall participation in the legal system by lower class individuals compared to middle or upper class individuals.

Social class similarly impacts individuals’ health due to the limited resources available to lower class individuals (Lott, 2002), and because socialization into a
particular social class influences individuals behavior (e.g., willingness to seek therapy; Russell, 1996). Social class also influences health more directly: the experiences of lower class individuals negatively impact their health because they tend to experience greater hardship (Côté, 2011) and stressful discrimination (Fuller-Rowell et al., 2012). Lower class individuals tend to have greater exposure to health risk factors, have fewer opportunities to receive care, and have a lower quality of care when they do receive it. This causes lower class individuals to have poorer health compared to middle and upper class individuals (Mirowsky & Ross, 2007).

The influence of social class also extends to the realm of education; individuals’ social class, particularly in the United States, impacts the resources available for their education from a very early age (e.g., school funding based on property taxes results in fewer resources available to lower class students; Lott, 2002, 2012). In addition, differences in socialization between social classes impact individuals’ ability to successfully navigate university environments, which in turn impacts their likelihood of graduation (Stephens, Fryberg, Markus, Johnson, & Covarrubias, 2012). Social class also impacts how education professionals perceive and interact with students. As a result, lower class students are less likely to receive academic support or guidance (e.g., information on how to apply for college or financial aid; Lott, 2002). Similarly, lower class students who struggle academically are less likely to receive institutional support (Fine, 1990), which might contribute to high drop-out rates in low income schools.

The consequences of negative stereotypes about lower social class (i.e., prejudice, discrimination) are further reinforced by institutional arrangements which legitimize these consequences. Legitimization of structural arrangements that promote prejudice and
discrimination toward marginalized groups has been linked to increased hostility towards these groups (e.g., LGBT individuals, Bahns & Branscombe, 2011). In addition, maintenance of institutional distancing policies (i.e., policies that prevent low status groups from achieving full societal participation; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) highlights the fact that groups affected by it are not worthy of full recognition (Lott, 2002). Institutional distancing policies also result in decreased participation of lower class individuals in civic activities such as voting (Manza & Brooks, 2008) and jury participation (Sandefur, 2008).

**Social Class Stereotypes and Resource-Based Prejudice**

In the context of mainstream American culture, being lower class can expose individuals to prejudice on the basis of their social class membership (Room, 2005; Williams, 2009). This prejudice derives from the perception of lower class individuals as having negative traits associated with the “culture of poverty” (e.g., laziness; Lott & Bullock, 2007). These stereotypes might increase backlash against them when these individuals receive welfare assistance, because the perception of lower class individuals as lazy is cemented by the “handouts” (i.e., welfare) they receive (Yaniv, 1997). If upper class individuals believe lower class individuals to be taking advantage of upper class resources (i.e., tax revenue), welfare assistance can elicit prejudice from upper class individuals against lower class individuals (Rothblum, 1996).

Receiving welfare assistance might also result in lower class individuals being morally excluded as a result of Protestant work ethic values. Moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990) represents a process by which individuals are perceived as undeserving of recognition as full human beings and are at risk of harm by others as a result. This
exclusion is an integral component of the process of prejudice against lower class individuals (Lott, 2002) because it deprives these individuals from recognition as full human beings as a result of their perceived failings (i.e., laziness, which the Protestant work ethic construes as indicative of moral shortcomings). Given the foundational nature of the Protestant work ethic on American society, the stigma of laziness assigned to lower class individuals reflects a historical phenomenon that extends from the earliest years of the colonial United States (Zinn, 2003). The permanence of this belief associating lower class membership and laziness, therefore, is granted enhanced veracity due to its long history within mainstream American beliefs (i.e., permanence bias and stability bias; Blanchar & Eidelman, 2013 and Laurin, Gaucher, & Kay, 2013, respectively).

This chapter reviewed the impact that social class has on individuals’ life experience, and on how individuals are perceived by others. Lower social class membership is consistently associated with worse outcomes in health, education, and participation in civic institutions (e.g., law), compared to middle/upper class membership. The combined influence of individual and structural factors on prejudice toward lower class individuals might similarly influence lower class individuals’ outcomes when individuals are involved in the legal system as defendants or as victims seeking redress. This would occur due to the influence which defendant and victim characteristics have on juror decision-making, as discussed next.
Chapter 3 – Social Class of Trial Parties and Its Influence on Juror Decision-making

A consistent finding in research on psychology and law is that characteristics of the defendant and victim (e.g., gender, race, physical attractiveness, religion) can influence jurors’ verdict decisions (Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner, 2005). Mock jurors perceive defendants who are male, Black, and low-SES as guiltier compared to their female, White, and high-SES counterparts (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Similarly, defendants who harm White victims receive greater punishment than defendants who harm Black victims (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Defendants who allegedly or admitted belong to a minority religion (i.e., “cult) are perceived as guiltier than those who do not (Pfeifer, 1999). Archival court data (Taylor & Hosch, 2004) found that defendant ethnicity is linked to longer sentences. More recent research suggests that for particular crimes, a defendant’s sexual orientation biases jurors toward perceiving the defendant as more guilty (e.g., gay male defendants are perceived as guiltier in cases involving child sexual assault; Wiley & Bottoms, 2009). The influence of defendant characteristics on juror decision-making, however, tends to be moderated by other factors such as case facts and juror characteristics (Mitchell et al., 2005).

Although social class has been investigated in relation to other areas of psychology and law (e.g., public attitudes toward police; Baumgarter, 1985; Ramos & Novo, 2002), little attention has been paid to social class as a characteristic of defendants or victims. This is significant given the impact that social class has on individuals’ experiences and perceptions of social others. This chapter provides an overview of research on the effect that trial parties’ social class has on mock jurors’ decision-making.
Specifically, the chapter focuses on the social class of the accused (i.e., defendant) and the social class of the victim.

**Effect of Defendant’s Social Class**

Social class as a defendant characteristic has received limited attention, compared to race or gender. The majority of research on the effect of defendants’ social class uses socioeconomic status as the operative variable. While not equal to social class, socioeconomic status can serve as a valid proxy as it is usually constructed based on two elements which also pertain to social class: income and occupation (see, e.g., Hout, 2008). Jurors and mock jurors tend to be biased against low SES defendants. In two major meta-analyses of experimental studies on juror decision-making, defendants’ social class consistently predicted more negative outcomes for defendants of lower social class (Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Moderation analyses indicated that crime type did not influence this effect, suggesting that the specific type of crime might not influence jurors’ verdicts.

Research on the impact of socioeconomic status on perceptions of offenders supports the findings of bias against low-SES individuals across a variety of crime types. Hoffman (1981) found that low-SES individuals were perceived as more likely to have committed crimes, compared to high-SES individuals. Similarly, court records show that defendants were more likely to be found guilty when tried by juries made up predominantly of individuals with higher SES than the defendant (Adler, 1973). Mock jurors express greater certainty that a low-SES defendant is guilty, greater certainty that a low-SES defendant will recidivate, and believe low-SES defendants as more likely to have committed similar offenses in the past, compared to high-SES defendants (Willis-
Esqueda, Espinoza, & Culhane, 2008). Low-SES defendants are also more likely to be found guilty than to be found not guilty by reason of insanity (Towers, McGinley, & Pasewark, 1992). In juvenile cases, bias against low-SES defendants is driven predominantly by stereotypes of low-SES juveniles as prone to commit crimes, rather than by a lack of perceived similarity between defendant and mock juror (Farnum & Stevenson, 2013).

In addition, defendants’ social class or SES can interact with other defendant characteristics to influence jurors’ decision-making. In a date rape trial, male mock jurors, but not female mock jurors, perceive low-SES defendants as more responsible for the offense than high-SES defendants (Black & Gold, 2008). Low-SES African American defendants are rated as more guilty and receive lengthier sentences than low-SES Whites or high-SES African Americans (Gleason & Harris, 1975). Similarly, low-SES Mexican American defendants received lengthier sentences compared to both high-SES Mexican American defendants and European-American defendants (Espinoza & Esqueda, 2008). These interactive effects suggest that under some circumstances, social class can magnify mock jurors’ pre-existing biases (e.g., against Mexican-Americans, Espinoza & Esqueda, 2008).

**Effect of Victim’s Social Class**

Social class can influence perceptions of injustice: for example, low-SES African Americans are perceived as more likely to be victims of racism, compared to high-SES African Americans (Hartman, Hoogstraten, & Spruijt-Metz, 1994). Similarly, social class might impact victims’ interactions with law enforcement, with cases involving high-SES victims receiving more law enforcement resources than cases involving low-SES victims.
(e.g., time spent investigating the case; Bynum, Cordner, & Greene, 1982). This section will describe the existing evidence on mock jurors’ decision-making bias based on the social class of victims of crime in the context of criminal and civil trials.

In the context of juror decision-making, a meta-analysis found no effect of victim’s SES on mock jurors’ decision-making (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). The reliability of these findings might be limited, however, given that they stem from only three studies. Further research on the impact of victim SES often involves civil litigation, in part because victim SES might be relevant to some of the decisions which civil trial jurors need to make (e.g., awards based on lost income, Greene & Bornstein, 2003). In the context of civil litigation, there is no evidence that victims’ SES influence damage awards generally (Greene & Bornstein, 2003, but see Lenton, 2007). While victim SES does not seem to influence damage awards, it might influence how jurors perceive the victim (e.g., low-SES victims might be perceived as more “needy,” asking for an undeserved award; Hans, 2000).

In the context of criminal trials, the evidence available is mixed. While these studies do not specifically measure social class or SES, some of the victim characteristics evaluated can serve as proxies for social class. On one hand, employment (i.e., whether the victim is employed or unemployed) did not influence jurors’ decision-making (Myer, 1980). On the other hand, cases in which the victims engaged in questionable behavior (e.g., alcohol abuse, careless behavior) resulted in lower certainty of the defendant’s guilt, in jurors’ pre-deliberation judgments (Visher, 1987). This latter finding is significant given that class-based social stigma associates lower social class membership with greater likelihood of engaging in questionable behavior (Bullock, 1995). Related to
this, a different study found that female mock jurors perceived a date rape victim as more responsible for her rape when the offender was of low-SES, compared to when the offender was of high-SES (Black & Gold, 2008). This might indicate class-based bias, as mock jurors might assume that the offender and victim were of similar SES, given that no SES information was explicitly given about the victim (Black & Gold, 2008). Finally, race can serve as a proxy for social class, given that African Americans might be perceived as belonging to lower social classes than Whites. This is supported by clear class divides in the types of crimes which are perceived as stereotypical of different racial groups: Whites are seen as more likely perpetrators of white-collar crime (which is more likely to be committed by middle or upper class individuals), while African Americans were seen as more likely perpetrators of property crimes (which are more likely to be committed by poor or working class individuals; Esqueda, 1997; Gordon, 1990; Gordon, Michels, & Nelson, 1996). The evidence for a race effect suggests that, barring race-dependent moderators (e.g., race salience) mock jurors are generally more punitive in cases with White victims (compared to Black victims; Baldus, Woodworth, Zuckerman, Weiner, & Broffitt, 1998; ForsterLee, ForsterLee, Horowitz, & King, 2006; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994).

Based on the literature on other victim characteristics (e.g., race, employment), it is expected that mock jurors will generally be more lenient toward the defendant in cases in which the victim is of lower social class. This effect is expected given that mock jurors appear to generally be less supportive of a victim’s case when the victim is part of a group which is perceived to be of low status (e.g., African Americans, unemployed individuals).
Social Class Bias and Juror Decision-Making

Research evidence indicates that social class can impact trial outcomes in criminal trials (e.g., verdict), either directly (i.e., juror bias against low-SES defendants) or indirectly (e.g., by amplifying other biases). And while no direct evidence links victim’s social class with defendant outcomes, variables which can be associated with social class (e.g., social class of an offender with whom the victim is acquainted, victim behaviors, race) can influence trial outcomes. These findings suggest that bias based on the defendant’s or victim’s social class can influence trial outcomes. Furthermore, the interactive effect of social class on other biases (e.g., racial bias, Espinoza & Willis-Esqueda, 2008) suggest that under certain circumstances, social class bias might require justifying factors to be expressed, or that social class might in itself be a justifying factor in the expression of other types of prejudice.

This project sought to expand the field’s understanding on the influence of social class on jurors’ decision-making in three ways. First, the project expanded current knowledge on the effect of defendants’ and victims’ social class on jurors’ decision-making, and whether the effects differ between defendants and victims. This is an important goal given the limited research on the effect that social class of trial participants have on jurors’ decisions. Second, the project relied on a case involving a crime which is not commonly viewed as being driven by financial gain (i.e., assault). The majority of studies on the effects of SES on jurors’ decision-making involve cases in which the defendant stood to gain financially from the crime (e.g., robbery, embezzlement, or grand theft auto). This might further bias jurors against lower class defendants due to the financial motive present. In an assault case there is no explicit
financial gain, and therefore this is less likely to influence mock jurors’ decisions.

Similarly, because a criminal assault case is not necessarily concerned with the economic cost to the victim (unlike civil cases), any financial gain motive should no longer influence mock jurors’ decisions in favor of or against the victim. It is possible, however, that jurors might nevertheless be biased against lower class victims in an assault case due to stereotypes of lower class individuals as violent (Spencer & Castano, 2007).

Second, the project goes beyond simply identifying the presence of bias against lower class defendants or victims, and to evaluate the role that specific mechanisms of prejudice (justification and intergroup threat) have on mock jurors’ bias toward lower class defendants or victims. Focusing on the specific mechanisms of prejudice can help better understand under which circumstances the social class of defendants and victims results in biased decisions from jurors. The project results can also clarify whether these mechanisms result in similar patterns of mock juror bias based on whether the defendant or the victim’s social class is manipulated (e.g., threat might result in prejudice only against lower class defendants, but not against lower class victims). To this end, the following sections will elaborate on the theories underlying the proposed mechanisms of juror bias: the Justification-Suppression Model of prejudice (Chapter 4) and Integrated Threat Theory (Chapter 5).
Chapter 4 – The Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice

Modern research on prejudice is based on two-stage theories such as aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) and modern racism (McConahay, 1983) in which prejudice is linked to motivations to present oneself in a positive manner. These motivations stem from social norms that stress egalitarianism and humanitarianism as values that “proper” members of society should possess. One commonality between these two-stage theories is the fact that they do not address the issue of prejudice *per se*. Rather, the focus of these theories is prejudice *expression* (i.e., the circumstances under which individuals choose to express their prejudice through behavior). In contrast, the justification-suppression model of prejudice (JSM; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) is focused on both experiencing prejudice (i.e., an individual’s feeling of prejudice against another) and expressing said prejudice.

**The Justification-Suppression Model and the Expression of Prejudice**

The JSM was developed in part to address the difference between the experience and the expression of prejudice and in part to provide a theoretical framework to explain both. According to the JSM, prejudice is an automatic, affective reaction to exposure to members of groups that individuals have developed negative schemas about (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; King, Shapiro, Hebl, Singletary, & Turner, 2006). Furthermore, because prejudice is affective, it motivates individuals to react to it (Brehm, 1999). That is, assuming an individual has internalized schemas that ascribe negative traits to members of different groups, prejudice toward these groups is inevitable and will result in action toward the source of prejudice (e.g., discrimination).
The expression of prejudice, however, is not deterministic. Individuals have the ability to engage in two processes upon which the expression of prejudice ultimately depends on: justification and suppression. That is, simply because the experience of prejudice is automatic it does not necessarily mean that the expression of such prejudice will also be automatic (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Crandall, Eshelman, & O’Brien, 2002; Devine, 1989). This is particularly true given social norms that discourage the expression of prejudice toward certain social groups (e.g., women, racial minorities). Instead, when experiencing prejudice, individuals might make attempts to suppress its expression to avoid violating egalitarian social norms. More common, however, are processes by which individuals justify the expression of prejudice. That is, individuals identify undesirable traits in the object that elicited prejudice that allow the individual to simultaneously express prejudice and maintain compliance with egalitarian social norms. For example, race-based prejudice is generally considered deviant and therefore suppressed, unless a negative trait (e.g., laziness) can be provided to help justify the expression of prejudice. Therefore, justification represents a cognitive counterpart to prejudice, a conceptualization supported by the role that stereotypes (a cognition-based phenomenon) have on justifying prejudice (Crandall, Bahns, Warner, & Schaller, 2011). Justification is conceptualized as more common than suppression because it is believed to require fewer cognitive resources, be more stable in the long term, and elicit positive affective reactions in the individual (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). According to the JSM, both the experience and expression of prejudice are dependent on contemporary social norms which define the “normative window.”
The Normative Window and Determining Who Faces Prejudice

The normative window of prejudice expression refers to specific timeframes within which attitudes toward the expression of prejudice against members of a given group are shifting (Crandall, Ferguson, & Bahns, 2013). As the name indicates, the normative window is defined by social norms which establish whether expressing prejudice against a particular group is acceptable or unacceptable. The normative window specifically covers those expressions of prejudice that are no longer perceived as completely acceptable, nor are they perceived as completely unacceptable. And being a window (i.e., an object defined by its boundaries), the expressions of prejudice are in this in-between state only to the extent that social norms are unclear on the acceptability of these expressions.

In other words, prejudice is any negative affect aimed toward a group, or toward individuals primarily because of their group affiliation (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Crandall & Warner, 2005; Crandall et al., 2013). Only those expressions of prejudice within the normative window are identified as prejudice, however, because expressions of prejudice outside the normative window are either completely unacceptable (e.g., against children) and therefore seen as something other than prejudice; or completely acceptable (e.g., against child molesters), and therefore not seen as prejudice.

The normative window defines what society understands as “prejudice” and determines when prejudice is acceptable to express (Crandall & Warner, 2005). In doing so, the normative window also defines which groups will face prejudice and which groups are unlikely to do so (and if they do, they are unlikely to understand it as prejudice). Based on the “position” of the normative window, Crandall and colleagues
(2013) define three types of groups: True Low groups, Normative Window groups, and Unsuppressed Prejudice groups.

“True Low” groups are groups that have seldom or never been the targets of prejudice (e.g., firefighters) or to groups which are seldom or no longer targets of prejudice (e.g., Irish-Americans). According to the normative window, these groups are unlikely to face prejudice for two reasons. First, these groups rarely elicit the negative affective reaction which defines prejudice. This means that individuals who encounter these groups effectively have no prejudice to express toward them. Second, even if individuals were to express prejudice against members of these groups, the rarity of this event would lead them to consider explanations other than prejudice (e.g., assuming the person expressing prejudice is unpleasant or rude by nature; Crandall et al., 2013).

By contrast, the other two types of groups will face prejudice due to their position with respect to the normative window. “Normative Window” groups are those groups toward which attitudes on the expression of prejudice are shifting, and might therefore experience prejudice and identify it as such (e.g., gay/lesbian individuals, racial minorities). Expressions of prejudice against these groups are often the focus of research and public opinion, precisely because such expressions are becoming increasingly unacceptable (Crandall & Warner, 2005). Because of these changing norms, however, the expression of prejudice is not universal, and might depend on individual characteristics (e.g., authoritarianism) or situational factors (e.g., group norms; Crandall et al., 2013).

“Unsuppressed Prejudice” groups represent those which have not yet “entered” the normative window, and therefore expressions of prejudice against them are nearly universal (e.g., terrorists, child abusers). These groups face constant prejudice for two
reasons: first, social factors (e.g., group norms, socialization) promote prejudice toward Unsuppressed Prejudice groups such that most individuals living with a given social context will experience prejudice toward members of these groups. Second, the universal nature of prejudice toward these groups dissuades people from suppressing their prejudice. This occurs because prejudice toward universally disliked groups is normative, and therefore unlikely to threaten individuals’ egalitarian self-concept. Ironically, the pervasiveness of prejudice against these groups results in a similar effect to that of True Lows’ misidentifying prejudice: most individuals would not necessarily consider negative affect toward Unsuppressed Prejudice groups as “prejudice” but rather as something different (and justified; Crandall & Warner, 2005; Crandall et al., 2013).

In summary, the normative window construct can help identify which targets are likely to face prejudice by defining whether the expression of prejudice against groups is deemed acceptable, unacceptable, or is shifting from one to the other (Unsuppressed Prejudice, True Lows, and Normative Window groups, respectively) based on the prevalent social norms in a given society at a particular point in time. Members of True Low groups are unlikely to face prejudice, and if they do, they are unlikely to identify it as such. By contrast, members of Unsuppressed Prejudice groups will nearly always face prejudice, although few individuals might consider it as such (including members of these groups). Members of Normative Window groups are likely to experience prejudice, although not as often as members of Unsuppressed Prejudice groups. Furthermore, expressions of prejudice against members of Normative Window groups are likely to be identified as prejudice. Having established a basic typology of social groups, the next
step is determining how the normative window applies to groups along the dimension of social class.

**The Normative Window and Class-related Prejudice**

Arguably, the primary difference between social class and other dimensions of group membership (e.g., race, gender) is the fact social class, while existing within the normative window, might be more likely to elicit unsuppressed prejudice, compared with other dimensions of group membership. That is, expressions of class-based prejudice (particularly against lower class targets) are more likely to be seen as normative, compared to expressions of race- or gender-based prejudice. Although no direct data testing this is available, previous research on the normative window of prejudice (e.g., Ferguson & Crandall, 2006) suggests this might indeed be the case.

Ferguson and Crandall (2006; described in Crandall et al., 2013) had participants rate various groups using a feeling thermometer which measured liking/rejection. Factor analysis showed that participants’ rating of poor people (i.e., the one social class listed) loaded on the same factor as other “traditional” targets of prejudice (e.g., Hispanics, Jews) suggesting that poor people are perceived as within the normative window of prejudice expression. As a result, individuals’ expression of prejudice toward poor people is likely to be influenced by the presence of justifications (rather than prejudice being always suppressed or always expressed).

As to the relative position of social class within the normative window, evidence suggests that individuals might find prejudice against lower class individuals more acceptable than prejudice against low-status groups in other dimensions (e.g., race). Specifically, Crandall and colleagues (2002) had participants rate the acceptability of
prejudice against 105 groups on a 3-point scale (0 = “Not OK to feel negatively about this group,” 1 = “Maybe OK to feel negatively about this group,” 2 = “OK to feel negatively about this group”). Although none of the groups were explicitly class-based, several groups imply a specific social class (e.g., rednecks, mean rating of 0.73; welfare recipients, mean rating of 0.62). Prejudice against these groups was rated more acceptable than against racial groups (e.g., the highest mean rating for a racial group, Hispanics, was 0.14). This suggests that, although most people might not find it acceptable to be prejudiced against groups which are associated with lower social class, they nevertheless believe prejudice against these groups to be more acceptable than against racial minorities.

Class prejudice differs from other types of due to the dynamic nature of class membership. Compared to other dimensions such as race or gender, it is relatively easy to cross class boundaries (George, 2006). This, combined with popular beliefs about class mobility (e.g., the “American Dream”), would increase the acceptability of expressing prejudice against lower class individuals. This would occur because the ability to move across class lines combined with an overemphasis on the influence of individual effort in doing so can easily lead to the belief that lower class individuals “deserve” their fate because of their lack of effort. Because one’s race or gender is independent of effort (e.g., hard work does not turn women into men, nor is it expected to), this same combination of factors would not apply to gender or race. Thus, while egalitarian norms might promote beliefs which reduce overall prejudice against groups in the normative window, the influence of these norms in reducing class prejudice is limited because most people underestimate the difficulty of upward class mobility.
Defining Justification

As noted above, Crandall and colleagues define “justification” as any element which allows individuals to express prejudice without appearing prejudiced (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Research on JSM has evaluated a wide range of possible justifications. These include features that confirm negative stereotypes about a group such as an obese individual drinking a large sugary drink (King et al., 2006) or a Muslim job applicant who wears Muslim attire (as opposed to Western attire; King & Ahmad, 2010). In the first example, prejudice is justified because the sugary drink suggests that the obese individual is uninterested or unwilling to “fix” her obesity. In the second example, prejudice is justified by the job applicants’ unwillingness to “assimilate” into the local culture.

For this project, we similarly choose a justification that would confirm negative stereotypes about the defendant: lack of warmth. According to the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002), group stereotypes stem from one of two dimensions: competence and warmth. A lack of warmth is characteristic of stereotypes of groups perceived as potential competitors for resources. Given this, both upper and lower class individuals can be perceived as lacking in warmth (Fiske et al., 2002), which provides a somewhat unique situation in which the same feature should trigger justification of prejudice toward both upper and lower class defendants. In this project, lack of warmth was operationalized as a defendant or victim acting in a rude or unpleasant manner toward other people (e.g., being abrasive toward wait staff or fellow patrons at a bar).

The JSM represents a dynamic model of how individuals develop unique cognitive systems that determine whether or not to express their experience of prejudice,
based on schemas adopted during their early socialization as well as changing social norms which govern the expression of prejudice. The JSM provides a theoretical framework to evaluate the impact that membership into a social group which elicits prejudice as well as potential justifications for prejudice can have on individuals’ perception of social others. It is unclear, however, whether perceptions of threat might influence the endorsement of possible justifications. Threat is an important aspect of intergroup conflict, as demonstrated by research on Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2002), discussed next.
Chapter 5 – Integrated Threat Theory

Intergroup threat theory, also described as integrated threat theory (ITT; Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan 2000) posits that intergroup relations are influenced by the extent to which individuals perceive outgroups and outgroup members as threatening to the values and well-being of the ingroup and its members. The main principles of ITT focus on the nature of intergroup threat, its antecedent factors, and its influence on intergroup relations. This chapter will review the assumptions underlying ITT, the nature and consequences of intergroup threat, and the empirical evidence for ITT. Finally, the chapter will also evaluate how ITT applies to the issue of class-based intergroup threat, and how characteristics associated with members of different social classes map unto predictors of intergroup threat.

**Underlying Assumptions of Integrated Threat Theory**

Integrated Threat Theory is based on specific assumptions about the effects of group membership on individuals’ self-construct, and the hostility that characterizes most intergroup contact. ITT assumes that group membership is a critical aspect of individuals’ construction of the self and that group membership tends to be fixed or stable (Brewer, 2007). As a result, threats to one’s ingroup would result in aversive reactions to the sources of this threat and increased identification with (as opposed to distancing from) the threatened ingroup. This aversive reaction then influences how individuals interact with outgroup members perceived to be threatening.

The theory similarly assumes that hostility and strife are the most common result of intergroup conflict (see, e.g., Stephan et al., 2002; Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). This assumption derives from the relative stability of group membership and an
expectation that initial contact with outgroup members is an inherently aversive experience. As a result, individuals are motivated to remain within their groups because the ingroup is important to them, and outgroups cause aversion, and react with hostility when the group or the individual are threatened by another. And although hostility is assumed to be the most common response to threat, it is by no means the only one: authors suggest that threat can motivate individuals to act in ways that increase intergroup cooperation (e.g., the Civil Rights Act; Stephan et al., 2009).

**The Nature of Intergroup Threat**

Intergroup threat occurs any time individuals perceive an outgroup as having the ability to harm them or their ingroup (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan et al., 2009). This means that individuals’ beliefs about how threatening specific outgroups are, and the influence of said belief on their perceptions and behaviors, is independent of the objective threat (if any) which the group might represent. Intergroup threat varies depending on the threatened entity (either the group as a whole or the individual group member) and the specific aspect of the group being threatened. Threats to the physical well-being of ingroup members or the resources available to the ingroup represent **realistic** threats. Threats to the norms and values endorsed by the ingroup represent **symbolic** threats (Stephan et al., 2009).

Perceptions of threat do not occur in a vacuum but rather develop within the broader cultural context in which groups exist, which includes cultural factors, the intergroup relationships, situational factors, and individual differences among members of the various groups (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan et al., 2009). In terms of cultural factors, Stephan and colleagues (2009) highlight that factors
which increase group identification and conformity (e.g., collectivism, cultural tightness, uncertainty avoidance) increase perceptions of intergroup threat because these cultural factors strengthen group identification and make group boundaries more salient (see, e.g., Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1995). Cultural factors are more relevant to perceptions of symbolic threat (as compared realistic threat), because these factors influence the values and beliefs of the group (Stephan et al., 2009).

In terms of intergroup relationship, group power is an influential source of threat. Specifically, members of low-power groups are more likely to experience threat from high-power groups than members of high-power groups are to experience threat from low-power groups. To the extent that members of high-power groups do experience threat, however, they will react more strongly in response than members of low-power groups would (Stephan et al., 2009). Additional sources of threat related to intergroup relations include relative size differences (e.g., smaller groups perceive larger groups as more threatening), a history of intergroup conflict, differences in value systems between groups, and individual degree of identification with the group. The above factors should increase perceptions of outgroups posing a realistic threat to the ingroup, with the exception of differences in value systems (which would increase perceptions of symbolic threat from outgroups), and degree of identification (which would increase both).

In terms of situational and individual factors, those which are conducive to experiences of threat (e.g., hostile or uncertain environments, authoritarian tendencies) can also influence whether individuals’ experiences with outgroup members will improve intergroup relations (by reducing threat; Stephan & Stephan, 1985) or harm intergroup relations (by increasing perceived threat, see e.g., Morrison & Ybarra, 2008; 2009). The
influence of threat is dependent on individuals’ degree of identification with their group, because low identification with a group allows individuals to disengage with a threatened group rather than responding to threats against said group, making threat less influential to these individuals compared to those who identify highly with the threatened group (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006)

**Consequences of Intergroup Threat**

The initial conceptualization of intergroup threat focused on the effects of threat on intergroup attitudes (e.g., Stephan et al., 2002). Further research expanded the consequences of threat to include cognitive and behavioral responses to threat (Stephan & Renfro, 2002). In addition, research (e.g., Maoz & McCauley, 2005; Vaes & Wicklund, 2002) also demonstrated that the effects of threat varied depending on threat target (individual or group) and threat type (realistic or symbolic). When threat targets individuals, their behavioral response tends to be individual (e.g., if at work, filing a grievance) and their emotional response tends to be inward-focused (e.g., shame, fear). Conversely, when threat targets the group, individuals’ behavioral responses tend to be collective (e.g., mass protests) and emotional responses tend to be outward-focused (e.g., anger toward the threatening outgroup; Stephan & Renfro, 2002). Threat type similarly results in different responses: when faced with symbolic threats, group members respond by increasing the distance between themselves and the outgroup (e.g., by adhering to group norms more strongly, dehumanizing or delegitimizing outgroup members). When faced with realistic threats, group members tend to respond with behaviors aimed at directly addressing the threat (e.g., avoidance of or aggression against outgroup members; Stephan et al., 2009).
Empirical Evidence for ITT

There is considerable support for ITT in intergroup relationship research across several dimensions of group affiliation (e.g., race, gender, sexual orientation). Threat is predictive of negative attitudes between members of different groups, such that individuals exposed to information which indicates members of an outgroup are a threat to ingroup values or resources, individuals will have more negative attitudes toward these outgroup members, compared to individuals who did not receive threat-related information. This finding has been replicated across multiple pairings of social groups, including American and Mexican citizens (Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000), White and Native Americans (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001), and White and Black Americans (Stephan et al., 2002). Perceptions of realistic and symbolic threat also predict negative attitudes toward terminal patients diagnosed with cancer and AIDS (Berrenberg, Finlay, Stephan, & Stephan, 2002). Threat also mediates the influence of anti-Black beliefs and political orientation on level of support for affirmative action policies (Renfro, Duran, Stephan, & Clason, 2006).

The relationship between threat and perception of outgroup members has been previously evaluated in a context which has considerable overlap with class issues: immigration and perceptions of immigrants (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005). Greater endorsement of beliefs that immigrants represent some kind of threat (either symbolic or realistic) to Americans result in more negative attitudes toward immigrants from Cuba, Mexico, and Asia (Stephan et al., 1999). Similarly, exposure to information describing an immigrant group as a source of threat resulted in more negative attitudes toward this group (Stephan et al.,
This effect was significantly stronger when the description included both realistic (immigrants will require economic support from the community) and symbolic threats (immigrants do not share the values of the community), compared to conditions which included only realistic or only symbolic threats. In addition, participants who were made to empathize with immigrants (by being asked to place themselves in the position of a foreign student immigrant to the U.S.) reported reduced anxiety and less negative attitudes toward immigrants, suggesting a potential mechanism to mitigate the effects of threat. Furthermore, perceptions of threat are stronger predictors of negative attitudes toward low-status groups, compared to high-status groups (Riek et al., 2006). Due to the considerable thematic overlap between stereotypes of immigrants and of low-income individuals (e.g., both are seen as outsiders, unwilling to do hard work, and are commonly perceived as being low-status groups), threat as conceptualized by ITT is likely to be a good predictor of class-based prejudice.

**ITT and Class-Based Prejudice**

While ITT has been applied to a variety of groups (race, nationality, religion) and in various societies (U.S., India, Mexico), there has been no direct application of this framework to the issue of class-based prejudice. Social class is arguably a good fit for evaluating intergroup threat given how prevalent threat-related messages are in discussions about issues of class. That is, discourse on class-related issues in the United States tends to focus on the threat that a given class poses to the rest of the nation, primarily in terms of using more resources than they are entitled to receive. This does not only target lower class individuals (e.g., “welfare queens”) but targets upper class individuals as well (e.g., demands for the rich to “pay their share” in taxes).
This discourse suggests that class-based prejudice would be primarily concerned with realistic threat, and findings on threat and group status (Maddux, Galinsky, Cuddy, & Polifroni, 2008; Tausch, Hewstone, & Roy, 2009) support this to some extent. Members of lower status groups (e.g., lower or middle class individuals) should perceive members of higher status groups (e.g., middle or upper class individuals) as sources of realistic threat. Conversely, members of higher status groups should perceive lower status group members as a source of symbolic threat. This threat is likely enhanced by stereotypes of lower class individuals as lacking mainstream values (e.g., they are lazy and untrustworthy; Bullock, 1995).

Individuals’ reactions to class-based intergroup threat also map onto the types of actions predicted by ITT. Specifically, individuals’ response to realistic threat is pragmatic, focused on addressing the threat (Stephan et al., 2009). In the context of class-based prejudice, actions aimed at political change (e.g., voting, protests) could be considered “direct” responses to the threat within the context of a democratic society. Conversely, individuals’ response to symbolic threat involves actions that distance one from the outgroup. In the context of class-based prejudice, this could include actions such as stronger endorsement of one’s class values (e.g., hard work, specific religious beliefs). Furthermore, groups with more power are less likely to perceive intergroup threat, compared to groups with less power, but to react more strongly to threat once it is identified (Stephan et al., 2000). This could explain the relative lack of actions indicative of intergroup threat by powerful groups (e.g., upper and middle classes) toward groups with less power (e.g., middle and lower classes).
Class Characteristics and the Applicability of ITT

The majority of ITT research (e.g., Stephan, Stephan, Demitrakis, Yamada, & Clason, 2000; Stephan et al., 2002, Stephan et al., 2009) has focused on relations between highly salient groups with which individuals tend to strongly identify with (e.g., race, gender). Social class (particularly in the United States) is a social category which is less salient and elicits weaker identification compared to race or gender. These characteristics suggest that individuals’ membership into a given social class might not be particularly conducive to experiencing threat toward their class.

Morrison and Ybarra (2008) elicited perceptions of realistic threat among university students in non-science majors by suggesting that students in science majors were often more successful post-graduation (e.g., because businesses preferred to hire science over non-science majors). These results suggest that even when group membership is less salient, perceptions of threat can occur by providing individuals with relevant information (in this study, the impact of one’s major on post-graduation employment opportunities). In the context of class-based prejudice, highlighting use of resources by lower class individuals (e.g., unemployment benefits, food stamps) could serve to elicit similar experiences of threat.

Group identification presents a more problematic issue. Highly identified individuals tend to be more sensitive to perceptions of intergroup threat compared to less identified individuals (Morrison & Ybarra, 2008; Riek et al., 2006). Given individuals’ relative low identification with their social class, this could reduce the likelihood that individuals will react to threats to their social class because these class groups are relatively unimportant to the individual. Group identification, however, is not the only
factor that influences appraisals of intergroup threat. In particular, the availability of negative stereotypes about an outgroup increases the perceived threat of that outgroup (Riek et al., 2009; Stephan et al., 2009). Negative stereotypes also result in stronger perceptions of intergroup threat, compared to group identification. This suggests that individuals’ awareness of negative stereotypes about social class outgroups will result in perceiving these outgroups as potential sources of threat. As a result, ITT should be able to account for the presence of class-based prejudice.

Beyond intergroup processes such as justifications and perceptions of threat, there are individual-level psychological constructs that are relevant to the study of intergroup relations between members of groups that vary in status, as well as constructs directly relevant to the study of social class relationships in the context of American society. The relevant constructs considered in this project, and discussed in detail in the next chapter, are legal authoritarianism, just world beliefs, the Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation.
Chapter 6 – Psychological Constructs relevant to Perceptions of Social Class

In the context of intergroup relations, beliefs which influence how one perceives other groups (i.e., intergroup appraisals) can have a profound effect on individuals’ attitudes and behaviors toward outgroup members (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). The constructs included in this project (authoritarianism, just world beliefs, the Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation) relate to intergroup appraisals in the context of hierarchical social arrangements, and specifically, to justification of inequality (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost et al., 2013). Because of their inequality-justifying nature, these constructs might influence interactions between members of low and high status groups (e.g., lower and upper social class individuals).

**Authoritarianism**

Authoritarianism is characterized by submission to established authorities, adherence to social norms endorsed by said authorities, and ethnocentrism (Altemeyer, 2004). Authoritarians also tend to have low tolerance for ambiguity and greater need for structure, which is related to their ethnocentrism (Kemmelmeier, 2010; Sidanius, 1978). Although the bulk of research on authoritarianism is focused on individuals who endorse right-wing ideologies (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 2004), evidence shows that similar patterns of behavior arise among authoritarian individuals who endorse left-wing ideologies (so-called ‘left-wing authoritarians;’ McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina-Paap, 1992, but see van Hiel, Duriez, & Kossowska, 2006 for ideological differences between right and left-wing authoritarians).

Endorsement of authoritarianism is related to greater punitiveness toward defendants (Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seing, & Pryce, 2001; Devine & Caughlin,
2014; Narby, Cutler, & Moran, 1993), more negative attitudes toward the insanity
defense (Cutler, Moran, & Narby, 1992), and greater likelihood of qualifying to serve as
a juror on a death penalty trial (Butler & Moran, 2007). Authoritarianism is also linked to
greater likelihood of ignoring judge’s instructions to disregard incriminating inadmissible
evidence (Werner, Kagehiro, & Strube, 1982), and greater likelihood of attributing
intentionality to a defendant’s actions (de la Fuente Solana, Garcia, & Tamayo, 1998).
Authoritarianism also mediates the relationship between other characteristics such as
religious fundamentalism and jurors’ decision-making (Miller, Maskaly, Peoples, &
Sigillo, 2014).

The relationship between authoritarianism and punitiveness is not universal,
however. These effects might be limited to criminal cases, as authoritarianism appears
unrelated to attitudes toward civil cases (Hans & Lofquist, 1994). This is likely because
compared to criminal defendants, civil defendants tend to be of higher status (e.g.,
corporations, medical doctors; Hans & Lofquist, 1994), and less likely to be perceived as
social deviants (particularly compared to criminal cases involving child abuse or murder;
Cramer, Adams, & Brodsky, 2012). Furthermore, authoritarian punitiveness in criminal
cases might be driven in part by social desirability effects, as authoritarian jurors are less
likely to convict a defendant who has similar attitudes as they do (Mitchell & Byrne,
1973). In addition, authoritarian jurors’ punitiveness is mitigated following deliberation
(McGowen & King, 1982), and authoritarian jurors tend to be more likely to change their
decision post-deliberation (Lamberth, Krieger, & Shay, 1982) suggesting these jurors
adjust their decision following exposure to others’ opinions.
Just World Beliefs

Individuals are motivated to believe that good deeds will be rewarded, and bad deeds will be punished (Lerner, 1980). This motivation stems from a need to perceive one’s world as stable and predictable, rather than chaotic and uncertain. As a result, instances which challenge this assumption of fairness are aversive and cause the observer to attempt to “fix” the situation to protect the just world belief (Dalbert, 2009; Hafer & Bègue, 2005). Lerner (1980) suggests that individuals address threats to just world beliefs through rational tactics (e.g., helping others or supporting organizations that do) and irrational tactics. Irrational tactics involve psychological processes such as ignoring the problem or reframing one’s perceptions of the situation or victim so that negative outcomes are construed as deserved (Lerner, 1980).

Just world beliefs are considered a two-dimensional construct (Dalbert, 2009; Hafer & Bègue, 2005). One dimension involves individuals’ perceptions of the world as fair in general (or unfair, see Loo, 2002), while the second dimension involves individuals’ perceptions of the world as fair to themselves (i.e., personal belief in a just world; Dalbert, 1999). Each belief results in different effects: personal belief in a just world is associated with adaptive effects (e.g., higher life satisfaction; Correia, Batista, & Lima, 2009), while general belief in a just world is associated with maladaptive effects (e.g., aggression, Bègue & Muller, 2006).

Just world beliefs influence how individuals perceive others, particularly those who are in a position to threaten the idea of the world as a fair place. For example, general belief in a just world has been linked to higher victim derogation (i.e., assuming victims of harm have done something to deserve it; e.g., Correia et al., 2012; Furnham,
2003; van Prooijen & van den Boos, 2009). These findings make intuitive sense, as “innocent” victims of harm (i.e., those who have not caused their harm) challenge just world beliefs, and within laboratory paradigms, participants are seldom able to take direct action to address the injustice and restore their belief in a just world. Instead, they rely on reframing the event or the victim so that the harm is perceived as “deserved,” protecting their belief in a just world. This can cause unexpected consequences: individuals who strongly endorsed just world beliefs perceived a poor mother as less deserving of government assistance the more she did to improve her situation (e.g., improving job skills, skipping meals to ensure her children eat; Appelbaum, Lennon, & Aber, 2006). This occurs because the mother’s failure to overcome poverty threatens just world beliefs more when she is “playing by the rules,” promoting her derogation.

Just world beliefs (particularly general just world beliefs) similarly influence intergroup relations more broadly. This occurs in large part because just world beliefs are related to support for unequal intergroup relations (Jost et al., 2013). This is not due to an inherent preference for unequal arrangements but rather because just world beliefs assume that societal status quo reflects a just world (e.g., high status people are at the top because of their competence; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). Information which challenges this assumption challenges the belief in a just world, which results in derogation of low status groups and greater support for unequal social arrangements (e.g., Dalbert & Yamauchi, 1994; Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003; Kaplan, 2012; Malahy, Rubinlicht, & Kaiser, 2009).

Finally, just world beliefs are also linked to greater punitiveness, particularly against low-status targets. Specifically, mock jurors with high endorsement of general
just world beliefs were more confident of a defendant’s guilt, and recommended more severe sentences, in cases involving low-SES defendants compared to high-SES defendants (Freeman, 2006). A different study found that mock jurors in a death penalty case with high endorsement of just world beliefs to be less likely to consider mitigating factors (i.e., factors which make the defendant less deserving of the death penalty; Butler & Moran, 2007). Both of these effects are congruent with findings described above: greater punitiveness against low-status defendants is congruent with a tendency for just world beliefs to support unequal social arrangements, and lower endorsement of mitigators makes the defendant more likely to receive a capital sentence (i.e., to be “justly” punished for his crimes).

**Protestant Work Ethic**

The Protestant work ethic refers to a constellation of beliefs focused on the importance of hard work as a means to salvation and of economic success as an indicator of divine favor (Weber, 1958). That is, individuals who endorse the Protestant work ethic believe that hard work is a reflection of an individuals’ devoutness and moral character, and that the success attained in life (presumably through hard work) reflects the fact that God views an individual favorably. This belief represents one of the core values of American society (Katz & Hass, 1988; Zinn, 2003) and it is an important component of inequality-justifying ideologies (Jost et al., 2013). In the context of legal decision-making, endorsement of the Protestant work ethic is linked to greater punitiveness toward atypical offenders (e.g., an upper social class individual who commits a traditionally blue collar crime such as burglary), and to greater perceptions of remorse by upper class offenders (Christopher, Marek, & May, 2003).
Social Dominance Orientation

Some individuals tend to support social arrangements which are based on inequality and the domination of one or more minority groups by a majority group. This preference is referred to as social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Initially, SDO was conceptualized as a tendency to prefer one’s ingroup dominance toward outgroups (see, e.g., Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), a preference influenced by a tendency to perceive the world in terms of competition rather than cooperation (Perry, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2013). Further research, however, indicated that endorsement of SDO was related to support for maintaining dominating groups in power (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). That is, individuals who endorsed SDO did not necessarily want their social ingroup to dominate other groups, but rather supported whichever group was the dominant one, even if this meant their ingroup was dominated by it. This increased the conceptual similarity of SDO with other processes related to support for unequal social arrangements (e.g., system justification; Jost et al., 2004).

Initially believed to be a one-dimensional construct, SDO was later found to be better described as a two-dimension construct (Ho et al., 2012; Jost & Thompson, 2000). These two dimensions are support for group-based hierarchies (Dominance dimension, or SDO-D) and an opposition to group-based equality (Egalitarianism, or SDO-E). While both dimensions of SDO result in support for unequal social arrangements, this support stems from the different foci outlined above. Similarly, evidence indicates that each dimension is related to different aspects of support for unequal social arrangements:
Endorsement of SDO-D is related to outgroup derogation and stereotype endorsement, while SDO-E is related to political conservatism (Kugler, Cooper, & Nosek, 2010).

Because of the inherent intergroup aspect of SDO, its effects are focused on perception of groups, or of individuals as members of specific groups, making it difficult to disentangle interpersonal from intergroup effects. The influence of SDO on intergroup relations, however, has been extensively studied. High SDO is related to stronger implicit bias in favor of one’s group in contexts that highlight group identity (Pratto & Shih, 2000). Endorsement of SDO is related to greater prejudice against racial and national outgroups (e.g., Danso, Sedlovskaya, & Suanda, 2007; Kemmelmeier, 2005; Miller, Smith, & Mackie, 2004; Poteat & Spanierman, 2012; Pratto et al., 1994), opposition to social policies that ameliorate group inequality (e.g., affirmative action; Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1998) and a tendency to choose lower absolute gains for one’s ingroup when this also results in lower gains for an outgroup (i.e., “Vladimir’s choice;” Sidanius, Haley, Molina, & Pratto, 2007). Related to this, among individuals with high endorsement of SDO, techniques known to reduce intergroup prejudice (i.e., imagining a positive encounter with an outgroup member) did not result in lower prejudice toward the imagined outgroup (Asbrock, Gutenbrunner, & Wagner, 2013).

Beyond general prejudice, endorsement of SDO is linked to greater punitiveness against minority group members. Correlational data indicates a strong relationship ($r = .49$) between SDO and a preference for punishment over leniency generally, and in specific areas (childrearing and criminal punishment; Capps, 2002). Within a legal context, Kemmelmeier (2005) found that endorsement of SDO moderated the relationship between defendant’s race and verdict among White mock jurors.
Specifically, there was no effect of defendant race among low-SDO mock jurors, but among high-SDO mock jurors, the Black defendant was perceived as more guilty, and received a more severe punishment, compared to the White defendant.

Endorsement of the constructs outlined in this chapter (authoritarianism, just world beliefs, Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation) relate to individuals’ perceptions of others. These relationships are particularly salient when the other individual is a member of a low-status group (e.g., lower class individuals). Thus, these constructs might moderate the relationship between the social class of trial parties (e.g., defendant, victim) and jurors’ decisions. The studies in this project, outlined in the next sections, are aimed at evaluating this influence.
Chapter 7 – Overview of the Project and Hypotheses

Social class can have a profound impact on how individuals are perceived by others (Fiske & Markus, 2012). This impact might in part be dependent on the presence of contextual factors which help justify the expression of prejudice, the perception of individuals as threatening to others’ ingroup and individual endorsement of beliefs which influence perceptions of intergroup relationships. One area in which the influence of social class has received little attention is juror decision-making. This project had three goals: first, to evaluate the impact of defendant’s social class (Study 1), victim’s social class (Study 2) and mock jurors’ social class (Studies 1 and 2) on mock jurors’ decision-making (i.e., verdict and sentencing recommendations), and determine whether patterns of bias vary between defendants and victims.

Second, the project evaluated an integrated model of justification and threat on the expression of class-based prejudice in the context of a jury trial. In this integrated model, the presence of a justification negates the benefit of ingroup affiliation on the presence of threat. In other words, in the presence of a justification (i.e., portraying a defendant or victim as threatening social values or resources) will result in bias against said defendant or victim, when the victim is of lower class. This effect was expected given three facts: first, lower class individuals report endorsing negative stereotypes about lower class people, which is related to more negative perceptions of lower class people (Bullock & Limbert, 2003; Shildrick & MacDonald, 2013). This intra-group bias has not been reported among upper class individuals. Second, both upper and lower class mock jurors might be motivated to suppress prejudice against lower class defendants or victims: upper class mock jurors would suppress prejudice out of a need to appear fair.
minded and egalitarian, and lower class mock jurors would suppress prejudice out of a need to protect their ingroup. The presence of justification allows all mock jurors to freely express this prejudice. Third, threat elicits a more negative response when the threatening group is of low (compared to high) status (Rick et al., 2006). These three facts indicate that bias against lower class defendants and victims would be exacerbated by the presence of justification and threat.

Third, the project evaluated the relationship of individual differences (i.e., endorsement of just world beliefs, legal authoritarianism, Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation) on mock jurors’ decision-making. Research has shown that these variables can influence individuals assessments of guilt, responsibility, or (see, e.g., Christopher et al., 2003; Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Freeman, 2006; Kemmelmeier, 2005). These variables have also been linked to support for unequal societal arrangements (e.g., Jost, Nosek, & Banaji, 2004; Jost et al., 2013), which could result in greater punitiveness toward low status groups (in the context of this project, lower social class defendants or victims). Because of this, I expected these variables to influence participants’ decisions in the context of a mock trial in which the defendant and victim were members of different social classes.

The project involved two studies. The first study investigated whether mock jurors’ decisions in an assault case vary systematically based on experimental condition, and whether individual-level variables similarly relate to mock jurors’ decisions. This study used a 2 (defendant’s social class: upper class vs. lower class) x 2 (justification: present vs. absent) x 3 (threat: no threat vs. symbolic vs. realistic) between subjects factorial experimental design. The second study used the same assault case as in Study 1,
albeit systematically varying the social class of the victim rather than the defendant. Thus, Study 2 used a 2 (victim’s social class: upper class vs. lower class) x 2 (justification: present vs. absent) x 3 (threat: no threat vs. symbolic vs. realistic) between subjects factorial experimental design.

The rationale for a second study was to determine whether the effects of social class bias, justification, threat, and individual differences from Study 1 replicate when the social class of the victim, rather than the defendant, is manipulated. The effects of social class were expected to replicate given evidence of general bias against lower class individuals (Bullock, 1995; Williams, 2009). The effects of justification were similarly expected to replicate given that justification can allow for the expression of prejudice toward victims of crime (i.e., “victim blaming,” see for example Black & Gold, 2008). The effects of threat were similarly expected to replicate. While the victim in this case did not cause serious harm to the defendant, this should not influence the perceived threat of the victim’s group (i.e., social class). This was expected given findings that even when individual group members do not represent a direct threat (e.g., international college students; Stephan et al., 2005) the perception of their group as threatening elicits prejudice. Therefore, even though the victim did not cause serious harm to the defendant, the potential threat to mock jurors’ ingroup resources or values should nevertheless lead mock jurors to be biased against the victim, as predicted by ITT. The effects of individual differences were similarly expected to replicate, given that these differences either predict general bias against lower class individuals (e.g., authoritarianism, PWE, SDO) or facilitate victim-blaming (JWB, Furnham, 2003).
The project hypotheses relate to the three focal points of the study: social class in the courtroom, justification and threat as mechanisms of intergroup bias, and the relationship between individual differences (i.e., endorsement of just world beliefs, legal authoritarianism, Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation) and mock jurors’ decisions. As a result, the hypotheses tested by the project did not cover those parts of the study which are tangential to the study (e.g., the influence on verdict of an interaction between an individual difference measures and the threat manipulation, while potentially interesting, was beyond the scope of this project, and as a result, was not evaluated).

**Study 1**

**Hypotheses for experimental variables**

1. When the defendant is of lower class, participants will report greater certainty of guilt, perceive the defendant as more responsible for the incident, and perceive the defendant more negatively, compared to conditions in which the defendant is of upper class.

2. There will be a main effect for justification such that, in conditions in which a justification is available, participants will report greater certainty of guilt, perceive the defendant as more responsible for the incident, and perceive the defendant more negatively, compared to conditions in which a justification is not available.

3. There will be a two-way interaction between defendants’ social class and the presence of justification such that the effect of justification outlined in Hypothesis 2 will be stronger in conditions in which the defendant is upper class, compared to conditions in which the defendant is lower class.
4. There will be a two-way interaction between the presence of justification and the presence of threat, such the effect of justification outlined in Hypothesis 2 will be stronger in conditions in which the defendant’s actions are described as a threat to the community, compared to conditions in which the defendant’s actions are not described as a threat to the community. These changes based on threat conditions will be greater among participants in conditions in which justification is available, compared with conditions in which justification is not available.

5. There will be a three-way interaction between defendant’s social class, justification, and threat such that the interactive effect of justification and threat (Hypothesis 4) will only occur when the defendant is of lower class. This hypothesis tests the integrated model of justification and threat, which posits that the combined presence of both justification and threat will result in bias against the lower class defendant regardless of his ingroup/outgroup status relative to the mock juror.

6. There will be a three-way interaction between participant’s social class, defendant’s social class, and threat such that there will be an effect of threat in which participants will report greater certainty on a guilty verdict, perceive the defendant as more responsible for the incident, and perceive the defendant more negatively when the defendant is presented as representing a symbolic threat (compared to no threat), and participants will report greater certainty on a guilty verdict and recommend lengthier sentences when the defendant is presented as representing a realistic threat (compared to symbolic threat). This effect for threat, however, will only occur when the participant and the defendant are members of
different social classes. Among participants whose social class is the same as that of the defendant, there will be no effect for threat.

**Hypotheses for individual differences variables**

7. There will be a main effect for endorsement of legal authoritarianism such that endorsement of legal authoritarianism will be positively related to certainty of guilt and negatively related to perceptions of responsibility and general perception of the defendant.

8. There will be a main effect for endorsement of just world beliefs (JWB) such that endorsement of JWB will be positively related to greater certainty of guilt and to perceptions of responsibility and negatively related to general perception of the defendant.

9. There will be a main effect for endorsement of Protestant work ethic (PWE) such that endorsement of JWB will be positively related to certainty of guilt will be positively related to greater certainty of guilt and to perceptions of responsibility and negatively related to general perception of the defendant.

10. There will be a main effect for endorsement of social dominance orientation such that endorsement of social dominance orientation will be positively related to certainty of guilt and will be positively related to greater certainty of guilt and to perceptions of responsibility and negatively related to general perception of the defendant.

11. There will be a two-way interaction between defendants’ social class and participants’ endorsement of legal authoritarianism such that the rate at which participants’ certainty on a guilty verdict and perception of defendant
responsibility increase as endorsement of legal authoritarianism increases, and the rate at which overall perception of the defendant decreases as endorsement of legal authoritarianism increases will all be greater among participants presented with a lower class defendant, compared to participants presented with an upper class defendant.

12. There will be a two-way interaction between defendants’ social class and participants’ endorsement of just world beliefs such that the rate at which participants’ certainty on a guilty verdict and perception of defendant responsibility increase as endorsement of just world beliefs increases, and the rate at which overall perception of the defendant decreases as endorsement of just world beliefs increases will all be greater among participants presented with a lower class defendant, compared to participants presented with an upper class defendant.

13. There will be a two-way interaction between defendants’ social class and participants’ endorsement of the Protestant work ethic such that the rate at which participants’ certainty on a guilty verdict and perception of defendant responsibility increase as endorsement of the Protestant work ethic increases, and the rate at which overall perception of the defendant decreases will all be greater among participants presented with a lower class defendant, compared to participants presented with an upper class defendant.

14. There will be a two-way interaction between defendants’ social class and participants’ endorsement of social dominance orientation such that the rate at which participants’ certainty on a guilty verdict and perception of defendant
responsibility increase as endorsement of legal authoritarianism increases, and the rate at which overall perception of the defendant decrease as endorsement of social dominance orientation increases will all be greater among participants presented with a lower class defendant, compared to participants presented with an upper class defendant.

**Study 2**

**Hypotheses for experimental variables**

15. There will be a main effect for social class such that in conditions in which the victim is of lower class, participants will report lowest certainty of guilt, report the most positive perceptions of the defendant, and view the victim as most responsible for the incident, compared to conditions in which the defendant is of upper class.

16. There will be a main effect for justification such that in conditions in which a justification is available, participants will report lowest certainty of guilt, report the most positive perceptions of the defendant, and view the victim as most responsible for the incident, compared to conditions in which a justification is not available.

17. There will be a two-way interaction between defendants’ social class and the presence of justification such that the effect of justification outlined in Hypothesis 16 will be stronger in conditions in which the victim is lower class, compared to conditions in which the victim is upper class.

18. There will be a two-way interaction between the presence of justification and the presence of threat, such the effect of justification outlined in Hypothesis 16 will
be stronger in conditions in which the victim’s actions are described as a threat to the community, compared to conditions in which the victim’s actions are not described as a threat to the community. These changes based on threat conditions will be greater among participants in conditions in which justification is available, compared with conditions in which justification is not available.

19. There will be a three-way interaction between defendant’s social class, justification, and threat such that the interactive effect of justification and threat (Hypothesis 18) will only occur when the victim is of lower class.

20. There will be a three-way interaction between participant’s social class, defendant’s social class, and threat such that there will be an effect of threat in which participants will report lower certainty on a guilty, evaluate the defendant more positively, and assign greater responsibility to the victim when the victim is presented as representing a symbolic threat (compared to no threat), and participants will report lower certainty on a guilty verdict and recommend shorter sentences when the victim is presented as representing a realistic threat (compared to symbolic threat). This effect for threat, however, will only occur when the participant and the victim are members of different social classes. Among participants whose social class is the same as that of the victim, there will be no effect for threat.

**Hypotheses for individual differences variables**

21. There will be a main effect for endorsement of legal authoritarianism same as that described in Study 1 (Hypothesis 7).

22. There will be a main effect for endorsement of just world beliefs (JWB) same as
that described in Study 1 (Hypothesis 8).

23. There will be a main effect for endorsement of Protestant work ethic (PWE same as that described in Study 1 (Hypothesis 9).

24. There will be a main effect for endorsement of social dominance orientation same as that described in Study 1 (Hypothesis 10).

25. There will be a two-way interaction between victim’s social class and participants’ endorsement of legal authoritarianism such that the rate at which participants’ certainty on a guilty verdict, evaluate the defendant, and assign responsibility to the victim increase as endorsement of legal authoritarianism increases will be greater among participants presented with an upper class victim, compared to participants presented with a lower class victim.

26. There will be a two-way interaction between victim’s social class and participants’ endorsement of just world beliefs such that the rate at which participants’ certainty on a guilty verdict, evaluate the defendant, and assign responsibility to the victim increase as endorsement of just world beliefs increases will be greater among participants presented with an upper class victim, compared to participants presented with a lower class victim.

27. There will be a two-way interaction between defendants’ social class and participants’ endorsement of the Protestant work ethic such that the rate at which participants’ certainty on a guilty verdict, evaluate the defendant, and assign responsibility to the victim increase as endorsement of the Protestant work ethic increases will be greater among participants presented with an upper class victim, compared to participants presented with a lower class victim.
28. There will be a two-way interaction between victim’s social class and participants’ endorsement of social dominance orientation such that the rate at which participants’ certainty on a guilty verdict, evaluate the defendant, and assign responsibility to the victim increase as endorsement of social dominance orientation increases will be greater among participants presented with an upper class victim, compared to participants presented with a lower class victim.
Chapter 8 – Pilot Study

A pilot study was conducted to ensure that the study materials will serve their intended purposes. The pilot study was done to ensure that a) a version of the trial summary with no class descriptors had an even verdict split; b) the descriptions of the defendant/victim reflect their intended social class; and c) the closing arguments which describe the defendant/victim as threatening the ingroup values/resources did in fact result in participants perceiving the defendant/victim as threatening the ingroup values/resources.

Method

Participants

Participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk (M-Turk; www.mturk.com). M-Turk is an online platform in which researchers can post surveys which can be completed by M-Turk “workers.” Samples recruited via M-Turk are more heterogeneous and more representative of the larger population compared to student samples (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). This was particularly important given that social psychological research tends to rely heavily on the experiences of college students (and in particular, college students enrolled in social science courses), which limits the socioeconomic diversity of study samples (Bullock & Lott, 2001). An overreliance on student samples can also bias results, as college samples tend to be more supportive of diversity than non-college samples (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). As a result, evaluating intergroup bias based on social class is particularly difficult when relying primarily on college samples. It is important to note that, while more representative than student samples, M-Turk samples remain a convenience sample, and as a result are not fully
representative of the population as a whole.

In total, 145 participants were recruited during pilot testing. Ninety participants were recruited for the first round of pilot testing, and were paid $1 for their participation. Seventy-five participants were recruited for the second and final round of pilot testing, and were paid $0.50.

**Procedure**

In the first wave, participants were presented with three vignettes (one for the trial; one for the description of the defendant; one for the attorney arguments). The first vignette presented participants with a trial summary describing an assault trial (Appendix A). Following the trial summary, participants were asked to provide a verdict using a dichotomous question (guilty/not guilty) and a continuous, 10-point Likert question on verdict certainty (1 = Very certain in a not guilty verdict; 10 = Very certain in a guilty verdict).

The second vignette contained three short (~50 words) descriptions of three individuals: a lower class individual, a middle class individual, and an upper class individual (Appendix B). Following each description, participants indicated their perception of the described individual’s social class (lower class, working class, middle class, upper middle class, upper class). The presentation order of these vignettes was counterbalanced to prevent possible order effects.

For the third vignette, participants were randomly assigned to read one of three attorney statements: the first statement described a defendant as threatening communal *resources*, the second statement described a defendant as threatening communal *values*, and the third statement did not describe a defendant in terms of threat (Appendix C).
Following each statement, participants completed a short questionnaire and then answered a manipulation check question. The manipulation check asked participants to indicate how the prosecution attorney described the defendant: as a violent person, as a threat to the values of the community, or as a threat to the resources of the community. Following this, participants provided their M-Turk ID to confirm participation and then read a debriefing form.

Participants in the second round of pilot testing were only given the second and third vignettes, as results of the first round of pilot testing showed that the trial summary was working as intended.

Results

Participants’ answers in the first vignette were evaluated using chi-square analyses to ensure their dichotomous verdict answer had a roughly equal (i.e., 50/50) split between guilty and not guilty verdicts. Participants’ continuous verdicts were evaluated using a one sample t-test comparing answers to the scale midpoint value of 5.5 for the continuous variable. Participants’ answers in the second vignette were evaluated using a chi-square test to determine if participants selected the appropriate class option more often than the other options. Participants’ answers in the third vignette were similarly evaluated using a chi-square test to determine if participants identified the correct type of threat presented more often than the other types of threat.

First wave

The chi-square analysis of participants’ verdict decisions in the trial summary vignette showed an even split between guilty and not guilty verdicts. For the dichotomous verdict variable, 48 participants answered “Guilty” and 42 participants answered “Not
Guilty,” $\chi^2 = 0.10, p = .76$. For the continuous verdict certainty variable, participants’ scores, $M(SE) = 5.77(0.24)$ was not significantly different from the mid-point of $5.5$, $t(90) = 1.12, p = .27$. Because neither verdict measured showed floor or ceiling effects (i.e., participants overwhelmingly choosing either guilty or not guilty verdicts), the trial summary vignette was not evaluated further.

Analysis of participants’ identification of the social class of the individual described in the second vignette showed that participants were significantly more likely to identify the lower class individual as being either lower or working class (84), compared to middle or upper class (6), $\chi^2 = 78.71, p < .001$. Similarly, participants were significantly more likely to identify the middle class individual as being middle class (67) compared to all other classes (23), $\chi^2 = 73.08, p < .001$. Participants were also significantly more likely to identify the upper class individual as being upper class (68) compared to all other classes (22), $\chi^2 = 73.08, p < .001$. Based on these results, the class manipulation was considered successful and was not evaluated further.

In the third vignette, participants in the no-threat condition were significantly more likely to correctly identify the defendant as being only described as dangerous (28) compared to the defendant being a threat to communal values or resources (5), $\chi^2 = 39.82, p < .001$. Participants in the symbolic threat condition were significantly more likely to correctly identify the defendant as being a threat to communal values (15) compared to the defendant being a threat to communal resources (1), but a considerable number of individuals still identified the defendant as being merely dangerous (11), $\chi^2 = 11.56, p = .003$. Participants in the realistic threat condition were not significantly more likely to correctly identify the defendant as being a threat to communal resources (17) compared
to the defendant being dangerous (14), and no participants identified the defendant as being a threat to community values. $\chi^2 = 0.29, p = .29$. Due to these results, a second wave of pilot testing was conducted to evaluate revised closing statements for the prosecution.

**Second wave**

For the second wave, the threat vignettes were modified to further emphasize the defendant’s threat to community values and resources. For both vignettes, I added a first sentence in which the attorney states that the defendant represents a threat to the values or the resources of the community. A second sentence added midway through the statement further stressed that the defendant and people like him were a threat to the community because their actions are antithetical to the values of the community, or because their actions caused economic burdens to the community.

Participants’ answers in the third vignette were similarly evaluated using a chi-square test to determine if participants identified the correct type of threat presented more often than the other types of threat. All participants in the no-threat condition identified the defendant as being only described as dangerous (23), which does not allow for chi-square testing. Participants in the symbolic threat condition were significantly more likely to correctly identify the defendant as being a threat to communal values (25) compared to the defendant being identified the defendant as being merely dangerous (11), and no participants identified the defendant as being a threat to community resources. $\chi^2 = 5.44, p = .020$. Participants in the realistic threat condition were significantly more likely to correctly identify the defendant as being a threat to communal resources (26) compared to the defendant being dangerous (3), and no participants identified the defendant as
being a threat to community values, $\chi^2 = 18.24, \ p < .001$. Based on these results, the threat manipulation was considered successful and was not evaluated further.

**Discussion**

The results of the pilot study showed that the trial vignette results in an even split between guilty and not guilty verdicts, and a mean score for verdict certainty which is close to the mid-point of the scale. This indicates that the trial vignette is unlikely to present floor or ceiling effects due to the trial described within it. Similarly, the results of the defendant descriptions showed, in line with previous research (e.g., Hout, 2005), that participants can accurately assess the social class of individuals presented to them. Finally, while the initial version of the threat manipulations did not work entirely as expected, further revisions resulted in attorney statements which participants correctly identified as relating to symbolic threat, realistic threat, or no threat. The amended materials were used in Studies 1 and 2.
Chapter 9 – Study 1

This study consisted of an online experiment to evaluate mock jurors’ decision-making in an assault case. The study used a 2 (defendant’s social class: upper class vs. lower class) x 2 (justification: present vs. absent) x 3 (threat: none vs. symbolic vs. realistic) between subjects factorial experimental design.

Method

Participants

Participants were Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com) workers who received $2 to complete the study. Workers who agreed to participate were directed to the study’s web survey hosted on Qualtrics. The study was set up so that M-Turk workers who participated in pilot testing were unable to access the study. A preliminary power analysis suggested a sample size of 480 should be sufficient to detect medium effects (Cohen’s $d = .50$) at $\beta = .90$, and a total of 482 participants were recruited. Participants (44; 9.1%) who completed the survey too quickly (less than 7 minutes) or too slowly (more than 40 minutes) were removed from the analyses out of a concern that these individuals were unlikely to have paid enough attention to the materials for the experimental manipulations to work. This resulted on a final sample of 438 participants.

The mean age of the sample was 36.44 years ($SD = 11.20$). The sample was roughly even in its gender split (50.8% female). The majority of participants were White (78.3%), with the largest minority groups being African American (8%), Hispanic (6.4%), and Asian American (5.9%). The sample was slightly liberal, $M(SD) = 3.32(1.68)$, $t(440) = -8.48$, $p < .001$. Most participants identified as working class (45.7%) or middle class (42.7%), with fewer participants identifying as lower class (11.0%) or
upper class (0.7%). In terms of income, most participants indicated an annual income between $30,000 and $59,999 (36.8%), followed by an annual income of less than $30,000 (27.9%), an annual income of between $60,000 and $89,000 (19.6%), and an annual income of between $90,000 and $119,999 (9.8%). The smallest sample group by income was those earning $120,000 or more per year (5.9%). In terms of education, most participants reported having a 4-year college degree (39.0%), followed by some college education but no degree (22.1%), a 2-year degree (14.6%), a high school diploma or GED (13.7%), a postgraduate degree (9.6%), with four participants (0.9%) indicating having not finished high school. See Table I for a full description of demographics for Study 1.

Procedure

Participants took part in an online study about juror decision-making. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 12 experimental conditions that varied specific facts of the case using Qualtrics’ built-in randomization feature. The study presented a vignette describing an assault case. The vignette included a description of the facts of the case, the closing arguments for the defense, the closing arguments for the prosecution, and the judge’s instructions to the jury. After reading the vignette, participants provided a verdict decision.

Following the verdict and sentencing items, participants completed scales measuring their endorsement of legal authoritarianism (Kravitz et al., 1993), just world beliefs (Dalbert, 1999), the Protestant work ethic (Katz & Hass, 1988), and social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). After completing these scales, participants provided demographic information, including a subjective measure of social class membership. After completing the demographic information section, participants
provided their M-Turk worker ID number to confirm their participation in the study, and were then debriefed and thanked for their participation.

**Materials**

The case vignette described an assault case in which the defendant was charged with attacking another individual following an argument about a car accident both individuals were involved in. Defendant’s social class was manipulated by altering the defendant’s employment, education, and vehicle: owner of a high-end jewelry store with an MBA from a local university who drives a high-end luxury car (upper class defendant condition) or a supermarket clerk with a high school diploma from the local high school who drives an old, cheap car (lower class defendant condition). This particular approach was chosen because manipulating employment, education, and property owned is a common method of altering perceived social class (see, e.g., Skolnick & Shaw, 1997; Esqueda et al., 2008). The presence of justification was manipulated by having the defense attorney and a witness describe the defendant as a cold, unpleasant, but not violent person (e.g., is blunt to people, is cold and distant to the staff; justification present conditions) or as pleasant and non-violent person (e.g., is friendly toward people, polite to the bar staff; justification absent condition). These manipulations served to provide justification of the defendant’s “bad” character, similar to other manipulations of justification (see, e.g., King et al., 2006). After reading the facts of the case, participants were provided with the closing arguments for the prosecution and the defense (see Appendix D). Threat will be manipulated by altering the closing arguments for the prosecution: the argument pointed out that the defendant attacked the victim (no threat conditions); stressed that the defendant’s attack means that communal resources now
need to be diverted toward treating the injured victim (realistic threat); or stressed that the defendant’s attack threatens the values of community and respect for the law which form the basis for morality in society (symbolic threat). Note that the threat manipulation assumed that portraying the broader group to which the defendant belongs to (e.g., lower class individuals) as threatening will be sufficient to elicit threat, regardless of whether or not the threat is related to the defendant’s actions. This is because threat stems from how the individual’s group is perceived, rather than how the individual is perceived (Stephan et al., 2009). Participants will read jury instructions (see Appendix F), and then provided their verdict decisions using two items: a dichotomous Not Guilty/Guilty question and a 10-point verdict certainty Likert scale item (1 = ‘Very Certain of a Not Guilty Verdict;’ 10 = ‘Very Certain of a Guilty Verdict’). Participants then indicated their perception of defendant’s responsibility for the incident, and victim’s responsibility for the incident, both using 11-point Likert items (1 = “0% responsible;” 6 = “50% responsible;” 11 = “100% responsible”). Participants also indicated their general perception of the defendant using a 10-point Likert item (1 = “Very negative;” 10 = “Very positive”). See Appendix G for the list of trial questions.

Following the trial questions, participants completed the revised Legal Attitudes Questionnaire (RLAQ, Kravitz et al., 1993; $\alpha = .83$), a 23-item scale that measures individuals’ endorsements for authoritarian, anti-authoritarian, and egalitarian beliefs related to law enforcement and the legal system (e.g., “Too many obviously guilty persons escape punishment because of legal technicalities;” see Appendix H for full scale). Next, participants completed the Just World Beliefs scale (Dalbert, 1999; $\alpha = .90$), a 6-item scale that measures the degree to which participants believe the world to be
generally a just and fair place (e.g., “I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice;” see Appendix I for full scale). Next, participants completed the Protestant Work Ethic scale (PWE; Katz & Hass, 1988; α = .84), an 11-item scale designed to measure participants’ emphasis on individual discipline and achievement, and a focus on hard work (e.g., “Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements;” see Appendix J for full scale). Next, participants completed the Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; α = .97), a 14-item scale that measures participants’ support for hierarchical social arrangements and opposition to egalitarianism (e.g., “Inferior groups should stay in their place;” see Appendix K for full scale).

All items in these scales were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = ‘Strongly Disagree;’ 7 = ‘Strongly Agree’). Participants’ scores for the RLAQ, BJW, and PWE scales were computed by taking the average score for participants’ answers in all items within each scale. For the SDO scale, participants received one score for each SDO subscale (SDO-E and SDO-D; Jost & Thompson, 2000), computed by taking the average score for participants’ answers in the items belonging to each subscale. See Table II for descriptive statistics.

Participants then provided demographic information (age, gender, race). Participants also reported their subjective social class affiliation using one question (“What would you say is your social class?” Lower class, Working class, Middle Class, Upper Class). Although the use of self-assigned class affiliation can be problematic because of the perception of American society as class-less, evidence from large-scale surveys such as the American National Election Studies (ANES) and the General Social Survey (GSS) suggests Americans are nevertheless aware of their class affiliation (Hout,
In addition, participants’ social class was also measured using two objective measures: household income and highest level of education achieved. Participants were also be asked to rate their political orientation on a 7-point scale (1 = ‘Very Conservative;’ 7 = ‘Very Liberal’). See Appendix L for the full list of demographic variables.

Finally, there were three manipulation check items (see Appendix M). The first item asked participants to indicate their perception of the defendant’s social class (working class, middle class, or upper class). Participants “passed” the manipulation check if they correctly assigned the defendant to the social class most closely resembling his description (i.e., “working class” in lower class condition, “upper class” in upper class condition). The second item asked participants to indicate how the defendant was described by the prosecution (as a threat to the values of the community, as a threat to the resources of the community, or as a dangerous individual). Participants “passed” the manipulation check if they correctly identified how the prosecution attorney’s statements described the defendant (i.e., as “a threat to the values of the community” in the symbolic threat condition, as “a threat to the resources of the community” in the realistic threat condition, or as “a dangerous individual” in the no threat condition). The third item checked the justification manipulation by asking participants to indicate how the witness described the defendant (as being cold and distant, as being easygoing, or as being a heavy drinker). Participants “passed” the manipulation check if they correctly identified how the prosecution attorney’s statements described the defendant (i.e., as being “cold

1 To minimize the possibility of threat effects in the “no threat” condition, the prosecuting attorney’s description of the defendant made no mention of threats to the community/group.
and distant” in the justification present condition, or as being “easygoing” in the justification absent condition). An initial evaluation of participants’ answers to the manipulation checks indicated that a very high number of participants (88) failed at least one manipulation question. To maintain a sample size large enough to conduct the intended analyses, participants who spent less than 7 minutes or more than 40 minutes in the study (equivalent to the 5th percentile and 95th percentiles in time spent in the survey) were excluded from the analyses. This was done under the assumption that spending too little time (i.e., less than 5 minutes) or too much time (i.e., more than 40 minutes) is indicative of inattentive responding (Huang, Curran, Keeney, Poposki, DeShon, 2012; Maniaci & Rogge, 2014; Meade & Craig, 2012), which can compromise the quality of the data. Furthermore, the use of response time is specifically recommended as a post-hoc method should more specific methods not be available (e.g., attentiveness scales; Meade & Craig, 2012).

Results

As a first step, I evaluated the continuous dependent variables (verdict certainty, defendant responsibility, and participants’ perception of the defendant) for normality. Examination of the verdict certainty variable showed moderate skew (-0.42). As a result, the DV was transformed by taking the square root of the reversed variable (i.e., the square root of subtracting 11 minus the verdict certainty score). The transformed variable had more acceptable skew (-0.06), and was therefore used for all analyses involving the verdict certainty variable. Examination of the defendant responsibility and participant perception of the defendant variables showed low skew (-0.24 and 0.26, respectively) and therefore neither of these variables were transformed prior to the analyses.
Study data were analyzed using six analyses. Four of these analyses evaluated the relationships between the experimental manipulations and participants’ social class on different dependent variables: verdict certainty, verdict, perceptions of the defendant’s responsibility, and overall perceptions of the defendant. The fifth and sixth analyses evaluated the relationship between defendant’s social class and participants’ individual difference variables on participants’ verdict certainty (fifth) and verdict (sixth).

Effect of experimental manipulations, and participants’ social class on verdict certainty For this analysis, participants were split based on their subjective social class identification, with participants who identified as lower or working class being classified as “lower class” \( (n = 244) \), and participants who identified as middle or upper class being classified as “upper class” \( (n = 183) \). In the first analysis, hypotheses 1 through 6 were evaluated using a general linear model (GLM) with experimental conditions (defendant social class, justification, and threat) and participants’ self-described social class entered as independent variables, and the transformed verdict certainty variable entered as the dependent variable. See Table III for all coefficients.

Results from this general linear model showed a marginal effect for defendant social class, \( F(1, 428) = 3.41, p = .065, \eta^2_p = .008 \). This was qualified by a two-way interaction between defendant social class and threat, \( F(2, 427) = 4.25, p = .015, \eta^2_p = .02 \). Evaluation of this interaction indicated in conditions in which the defendant was described as posing a realistic threat to the community, participants were more punitive when the defendant was upper class, compared to when the defendant was lower class,
$M(SE) = 6.94(0.33) \text{ vs. } 5.39(0.29)$ $p = .004$. There were no differences based on defendant’s social class in the no threat and symbolic threat conditions, all $ps < .75$ (see Figure 1a). An alternative evaluation of this effect indicated that participants were more punitive toward lower class defendants described as symbolic threats, compared to lower class defendants described as realistic threats, $M(SD) = 6.67(0.26) \text{ vs. } 5.39(0.29)$, $p = .001$, or lower class defendants described as no threat, $M(SD) = 6.57(0.29) \text{ vs. } 5.39(0.29)$, $p = .001$. There were no differences between lower class defendants described as symbolic threats and lower class defendants described as no threat, $p = .25$. Threat had no effect on verdicts among participants presented with an upper class defendant, all $ps > .30$ (see Figure 1b).

There was also a marginal effect for justification, $F(1, 428) = 2.95$, $p = .087$, $\eta^2_p = .01$, which was qualified by a two-way interaction between defendant social class and justification, $F(2, 427) = 5.94$, $p = .015$, $\eta^2_p = .02$. This was further moderated by a three-way interaction between defendant social class, justification, and participants’ social class, $F(2, 427) = 4.34$, $p = .038$, $\eta^2_p = .01$. A breakdown of this interaction showed that lower class participants were more punitive toward the lower class defendant who was described as cold and unfriendly (justification present), compared to the lower class defendant who was described as friendly and easygoing (justification absent), $M(SE) = 7.08(0.32) \text{ vs. } 5.70(0.28)$, $p = .001$. Lower class participants were only marginally significantly more punitive toward an upper class defendant described as friendly and easygoing (justification absent), compared to an upper class defendant described as cold.

\footnote{For ease of interpretation, all reported means and standard deviations are from the non-transformed verdict certainty variable.}
and unfriendly (justification present), \( M(SE) = 7.02(0.34) \) vs. \( 6.15(0.29) \), \( p = .053 \). This pattern did not hold for upper class participants. There were no differences in verdict certainty among upper class participants based on defendant social class or justification, all \( ps < .15 \) (see Figure 2). There were no other significant main effects or interactions.

**Effect of experimental manipulations, and participants’ social class on verdict (dichotomous)**

For this analysis, participants were split based on their subjective social class identification, with participants who identified as lower or working class being classified as “lower class,” and participants who identified as middle or upper class being classified as “upper class.” The second analysis evaluated hypotheses 1 through 6 using logistic regression, with experimental conditions (defendant social class, justification, and threat) and participants’ social class entered as independent variables, and the dichotomous verdict variable entered as the dependent variable. Results from the logistic regression model found no significant main effects or interactions, all \( ps < .23 \). See Table IV for all coefficients.

**Effect of experimental manipulations, and participants’ social class on perceptions of defendant’s responsibility**

For this analysis, participants were split based on their subjective social class identification, with participants who identified as lower or working class being classified as “lower class,” and participants who identified as middle or upper class being classified as “upper class.” In the third analysis, hypotheses 1 through 6 were evaluated using three general linear models (GLMs) with experimental conditions (defendant social class, justification, and threat) and participants’ social class entered as independent variables,
and participants’ perception of the defendant’s responsibility for the incident as the
dependent variable. See Table III for all coefficients.

Results showed a main effect for justification, $F(1,421) = 25.00$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. This main effect was qualified by a three way interaction between defendant’s social
class, justification, and threat, $F(2,420) = 3.47$, $p = .032$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. A breakdown of this
interaction showed that participants perceived the lower class defendant as more
responsible for the incident when the defendant was described as cold and unfriendly
(justification present), compared to when the defendant was described as friendly and
easygoing (justification absent), but this effect occurred when the defendant was
described as posing no threat to the community, $M(SD) = 8.55(0.33)$ vs. $6.76(0.33)$, $p < .001$, or when the defendant was described as posing a threat to the resources of the
community (realistic threat), $M(SD) = 7.72(0.33)$ vs. $6.01(0.34)$, $p < .001$. Conversely,
participants perceived the upper class defendant as more responsible for the incident
when the defendant was described as cold and unfriendly, compared to when the
defendant was described as friendly and easygoing, but only when the defendant was also
described as threatening the values of the community (symbolic threat), $M(SD) = 7.59(0.33)$ vs. $6.34(0.35)$, $p = .009$ (see Figure 3a). There were no other significant main
effects or interactions.

An alternative evaluation of the three-way interaction indicated that, among
participants presented with a lower class defendant described as friendly and easygoing,
participants perceived the defendant as more responsible for the incident when the
defendant was described as a symbolic threat, compared to when the defendant was
described as a realistic threat, $M(SD) = 7.22(0.28)$ vs. $6.01(0.34)$, $p = .007$. There were no
differences in participants’ perceptions of defendant responsibility when the defendant was described as no threat, compared to symbolic threat or realistic threat, $ps = .22$ and .16, respectively. Among participants presented with an upper class defendant described as friendly and easygoing, the effect was reversed: participants perceived the defendant as less responsible for the incident when the defendant was described as a symbolic threat, compared to when the defendant was described as a realistic threat $M(SD) = 6.34(0.35)$ vs. $7.46(0.39)$, $p = .032$, or no threat, $M(SD) = 6.34(0.35)$ vs. $7.66(0.38)$, $p = .007$. There were no differences in participants’ perceptions of defendant responsibility when the defendant was described as no threat, compared to realistic threat, $ps = .29$ (see Figure 3b). There were no threat effects among participants presented with a defendant who was described as cold and unfriendly.

**Effect of experimental manipulations, and participants’ social class on participants’ overall perception of the defendant**

For this analysis, participants were split based on their subjective social class identification, with participants who identified as lower or working class being classified as “lower class,” and participants who identified as middle or upper class being classified as “upper class.” In the fourth analysis, hypotheses 1 through 6 were evaluated using three general linear models (GLMs) with experimental conditions (defendant social class, justification, and threat) and participants’ social class entered as independent variables, and participants’ overall perception of the defendant as the dependent variable. See Table III for all coefficients.

Results showed a main effect for justification, $F(1, 421) = 66.01, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .14$, such that participants had a more positive perception of the defendant described as
friendly and outgoing (justification absent) compared to the defendant described as cold and unfriendly (justification present), $M(SD) = 5.38(0.13)$ vs. $3.96(0.12)$, $p < .001$. There was also a two-way interaction between defendant’s social class and participants’ social class, $F(1,421) = 4.46$, $p = .035$, $\eta^2_p = .01$. A breakdown of this interaction showed that lower class participants perceived the lower class defendant more positively, compared to the upper class defendant, $M(SD) = 4.96(0.16)$ vs. $4.44(0.17)$, $p = .024$ (see Figure 4). There were no other significant main effects or interactions.

**Relationship between verdict certainty, individual difference variables, and defendant social class**

For this analysis, participants were split based on their subjective social class identification, with participants who identified as lower or working class being classified as “lower class,” and participants who identified as middle or upper class being classified as “upper class.” The fifth analysis evaluated hypotheses 7 through 14 using defendant social class, participants’ social class, participants’ mean-centered scores on the RLAQ and PWE scales, log-transformed SDO-E and SDO-D scales, and square-root transformed BJW scale, two-way interactions terms between defendant social class and participants’ mean-centered individual difference scales, two-way interactions terms between participants’ social class and participants’ mean-centered individual difference scales, three-way interaction terms between defendant social class, participants’ social class, and participants’ mean-centered individual difference scales and the transformed verdict certainty variable entered as the dependent variable. Given that one of the goals of this project was to evaluate the relationship between social class and endorsement of
RLAQ, JWB, PWE, and SDO in the context of a criminal trial, defendant social class was the only experimental variable included in the analyses. See Table V for all coefficients.

Results from the linear regression model showed a marginal two-way interaction between participants’ PWE scores and defendant social class, $b(SE) = -0.23(0.13), t(404) = -1.83, p = .068$, such that greater endorsement of the Protestant work ethic resulted in lower punitiveness toward lower class defendants, $b(SE) = 0.23(0.09), p = .012$, but not toward upper class defendants, $b(SE) = -0.13(0.10), p = .22$ (see Figure 5).

**Relationship between verdict (dichotomous), individual difference variables, and defendant social class**

The sixth analysis evaluated hypotheses 7 through 14 using defendant social class, participants’ social class, participants’ mean-centered scores on the RLAQ and PWE scales, log-transformed SDO-E and SDO-D scales, and square-root transformed BJW scale, two-way interactions terms between defendant social class and participants’ mean-centered individual difference scales, two-way interactions terms between participants’ social class and participants’ mean-centered individual difference scales, three-way interaction terms between defendant social class, participants’ social class, and participants’ mean-centered individual difference scales and the dichotomous verdict variable as the dependent variable. See Table VI for all coefficients.

For this analysis, participants were split based on their subjective social class identification, with participants who identified as lower or working class being classified as “lower class,” and participants who identified as middle or upper class being classified as “upper class.” Results showed a significant three-way interaction between defendant social class, participants’ social class, and participants’ PWE scores, $b(SE) = 1.99(0.64)$,
\( W = 9.74, p = .002, \text{Exp}(b) = 7.37, \) such that participants’ endorsement of the Protestant work ethic was related to a lower likelihood of a “Guilty” verdict, but only among participants presented with a lower class defendant, \( b(SE) = -1.41(0.40), p < .001, \text{Exp}(b) = 0.24; \) all other comparison \( ps > .25 \) (see Figure 6).

In addition, there was a marginal two-way interaction between defendant social class and participants’ JWB scores, \( b(SE) = -2.15(1.25), W = 2.94, p = .086, \text{Exp}(b) = 0.12, \) such that among participants presented with an upper class defendant, endorsement of just world beliefs was related to lower likelihood of a “Guilty” verdict, \( b(SE) = 1.20(0.90), p = .18, \) while among participants presented with a lower class defendant, endorsement of just world beliefs was related to higher likelihood of a “Guilty” verdict, \( b(SE) = -0.95, p = .27, \) although neither effect reached statistical significance (see Figure 7). There were no other significant main effects or interactions.

**Discussion**

Study 1 evaluated the influence of defendant’s social class, participants’ social class, justification, and threat on participants’ verdict decisions, perceptions of defendant responsibility, and perceptions of the defendant in a simulated jury trial. The results of Study 1 were mixed (see Appendix N for the full hypothesis table). The hypotheses for experimental variables received partial support: hypothesis 1 predicted that participants would be more certain on a guilty verdict, perceive the defendant as more responsible for the incident, and perceive the defendant more negatively when participants were presented with a lower class defendant, compared to an upper class defendant. This hypothesis was partially supported, with a marginal effect for verdict certainty, a partial effect for defendant responsibility (only among upper class defendants), and a partial
opposite effect for defendant perception (i.e., lower class participants perceived the lower class defendant more positively). Hypothesis 2 predicted that participants would be more certain on a guilty verdict, perceive the defendant as more responsible for the incident, and perceive the defendant more negatively when participants were presented with a defendant described as cold and unfriendly, compared to a defendant described as friendly and easygoing. This hypothesis was supported. Hypothesis 3 predicted that the main effect for justification (H2) would be qualified such that the negative effect of justification would be stronger when the defendant was of lower class, compared to upper class. This hypothesis was partially supported in the verdict certainty DV. Hypothesis 4 predicted that the main effect of justification would be stronger when the defendant was described as a threat (symbolic or realistic), compared to when the defendant was not described as a threat. This hypothesis was partially supported in the defendant responsibility DV: the effect arose only among participants presented with an upper class defendant. Hypothesis 5 predicted that the combined effect of justification and threat (H4) would only arise when the defendant was lower class. Results showed the opposite effect than predicted: participants perceived the upper class defendant as more responsible for the incident when the defendant was described as a symbolic threat, compared to when the defendant was described as realistic or no threat. Conversely, the effect of threat and justification resulted in lower class defendants being perceived as less responsible for the incident when the defendant was described as a symbolic threat, compared to realistic or no threat. Hypothesis 6 predicted that the effect of threat would only arise when the defendant and participant were members of different social groups (i.e., the predicted effect of Integrated Threat Theory). Results demonstrated the opposite
effect: upper class participants presented with a lower class defendant who was described
as a realistic threat reported lower certainty on a guilty verdict, and lower defendant
responsibility, compared to no threat or symbolic threat conditions.

The results of the hypotheses for individual variables were also mixed. Hypothesis 7 predicted that participants’ endorsement of legal authoritarianism would be
positively related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict and greater likelihood of a guilty
verdict. This hypothesis was not supported. Hypothesis 8 predicted that participants’
endorsement of just world beliefs would be positively related to greater certainty on a
guilty verdict and greater likelihood of a guilty verdict. This hypothesis was not
supported. Hypothesis 9 predicted that participants’ endorsement of the Protestant work
ethic would be positively related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict and greater
likelihood of a guilty verdict. This hypothesis was not supported. Hypothesis 10 predicted
that participants’ endorsement of social dominance orientation would be positively
related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict and greater likelihood of a guilty verdict.
This hypothesis was not supported.

Hypothesis 11 predicted that the effect of legal authoritarianism (H7) would be
stronger when the defendant was lower class, compared to when the defendant was upper
class. This hypothesis was not supported. Hypothesis 12 predicted that the effect of just
world beliefs (H8) would be stronger when the defendant was lower class, compared to
when the defendant was upper class. This hypothesis was partially supported, as the
effect arose only among upper class participants with the dichotomous verdict DV.
Hypothesis 13 predicted that the effect of Protestant work ethic (H9) would be stronger
when the defendant was lower class, compared to when the defendant was upper class.
The evidence for this hypothesis was conflicting: using the dichotomous verdict variable, results suggested partial support, as the effect did arise but only among upper class participants. Using the continuous verdict certainty variable, the opposite effect arose: participants’ PWE scores were negatively related to certainty on a guilty verdict when the defendant was lower class (i.e., stronger endorsement of PWE was related to greater certainty on a not guilty verdict). Hypothesis 14 predicted that the effect of social dominance orientation would be stronger when the defendant was lower class, compared to when the defendant was upper class. This hypothesis was not supported.

**Predicting mock jurors’ decisions using a justification-suppression framework**

Given the evidence supporting hypotheses 2 and 4, presenting a defendant as cold and unfriendly is sufficient to justify expressing class-based prejudice toward this defendant, particularly if the defendant is of lower social class. The implications of this finding are threefold: first, it provides further support for the biasing effect of defendant’s social class on mock jurors’ decision-making. As previous research showed, defendants of lower class or low socioeconomic status often had more adverse outcomes (e.g., mock jurors’ greater certainty of a guilty verdict), compared to upper class/high-SES defendants (see, e.g., Devine & Caughlin, 2014; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Esqueda et al., 2008). The present study expanded on previous research by providing evidence of one mechanism by which class-based prejudice is expressed in simulated jury trials: the justification-suppression model of prejudice.

The second implication of the results of the justification hypotheses further confirm that social class exists within the normative window of prejudice (Crandall et al., 2013), as prejudice toward lower class defendants only arose in the presence of
justification. Previous research had provided indirect support for this, for example, by demonstrating that participants rated groups associated with lower social class (e.g., rednecks, welfare recipients) as groups against which prejudice is sometimes acceptable (Crandall et al., 2002). Results of this study provide the first direct evidence that lower social class, as a category, represents a valid target of prejudice when justification is present.

Finally, the third implication of the results for justification is support for the use of stereotype content theory as a means to develop justifications for the expression of prejudice (Fiske et al., 2002). As noted in the chapter for the JSM, Crandall and colleagues are generally vague when defining what constitutes a justification to express prejudice. The results of this study provide support for the use of stereotype content as a mechanism to develop justifications for the expression of prejudice. This is particularly important in the context of evaluating the JSM in the context of jury trials, as it provides researchers with a mechanism that generates potential justifications without relying on stereotypes which could be used by mock jurors as evidence of guilt. For example, African Americans are often stereotyped as violent (Devine, 1989; Trawalter, Todd, Baird, & Richeson, 2008), but the use of this stereotype to elicit the justification of prejudice can create a confound effect, as it becomes unclear whether mock jurors’ bias is driven by prejudice toward African Americans, or by the fact that a defendant’s violent character is related to perceptions of guilt (Unnever & Cullen, 2008). By contrast, justifications drawn from stereotype content theory are based on traits (i.e., competence and warmth) which are less likely to generate this confound effect: a defendant’s laziness or unfriendliness are unlikely to generate sympathy from mock jurors, but being lazy or
unfriendly is unlikely to be perceived in and of itself as indicative of guilt. Being lazy or unfriendly, however, could provide mock jurors with a justification to express their prejudice towards a defendant due to the defendant’s group membership (e.g., race, gender, religion, or social class).

The present findings indicate that the justification-suppression model of prejudice serves as a valid model to evaluate the expression of mock jurors’ bias toward defendants. Study 2 further evaluated the reliability of the JSM to help explain mock jurors’ bias toward victims of crime. While the findings of this study provided considerable support for the JSM, the same cannot be concluded of the Integrated Threat Theory, discussed next.

**Predicting mock juror jurors’ decisions using a threat framework**

Results for hypothesis 6 indicate that the expected effect of threat did not materialize. On the contrary, the significant effects that did arise suggest that describing a lower class defendant as a realistic threat results in lower punitiveness, compared to no threat or symbolic threat. This was an unexpected finding, as any threat is expected to generate bias against, not in favor of, the defendant. It is possible that this effect was a result of the specific type of threat used: the lower class defendant might not have been perceived as a valid source of realistic threat given their low status, and as a result the prosecuting attorney’s claims had the opposite effect than intended. This is further supported by the fact that there were no differences between symbolic and no threat conditions: describing the defendant as threatening, by itself, did not result in the mock jurors expressing pro-defendant bias. Rather, it was only when the defendant was described as a realistic threat that this bias arose. Overall, these findings suggest that, at
least in the context of class-based prejudice, the classic threat effect posited by Stephan and colleagues (2002) does not arise. A slightly modified effect, however, was found when evaluating threat in conjunction with justification, as discussed next.

**Predicting mock jurors’ decisions using a joint justification/threat framework**

One of the purposes of the present study was to evaluate the impact of a joint justification-threat effect would have on mock jurors’ decisions. Specifically, I expected that the presence of justification would strip defendants of the benefits of ingroup membership, which would result in both ingroup and outgroup members expressing bias toward defendants described as both cold and unfriendly and a symbolic or realistic threat. This effect, in turn, was only expected to arise when participants were presented with a lower class defendants, because this was the group most likely to generate a biased response in the presence of justification (i.e., what little evidence was available for class-based prejudice suggested lower class individuals as the likely target, not upper class individuals).

The results of the study demonstrated the opposite effect. Rather than generating bias toward lower class defendants, the joint presence of threat and justification elicited bias toward the *upper class* defendant. This effect, in turn, only arose when the upper class defendant was described as both cold and unfriendly, and as a symbolic threat. That the effect arose when the upper class participant was described as a symbolic, rather than realistic threat, was unexpected, given that in general higher status groups elicit realistic, not symbolic threat from lower status group members (Maddux et al., 2008). A possible explanation for this effect is a change in the American *zeitgeist* since the 2008 Great Recession. Specifically, it has become more common to highlight value discrepancies
between mainstream American society and the very rich (see, e.g., Ethan Couch and the “affluenza” defense; Mohney, 2015), which might therefore make individuals more likely to see upper class individuals as a threat to society’s values. As a result, it is possible that mock jurors were motivated toward expressing bias against the upper class defendant when said defendant was described as a threat to the values of the community (particularly when the defendant was already described as cold and unfriendly).

These results suggest that while there is an interactive effect between justification and threat, this effect is not as straightforward as I had initially hypothesized. The results of Study 2 should further clarify the circumstances under which this joint effect takes place, in the context of evaluating mock jurors’ bias toward victims of crime. Before that, the final set of results discussed here covers the results of the individual difference variables (legal authoritarianism, just world beliefs, Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation).

Predicting mock jurors’ decisions based on individual difference variables

Results from the individual difference variables indicate that participants’ just world beliefs and Protestant work ethic are related to mock jurors’ verdict certainty. Findings from Study 1 also indicated that endorsement of just world beliefs is linked to greater punitiveness toward lower class defendants and greater leniency toward upper class defendants. This suggests that participants’ beliefs that the world is inherently just and fair are in fact related to greater punitiveness toward lower class defendants. This effect is in line with research that showed that endorsement of just world beliefs is linked to bias against low status groups (Kaplan, 2012). This result, however, was only marginally significant, and slope analysis showed that the slope for just world belief
scores was non-significant regardless of defendant class. This suggests that the relationship between mock jurors’ endorsement of just world beliefs and their punitiveness toward lower class defendant is likely small.

The interaction effect between participants’ Protestant work ethic and defendant’s social class was opposite of what theory would predict: endorsement of the Protestant work ethic resulted in lower punitiveness toward lower class defendants, but only among upper class participants. This finding is unexpected due to the fact that the Protestant work ethic has consistently been related to greater prejudice toward lower class individuals (Rosenthal, Levy, & Moyer, 2011). Furthermore, while endorsement of the Protestant work ethic has been linked to greater tolerance, this effect only arises among low-status groups (Ramírez, Levy, Velilla, & Hughes, 2010). One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that religious individuals, particularly Protestants, are more likely to report seeking forgiveness for themselves and others, compared to non-religious individuals (Toussaint & Williams, 2008). It is possible that endorsement of the Protestant work ethic is related to greater likelihood of reporting wanting to forgive others. As a result, high-PWE participants would have been motivated to present themselves as willing to forgive a defendant, particularly a low-status one, because this would be “proper” Christian behavior. This would similarly explain why this effect arose only among upper class participants: high status individuals tend to report stronger endorsement of Protestant work values, compared to low status individuals (Cokley et al., 2007; Frey & Powell, 2009). This pattern arose in Study 1 data: upper class participants endorsed Protestant ethic values more strongly than lower class participants did, \( M(SD) = \)
4.17(0.83) vs. 3.92(1.05), t(435) = 2.83, p = .005. However, given that participants did not report their religious affiliation, this explanation remains speculative.

Results of Study 1 showed how mock jurors’ decisions were influenced by their own social class, the defendant’s social class, the presence of justification, the presence of threat, and endorsement of just world beliefs, and the Protestant work ethic. To better understand these findings, I conducted a second study in which the social class of the victim, rather than the defendant, was experimentally manipulated.
Chapter 10 – Study 2

This study consisted of an online experiment to evaluate mock jurors’ decision-making in an assault case. The study used a 2 (victim’s social class: upper class vs. lower class) x 2 (justification: present vs. absent) x 3 (threat: no threat vs. symbolic vs. realistic) between subjects factorial experimental design.

Method

Participants

Participants were recruited from M-Turk (www.mturk.com), and were paid $2 to complete the study. Recruitment was set up so that M-Turk workers who participated in pilot testing or in Study 1 were not able to participate in Study 2. M-Turk was chosen as a recruitment platform because samples recruited via M-Turk are more heterogeneous and more representative of the larger population, compared to student samples (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). A total of 509 participants were recruited. The final sample contained 442 participants.

The mean age of the sample was 38.90 years (SD = 12.52). The sample was predominantly female (57.4%). The majority of participants were White (79.4%), with the largest minority groups being African American (7.5%), Hispanic (5.4%), and Asian American (5.0%). The sample was slightly liberal, $M(SD) = 3.62(1.807)$, $t(437) = -4.401$, $p < .001$. Most participants identified as working class (39.3%) or middle class (49.0%), with fewer participants identifying as lower class (10.9%) or upper class (0.9%). In terms of income, most participants indicated an annual income between $30,000 and $59,999 (32.5%), followed by an annual income of between $60,000 and $89,000 (25.6%), an annual income of less than $30,000 (25.2%), and an annual income of between $90,000
and $119,999 (11.2%). The smallest sample group by income was those earning $120,000 or more per year (5.5%). In terms of education, most participants reported having a 4-year college degree (33.2%), followed by some college education but no degree (26.8%), a high school diploma or GED (14.2%), a 2-year degree (13.3%), a postgraduate degree (12.3%), with only one participant (0.2%) indicating having not finished high school.

Procedure

Participants completed an online study structured in the same manner as Study 1. The scale reliabilities were similar to Study 1: RLAQ $\alpha = .84$, JWB $\alpha = .89$, PWE $\alpha = .81$, and SDO $\alpha = .95$. See Table VII for descriptive statistics.

Materials

The case vignette described the same assault case presented in Study 1. Unlike Study 1, however, the experimental manipulations focused on the victim rather than the defendant. Victim’s social class was manipulated by altering the victim’s employment, education, and car: owner of a high-end jewelry store with an MBA from a local university who drives a high-end luxury car (upper class victim condition) or a supermarket clerk with a high school diploma from the local high school who drives an old, cheap car (lower class victim condition). The presence of justification was manipulated by having the prosecution attorney and a witness describe the victim as a cold, unpleasant, but not violent person (e.g., is blunt to people, is cold and distant to the staff; justification present conditions) or as non-violent person (e.g., is friendly toward people, polite to the bar staff; justification absent condition). These manipulations served to provide justification of the victim’s “bad” character, similar to other manipulations of
justification (see, e.g., King et al., 2006). After reading the facts of the case, participants were provided with the closing arguments for the prosecution and the defense (see Appendix E). Threat was manipulated by altering the closing arguments for the defense: the arguments will simply point out that the defendant merely defended himself (no threat conditions); stress that the victim’s action threaten communal resources, which now need to be diverted toward addressing an issue that could have been resolved amicably (realistic threat); or stress that the victim’s actions threatens the values of respect for the law which form the basis for morality in American society (symbolic threat). Note that the threat manipulation assumes that portraying the broader group to which the victim belongs to (e.g., lower class individuals) as threatening will be sufficient to elicit threat, regardless of whether or not the threat is related to the victim’s actions. This is because threat stems from how the individual’s group is perceived, rather than how the individual is perceived (Stephan et al., 2009). Participants then answered trial questions, individual differences scales, and demographic characteristics using the same items as in Study 1. For manipulation check questions, the questions remained the same except that the questions were focused on the victim rather than the defendant and (for the second question) referred to the defense attorney’s statements rather than the prosecution attorney’s statements. Participants who incorrectly answered the manipulation check questions, and participants who spent less than 5 minutes or more than 42 minutes in the study (equivalent to the 5th percentile and 95th percentiles in time spent in the survey) were excluded from analyses. The time-based exclusion of participants was done under the assumption that spending too little time (i.e., less than 5 minutes) or too much time (i.e., more than 42 minutes) is indicative of inattentive responding (Huang et al., 2012;
Maniaci & Rogge, 2014; Meade & Craig, 2012), which can compromise the quality of the data. Furthermore, the use of response time is specifically recommended as a post-hoc method should more specific methods not be available (e.g., attentiveness scales; Meade & Craig, 2012).

Results

As a first step, I evaluated the verdict certainty variable for normality. Examination of this variable showed moderate skew (-0.33). As a result, the DV was transformed by taking the square root of the reversed variable (i.e., the square root of subtracting 11 minus the verdict certainty score). The transformed variable had more acceptable skew (-0.10), and was therefore used for all analyses involving the verdict certainty variable.

Study data were analyzed using six analyses. Four of these analyses evaluated the relationships between the experimental manipulations and participants’ social class on different dependent variables: verdict certainty, verdict, perceptions of the defendant’s responsibility, and overall perceptions of the defendant. The fifth and sixth analyses evaluated the relationship between victim’s social class and participants’ individual difference variables on participants’ verdict certainty (fifth) and verdict decision (sixth).

Effect of experimental manipulations, and participants’ social class on verdict certainty

For this analysis, participants were split based on their subjective social class identification, with participants who identified as lower or working class being classified as “lower class” ($n = 217$), and participants who identified as middle or upper class being classified as “upper class” ($n = 209$). In the first analysis, hypotheses 15 through 20 were
evaluated using three general linear models (GLMs) with experimental conditions (victim social class, justification, and threat) and participants’ social class entered as independent variables, and the transformed verdict certainty variable entered as the dependent variable. See Table VIII for all coefficients.

Results from the general linear model showed a main effect for justification, $F(1, 425) = 7.69, p = .006, \eta_p^2 = .02$. This effect was qualified by a four-way interaction between victim’s social class, justification, threat, and participants’ self-reported social class, $F(2, 423) = 3.64, p = .027, \eta_p^2 = .02$. Evaluation of this interaction effect showed that participants were more punitive when defendants harmed a victim described as friendly and easygoing, compared to when defendants harmed a victim described as cold and unfriendly. Among lower class participants, this effect occurred when the victim was lower class and described as no threat, $M(\text{SE}) = 7.36(0.68)$ vs. $5.59(0.62), p = .057$, when the victim was upper class and described as a symbolic threat, $M(\text{SE}) = 6.82(0.62)$ vs. $4.36(0.68), p = .014$, and when the victim was upper class and described as a realistic threat, $M(\text{SE}) = 6.35(0.62)$ vs. $4.54(0.70), p = .050$ (see Figure 8a). No other pairwise comparisons were significant or marginally significant.

An alternate evaluation of this interaction effect showed that in conditions without a justification to express prejudice, in which the victim of the crime is presented as being a realistic threat, upper class participants were less punitive toward defendants who harm the lower class (i.e., outgroup) victim compared to the upper class victim, $M(\text{SE}) = 5.50(0.68)$ vs. $7.33(0.60), p = .039$. In conditions with a justification to express prejudice, lower class participants were less punitive toward a defendant who harmed an upper class victim (compared to a lower class victim) when the victim was described as a symbolic
threat, $M(SE) = 4.36(0.68)$ vs. $7.07(0.48)$, $p = .003$, or as a realistic threat, $M(SE) = 4.54(0.70)$ vs. $6.84(0.58)$, $p = .011$ (see Figure 8b). All other pairwise comparisons were non-significant. No other significant effects emerged.

**Effect of experimental manipulations, and participants’ social class on verdict**

(dichotomous)

Results showed a main effect for threat, $W = 6.23$, $p = .044$, such that participants in conditions in which the victim was described as a realistic threat were less punitive, compared to participants in the no threat condition, $b(SE) = -1.83(0.75)$, $W = 5.98$, $p = .014$, $\text{Exp}(b) = 0.16$. The second analysis evaluated hypotheses 15 through 20 using logistic regression, with experimental conditions (victim social class, justification, and threat) and participants’ social class entered as independent variables, and the dichotomous verdict variable entered as the dependent variable. There was no significant difference between the no threat and symbolic threat conditions, $p = .089$. See Table IX for all coefficients.

**Effect of experimental manipulations, and participants’ social class on perceptions of defendant’s responsibility**

For this analysis, participants were split based on their subjective social class identification, with participants who identified as lower or working class being classified as “lower class,” and participants who identified as middle or upper class being classified as “upper class.” In the third set of analyses, hypotheses 15 through 20 were evaluated using three general linear models (GLMs) with experimental conditions (victim social class, justification, and threat) and participants’ social class entered as independent
variables, and participants’ perception of the victim’s responsibility for the incident as the dependent variable. See Table VII for all coefficients.

Results from this analysis showed a main effect for justification, $F(1, 436) = 14.56, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .03$. This effect was qualified by a four-way interaction between victim’s social class, justification, threat, and participants’ social class, $F(2,435) = 8.60, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .04$. Evaluation of this interaction effect showed that participants perceived the cold and unfriendly victim as more responsible for the incident, compared to the friendly and easygoing victim. Among lower class participants, this effect only occurred when the victim was upper class and described as no threat, $M(SE) = 6.15(0.46)$ vs. 4.71(0.55), $p = .045$, and when the victim was upper class and described as a realistic threat, $M(SE) = 7.29(0.55)$ vs. 4.94(0.50), $p = .002$. Among upper class participants, this effect only occurred when the victim was lower class and was described as representing a symbolic threat, $M(SE) = 7.35(0.50)$ vs. 5.56(0.51), $p = .012$ (see Figure 9a). No other pairwise comparisons were significant or marginally significant.

An alternative evaluation of the four-way interaction indicated that upper class participants presented with a lower class victim described as cold and unfriendly perceived this victim as significantly less responsible for the incident when the victim was described as a realistic threat compared to a victim described as no threat, $M(SD) = 5.61(0.43)$ vs. 7.29(0.58), $p = .016$, or compared to a victim described as symbolic threat, $M(SD) = 5.61(0.43)$ vs. 7.36(0.50), $p = .008$. Conversely, lower class participants presented with an upper class victim described as friendly and easygoing perceived the victim as significantly more responsible for the incident when the victim was described as a realistic threat compared to a victim described as no threat, $M(SD) = 6.84 (0.47)$ vs.
4.71(0.55), \( p = .003 \), or compared to a victim described as symbolic threat, \( M(SD) = 6.84 \) (0.47) vs. 4.94(0.50), \( p = .006 \) (see Figure 9b). There were no other significant pairwise comparisons.

**Effect of experimental manipulations, and participants’ social class on participants’ overall perception of the defendant**

For this analysis, participants were split based on their subjective social class identification, with participants who identified as lower or working class being classified as “lower class,” and participants who identified as middle or upper class being classified as “upper class.” In the fourth analysis, hypotheses 15 through 20 were evaluated using three general linear models (GLMs) with experimental conditions (victim social class, justification, and threat) and participants’ social class entered as independent variables, and participants’ overall perception of the defendant as the dependent variable. See Table VII for all coefficients.

Results showed a main effect for justification, \( F(1, 439) = 18.81, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .04 \). This effect was qualified by a four-way interaction between victim’s social class, justification, threat, and participants’ subjective social class, \( F(2, 438) = 4.42, p = .013, \eta_p^2 = .02 \). Evaluation of this interaction showed that participants perceived the defendant more negatively when the victim was described as friendly and easygoing, compared to when the victim was described as cold and unfriendly. Among lower class participants, this effect occurred when participants were presented with an upper class victim who was not described as a threat, \( M(SD) = 3.85(0.55) \) vs. 5.65(0.44), \( p = .011 \), and an upper class victims who was described as a symbolic threat, \( M(SD) = 4.82(0.48) \) vs. 6.57(0.53), \( p = .015 \). Among upper class participants, this effect occurred when participants were
presented with an upper class victim who was described as a realistic threat, \( M(SD) = 4.48(0.45) \) vs. \( 6.00(0.48) \), \( p = .021 \) (see Figure 10a). No other pairwise comparisons were significant.

An alternative evaluation of the four way interaction indicated that among lower class participants presented with a lower class victim described as cold and unfriendly, participants perceived the defendant less positively when the victim was described as presenting a symbolic threat compared to when the victim described as no threat, \( M(SD) = 4.76(0.36) \) vs. \( 6.22(0.47) \), \( p = .014 \). Among lower class participants presented with an upper class victim described as friendly and easygoing, participants perceived the defendant significantly less positively when the victim was described as no threat compared to when the victim described as presenting a realistic threat, \( M(SD) = 3.85(0.55) \) vs. \( 5.90(0.45) \), \( p = .004 \). Among upper class participants presented with a lower class victim described as cold and unfriendly, participants perceived the defendant more positively when the victim was described as no threat compared to when the victim described as representing a realistic threat, \( M(SD) = 6.33 (0.51) \) vs. \( 4.54(0.41) \), \( p = .007 \). These participants also perceived the defendant more positively when the victim was described as a symbolic threat compared to when the victim described as representing a realistic threat, \( M(SD) = 6.41 (0.48) \) vs. \( 4.54(0.41) \), \( p = .004 \). Among upper class participants presented with an upper class victim described as friendly and easygoing, participants perceived the defendant marginally less positively when the victim was described as representing no threat compared to when the victim was described as representing a symbolic threat, \( M(SD) = 4.47 (0.45) \) vs. \( 5.61(0.47) \), \( p = .081 \) (see Figure 10b). There were no other significant pairwise comparisons.
Relationship between verdict certainty, individual difference variables, and defendant social class

For this analysis, participants were split based on their subjective social class identification, with participants who identified as lower or working class being classified as “lower class,” and participants who identified as middle or upper class being classified as “upper class.” The fifth analysis evaluated hypotheses 21 through 28 using victim social class, participants’ social class, participants’ mean-centered scores on the RLAQ and PWE scales, log-transformed SDO-E and SDO-D scales, and square-root transformed BJW scale, two-way interactions terms between victim social class and participants’ mean-centered individual difference scales, two-way interactions terms between participants’ social class and participants’ mean-centered individual difference scales, three-way interaction terms between victim social class, participants’ social class, and participants’ mean-centered individual difference scales and the transformed verdict certainty variable as the dependent variable. There were no significant main effects or interactions. See Table X for all coefficients.

Relationship between verdict (dichotomous), individual difference variables, and defendant social class

For this analysis, participants were split based on their subjective social class identification, with participants who identified as lower or working class being classified as “lower class,” and participants who identified as middle or upper class being classified as “upper class.” The sixth analysis evaluated hypotheses 21 through 28 using victim social class, participants’ social class, participants’ mean-centered scores on the RLAQ and PWE scales, log-transformed SDO-E and SDO-D scales, and square-root
transformed BJW scale, two-way interactions terms between victim social class and participants’ mean-centered individual difference scales, two-way interactions terms between participants’ social class and participants’ mean-centered individual difference scales, three-way interaction terms between victim social class, participants’ social class, and participants’ mean-centered individual difference scales and the dichotomous verdict variable as the dependent variable. There were no significant main effects or interactions. See Table XI for all coefficients.

Discussion

Study 2 evaluated the influence of victim’s social class, participants’ social class, justification, and threat on participants’ verdict decisions, perceptions of victim responsibility, and perceptions of the defendant in a simulated jury trial. The results of Study 2 were mixed (see Appendix N for the full hypothesis table). Results for the hypotheses for experimental variables were mixed. Hypothesis 15 predicted that participants would be less certain on a guilty verdict, would perceive the victim as more responsible, and would perceive the defendant more positively when presented with a lower class victim, compared to an upper class victim. This effect was not supported. Hypothesis 16 predicted that participants would be less certain of a guilty verdict, would perceive the victim as more responsible and would perceive the defendant more positively when the victim was described as cold and unfriendly, compared to when the victim was described as friendly and easygoing. This hypothesis was generally supported, except with the dichotomous verdict DV (null effect).

Hypothesis 17 predicted that the effect of justification (H16) would be stronger when the victim was upper class, compared to when the victim was lower class. This
hypothesis was not supported. Hypothesis 18 predicted that the effect of justification (H16) would be stronger when the victim was described as a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to no threat. This hypothesis was partially supported, as the effect arose only among upper class participants presented with a defendant who harmed a victim described as a realistic threat.

Hypothesis 19 predicted that the interactive effect of justification and threat (H18) would only arise when the victim was lower class. This hypothesis was not supported, as the opposite effect arose: participants had more negative perceptions of the defendant when presented with a defendant who harmed an upper class victim who was described as a symbolic threat, compared to participants presented with a defendant who harmed a lower class victim. Hypothesis 20 predicted that participants would report lower certainty on a guilty verdict, would perceive the victim as more responsible, and would perceive the defendant more positively when presented with an outgroup victim described as a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to no threat. Support for this hypothesis was mixed: generally, participants perceived the outgroup victim as more responsible for the incident when the victim was described as realistic threat. This effect, however, arose only among lower class participants.

The results of the hypotheses for individual differences variables, by contrast, were not supported. Hypotheses 21 through 24, which predicted that endorsement of individual difference variables (legal authoritarianism, just world beliefs, Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation, respectively) would be positively related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict, were not supported. Similarly, Hypotheses 25 through 28, which predicted that endorsement of individual difference variables (legal
authoritarianism, just world beliefs, Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation, respectively) would be positively related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict when the defendant harmed an upper class victim, were not supported.

**Predicting mock jurors’ decisions using a justification-suppression framework**

The results of hypotheses 16 and 17 indicate that, as with Study 1, the expression of bias against victims was driven in part by the presence of justification. Contrary to the findings of Study 1, these findings demonstrated that lower class mock jurors were less punitive toward defendants who harmed cold and unfriendly *upper class* victims. As with Study 1, these findings indicate that the expression of bias toward individuals of a social class outgroup is influenced by the presence of extralegal factors which justify prejudice (e.g., how likeable the victim is), and that justification can be elicited by providing individuals with a target of prejudice (in this case, the victim) whose prejudice-justifying threat is based on the stereotype content model (i.e., lack of warmth; Fiske et al., 2002).

The findings of Study 2 provide an unique insight on the effect of justification on class-based prejudice. These findings confirm that the social class of the victim of a crime influenced mock jurors’ decision-making. As noted in the chapter on juror decision-making, the literature on the effect of victim social class is limited (Mazzella, & Feingold, 1994). This study expands on this literature by demonstrating that victim’s social class can influence mock jurors’ decision-making, and by providing a specific mechanism by which this influence is expressed (i.e., the process of justification-suppression of prejudice). It is possible that the previous, mixed results for victim social class were in part mixed due to the lack of a justification for the expression of class-based prejudice.
Furthermore, these findings indicate that the effect of justification on the expression of prejudice is not limited to criminal defendants. This demonstrates that the justification of expression of class-based bias is independent of whether the target of prejudice is a defendant or a victim. This is important because it demonstrates that the justification of prejudice within a mock juror trial is a general process, and therefore likely to affect a broad spectrum of individuals involved with the legal system, rather than a limited process which only affects defendants. Therefore, the process of class-based prejudice expressed through justification might affect victim-related psycholegal phenomena such as reactions to victim impact statements and victim blaming. While the findings of Study 2 provided additional support for the JSM, the evidence for Integrated Threat Theory, discussed next, was less clear.

**Predicting mock jurors’ decisions using a threat framework**

Results of hypothesis 20 provided partial support for the effect of threat on class-based bias. Specifically, lower class mock jurors consistently reported bias against the upper class victim described as realistic threat. This bias was reported both in evaluations of the victim’s responsibility for the incident, and in perceptions of the defendant.

This partial effect might be due to the difference in status between mock jurors and victim. Upper class jurors are members of a higher status group compared to the victim, and therefore might be less likely to perceive the victim as a valid source of threat. Conversely, lower class mock jurors reacted as expected when presented with an upper class victim described as a realistic threat. This suggests that realistic threat might motivate victim derogation when the victim is of higher status than the mock juror. This is in line with Integrated Threat Theory predictions, as individuals are more likely to
perceive members of groups with higher status as their own as likely sources of realistic threat, because higher status groups are likely to have the power to threaten the lower status groups’ access to resources (Maddux et al., 2008). These findings suggest that group status impacts perceptions of victims, with members of a group of lower status than the victim’s group being the only ones to perceive said victim as a threat. This stands in contrast to the findings regarding a combined justification and threat effect, discussed next.

**Predicting mock jurors’ decisions using a joint justification-threat framework**

One of the purposes of the present project was to evaluate the impact of a joint justification-threat effect would have on mock jurors’ decisions. For Study 2, I expected that the presence of justification would strip victims of the benefits of ingroup membership, which would result in both ingroup and outgroup members expressing bias toward victims described as both cold and unfriendly and a symbolic or realistic threat. This effect was expected to arise exclusively when the victim was of lower social class, as lower class individuals were the expected targets of prejudice.

Contrary to expectations, the combined effect of justification and threat arose when the victim was of *upper* class, rather than lower class, and only among lower class participants. This suggests that while the joint presence of threat and justification does manifest, it does so toward upper class, rather than lower class victims. The combined effect of justification and realistic threat, specifically, fits within our current knowledge of Integrated Threat Theory: upper class victims are of higher status than lower class mock jurors, therefore these jurors are likely to perceive the upper class victims as valid sources of realistic threat (and therefore will react negatively to this threat). But
Integrated Threat Theory predicts that symbolic threat should elicit bias toward lower class victims by upper class mock jurors, which does not materialize here. This might reflect, as noted in Study 1, changes in American public opinion following the 2008 Great Recession, which results in lower class individuals perceiving upper class individuals (in this case, assault victims) as likely sources of both realistic and symbolic threat. In addition, the presence of justification resulted in lower class mock jurors expressing bias against lower class victims when the victim was presented as no threat, and as cold and unfriendly, compared to friendly and easygoing. This might represent a similar backlash effect as that reported in Study 1: the defense attorney’s description of the lower class defendant as a realistic or symbolic threat might have muted the effect of justification, as lower class participants are motivated to defend their ingroup from the attorney’s claim that the group threatens communal resources or values. Without this motivation (i.e., when the defense attorney makes no mention of threat), participants are not motivated to defend their ingroup, since the victim’s cold and unfriendly demeanor does not necessarily reflect on their larger group.

These results showed the relationship between victim and mock jurors’ social class, justification, and threat on mock jurors’ decision-making. The next chapter discusses the results of both studies jointly, and the implication of these findings for psychological theory and for legal practice and policy-making.
Chapter 11 – General Discussion

This project had three core goals: first, evaluate the impact of defendant and victim’s social class on mock jurors’ decision making. Second, evaluate the joint effect of justification and threat on class-based prejudice. Third, evaluate the relationship between class-based prejudice and legal authoritarianism, just world beliefs, Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation. Across two studies, the findings provide partial support for the effect of defendant and victim social class on mock jurors’ decision-making. In Study 1, participants who identified as lower or working class expressed bias against lower class defendants, while in Study 2 there were no results that indicated a clear bias against lower class (or upper class) victims.

The findings also illustrated how justification and threat influence the expression of class-based bias. Study 1 results demonstrated that the presence of justification was critical in the expression of class-based prejudice under specific circumstances, with mock jurors being more punitive, and perceiving the defendant as more responsible, when an upper class defendant was described as both cold and unfriendly, and a threat to the values of the community. In Study 2, mock jurors were less punitive, and perceived the defendant more negatively, when the defendant harmed an upper class victim who was described as cold and unfriendly and as no threat.

Finally, the findings indicated that just world beliefs and Protestant work ethic influence mock jurors’ decision-making, but only when the defendant was of lower social class. In Study 2, the victim’s social class did not appear to have an effect on the relationship between just world beliefs and Protestant work ethic on mock jurors’ decisions (Study 2).
In this chapter, I will discuss the implications of these findings. The first point of discussion is the implications for the effects of justification on the expression of class-based prejudice (hypotheses 1, 2, 7, 16, and 21). Next, the discussion will focus on the results related to threat (hypotheses 14 and 28), and then on the theorized combined model of justification and threat (hypotheses 8, 13, 22, and 27). Then the chapter will cover the effects of individual level differences, focusing primarily on the results related to endorsement of just world beliefs and the Protestant work ethic (hypotheses 4, 11, 19, and 25). Finally, the chapter will conclude by presenting the potential implications of these findings to psychological science and to the legal system.

**Social class and the justification of prejudice**

The clearest result from this project is that mock jurors will consistently display bias against cold and unfriendly individuals, compared to friendly and easygoing individuals. This effect, in itself, while not entirely surprising, is nevertheless concerning: the legal system assumes that jurors will make decisions based exclusively on legally-relevant evidence, and will dismiss extralegal information, such as the general demeanor of the defendant or victim. In both studies presented here, this did not occur. Instead, mock jurors’ decisions were influenced by whether the defendant was friendly or not. This effect is not entirely unexpected, given the evidence that more attractive defendants tend to experience better outcomes in trial (see, e.g., Baumeister & Darley, 1982; Lieberman, 2002; Patry, 2008).

The results from both studies also demonstrate that social class, in itself, is not sufficient to elicit prejudice toward a lower or upper class individual. Rather, the expression of class-based prejudice is dependent on the presence of multiple factors. As
mentioned above, the presence of justification is a critical one: mock jurors demonstrated a consistent negative bias toward individuals described as cold and unfriendly (justification present conditions), compared to individuals described as friendly and easygoing (justification absent conditions). This bias was generally expressed by lower class participants (against either lower class defendants or upper class victims). This does not suggest that only lower class individuals engage in expressions of class-based prejudice: upper class participants reported bias against lower class victims, for example (albeit toward friendly and easygoing victims). Rather, this finding suggests that lower class participants were more sensitive to the defendant or victim’s cold and unfriendly demeanor, compared to upper class participants. In other words, lower class participants believed being cold and unfriendly was a serious offense, regardless of the social class of the offender. This is to be expected given that lower class individuals tend to be more community-oriented than upper class individuals (Piff et al., 2012). Individuals with a community-oriented outlook are likely to be negatively predisposed toward individuals who are unlikely to work well with others (e.g., by being cold and unpleasant). In addition to these effects, the expression of class-based prejudice was also influenced by the presence of threat, which is discussed next.

**Social class and intergroup threat**

Integrated threat theory (ITT) predicts that individuals will report bias against outgroup members when these members are described as representing a threat to the individual’s group values (symbolic threat) or group resources (realistic threat), but not when these outgroup members are not described or perceived as a threat. The results of this study only demonstrated this effect among lower class participants presented with an
upper class victim who was described as a realistic threat. Conversely, upper class participants were less punitive toward a lower class defendant described as a realistic threat, compared to lower class defendants described as a symbolic threat or no threat.

These results were in line with previous findings that indicate that low status groups are particularly sensitive to realistic threats from high status groups (Maddux et al., 2008). Specifically, lower class participants displayed bias against the upper class victim described as a realistic threat by reporting a more positive perception of the defendant, compared to when the victim was not described as a threat. By contrast, upper class participants did not appear particularly threatened by a lower class defendant described as a realistic threat, given that they were less certain on a guilty verdict toward this defendant, compared to a defendant described as no threat or as a symbolic threat. This further supports the findings that the relative power of a group is a key element in how individuals react to intergroup threat, as realistic threats are credible (and therefore generate a negative bias response) when coming from members of higher-status groups as one’s own, but are not credible (and therefore do not generate a negative bias response) when coming from members of lower-status groups as one’s own. The effects outlined here were the only ones in which different types of threat resulted in significant differences in verdict certainty or perceptions of the defendant. There were additional effects, however, in which justification and threat jointly influenced participants’ decision making. These effects are discussed next.

The joint effect of justification and threat on mock jurors’ decision making

One of the core goals of this study was to evaluate the joint effect that describing a victim or defendant as both cold and unfriendly and as a realistic or symbolic threat to
the community would have on mock jurors’ decisions. Specifically, I expected the presence of justification to make ingroup targets susceptible to the threat manipulation. In other words, while being an ingroup member generally protects individuals from becoming the target of threat-based prejudice from members of their own group, an individual who is described as a threat and also has a negative trait that justifies the expression of prejudice (e.g., being cold and unfriendly) will be the target of prejudice from both outgroup and ingroup members. I expected this effect to primarily arise when the target of prejudice (either defendant or victim) were of lower class, as lower class individuals are more likely targets of prejudice than upper class individuals (Bullock, 1995).

This effect did not materialize in either of the studies. Instead, there were three distinct patterns of the joint effect of justification and threat on mock jurors’ decisions. The first pattern was a consistent bias against upper class defendants and victims described as a symbolic threat and as cold and unfriendly (compared to friendly and easygoing). This pattern only arose among lower class participants. At first glance, this effect seems unexpected, given that lower class participants should be more sensitive to upper class individuals’ realistic threat, rather than symbolic threat (Maddux et al., 2008). These effects might be due to the “primacy of warmth” effect (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008). The primacy of warmth posits that in the evaluation of social targets, assessments of warmth occur before assessments of competence, and assessments of warmth carry greater weight than assessments of competence on an individual’s final evaluation of a social target. Evidence suggests that this effect can explain why groups perceived as having low or moderate warmth are also perceived as symbolic threats, regardless of their social status (e.g., Asian Americans; Zhang, 2015).
This explanation, however, does not entirely explain why threat-based responses arose more often among lower class participants compared to upper class participants. This discrepancy might be understood in terms of each group’s sensitivity to threat (Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & Keltner, 2012; Manstead, 2018).

Specifically, differences in individuals’ life experiences affect the extent to which individuals focus on potential threats to their well-being. Lower class individuals, due to their relative power, generally experience less security across several aspects of life (e.g., employment, housing, health). As a result, these individuals develop a greater sensitivity to potential threats, compared to upper class individuals whose greater security results in lower sensitivity to threat. In the context of these results, greater sensitivity to threat would explain lower class participants’ responses, as their life experiences have made them more sensitive to the potential threat represented by elements of their environment. This, in turn, would likely motivate lower class participants to reduce the threat posed by a potentially dangerous defendant (regardless of the defendant’s social class), compared to upper class participants.

The second pattern refers to the bias expressed by upper class individuals in favor of a lower class defendant or victim described as cold and unfriendly and a realistic threat (compared to symbolic or no threat). In these situations, the presence of realistic threat made upper class participants less punitive toward lower class defendants (Study 1), and more punitive toward defendants who harmed a lower class victim (Study 2). This might be an example of the boomerang effect (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). The boomerang effect refers to instances in which an audience has the opposite reaction to a message than expected (e.g., listeners of a Republican ad against a Democratic candidate report greater
support for the Democratic candidate; Jaspersen & Fan, 2002). A similar effect is found among defendants who testify in their own defense: jurors were more punitive toward a defendant who provided extenuating circumstances to justify his wrongdoing, compared to when a neutral witness provided the same extenuating circumstances (Frankel & Morris, 1976). The bias in favor of lower class defendants or victims described above could reflect this boomerang effect. Specifically, it is possible that upper class mock jurors reacted negatively to the attorneys’ description of the defendant or victim as realistic threat, resulting in these mock jurors expressing the opposite reaction as that intended by the attorney’s messages (i.e., greater leniency for the lower class defendant in Study 1, greater punitiveness for the defendant who harmed the lower class victim in Study 2). As noted before, high-status groups are more likely to perceive low-status groups as symbolic, rather than realistic threats (Maddux et al., 2008), which suggests upper class mock jurors might be unlikely to accept the attorney’s description of a lower class defendant or victim threatening the upper class mock jurors’ resources.

The third pattern describes the differences that arise across conditions based on the objective values of the cell means. I found that across both studies, almost all significant differences for the combined effect of justification and threat showed a clear difference on which “side” of the scales participants scored in the dependent variables of the study. In Study 1, when justification was absent, participants’ verdict certainty and perceptions of defendant were generally close to the midpoint of the scale. This suggests that participants in these conditions were either split in their beliefs and decisions (and therefore the average of the condition was between the two extreme camps), or their beliefs and decisions were ambivalent (and therefore most responses were close to the
midpoint of the scale). Conversely, when justification was present, participants’ scores were clearly within the side of the scale that indicated greater bias toward the defendant (i.e., greater guilt, greater responsibility for the incident). In Study 2, a similar pattern arose: in the presence of justification, participants were more ambivalent about their verdict certainty, viewed the victim as more than 50% responsible for the incident, and perceived the defendant more positively. In the absence of justification, participants reported certainty levels well within the “Guilty” side of the verdict scale, viewed the victim as less than 50% responsible for the incident, and perceived the defendant negatively. These results provide further support for the positioning of social class within the normative window of prejudice: in the absence of an excuse to express prejudice (either justification, intergroup threat, or both), participants reported ambivalent perceptions of the defendant/victim. Under the combined effect of justification and threat, however, individuals’ attitudes shifted from ambivalence toward a clear expression of prejudice (e.g., greater certainty of a guilty verdict, greater responsibility for the incident). In addition to the effects of justification and threat discussed so far, the present project also found effects related to mock jurors’ endorsement of just world beliefs and the Protestant work ethic. These effects are discussed next.

**Individual level differences and mock jurors’ decision making.**

The third goal of the project was to evaluate the influence of legal authoritarianism, just world beliefs, the Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation on mock jurors’ decisions in a case involving lower and upper class defendants. In general, I expected that greater endorsement of these constructs would be related to greater punitiveness toward the defendant, and this effect would be stronger
among participants presented with a lower class defendant, or participants presented with a defendant who harmed an upper class victim. These effects did not manifest.

Instead, there was an effect opposite to that predicted by the Protestant work ethic hypotheses from Study 1 (hypotheses 5 and 11). There was a significant interaction effect between defendant social class, participants’ social class, and participants’ PWE scores: upper class participants presented with a lower class defendant were less certain on a guilty verdict (or less likely to render a guilty verdict) as endorsement of PWE increased. This effect was opposite to the hypothesized effect described above. As noted in the discussion for Study 1, this might be a result of high-PWE individuals being motivated to present themselves as forgiving (Toussaint & Williams, 2008), although this conclusion remains speculative as forgiveness was not measured in either study. This is further supported by the lack of a PWE effect in Study 2: endorsement of PWE is less clearly predictive of forgiveness when the status of the target of forgiveness (e.g., a defendant) is unclear. Similarly, PWE does not appear to be related to favoritism toward low status individuals; as such favoritism would have resulted in greater punitiveness toward defendants who harm lower class defendants.

The just world beliefs hypotheses were partially supported in Study 1 (hypotheses 4 and 10): there was a marginally significant interaction between defendant social class and participants’ endorsement of just world beliefs. This effect, although only marginally significant, did display the hypothesized pattern of results: greater endorsement of just world beliefs was linked to greater punitiveness toward lower class defendants, and to lower punitiveness toward upper class defendants. Although this effect did not arise in Study 2 (hypotheses 18 and 24), the trend in the data was consistent with the theorized
effect (i.e., endorsement of just world beliefs was linked with greater punitiveness against defendants who harmed an upper class victim, see Table IX).

These effects, although non-significant, nevertheless support the general construction of just world beliefs as a system-justifying ideology (Jost et al., 2013). Endorsement of just world beliefs has been consistently found to be positively related to endorsement of beliefs that the current status quo of society is fair (De Keersmaecher & Roets, 2017; Monteith, Burns, Rupp, & Mihalec-Adkins, 2016; Papp & Erchull, 2017). As a result, endorsement of just world beliefs should be related to greater bias in favor of high-status individuals, because if society is fair, then high-status individuals are “better” than low-status individuals, thus deserving preferential treatment. The marginal or non-significant nature of the effects found in the present studies suggests that the effect of just world belief endorsement, although constant, is small, and therefore it might be difficult to discern even in a moderately-sized study such as this one (combined N = 924).

The hypotheses related to legal authoritarianism (hypotheses 3, 9, 17, and 23) and social dominance orientation (hypotheses 6, 12, 20, and 26) were not supported. The lack of effects related to these constructs suggests the possibility that the relationship between jurors’ endorsement of these constructs and verdict decisions is dependent on characteristics of the case. The most obvious difference is the specific type of group used in previous research. As noted in the literature review, social class is a relatively understudied social group, particularly in the context of jury decision making studies. Conversely, both race and gender have received considerable attention in jury decision making research. Both race and gender are categories with higher levels of entitativity (i.e., group boundaries are more clearly defined), compared to social class. Higher levels
of entitativity makes it easier for mock jurors to determine whether a defendant belongs to their ingroup or outgroup, which in turn might facilitate the expression of bias among mock jurors with high endorsement of legal authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (see, Landwehr et al., 2002 and Kemmelmeier, 2005, respectively). The results of this study suggest that, while legal authoritarianism and social dominance might not be relevant to a case in which the defendant and victim are from different social classes, just world beliefs and the Protestant work ethic are relevant.

**Implications for social science theory**

The second goal of this study was to evaluate a joint model of justification and threat. As noted in a previous section, the predictions of this model did not arise. Instead, I found that lower class participants expressed bias against upper class defendants and victims described as both cold and unfriendly and as a symbolic threat. This finding was unexpected, given that research on intergroup threat has shown that low status groups (e.g., lower class individuals) are generally perceived as a source of realistic threat, rather than high status groups. One possible explanation was the primacy of warmth (Cuddy et al., 2008; Zhang, 2015), which suggests that low-warmth targets (e.g., an individual described as cold and unfriendly) might be more likely to be perceived as a source of intergroup threat (both realistic and symbolic), compared to a high-warmth target. This effect, in turn, would be expected to result in greater prejudice toward the low-warmth targets that are associated with intergroup threat.

In the present studies, low warmth only resulted in prejudice toward an outgroup member when the target was also described as a symbolic threat, but not as realistic threat. This effect might have occurred due to the relationship between warmth and
competence that underlie social perceptions of lower and upper class participants. Specifically, the fact that prejudice toward a low-warmth target arises when the defendant or victim is described as a symbolic, rather than realistic threat is in line with research that notes that lower class individuals tend to be more community-oriented (Piff et al., 2012). If lower class participants are more likely than upper class participants to rely on their community, they would similarly be expected to express bias against an individual who cannot be relied on (e.g., someone whose cold and unfriendly demeanor might make it difficult to work with them).

Piff and colleagues (2012), also found that while lower class individuals are community-oriented, upper class individuals are more resource oriented. This suggests the possibility of a similar joint effect of justification and threat among upper class participants. Specifically, if the justification was based on the competency dimension of stereotype content, rather than the warmth dimension, it is possible that resource-oriented upper class individuals would report bias against lazy or incompetent lower class participants who are described as a realistic threat. Research on the relationship between stereotype content and intergroup threat suggests that the competence dimension of stereotype content is related to perceptions of realistic threat (Kervyn, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2015), supporting the possibility of a joint effect of competence-based justification to express prejudice and realistic intergroup threat. This effect, however, remains entirely hypothetical. Future research will evaluate whether a competence-based justification is amplified when the target of prejudice is presented as a realistic or symbolic threat.

Beyond the potential joint effects of justification and threat, the findings of the present project have important implications for the understanding of class-based
prejudice as well as the nature of justification in the justification-suppression model of prejudice. As noted in the literature review, the initial research on the JSM suggested, but did not confirm, that social class fell within the normative window of prejudice. That is, groups defined in terms of their class standing (e.g., welfare recipients, rednecks) were perceived as neither fully acceptable targets of prejudice, nor fully unacceptable targets of prejudice (Crandall et al., 2002). This suggested that class-based prejudice might be acceptable under certain circumstances, and unacceptable under other circumstances (i.e., social class falls within the normative window of prejudice). The findings of these studies support this conclusion: across two studies, I found examples of class-based prejudice which arose only when participants had a justification to express prejudice. This finding demonstrates that the expression of class-based prejudice requires the presence of a justification to allow individuals to express said prejudice while maintaining an egalitarian self-image.

The results of this study provide additional support for the use of stereotype content as a means to develop justifications for the expression of prejudice. The initial conceptualization of the JSM provided a very broad definition of what qualified as a justification. Essentially, any feature of a target which can be used to justify prejudice is a justification (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). The results of this study provide, to my knowledge, the first test of the warmth dimension of stereotype content as a potential source of justifications to express prejudice. Previous research on the JSM has indirectly shown that competence-related stereotypes can justify the expression of prejudice toward obese individuals (i.e., whether the obese individual appears to be lazy or active; King et al., 2008). Future research on this effect will further evaluate whether competence-based
traits can similarly serve as valid justifications for the expression of class-based prejudice.

Finally, these findings can inform how different individuals use social control (as defined by Black, 1998). To recap, social control refers to any mechanism by which individuals and groups define and address deviant behavior. Black (1976, 1998, 2000) points out that punishment should be greater as social distance increases. In other words, the greater the differences in power, class, or culture between the deviants and those who enforce social control on them, the greater the punishment. In this framework, punishment is greater when directed from those with more power to those with less power (in Black’s terms, when law moves downward across the vertical dimension of social space).

Our findings, however, showed that lower class mock jurors were generally more likely to recommend greater punishment toward outgroup defendants, compared to upper class mock jurors. This suggests that lower class individuals might use the power of a third party (i.e., the courts) as a means to enforce social control against groups which they would not otherwise be able to control (i.e., upper class individuals). This is possible, under Black’s framework, because of the greater power (or higher position on the vertical dimension of social space) that government institutions have compared to individual citizens, even wealthy ones. This interpretation, however, remains tentative as there were no attempts to measure participants’ perceived social distance from the defendant or victim. Beyond their relevance to social science theory, these findings can also help inform legal practice, discussed next.
Implications for the legal system

The results of this project can help inform the legal system by expanding our understanding of how characteristics of the jurors, defendants, and victims can bias jurors’ decision-making. Across both studies I found that jurors were generally biased against upper class defendants and upper class victims who were perceived as a threat, although the latter effect only arose if the upper class victim was described as cold and unfriendly. This presents a potential risk for defendants or victims who belong to groups generally portrayed as threatening communal resources (e.g., upper class individuals), or communal values (e.g., Muslims), as jurors might be motivated to punish them, or be more lenient toward their attackers, solely because of the defendant or victim’s group membership. Fortunately, research on intergroup threat suggests that promoting the self-regulation of prejudice can reduce the influence of intergroup threat on individuals’ attitudes and decisions. Legault and Green-Demers (2012) found that individuals who are motivated to self-regulate their prejudice (e.g., because they strongly endorse egalitarian values) are less affected by exposure to intergroup threat, resulting in lower bias toward the threatening group compared to individuals who are not motivated to self-regulate their prejudice. Additional research suggests that individuals can be primed to enhance their self-regulation of prejudice (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Monteith, 1993). Therefore, it might be possible to reduce the influence of threat on jurors’ decision-making by promoting jurors’ self-regulation of prejudice (e.g., by stressing the importance of fairness to the trial process).

The present project also showed that mock jurors were biased against defendants and victims who showed stereotype-congruent traits and lower class mock jurors were
biased against an ingroup defendant who showed stereotype-incongruent traits. This suggests that jurors might be less likely to suppress their prejudice toward defendants or victims who have traits that confirm jurors’ stereotypes about the defendant or victim’s ingroup, such as a Muslim person wearing traditional Muslim attire (King & Ahmad, 2010, but see Maeder, Dempsey, & Pozzulo, 2012, for a counterpoint). In cases in which jurors are likely to be biased toward the defendant or victim, it might be possible to reduce prejudice toward the defendant or victim by promoting the suppression of prejudice. Research suggests that individuals are more likely to suppress their prejudice when they are externally motivated to do so (i.e., when social or environmental factors promote the suppression of prejudice), but do not suppress prejudice when they have an internal motivation to do so (i.e., when their beliefs or attitudes indicate they should not be prejudiced; Costarelli & Gerlowska, 2015). Based on these findings, jurors might be motivated to suppress their prejudice if social norms promoting fairness are highlighted (e.g., through jury instructions or a judicial admonition).

The findings regarding the effect of the Protestant work ethic (PWE) were opposite of those expected based on existing research. This might be due to a tendency for religious individuals to describe themselves as forgiving. These findings can be helpful to inform lawyers’ voir dire decisions, as greater endorsement of PWE might make jurors more likely to rule in favor of a lower class defendant. Research shows that PWE endorsement is higher among Christians (both Protestants and Catholics) than among non-religious individuals (Zulfikar, 2012). This suggests that a venireperson’s religious affiliation should serve as a valid proxy for endorsement of PWE. This is
helpful because it allows lawyers to gauge individuals’ likely endorsement of PWE without having them complete a multi-item questionnaire.

The findings of this project demonstrated the impact of social class, justification, threat, and PWE endorsement on mock jurors’ decision-making in an assault case. These results will expand our understanding of the mechanisms by which individuals justify the expression of prejudice, how threat influences individuals’ expression of bias toward members of different social classes, and how PWE influences individuals’ decisions in a criminal trial. These findings, however, must be considered together with the limitations of this project, which are discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 12 – Limitations and Future Directions

These studies have several limitations which must be outlined to better understand the applicability of these findings beyond the laboratory. The participant sample may not have been representative enough to provide results that can be generalized to the broader U.S. population. Although M-Turk samples are more diverse than student samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011, Paolacci & Chandler, 2014), they remain non-representative of the broader population. This can similarly result in a more homogeneous sample in terms of social class membership compared to community samples such as those from which jurors are selected, which could impact the findings of the study, particularly if demographic characteristics interact with case factors (Wiener, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2011). Future research should address this limitation by evaluating the impact of sample source (M-Turk vs. student sample vs. community sample vs. venirepersons) on mock jurors’ class-based biases.

The use of mock jurors raises concerns about verisimilitude of the case (i.e., how well the experimental procedure realistically mimics a criminal trial), which can impact mock jurors’ decision because a lack of verisimilitude can lead participants to pay less attention to the study materials because they do not represent a “real” trial (Wiener et al., 2011). Lower participant attention is of particularly concern given that the study will be conducted online, because the researcher will be unable to control the environment in which participants complete the study. Similarly, the use of mock jurors raises concerns about consequentiality (i.e., because it is a mock juror study, there are no “real” consequences to participants’ decisions; Bornstein & McCabe, 2004). This can lead participants to pay less attention to their answers, or to provide random answers to the
items of the survey because there is no “real” defendant who is affected by the participants’ decisions. Although the issue of verisimilitude has not been found to influence results directly (Bornstein, 1999), evidence indicates that it might impact results through its moderating effect on other variables (e.g., sample type; Weiner et al., 2011). Future research should address this issue by creating more realistic trial stimuli (e.g., in-person studies with audiovisual stimuli, compared to online, text-only studies).

Unlike a real jury trial, there was no deliberation, which could have similarly influenced participants’ decisions because they do not need to explain their decisions to other jurors (Devine et al., 2001). This can result in participants choosing answers with less care, or to purposefully making harsher or more lenient decisions because their decisions are anonymous. Evidence suggests that deliberation can influence mock jurors’ perception of the case, and such an influence (whether it results in greater punitiveness or greater leniency), an influence which will be absent from this study. In addition, deliberation can involve interaction with members of other social classes. This greater diversity has been found in other contexts to lead to more lenient verdicts (e.g., race; Sommers, 2006). Future research should evaluate the impact of deliberation on mock jurors’ expression of social class bias by requiring participants to deliberate in studies involving an experimental manipulation of defendant’s social class.

In this project, the presence of justification only influenced mock jurors’ decision-making when the defendant or victim was of upper class. As previously discussed, this could be due in part to the justification manipulation used in these studies. Future research should expand on these findings by evaluating whether using a justification based on the “competence” dimension of stereotype contents (Cuddy et al., 2002). This
would demonstrate whether presenting a lower class defendant or victim as lazy or incompetent results in similar biases as those found in the present studies.

In these studies, employment, education, and material possessions (specifically, type of car owned) were experimentally manipulated to portray the social class of defendants and victims. Social class, however, is understood to encompass individual characteristics beyond employment and education, particularly occupational prestige and objective indicators of power (e.g., whether one supervises or is supervised at work; Diemer, Mistry, Wadsworth, Lopez, & Reimers, 2013). It is possible that the use of prestige and power characteristics to describe the social class of defendant and victims would affect how these defendants and victims are perceived by mock jurors. Future research will address this by evaluating how the use of different individual characteristics (employment, education, occupational prestige, and power) influence mock jurors’ perceptions of defendants and victims.

Related to the previous point, the present study relied on mock jurors’ subjective social class to determine their class membership. While objective measures of social class (specifically, income and education) were collected, these measures were not ultimately used in the study. This was done for practical reasons: using groups based on income and education often resulted in very small cell sizes in multiple analyses, which undermined the reliability of the results. However, future research should evaluate whether the results obtained here are replicated when mock jurors are classified based on objective measures of social class (e.g., employment, education, occupational prestige).

An additional limitation related to participants’ social class stems from the make-up of the “lower class” and “upper class” categories. Specifically, due to the
demographics of the study samples, most participants (< 90%) were either working class or middle class. This could have skewed results, as working or middle class participants might not have considered the lower and upper class defendants part of their ingroup. This would be particularly true of the upper class defendant, whose background reflected a high social status (e.g., Ivy League degree), which could be a confounding factor underlying the lack of ingroup bias effects among middle class participants. Future research could address this limitation by conducting similar studies on a sample with greater representation of lower and upper class participants.

Finally, research on self-regulation of prejudice (Amodio et al., 2005; Costarelli & Gerlowska, 2015; Monteith, 1993) suggests that the bias arising from the presence of justification and threat could be mitigated. Future research should evaluate the effectiveness of these approaches to bias mitigation applied to the context of a legal trial (e.g., via jury instructions, attorney statements, or judicial admonitions). Findings on these studies could provide valuable information to the courts as to possible venues to mitigate the influence of extralegal factors on jurors’ decisions.
Chapter 13 – Conclusion

Social class represents a powerful force in the lives of individuals, impacting their everyday experiences, how they perceive themselves, others, and their environments, and how others perceive them (Lott, 2012; Lott & Bullock, 2007). Findings from Study 1 show that mock jurors are more punitive toward upper class defendants who are described as threatening the community’s values or resources, lower mock jurors are biased against lower class defendants who display atypical traits, and mock jurors’ endorsement of the Protestant work ethic (PWE) is linked to greater punitiveness toward upper class defendants. Findings from Study 2 show that lower class mock jurors are less punitive toward a defendant who harms an upper class victim, but only when the victim is described as a threat to the community’s values or resources and mock jurors have a justification to express prejudice. In Study 2, mock jurors’ endorsement of PWE was related to greater punitiveness toward defendants who harmed an upper class victim.

Taken together, the findings from Studies 1 and 2 further confirm that differences in status between groups influence whether members of the group react to perceived threat. Specifically, members of lower-status (e.g., lower class individuals) groups are more sensitive to intergroup threat, and are therefore more likely to react to said threat, compared to members of higher-status groups (e.g., upper class individuals). The findings also expand on the nature of the justification to express prejudice. Specifically, it suggests that the justification of prejudice requires the source of prejudice (e.g., the defendant) to possess a negative trait which is congruent with known stereotypes of the group they belong to (e.g., upper class individuals being cold and unfriendly). Finally, the findings of this project also demonstrate that in the context of a crime in which the salient
demographic feature of the defendant or victim is the social class they belong to, mock jurors’ endorsement of just world beliefs and the Protestant work ethic influences their decisions in the case, but other individual-level variables related to intergroup bias (specifically, legal authoritarianism and social dominance orientation) do not.

Overall, these findings suggest that both threat and justification might play a role on jurors’ decisions in cases in which the defendants and victims are from different social classes. Knowing that threat and justification can be a source of bias is a first step to develop strategies to attempt to minimize their influence on jurors’ decisions. These strategies, in turn, can help protect defendants’ rights to a fair trial by minimizing the influence of extralegal factors on jurors’ decisions.
References


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De keersmaecker, J., & Roets, A. (2017). All victims are equally innocent, but some are more innocent than others: The role of group membership on victim blaming. *Current Psychology: A Journal For Diverse Perspectives on Diverse Psychological Issues*, doi:10.1007/s12144-017-9763-9


Farnum, K. S., & Stevenson, M. C. (2013). Economically disadvantaged juvenile offenders tried in adult court are perceived as less able to understand their actions, but more guilty. Psychology, Crime & Law, 19(8), 727-744. doi:10.1080/1068316X.2013.793766


Table I. Demographic comparison between Study 1 and Study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Study 1 $N = 438$</th>
<th></th>
<th>Study 2 $N = 442$</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>%</td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>38.90</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>African American</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic or Latino</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td>White</td>
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<td>78.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>10.9</td>
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<td>39.3</td>
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<td>42.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper class</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (per year)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $30,000</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>27.9</td>
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<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between $30,000 and $59,999</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>32.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Between $60,000 and $89,999</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between $90,000 and $119,999</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than $120,000</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not finish high school</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school diploma or GED</td>
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<td>13.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>26.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-year degree</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-year degree</td>
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<td>39.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s degree</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional degree (PhD, MD, JD)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
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Table II. Descriptive statistics for legal authoritarianism scores, just world belief scores, Protestant work ethic scores, social dominance orientation scores (total and subscales independently), verdict certainty, defendant responsibility, and perceptions of defendant (Study 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Mdn</th>
<th>(SD)</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal authoritarianism</td>
<td>3.640</td>
<td>3.652</td>
<td>(0.784)</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>6.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just world belief</td>
<td>4.085</td>
<td>4.167</td>
<td>(1.270)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant work ethic</td>
<td>4.029</td>
<td>4.090</td>
<td>(0.967)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>6.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social dominance orientation</td>
<td>2.393</td>
<td>2.063</td>
<td>(1.359)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO equality subscale</td>
<td>2.435</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>(1.477)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO dominance subscale</td>
<td>2.351</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>(1.454)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verdict certainty</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>(2.445)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant responsibility</td>
<td>7.39</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>(2.119)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of defendant</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>(1.966)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table III. General linear model (GLM) between defendant’s social class, justification, threat, and participants' subjective social class (IVs), and verdict certainty, defendant responsibility, and perceptions of the defendant (DV). Study 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Verdict Certainty</th>
<th>Defendant Responsibility</th>
<th>Perception of Defendant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$F$</td>
<td>$df$</td>
<td>$p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class</td>
<td>3.741</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>3.103</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>1.313</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant’s class</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class *</td>
<td>6.765</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>4.934</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Threat</td>
<td>1.263</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Threat</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification *</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Threat</td>
<td>1.137</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification *</td>
<td>4.464</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class</td>
<td>1.445</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Threat</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2926.14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Participants’ class variable was created by merging self-identified lower and working class participants into one category (“Lower class”) and self-identified middle and upper class participants into another category (“Upper class”).
Table IV. Logistic regression between defendant’s social class, justification, threat, and participants’ subjective social class (IVs), and dichotomous verdict (DV). Study 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Exp(b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>.619</td>
<td>1.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.842</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>.889</td>
<td>1.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic threat</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.689</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>.823</td>
<td>1.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realistic threat</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>.363</td>
<td>2.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant’s class</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.689</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>.823</td>
<td>1.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Justification</td>
<td>-1.281</td>
<td>1.187</td>
<td>1.165</td>
<td>.280</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Symbolic threat</td>
<td>-0.442</td>
<td>1.028</td>
<td>0.1885</td>
<td>.667</td>
<td>0.643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Realistic threat</td>
<td>-0.878</td>
<td>1.111</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>.429</td>
<td>0.416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Participants’ class</td>
<td>-0.511</td>
<td>1.010</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>.613</td>
<td>0.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Symbolic threat</td>
<td>20.643</td>
<td>13397.7</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>9.2E8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Realistic threat</td>
<td>-1.353</td>
<td>1.129</td>
<td>1.436</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Participants’ class</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>1.072</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>.965</td>
<td>1.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat * Participants’ class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic threat * Participants’ class</td>
<td>-0.837</td>
<td>0.905</td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td>.355</td>
<td>0.433</td>
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<td>Realistic threat * Participants’ class</td>
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<td>1.105</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td>.404</td>
<td>0.429</td>
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<td>Defendant class * Justification * Threat</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Justification * Symbolic threat</td>
<td>-19.731</td>
<td>13397.7</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Justification * Realistic threat</td>
<td>2.200</td>
<td>1.557</td>
<td>1.995</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>9.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.495</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>.954</td>
<td>1.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Threat * Participants’ class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Symbolic threat * Participants’ class</td>
<td>1.577</td>
<td>1.366</td>
<td>1.333</td>
<td>.248</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Realistic threat * Participants’ class</td>
<td>1.438</td>
<td>1.431</td>
<td>1.010</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>4.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Threat * Participants’ class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Symbolic threat * Participants’ class</td>
<td>-20.279</td>
<td>13397.7</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.870</td>
<td>1.467</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>.553</td>
<td>2.386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Justification * Threat * Participants’ class</td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>$SE$</td>
<td>$W$</td>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>$\text{Exp}(b)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Justification * Symbolic threat * Participants’ class</td>
<td>18.979</td>
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<td>$&lt;0.001$</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>1.7E8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Justification * Realistic threat * Participants’ class</td>
<td>-1.461</td>
<td>2.019</td>
<td>0.523</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>.569</td>
<td>1.333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Reference category = Upper class defendant, b Reference category = Justification absent, c Reference category = no threat, d Reference category = Upper class participant. Note: Participants’ class variable was created by merging self-identified lower and working class participants into one category (“Lower class”) and self-identified middle and upper class participants into another category (“Upper class”).
Table V. Linear regression between defendant’s social class, and participants’ subjective social class, legal authoritarianism, just world beliefs, Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation (IVs), and verdict certainty (DV). Study 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>1.505</td>
<td>.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>.955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal authoritarianism</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>-1.078</td>
<td>.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just world beliefs</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>-0.868</td>
<td>.386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant work ethic</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>-1.173</td>
<td>.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social dominance orientation (Dominance subscale)</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>.937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social dominance orientation (Equality subscale)</td>
<td>-0.167</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>-0.451</td>
<td>.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Legal authoritarianism</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>-0.341</td>
<td>.734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Just world beliefs</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.825</td>
<td>.410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Protestant work ethic</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>1.827</td>
<td>.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Social dominance orientation (Dominance subscale)</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>.865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Social dominance orientation (Equality subscale)</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class * Legal authoritarianism</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>.917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class * Just world beliefs</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class * Protestant work ethic</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>.932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class * Social dominance orientation (Dominance subscale)</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class * Social dominance orientation (Equality subscale)</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>.991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Participants’ class * Legal authoritarianism</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>1.278</td>
<td>.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Participants’ class * Just world beliefs</td>
<td>-0.286</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>-0.657</td>
<td>.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Participants’ class * Protestant work ethic</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>-0.991</td>
<td>.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Participants’ class * Social dominance orientation (Dominance subscale)</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>-0.482</td>
<td>.630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Participants’ class * Social dominance orientation (Equality subscale)</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.740</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>.971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.033</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>38.899</td>
<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aReference category = Upper class defendant, bReference category = Upper class participant. Note: Participants’ class variable was created by merging self-identified lower and working class participants into one category (“Lower class”) and self-identified middle and upper class participants into another category (“Upper class”).
Table VI. Logistic regression between defendant’s social class, and participants’ subjective social class, legal authoritarianism, just world beliefs, Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation (IVs), and verdict certainty (DV). Study 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Exp(b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class(^a)</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>.540</td>
<td>0.879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class(^b)</td>
<td>-0.340</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>2.494</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>0.712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal authoritarianism</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td>0.345</td>
<td>2.534</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>1.732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just world beliefs</td>
<td>1.204</td>
<td>0.904</td>
<td>1.776</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>3.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant work ethic</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td>.373</td>
<td>1.384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social dominance orientation</td>
<td>0.631</td>
<td>1.464</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>.666</td>
<td>1.880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Dominance subscale)</td>
<td>-0.740</td>
<td>1.453</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>.611</td>
<td>0.477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Equality subscale)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Legal authoritarianism</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0.509</td>
<td>0.686</td>
<td>.408</td>
<td>1.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Just world beliefs</td>
<td>-2.150</td>
<td>1.254</td>
<td>2.939</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Protestant work ethic</td>
<td>-1.739</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>10.315</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Social dominance orientation (Dominance subscale)</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>2.176</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>.915</td>
<td>1.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Social dominance orientation (Equality subscale)</td>
<td>1.994</td>
<td>2.144</td>
<td>0.865</td>
<td>.352</td>
<td>7.347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class * Legal authoritarianism</td>
<td>0.464</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>.343</td>
<td>1.591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class * Just world beliefs</td>
<td>-0.393</td>
<td>1.193</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>.742</td>
<td>0.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class * Protestant work ethic</td>
<td>-0.347</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.601</td>
<td>.438</td>
<td>0.707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class * Social dominance orientation (Dominance subscale)</td>
<td>-2.241</td>
<td>2.104</td>
<td>1.134</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants’ class * Social dominance orientation (Equality subscale)</td>
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<td>2.101</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>.910</td>
<td>1.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Participants’ class * Legal authoritarianism</td>
<td>-0.908</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>1.780</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>0.403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Participants’ class * Just world beliefs</td>
<td>2.452</td>
<td>1.629</td>
<td>2.265</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>11.610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Participants’ class * Protestant work ethic</td>
<td>1.998</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>9.744</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>7.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Dominance subscale)</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td>2.844</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>.765</td>
<td>2.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant class * Participants’ class * Social dominance orientation (Equality subscale)</td>
<td>-2.205</td>
<td>2.824</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>.435</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>7.436</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>1.705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Reference category = Upper class defendant, \(^b\) Reference category = Upper class participant. Note: Participants’ class variable was created by merging self-identified lower and working class participants into one category (“Lower class”) and self-identified middle and upper class participants into another category (“Upper class”).
Table VII. *Descriptive statistics for legal authoritarianism scores, just world belief scores, Protestant work ethic scores, social dominance orientation scores (total and subscales independently), verdict certainty, defendant responsibility, and perceptions of defendant (Study 2).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Mdn</th>
<th>(SD)</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal authoritarianism</td>
<td>3.853</td>
<td>3.955</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>5.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just world belief</td>
<td>4.128</td>
<td>4.167</td>
<td>1.239</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant work ethic</td>
<td>4.156</td>
<td>4.182</td>
<td>0.882</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social dominance orientation</td>
<td>2.462</td>
<td>2.133</td>
<td>1.221</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>6.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO equality subscale</td>
<td>2.521</td>
<td>2.250</td>
<td>1.346</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO dominance subscale</td>
<td>2.403</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>1.364</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verdict certainty</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>2.645</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant responsibility</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>2.156</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of defendant</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>2.052</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table VIII. General linear model (GLM) between victim social class, justification, threat, and participants’ subjective social class (IVs), and verdict certainty, defendant responsibility, and perceptions of the defendant (DV). Study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Verdict Certainty</th>
<th>Victim Responsibility</th>
<th>Perception of Defendant</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$F$</td>
<td>df</td>
<td>$p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim class</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>7.558</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant’s class</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim class * Justification</td>
<td>2.636</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim class * Threat</td>
<td>0.643</td>
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<td>.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim class * Participants’ class</td>
<td>9.711</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Threat</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Participants’ class</td>
<td>1.100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat * Participants’ class</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim class * Justification * Threat</td>
<td>1.248</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim class * Justification * Participants’ class</td>
<td>2.135</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.145</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victim class * Threat * Participants’ class</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>.564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Threat * Participants’ class</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim class * Justification * Threat * Participants’ class</td>
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<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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</table>

Note: Participants’ class variable was created by merging self-identified lower and working class participants into one category (“Lower class”) and self-identified middle and upper class participants into another category (“Upper class”).
Table IX. *Logistic regression between victim social class, justification, threat, and participants’ subjective social class (IVs), and dichotomous verdict (DV).* Study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Exp(b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim class(a)</td>
<td>-0.869</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>1.672</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>0.420</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justification(b)</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
<td>0.721</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>.800</td>
<td>0.833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat(c)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic threat</td>
<td>-1.831</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td>5.984</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>0.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realistic threat</td>
<td>-0.599</td>
<td>0.721</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>.406</td>
<td>0.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant’s class(d)</td>
<td>-1.766</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td>4.891</td>
<td>.027</td>
<td>0.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim class * Justification</td>
<td>-0.821</td>
<td>1.022</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>0.440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim class * Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim class * Symbolic threat(a)</td>
<td>0.828</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Victim class * Participants’ class</td>
<td>1.497</td>
<td>0.998</td>
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<td>4.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Threat</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Symbolic threat(a)</td>
<td>1.163</td>
<td>1.007</td>
<td>1.333</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>3.200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justification * Realistic threat(a)</td>
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<td>0.993</td>
<td>0.031</td>
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<td>0.894</td>
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<tr>
<td>Symbolic threat * Participants’ class</td>
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<td>1.063</td>
<td>4.427</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>9.360</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Victim class * Justification * Threat</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.439</td>
<td>0.048</td>
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<td>0.085</td>
<td>.771</td>
<td>1.515</td>
</tr>
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<td>Victim class * Threat * Participants’ class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim class * Symbolic threat(a) * Participants’ class</td>
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<td>1.445</td>
<td>1.457</td>
<td>.227</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.106</td>
<td>1.404</td>
<td>0.620</td>
<td>.431</td>
<td>3.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Threat * Participants’ class</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification * Symbolic threat(a) * Participants’ class</td>
<td>-1.856</td>
<td>1.449</td>
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<td>1.361</td>
</tr>
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<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>Exp(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victim class * Justification * Symbolic threat * Participants’ class</td>
<td>1.583</td>
<td>2.040</td>
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<td>.438</td>
<td>4.867</td>
</tr>
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<td>Victim class * Justification * Realistic threat * Participants’ class</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.526</td>
<td>3.297</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>2.600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Reference category = Upper class victim, “Reference category = Justification absent, “Reference category = no threat, “Reference category = Upper class participant. Note: Participants’ class variable was created by merging self-identified lower and working class participants into one category (“Lower class”) and self-identified middle and upper class participants into another category (“Upper class”).
Table X. Linear regression between victim social class, and participants' subjective social class, legal authoritarianism, just world beliefs, Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation (IVs), and verdict certainty (DV). Study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
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<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>0.090</td>
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<td>Just world beliefs</td>
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*Reference category = Upper class victim, b Reference category = Upper class participant. Note: Participants’ class variable was created by merging self-identified lower and working class participants into one category (“Lower class”) and self-identified middle and upper class participants into another category (“Upper class”).
Table XI. Logistic regression between victim social class, and participants’ subjective social class, legal authoritarianism, just world beliefs, Protestant work ethic, and social dominance orientation (IVs), and verdict certainty (DV). Study 2.

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<td>Just world beliefs</td>
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<td>.759</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

$^a$Reference category = Upper class victim, $^b$Reference category = Upper class participant. Note: Participants’ class variable was created by merging self-identified lower and working class participants into one category (“Lower class”) and self-identified middle and upper class participants into another category (“Upper class”).
Figures

Figure 1a. Study 1: Estimated marginal means for mock jurors’ verdict certainty scores based on defendant’s social class and threat.
Figure 1b. Study 1: Estimated marginal means for mock jurors’ verdict certainty scores based on defendant’s social class and threat.
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Figure 3b. Study 1: Mock jurors’ defendant responsibility scores based on threat, defendant’s social class and justification.
Figure 4. *Study 1: Mock jurors’ perception of defendant scores based on defendant’s social class and mock jurors’ social class.*
Figure 5. *Study 1:* mean values for mock jurors’ verdict certainty scale scores based on defendant social class and mean-centered scores on the Protestant Work Ethic Scale (Katz & Hass, 1988). Higher values indicate greater certainty on a guilty verdict (i.e., greater punitiveness).
Figure 6. Study 1: probability of mock jurors’ guilty verdict based on defendant social class and mean-centered scores on the Protestant Work Ethic Scale (Katz & Hass, 1988). Higher values indicate greater probability of a guilty verdict (i.e., greater punitiveness).
Figure 7. Study 1: probability of mock jurors’ guilty verdict based on defendant social class and mean-centered scores on the Just World Beliefs scale (Dalbert, 1999). Higher values indicate greater probability of a guilty verdict (i.e., greater punitiveness).
Figure 8a. Study 2: Estimated marginal means for mock jurors’ verdict certainty scores based on justification, threat, victim’s social class and mock jurors’ social class.
Figure 8b. Study 2: Estimated marginal means for mock jurors’ verdict certainty scores based on threat, justification, victim’s social class and mock jurors’ social class.
Figure 9a. Study 2: Mock jurors’ victim responsibility scores based on justification, threat, victim’s social class and mock jurors’ social class.
Figure 9b. Study 2: Mock jurors’ victim responsibility scores based on threat, justification, victim’s social class and mock jurors’ social class.
Figure 10a. *Study 2: Mock jurors’ perception of defendant scores based on justification, threat, victim’s social class and mock jurors’ social class.*
Figure 10b. Study 2: Mock jurors’ perception of defendant scores based on threat, justification, victim’s social class and mock jurors’ social class.
Appendix A: Pilot study – Trial summary

In the present case, the defendant, Michael Hart, stands accused of assault. The victim was John Bradley. On May 10th, 2014, Mr. Hart spent the evening at Arena Sports Bar. Mr. Hart left the bar around 11:30pm. While leaving the bar, Mr. Hart’s vehicle collided with Mr. Bradley’s vehicle. Following the collision, Mr. Hart and Mr. Bradley began arguing about who was at fault for the collision. According to David O’Hara, an employee of Arena Sports Bar, a bar patron told him that there were two men arguing outside the bar, and that the argument was becoming heated, with both individuals speaking in increasingly loud and hostile manner to the other. At this point, the bar patron told O’Hara that he entered the bar to “avoid any trouble,” and did not see what transpired next. Around 11:45pm, O’Hara went outside to check on the situation. When Mr. O’Hara was outside the bar, he found Mr. Hart standing near an unconscious Mr. Bradley. When Mr. Hart saw Mr. O’Hara, he fled the scene. At this point, Mr. O’Hara called 911. Mr. Hart was later picked up by police at his apartment. Police report indicates that Mr. Hart surrendered willingly and cooperated with the authorities.

The following is the testimony of the defendant, Michael Hart:

The night of the incident I went to Arena Sports Bar to watch a basketball game. I left shortly after the fight was over, annoyed because the team I was rooting for lost. As I’m leaving the bar, this dude comes out of nowhere and smashes into my car. I get out of the car and we get into an argument over who was at fault. Out of nowhere, this guy starts shouting at me. So I start shouting at him too. Then he shoves me. So I shoved him back. Then he takes a swing at me, and misses. Eventually he grabs me, pushes me to the ground and starts choking me. I panicked and reached for the first thing that I could grab and swung at his face as hard as I could. After I hit the guy, he passes out. I get up and I see the bartender looking at us. I panicked, and ran away. I know it looks bad, but I freaked out! Once I got home and had a chance to cool off, I realized my mistake. By then the police were outside, so I figured I should cooperate. Because I know I did nothing wrong. I thought I was going to die, so I defended myself! I’m not at fault here!

The following is the testimony of the victim, John Bradley:

On May 10th, I was driving home after a late night at work when suddenly someone crashes into my car. I get out of my car to check the damage. I admit I was a bit angry, so I start screaming at the other driver. Then he starts screaming at me. Then he shoves me. So I shove him back. And then he takes a swing at me. He misses, and then I tried to push him away from me. But he grabs my arm and pushes me to the ground. I managed to get him off me, and then everything goes black. The next thing I know, I’m in the ER with a concussion, several broken bones in my face, and a nasty gash which required twelve stitches. I don’t care what this guy says, I never tried to choke him. I was trying to keep this crazy angry man from hurting me, and he knocked me out. Thank goodness the bartender showed up, otherwise I don’t know what the defendant could’ve done to me.

The following is the testimony of the sole witness to the event, David O’Hara:
On the night of May 10th, I was bartending at Arena Sports Bar. Michael Hart was there, and left shortly after 11:30. He didn’t have much to drink, probably because he was driving home, and because of the basketball game. Meaning that his team losing the game put him in a down mood. He was so upset that he barely touched his second beer. He just sat there, quietly. I was a bit surprised, because Mike is generally a pretty easygoing guy. He’s polite to the staff, and to other customers. Sometimes he’ll ask people if they can quiet down if he’s trying to watch the game, but always nicely. He’s really into basketball, you see, and he prefers not to get distracted by others. A little after Mike left for the night, another guy comes in and tells me two guys were having a pretty nasty argument right outside the bar. I went out to check that out, and I find Mike standing there, and an unconscious guy on the ground next to him. I look at Mike, and he drops the rock that was in his hand, then screams at me something about this other guy trying to kill him. Before I can do anything else, Mike runs away. I then called 911 to get the other guy some help, and when the police came in, I told them about what I saw.

The judge provided the following instructions to the jury:

The defendant is charged with assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 245. To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1A. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person, and
1B. The force used was likely to produce great bodily injury.

2. The defendant did that act willfully;

3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force likely to produce great bodily injury AND

5. The defendant did not act in self-defense.

Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage. The terms application of force and apply force mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind. The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object to touch the other person.
The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone. The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when he acted. No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant’s act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault. Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.
Appendix B: Pilot study - Individual’s description

[Upper class:] Mr. Hart is a 35-year old man who owns and manages a jewelry store. He was born and raised in the community, attended the local school system and later obtained a bachelor’s degree in English Literature and a Master’s degree in business administration at the local university. He drives a 2014 BMW sedan.

[Middle class:] Mr. Hart is a 35-year old man who manages a small book store. He was born and raised in the community, attended the local school system and later obtained a bachelor’s degree in business administration at the local college. He drives a 2010 Toyota sedan.

[Lower class:] Mr. Hart is a 35-year old man who works as a part-time cashier at a local supermarket. He was born and raised in the community, attended the local school system and graduated with high school diploma. He drives a 1989 Ford sedan.
Appendix C: Pilot study – Prosecution statement.

Wave 1:

[No threat condition:] The evidence linking Mr. Hart to this terrible act is clear: the defendant attacked the victim following their argument, and in doing so, he acted in a callous and violent manner. Mr. Hart’s actions show he is a violent and uncaring individual. He attacked the victim with a rock. A rock! Like some sort of wild caveman! Mr. Hart’s actions show that he is a violent and uncaring individual, and therefore dangerous to the community. Remember also that nobody else saw this alleged choking. Mr. Hart is clearly using self-defense as a way of getting out of a punishment he rightly deserves. Because of the danger that Mr. Hart represents, I urge you to find him guilty of the charges brought against him.

[Realistic threat condition:] The evidence linking Mr. Hart to this terrible act is clear: the defendant attacked the victim following their argument, and in doing so, he acted in a callous and violent manner. This incident shows that Mr. Hart and other people like him are a danger to our community. He has no problem using violence against an innocent man. Furthermore, Mr. Hart and people like him live off the hard work of the honest people in this community. Mr. Hart and people like him use our roads, our public services, without contributing fairly to the community. And then, people like Mr. Hart go and use up even more community services by having the police have to waste time and money to find him, because he couldn’t be bothered to turn himself in. Remember also that nobody else saw this alleged choking. Mr. Hart is clearly using self-defense as a way
of getting out of a punishment he rightly deserves. Because of the danger that Mr. Hart represents, I urge you to find him guilty of the charges brought against him.

[Symbolic threat condition:] The evidence linking Mr. Hart to this terrible act is clear: the defendant attacked the victim following their argument, and in doing so, he acted in a callous and violent manner. This incident shows that Mr. Hart and other people like him are a danger to our community. Furthermore, Mr. Hart and people like him undermine the values of the honest people in this community. Mr. Hart and people like him ignore the values of brotherhood and community that make us strong. And then, people like Mr. Hart further undermine our values by using violence to resolve simple disputes. Mr. Hart and people like him are dangerous because they threaten not only our fellow citizens, but the values that make our community strong. Remember also that nobody else saw this alleged choking. Mr. Hart is clearly using self-defense as a way of getting out of a punishment he rightly deserves. Because of the danger that Mr. Hart represents, I urge you to find him guilty of the charges brought against him.

Wave 2:

[No threat condition:] The evidence linking Mr. Hart to this terrible act is clear: the defendant attacked the victim following their argument, and in doing so, he acted in a callous and violent manner. Mr. Hart’s actions show he is a violent and uncaring individual. He attacked the victim with a rock. A rock! Like some sort of wild caveman! Mr. Hart’s actions show that he is a violent and uncaring individual, and therefore dangerous to the community. Remember also that nobody else saw this alleged choking.
Mr. Hart is clearly using self-defense as a way of getting out of a punishment he rightly deserves. Because of the danger that Mr. Hart represents, I urge you to find him guilty of the charges brought against him.

[Realistic threat condition:] The evidence linking Mr. Hart to this terrible act is clear: the defendant attacked the victim following their argument, and in doing so, he acted in a callous and violent manner. This incident shows that Mr. Hart and other people like him are a danger to our community. He [takes advantage of his position and power (upper class condition)/is angry at his lack of power (lower class condition)], and so has no problem using violence against an innocent man. Furthermore, Mr. Hart and people like him live off the hard work of the honest people in this community. Mr. Hart and people like him [use their money to avoid helping their fair share (upper class condition)/mooch off other people’s money and don’t help their fair share (lower class condition)]. Mr. Hart and people like him use our roads, our public services, without contributing fairly to the community. And then, people like Mr. Hart go and use up even more community services by having the police have to waste time and money to find him, because he couldn’t be bothered to turn himself in. Remember also that nobody else saw this alleged choking. Mr. Hart is clearly using self-defense as a way of getting out of a punishment he rightly deserves. Because of the danger that Mr. Hart represents, I urge you to find him guilty of the charges brought against him.

(Symbolic threat condition:) The evidence linking Mr. Hart to this terrible act is clear: the defendant attacked the victim following their argument, and in doing so, he
acted in a callous and violent manner. This incident shows that Mr. Hart and other people like him are a danger to our community. He [takes advantage of his position and power (upper class condition)/is angry at his lack of power (lower class condition)], and so has no problem using violence against an innocent man. Furthermore, Mr. Hart and people like him undermine the values of the honest people in this community. Mr. Hart and people like him think [their money (upper class condition)/their lack of money (lower class condition)] means they don’t have to follow the rules everyone else lives by. Mr. Hart and people like him ignore the values of brotherhood and community that make us strong. And then, people like Mr. Hart further undermine our values by using violence to resolve simple disputes. Mr. Hart and people like him are dangerous because they threaten not only our fellow citizens, but the values that make our community strong. Remember also that nobody else saw this alleged choking. Mr. Hart is clearly using self-defense as a way of getting out of a punishment he rightly deserves. Because of the danger that Mr. Hart represents, I urge you to find him guilty of the charges brought against him.
Appendix D: Case trial summary and closing arguments (Study 1)

Note: Manipulation for class is highlighted in yellow, manipulations for justification are highlighted in green, and manipulations for threat are highlighted in red.

In the present case, the defendant, Michael Hart, stands accused of assault. Mr. Hart is a 35-year old man who [owns and manages a high-end jewelry store (upper class condition)/works as a part-time cashier at a local supermarket (lower class condition)]. He was born and raised in the community, attended the local school system [and later obtained a bachelor’s degree in English Literature and a Master’s degree in business administration at an Ivy League university (upper class condition)/and graduated with high school diploma (lower class condition)]. The victim was John Bradley. Mr. Bradley is a 32-year old man who manages a small book store. Mr. Bradley was born and raised in the community, attended the local school system and later obtained a bachelor’s degree in business administration at the local college.

On May 10th, 2014, Mr. Hart spent the evening at Arena Sports Bar. Mr. Hart left the bar around 11:30pm. While leaving the bar, Mr. Hart’s vehicle, a [2016 BMW sedan (upper class condition)/1989 Ford sedan (lower class condition)], collided with Mr. Bradley’s vehicle, a 2010 Toyota sedan. Following the collision, Mr. Hart and Mr. Bradley began arguing about who was at fault for the collision. According to David O’Hara, an employee of Arena Sports Bar, a bar patron told him that there were two men arguing outside the bar, and that the argument was becoming heated, with both individuals speaking in increasingly loud and hostile manner to the other. At this point, the bar patron told O’Hara that he entered the bar to “avoid any trouble,” and did not see what transpired next. Around 11:45pm, O’Hara went outside to check on the situation.
When Mr. O’Hara was outside the bar, Mr. Hart saw Mr. O’Hara, he fled the scene. At this point, Mr. O’Hara called 911. Mr. Hart was later picked up by police at his apartment. Police report indicates that Mr. Hart surrendered willingly and cooperated with the authorities.

[Justification present condition]
The following is the testimony of the defendant, Michael Hart:

The night of the incident I went to Arena Sports Bar to watch a basketball game. I left shortly after the fight was over, annoyed because my team lost. As I’m leaving the bar, this dude comes out of nowhere and smashes into my car. I get out of the car and we get into an argument over who was at fault. I asked him if he was blind or just stupid, and then he gets angry and starts shouting at me. So I start shouting at him too. Then he shoves me. So I shoved him back. Then he takes a swing at me, and misses. Eventually he grabs me, pushes me to the ground and starts choking me. I panicked and reached for the first thing that I could grab and swung at his face as hard as I could. After I hit the guy, he passes out. I get up and I see the bartender looking at us. I panicked, and ran away. I know it looks bad, but I freaked out! Once I got home and had a chance to cool off, I realized my mistake. By then the police were outside, so I figured I should cooperate. Because I know I did nothing wrong. I thought I was going to die, so I defended myself! I’m not at fault here!

The following is the testimony of the victim, John Bradley:

On May 10th, I was driving home after a late night at work when suddenly someone crashes into my car. I get out of my car to check the damage. I admit I was a bit angry, so when the other driver called me stupid, I start screaming at him. Then he starts
screaming at me. Then he shoves me. So I shove him back. And then he takes a swing at me. He misses, and then I tried to push him away from me. But he grabs my arm and pushes me to the ground. I managed to get him off me, and then everything goes black.

The next thing I know, I’m in the ER with a concussion, several broken bones in my face, and a nasty gash which required twelve stitches. I don’t care what this guy says, I never tried to choke him. I was trying to keep this crazy angry man from hurting me, and he knocked me out. Thank goodness the bartender showed up, otherwise I don’t know what the defendant could’ve done to me.

The following is the testimony of the sole witness to the event, David O’Hara:

On the night of May 10th, I was bartending at Arena Sports Bar. Michael Hart was there, and left shortly after 11:30. He didn’t have much to drink, probably because he was driving home, and because of the basketball game. Meaning that his team losing the game put him in a down mood. He was so upset that he barely touched his second beer. He just sat there, quietly by himself. That isn’t unusual, mind you. Mike is not the easiest guy to deal with. He’s always cold and distant, like he doesn’t like anyone. I’ve never heard him speak to staff or other customers unless something is bothering him, and he won’t sugarcoat it. Sometimes he’ll tell people to shut up if he’s trying to watch the game. He’s really into basketball, you see, and he prefers not to get distracted. No wonder he’s always watching the games alone. Anyway, a little after Mike left for the night, another guy comes in and tells me two guys were having a pretty nasty argument outside the bar. I went out to check that out, and I find Mike standing there, and an unconscious guy on the ground next to him. I look at Mike, and he drops the rock that was in his hand, then screams at me something about this other guy trying to kill him. Before I can do anything
else, Mike runs away. I then called 911 to get the other guy some help, and when the police came in, I told them about what I saw.

[Justification absent condition]

The following is the testimony of the defendant, Michael Hart:

The night of the incident I went to Arena Sports Bar to watch a basketball game. I left shortly after the fight was over, annoyed because my team lost. As I’m leaving the bar, this dude comes out of nowhere and smashes into my car. I get out of the car and we get into an argument over who was at fault. Out of nowhere, this guy starts shouting at me. So I start shouting at him too. Then he shoves me. So I shoved him back. Then he takes a swing at me, and misses. Eventually he grabs me, pushes me to the ground and starts choking me. I panicked and reached for the first thing that I could grab and swung at his face as hard as I could. After I hit the guy, he passes out. I get up and I see the bartender looking at us. I panicked, and ran away. I know it looks bad, but I freaked out! Once I got home and had a chance to cool off, I realized my mistake. By then the police were outside, so I figured I should cooperate. Because I know I did nothing wrong. I thought I was going to die, so I defended myself! I’m not at fault here!

The following is the testimony of the victim, John Bradley:

On May 10th, I was driving home after a late night at work when suddenly someone crashes into my car. I get out of my car to check the damage. I admit I was a bit angry, so I start screaming at the other driver. Then he starts screaming at me. Then he shoves me. So I shove him back. And then he takes a swing at me. He misses, and then I tried to push him away from me. But he grabs my arm and pushes me to the ground. I managed to get him off me, and then everything goes black. The next thing I know, I’m
in the ER with a concussion, several broken bones in my face, and a nasty gash which required twelve stitches. I don’t care what this guy says, I never tried to choke him. I was trying to keep this crazy angry man from hurting me, and he knocked me out. Thank goodness the bartender showed up, otherwise I don’t know what the defendant could’ve done to me.

The following is the testimony of the sole witness to the event, David O’Hara:

On the night of May 10th, I was bartending at Arena Sports Bar. Michael Hart was there, and left shortly after 11:30. He didn’t have much to drink, probably because he was driving home, and because of the basketball game. Meaning that his team losing the game put him in a down mood. He was so upset that he barely touched his second beer. He just sat there, quietly. I was a bit surprised, because Mike is generally a pretty easygoing guy. He’s polite to the staff, and to other customers. Sometimes he’ll ask people if they can quiet down if he’s trying to watch the game, but always nicely. He’s really into basketball, you see, and he prefers not to get distracted. Anyway, a little after Mike left for the night, another guy comes in and tells me two guys were having a pretty nasty argument outside the bar. I went out to check that out, and I find Mike standing there, and an unconscious guy on the ground next to him. I look at Mike, and he drops the rock that was in his hand, then screams at me something about this other guy trying to kill him. Before I can do anything else, Mike runs away. I then called 911 to get the other guy some help, and when the police came in, I told them about what I saw.

The prosecuting attorney presented his closing argument:

[No threat condition:]
The evidence linking Mr. Hart to this terrible act is clear: the defendant attacked the victim following their argument, and in doing so, he acted in a callous and violent manner. Mr. Hart’s actions show that he is dangerous to the community. He has nothing to lose and so has no problem using violence against an innocent man. He attacked the victim with a rock. A rock! Like some sort of wild caveman! This incident shows that Mr. Hart is dangerous. Remember also that nobody else saw this alleged choking. Mr. Hart is clearly using self-defense as a way of getting out of a punishment he rightly deserves. Because of the danger that Mr. Hart represents, I urge you to find him guilty of the charges brought against him.

[Realistic threat condition:]

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, let me be clear: Mr. Hart threatens this community because through his actions, he is taking more than his fair share of the resources of this community, leaving the rest of us with less. The evidence linking Mr. Hart to this terrible act is clear: the defendant attacked the victim following their argument, and in doing so, he acted in a callous manner. This incident shows that Mr. Hart and other people like him are a danger to our community. Mr. Hart and people like him mooch off other people’s money and don’t help their fair share. He has nothing to lose and so has no problem using violence against an innocent man. He takes advantage of the fact that our judicial system is severely underfunded to try and escape justice. He thinks he can get away with his crime, and so has no problem using violence against an innocent man. Furthermore, Mr. Hart and people like him live off the hard work of the honest people in this community. Mr. Hart and people like him do not give their fair share back to the community, which means all of us have to give more. Mr. Hart and
people like him use our roads, our public services, without contributing fairly to the community. And people like Mr. Hart go and use up even more community services by having the police have to waste time and money to find him, because he couldn’t be bothered to turn himself in. Remember also that nobody else saw this alleged choking. Mr. Hart is clearly using self-defense as a way of getting out of a punishment he rightly deserves. Because of the danger that Mr. Hart represents, I urge you to find him guilty of the charges brought against him.

[Symbolic threat condition:]

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, let me be clear: Mr. Hart threatens this community because through his actions, he undermines the values we all hold dear. The evidence linking Mr. Hart to this terrible act is clear: the defendant attacked the victim following their argument, and in doing so, he acted in a callous manner. This incident shows that Mr. Hart and other people like him are a danger to our community. He has nothing to lose and so has no problem using violence against an innocent man. He takes advantage of the values of our judicial system, which presumes people are innocent until proven guilty. He thinks he can get away with his crime, and so has no problem using violence against an innocent man. Furthermore, Mr. Hart and people like him undermine the values of the honest people in this community. Mr. Hart and people like him think they don’t have to follow the rules or share the values everyone else lives by. Mr. Hart and people like him ignore the values of brotherhood and community that make us strong. And then, people like Mr. Hart further undermine our values by using violence to resolve simple disputes. Mr. Hart and people like him are dangerous because they threaten not only our fellow citizens, but the values that make our community strong.
Remember also that nobody else saw this alleged choking. Mr. Hart is clearly using self-defense as a way of getting out of a punishment he rightly deserves. Because of the danger that Mr. Hart represents, I urge you to find him guilty of the charges brought against him.

The defense attorney presented the following closing argument:

It is clear based on the facts of the case that my client, Mr. Hart is innocent of the charges brought against him. The fact of the matter is that the prosecution is targeting my client solely because it makes for a compelling story: an evil man who overreacts violently against an innocent victim. But this situation is nothing of the sort: my client was merely acting in self-defense after Mr. Bradley attacked him first. [Mr. Hart can be cold and distant, but he has never shown himself to be violent (justification present condition)/ Mr. Hart is a friendly and caring person who has never shown himself to be violent (justification absent condition)]. Mr. Bradley’s injuries, while unfortunate, are ultimately the result of his actions, not of the actions of my client. Those individuals who know him best can attest to my client’s calm demeanor and honest behavior. I urge to consider these facts, as they demonstrate that my client is innocent of the charges.
Appendix E: Case trial summary and closing arguments (Study 2)

Note: Manipulation for class is highlighted in yellow, manipulations for justification are highlighted in green, and manipulations for threat are highlighted in red.

In the present case, the defendant, John Bradley, stands accused of assault. Mr. Bradley is a 32-year old man who manages a small book store. Mr. Bradley was born and raised in the community, attended the local school system and later obtained a bachelor’s degree in business administration at the local college. The victim is Michael Hart. Mr. Hart [owns and manages a high-end jewelry store (upper class condition)/works as a part-time cashier at a local supermarket (lower class condition)]. He was born and raised in the community, attended the local school system [and later obtained a bachelor’s degree in English Literature and a Master’s degree in business administration at an Ivy League university (upper class condition)/and graduated with high school diploma (lower class condition)].

On May 10th, 2014, Mr. Bradley was driving by Arena Sports Bar. Mr. Hart had spent the evening at the same bar, leaving around 11:30pm. While leaving the bar, Mr. Hart’s vehicle, a [2016 BMW sedan (upper class condition)/1989 Ford sedan (lower class condition)], collided with Mr. Bradley’s vehicle, a 2010 Toyota sedan. Following the collision, Mr. Hart and Mr. Bradley began arguing about who was at fault for the collision. According to David O’Hara, an employee of Arena Sports Bar, a bar patron told him that there were two men arguing outside the bar, and that the argument was becoming heated, with both individuals speaking in increasingly loud and hostile manner to the other. At this point, the bar patron told O’Hara that he entered the bar to “avoid any trouble,” and did not see what transpired next. Around 11:45pm, O’Hara went outside to
check on the situation. When Mr. O’Hara was outside the bar, he found Mr. Bradley standing near an unconscious Mr. Hart. When Mr. Bradley saw Mr. O’Hara, he fled the scene. At this point, Mr. O’Hara called 911. Mr. Bradley was later picked up by police at his apartment. Police report indicates that Mr. Bradley surrendered willingly and cooperated with the authorities.

[Justification present condition]

The following is the testimony of the defendant, John Bradley:

On May 10th, I was driving home after a late night at work when suddenly someone crashes into my car. I get out of my car to check the damage, and the other driver starts screaming like crazy at me. So I start yelling back at him. Then he shoves me. So I shove him back. And then he takes a swing at me. He misses, and then I tried to push him away from me. Eventually he grabs me, pushes me to the ground and starts choking me. I panicked and reached for the first thing that I could grab and swung at his face as hard as I could. After I hit the guy, he passes out. I get up and I see the bartender looking at us. I panicked, and ran away. I know it looks bad, but I freaked out! Once I got home and had a chance to cool off, I realized my mistake. By then the police were outside, so I figured I should cooperate. Because I know I did nothing wrong. I thought I was going to die, so I defended myself! I’m not at fault here!

The following is the testimony of the victim, Michael Hart:

The night of the incident I went to Arena Sports Bar to watch a basketball game. I left shortly after the fight was over, annoyed because my team lost. As I’m leaving the bar, this dude comes out of nowhere and smashes into my car. I get out of the car and we get into an argument over who was at fault. I asked him if he was blind or just stupid, and
then he gets angry and starts shouting at me. So I start shouting at him too. Then he
shoves me. So I shoved him back. Then he starts coming my way again, so I take a swing
at him, and miss. But he grabs my arm and pushes me to the ground. I managed to get
him off me, and then everything goes black. The next thing I know, I’m in the ER with a
concussion, several broken bones in my face, and a nasty gash which required twelve
stitches. I don’t care what this guy says, I never tried to choke him. I was trying to keep
this crazy angry man from hurting me, and he knocked me out. Thank goodness the
bartender showed up, otherwise I don’t know what the defendant could’ve done to me.

The following is the testimony of the sole witness to the event, David O’Hara:

On the night of May 10th, I was bartending at Arena Sports Bar. Michael Hart was
there, and left shortly after 11:30. He didn’t have much to drink, probably because he was
driving home, and because of the basketball game. Meaning that his team losing the game
put him in a down mood. He was so upset that he barely touched his second beer. He just
sat there, quietly by himself. That isn’t unusual, mind you. Mike is not the easiest guy to
deal with. He’s always cold and distant, like he doesn’t like anyone. I’ve never heard him
speak to staff or other customers unless something is bothering him, and he won’t
sugarcoat it. Sometimes he’ll tell people to shut up if he’s trying to watch the game. He’s
really into basketball, you see, and he prefers not to get distracted. No wonder he’s
always watching the games alone. Anyway, a little after Mike left for the night, another
guy comes in and tells me two guys were having a pretty nasty argument outside the bar.
I went out to check that out, and I find this guy standing there, and an unconscious Mike
on the ground next to him. I look at the guy, and he drops the rock that was in his hand,
then screams at me something about this other guy trying to kill him. Before I can do
anything else, the guy runs away. I then called 911 to get Mike some help, and when the police came in, I told them about what I saw.

[Justification absent condition]

The following is the testimony of the defendant, John Bradley:

On May 10th, I was driving home after a late night at work when suddenly someone crashes into my car. I get out of my car to check the damage. I admit I was a bit angry, so I start screaming at the other driver. Then he starts screaming at me. Then he shoves me. So I shove him back. And then he takes a swing at me. He misses, and then I tried to push him away from me. Eventually he grabs me, pushes me to the ground and starts choking me. I panicked and reached for the first thing that I could grab and swung at his face as hard as I could. After I hit the guy, he passes out. I get up and I see the bartender looking at us. I panicked, and ran away. I know it looks bad, but I freaked out! Once I got home and had a chance to cool off, I realized my mistake. By then the police were outside, so I figured I should cooperate. Because I know I did nothing wrong. I thought I was going to die, so I defended myself! I’m not at fault here!

The following is the testimony of the victim, Michael Hart:

The night of the incident I went to Arena Sports Bar to watch a basketball game. I left shortly after the fight was over, annoyed because my team lost. As I’m leaving the bar, this dude comes out of nowhere and smashes into my car. I get out of the car and we get into an argument over who was at fault. Out of nowhere, this guy starts shouting at me. So I start shouting at him too. Then he shoves me. So I shoved him back. Then he takes a swing at me, and misses. But he grabs my arm and pushes me to the ground. I managed to get him off me, and then everything goes black. The next thing I know, I’m
in the ER with a concussion, several broken bones in my face, and a nasty gash which required twelve stitches. I don’t care what this guy says, I never tried to choke him. I was trying to keep this crazy angry man from hurting me, and he knocked me out. Thank goodness the bartender showed up, otherwise I don’t know what the defendant could’ve done to me.

The following is the testimony of the sole witness to the event, David O’Hara:

On the night of May 10th, I was bartending at Arena Sports Bar. Michael Hart was there, and left shortly after 11:30. He didn’t have much to drink, probably because he was driving home, and because of the basketball game. Meaning that his team losing the game put him in a down mood. He was so upset that he barely touched his second beer. He just sat there, quietly. I was a bit surprised, because Mike is generally a pretty easygoing guy. He’s polite to the staff, and to other customers. Sometimes he’ll ask people if they can quiet down if he’s trying to watch the game, but always nicely. He’s really into basketball, you see, and he prefers not to get distracted by others. Anyway, a little after Mike left for the night, another guy comes in and tells me two guys were having a pretty nasty argument outside the bar. I went out to check that out, and I find this guy standing there, and an unconscious Mike on the ground next to him. I look at the guy, and he drops the rock that was in his hand, then screams at me something about this other guy trying to kill him. Before I can do anything else, the guy runs away. I then called 911 to get Mike some help, and when the police came in, I told them about what I saw.

The prosecuting attorney presented his closing argument:

The evidence linking Mr. Bradley to this terrible act is clear: the defendant attacked the victim following their argument, and in doing so, he acted in a callous and
violent manner. [The victim, Mr. Hart, can be cold and distant, but he has never shown himself to be violent (justification present condition)/ The victim, Mr. Hart, is a friendly and caring person who has never shown himself to be violent (justification absent condition)]. This surely demonstrates that Mr. Hart’s actions were unwarranted. Mr. Hart’s actions show he is a violent and uncaring individual. He attacked the victim with a rock. A rock! Like some sort of wild caveman! This incident shows that Mr. Hart is dangerous. Remember also that nobody else saw this alleged choking. Mr. Hart is clearly using self-defense as a way of getting out of a punishment he rightly deserves. Because of the danger that Mr. Hart represents, I urge you to find him guilty of the charges brought against him.

The defense attorney presented the following closing argument:

[No threat condition:]

It is clear based on the facts of the case that my client, Mr. Bradley is innocent of the charges brought against him. The fact of the matter is that the prosecution is targeting my client solely because it makes for a compelling story: an evil man who overreacts violently against an innocent victim. But this situation is nothing of the sort: my client was merely acting in self-defense after Mr. Hart attacked him first. Mr. Hart’s injuries, while unfortunate, are ultimately the result of his actions, not of the actions of my client. Mr. Hart’s actions show that he is a violent and uncaring individual, and therefore dangerous to the community. Those individuals who know him best can attest to my client’s calm demeanor and honest behavior. I urge to consider these facts, as they demonstrate that my client is innocent of the charges.

[Realistic threat condition:]
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it is clear based on the facts of the case that my client, Mr. Bradley is innocent of the charges brought against him. The fact of the matter is that the prosecution is targeting my client solely because it makes for a compelling story: an evil man who overreacts violently against an innocent victim. But this situation is nothing of the sort: my client was merely acting in self-defense after Mr. Hart attacked him first. Mr. Hart’s injuries, while unfortunate, are ultimately the result of his actions, not of the actions of my client. Those individuals who know him best can attest to my client’s calm demeanor and honest behavior. This incident shows that Mr. Hart and other people like him are a danger to our community. Mr. Hart and people like him mooch off other people’s money and don’t help their fair share. Through his actions, Mr. Hart is taking more than his fair share of the resources of this community, leaving the rest of us with less. He has nothing to lose and so has no problem using violence against an innocent man. Furthermore, Mr. Hart and people like him live off the hard work of the honest people in this community. Mr. Hart and people like him do not give their fair share back to the community, which means all of us have to give more. Mr. Hart and people like him use our roads, our public services, without contributing fairly to the community. I urge to consider these facts, as they demonstrate that my client is innocent of the charges.

[Symbolic threat condition:]

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it is clear based on the facts of the case that my client, Mr. Bradley is innocent of the charges brought against him. The fact of the matter is that the prosecution is targeting my client solely because it makes for a compelling story: an evil man who overreacts violently against an innocent victim. But this situation
is nothing of the sort: my client was merely acting in self-defense after Mr. Hart attacked him first. Mr. Hart’s injuries, while unfortunate, are ultimately the result of his actions, not of the actions of my client. Those individuals who know him best can attest to my client’s calm demeanor and honest behavior. This incident shows that Mr. Hart and other people like him are a danger to our community. Mr. Hart threatens this community because through his actions, he undermines the values we all hold dear. He has nothing to lose and so has no problem using violence against an innocent man. Furthermore, Mr. Hart and people like him undermine the values of the honest people in this community. Mr. Hart and people like him think they don’t have to follow the rules or share the values everyone else lives by. Mr. Hart and people like him ignore the values of brotherhood and community that make us strong. And then, people like Mr. Hart further undermine our values by using violence to resolve simple disputes. Mr. Hart and people like him are dangerous because they threaten not only our fellow citizens, but the values that make our community strong. I urge to consider these facts, as they demonstrate that my client is innocent of the charges.
Appendix F: Jury instructions.

The judge provided the following instructions to the jury:

The defendant, [Mr. Michael Hart (Study 1)/Mr. John Bradley (Study 2) is charged with assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 245. To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1A. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person, and
1B. The force used was likely to produce great bodily injury.

2. The defendant did that act willfully;

3. When the defendant acted, (he/she) was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that (his/her) act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone;

4. When the defendant acted, (he/she) had the present ability to apply force likely to produce great bodily injury AND

5. The defendant did not act in self-defense.

Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage. The terms application of force and apply force mean to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind. The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object to touch the other person.

The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually touched someone. The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against someone when he acted. No one needs to actually have been injured by defendant’s act. But if someone was injured, you may consider that fact, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant committed an assault. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to assault. Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.
Appendix G: Trial questions.

Please indicate your verdict decision:
Not Guilty
Guilty

Please indicate how certain you are of your decision:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Very certain on a

Not Guilty verdict
Guilty verdict

How responsible do you think the defendant is for this incident?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0% 50% 100%
responsible responsible responsible

How responsible do you think the victim is for this incident?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0% 50% 100%
responsible responsible responsible

Please indicate your overall perception of the defendant, Michael Hart:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Very negative Very positive
Appendix H: Revised Legal Authoritarianism Questionnaire (Kravitz et al., 1993)

Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements, from 1 – “Strongly Disagree” to 7 – “Strongly Agree”.

1. Unfair treatment of underprivileged groups and classes is the chief cause of crime.
2. Too many obviously guilty persons escape punishment because of legal technicalities.
3. Evidence illegally obtained should be admissible in court if such evidence is the only way of obtaining a conviction.
4. Search warrants should clearly specify the person or things to be seized.
5. No one should be convicted of a crime on the basis of circumstantial evidence, no matter how strong such evidence is.
6. There is no need in a criminal case for the accused to prove his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.
7. Any person who resists arrest commits a crime.
8. When determining a person's guilt or innocence, the existence of a prior arrest record should not be considered.
9. Wiretapping by anyone and for any reason should be completely illegal.
10. Defendants in a criminal case should be required to take the witness stand.
11. All too often, minority group members do not get fair trials.
12. Because of the oppression and persecution minority group members suffer, they deserve leniency and special treatment in the courts.
13. Citizens need to be protected against excess police power as well as against criminals.
14. It is better for society that several guilty men be freed than one innocent one wrongly imprisoned.
15. Accused persons should be required to take lie-detector tests.
16. When there is a "hung" jury in a criminal case, the defendant should always be freed and the indictment dismissed.
17. A society with true freedom and equality for all would have very little crime.
18. It is moral and ethical for a lawyer to represent a defendant in a criminal case even when he believes his client is guilty.
19. Police should be allowed to arrest and question suspicious looking persons to determine whether they have been up to something illegal.
20. The law coddles criminals to the detriment of society.
21. The freedom of society is endangered as much by overzealous law enforcement as by the acts of individual criminals.
22. In the long run, liberty is more important than order.
23. Upstanding citizens have nothing to fear from the police.
Appendix I: The Belief in a Just World scale (Dalbert, 1999).

Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements, from 1 – “Strongly Disagree” to 7 – “Strongly Agree”.

1. I think basically the world is a just place.
2. I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve.
3. I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice.
4. I am convinced that in the long run people will be compensated for injustices.
5. I believe firmly that injustices in all areas of life (e.g., professional, family, politic) are the exception rather than the rule.
6. I think people try to be fair when making important decisions.
Appendix J: Protestant Work Ethic scale (Katz & Hass, 1988)

Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements, from 1 – “Strongly Disagree” to 7 – “Strongly Agree”.

1. Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements.
2. Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time.
3. Money acquired easily is usually spent unwisely.
4. Most people who don't succeed in life are just plain lazy.
5. Anyone who is willing and able to work hard has a good chance of succeeding.
6. People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough.
7. Life would have very little meaning if we never had to suffer.
8. The person who can approach an unpleasant task with enthusiasm is the person who gets ahead.
9. If people work hard enough they are likely to make a good life for themselves.
10. I feel uneasy when there is little work for me to do.
11. A distaste for hard work usually reflects a weakness of character
Appendix K: The Social Dominance Orientation scale (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999)

Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements, from 1 – “Strongly Disagree” to 7 – “Strongly Agree”.

1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
9. It would be good if groups could be equal.*
10. Group equality should be our ideal.*
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.*
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.*
13. Increased social equality is beneficial to society.*
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.*
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.*
16. No group should dominate in society.*

Items marked with an (*) indicate reverse-scoring.
Appendix L: Demographic Information:

Please check the line that corresponds to your answer or write an answer where asked.

What is your sex?
___ Male
___ Female

What is your race/ethnicity?
_____ African American
_____ Asian/Pacific Islander
_____ Hispanic
_____ Native American
_____ White
_____ Other (please specify) __________________________________________

What is your age? __________

Do you have a political party affiliation? If so, please specify here: ________________

How liberal or conservative are you?

1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Very Liberal  Middle of the Road  Very Conservative

Are you currently a student?
_____ Yes
_____ No

[If participants answer “Yes,” they will be given the following questions].

People sometimes see themselves as belonging to a particular social class. Would you consider your parents as belonging to the:

_____ Lower class
_____ Working class
_____ Middle class
_____ Upper class

Please indicate your parents’ highest level of education:

_____ Did not finish high school
_____ High school diploma or GED
_____ Some college
Associate’s degree or other 2-year university degree
Bachelor’s degree or other 4-year university degree
Master’s degree
Professional degree (MD, Law, PhD)

Please indicate which bracket best describes your parents’ household income:

Less than $30,000 per year
Between $30,000 and $59,999 per year
Between $60,000 and $89,999 per year
Between $90,000 and $119,999 per year
More than $120,000 per year

[If participants answer “No,” they will be given the following questions].
People sometimes see themselves as belonging to a particular social class. Would you consider yourself as belonging to the:

Lower class
Working class
Middle class
Upper class

Please indicate your highest level of education:

Did not finish high school
High school diploma or GED
Some college
Associate’s degree or other 2-year university degree
Bachelor’s degree or other 4-year university degree
Master’s degree
Professional degree (MD, Law, PhD)

Please indicate which bracket best describes your household income:

Less than $30,000 per year
Between $30,000 and $59,999 per year
Between $60,000 and $89,999 per year
Between $90,000 and $119,999 per year
$120,000 or more per year
Appendix M: Manipulation checks

[Social Class manipulation check:]
1. How would you describe [the defendant (Study 1)/the victim (Study 2)]?
   a) A working class person
   b) A middle class person
   c) An upper class person

[Justification manipulation check:]
2. According to the witness, [the defendant (Study 1)/the victim (Study 2)]:
   a) Is polite toward the bar staff, but rude toward customers who bother him.
   b) Is polite toward the bar staff and toward customers.
   c) Is rude toward bar staff and customers both.

[Threat manipulation check:]
3. According to [the prosecution attorney, the defendant is: (Study 1)/the defense
   attorney, the victim: (Study 2)]
   a) Is dangerous because of his violent behavior
   b) Is a danger to the community because he takes more than his fair share of community
      resources
   c) Is a danger to the community because he undermines the values of the community
### Table XII. Hypothesis support by verdict certainty (Study 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H#</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Supported?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H01</td>
<td>Participants will report greater certainty of guilt when presented with a lower class defendant compared to an upper class defendant.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Partially supported (marginal effect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H02</td>
<td>Participants will report greater certainty of guilt when presented with a defendant described as cold and unfriendly compared to a defendant described as friendly and easygoing.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Partially supported (marginal effect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H03</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H02) will be stronger when the defendant is lower class, compared to when the defendant is upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Partially supported, effect only arose among lower class participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H04</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H02) will be stronger when the defendant is described as a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to when the defendant is not described as a threat.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H05</td>
<td>The interactive effect of justification and threat (H04) will only occur when the defendant is of lower class.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H06</td>
<td>Participants will be more certain of the defendant’s guilt when presented with defendants described as representing a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to defendants described as no threat. This effect will only occur when the defendant is a member of the participant’s outgroup.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Opposite effect, realistic threat (compared to no threat or symbolic threat) results in lower punitiveness toward lower class defendants by upper class participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H07</td>
<td>Higher participants’ RLAQ scores will be related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H08</td>
<td>Higher participants’ JWB scores will be related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H09</td>
<td>Higher participants’ PWE scores will be related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H10</td>
<td>Higher participants’ SDO scores will be related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H11</td>
<td>The effect of RLAQ (H03) will be stronger when the defendant is of lower class, compared to when the defendant is of upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H12</td>
<td>The effect of JWB (H04) will be stronger when the defendant is of lower class, compared to when the defendant is of upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H13</td>
<td>The effect of PWE (H05) will be stronger when the defendant is of lower class, compared to when the defendant is of upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported. PWE resulted in lower certainty on a guilty verdict against lower class defendants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H14</td>
<td>The effect of SDO (H06) will be stronger when the defendant is of lower class, compared to when the defendant is of upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table XIII. Hypothesis support by dichotomous verdict variable (Study 1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H#</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Supported?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H01</td>
<td>Participants will report greater certainty of guilt when presented with a lower class defendant compared to an upper class defendant.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H02</td>
<td>Participants will report greater certainty of guilt when presented with a defendant described as cold and unfriendly compared to a defendant described as friendly and easygoing.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H03</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H02) will be stronger when the defendant is lower class, compared to when the defendant is upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H04</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H02) will be stronger when the defendant is described as a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to when the defendant is not described as a threat.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H05</td>
<td>The interactive effect of justification and threat (H07) will only occur when the defendant is of lower class.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H06</td>
<td>Participants will be more likely to find guilty defendants described as representing a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to defendants described as no threat. This effect will only occur when the defendant is a member of the participant’s outgroup.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H07</td>
<td>Higher participants’ RLAQ scores will be related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H08</td>
<td>Higher participants’ JWB scores will be related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H09</td>
<td>Higher participants’ PWE scores will be related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H10</td>
<td>Higher participants’ SDO scores will be related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H11</td>
<td>The effect of RLAQ (H03) will be stronger when the defendant is of lower class, compared to when the defendant is of upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H12</td>
<td>The effect of JWB (H04) will be stronger when the defendant is of lower class, compared to when the defendant is of upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Partially supported, marginal effect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H13</td>
<td>The effect of PWE (H05) will be stronger when the defendant is of lower class, compared to when the defendant is of upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Partially supported, effect only arose among upper class participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H14</td>
<td>The effect of SDO (H06) will be stronger when the defendant is of lower class, compared to when the defendant is of upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table XIV. *Hypothesis support by defendant responsibility (Study 1)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H#</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Supported?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H01</td>
<td>Participants will perceive the defendant as more responsible for the incident when presented with a lower class defendant compared to an upper class defendant.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H02</td>
<td>Participants will perceive the defendant as more responsible for the incident when presented with a defendant described as cold and unfriendly compared to a defendant described as friendly and easygoing.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H03</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H02) will be stronger when the defendant is lower class, compared to when the defendant is upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H04</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H02) will be stronger when the defendant is described as a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to when the defendant is not described as a threat.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Partially supported (see H13).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H05</td>
<td>The interactive effect of justification and threat (H04) will only occur when the defendant is of lower class.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Opposite effect: upper class defendant seen as more responsible when described as cold and unfriendly (compared to friendly and easygoing) and a symbolic threat. Lower class defendants seen as more responsible when described as cold and unfriendly (compared to friendly and easygoing) and no threat or realistic threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H06</td>
<td>Participants will have perceive the defendant as more responsible for the incident when the defendant is described as representing a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to defendants described as no threat. This effect will only occur when the defendant is a member of the participant’s outgroup.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Opposite effect, realistic threat results in lower perceptions of responsibility toward lower class defendants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table XV. Hypothesis support by perception of defendant (Study 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H#</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Supported?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H01</td>
<td>Participants will perceive the defendant more negatively for the incident when presented with a lower class defendant compared to an upper class defendant.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Partial opposite effect, lower class participants perceived lower class defendant more positively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H02</td>
<td>Participants will perceive the defendant more negatively when presented with a defendant described as cold and unfriendly compared to a defendant described as friendly and easygoing.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H03</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H02) will be stronger when the defendant is lower class, compared to when the defendant is upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H04</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H02) will be stronger when the defendant is described as a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to when the defendant is not described as a threat.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H05</td>
<td>The interactive effect of justification and threat (H07) will only occur when the defendant is of lower class.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H06</td>
<td>Participants will have more negative perceptions of defendants described as representing a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to defendants described as no threat. This effect will only occur when the defendant is a member of the participant’s outgroup.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table XVI. Hypothesis support by verdict certainty (Study 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H#</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Supported?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H15</td>
<td>Participants will report lower certainty of guilt when presented with a defendant who harms a lower class victim, compared to defendants who harm an upper class victim.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Partial support, only arose among upper class participants presented with a lower class victim described as realistic threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H16</td>
<td>Participants will report lower certainty of guilt when presented with a victim described as cold and unfriendly compared to a victim described as friendly and easygoing.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H17</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H16) will be stronger when the victim is lower class, compared to when the victim is upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H18</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H16) will be stronger when the victim is described as a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to when the victim is not described as a threat.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Partial support: effect only arose among lower class participants presented with an upper class victim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H19</td>
<td>The interactive effect of justification and threat (H22) will only occur when the victim is of lower class.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Opposite effect: lower class participants were less punitive toward defendants who harmed upper class victims described as cold and unfriendly (compared to friendly and easygoing) and described as either realistic or symbolic threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H20</td>
<td>Participants will be less punitive toward defendants who harm victims described as representing a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to defendants who harm victims described as representing no threat. This effect will only occur if the victim is a member of the participant’s outgroup.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H21</td>
<td>Higher participants’ RLAQ scores will be related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H22</td>
<td>Higher participants’ JWB scores will be related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H23</td>
<td>Higher participants’ PWE scores will be related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H24</td>
<td>Higher participants’ SDO scores will be related to greater certainty on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H25</td>
<td>The effect of RLAQ (H03) will be stronger when the victim is of upper class, compared to when the victim is of lower class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H26</td>
<td>The effect of JWB (H04) will be stronger when the victim is of upper class, compared to when the victim is of lower class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H27</td>
<td>The effect of PWE (H05) will be stronger when the victim is of upper class, compared to when the victim is of lower class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H28</td>
<td>The effect of SDO (H06) will be stronger when the victim is of upper class, compared to when the victim is of lower class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table XVII. Hypothesis support by dichotomous verdict variable (Study 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H#</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Supported?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H15</td>
<td>Participants will report lower likelihood of guilt when presented with a defendant who harms a lower class victim, compared to defendants who harm an upper class victim.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H16</td>
<td>Participants will report lower likelihood of guilt when presented with a victim described as cold and unfriendly compared to a victim described as friendly and easygoing.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H17</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H16) will be stronger when the victim is lower class, compared to when the victim is upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H18</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H16) will be stronger when the victim is described as a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to when the victim is not described as a threat.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H19</td>
<td>The interactive effect of justification and threat (H22) will only occur when the victim is of upper class.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H20</td>
<td>Participants will be less punitive toward defendants who harm a victim who is a member of the participant’s outgroup, compared to defendants who harm a victim who is a member of the participant’s ingroup. This effect will only occur when the defendant is described as representing a symbolic or realistic threat.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H21</td>
<td>Higher participants’ RLAQ scores will be related to greater likelihood on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H22</td>
<td>Higher participants’ JWB scores will be related to greater likelihood on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H23</td>
<td>Higher participants’ PWE scores will be related to greater likelihood on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H24</td>
<td>Higher participants’ SDO scores will be related to greater likelihood on a guilty verdict.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H25</td>
<td>The effect of RLAQ (H17) will be stronger when the victim is of upper class, compared to when the victim is of lower class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H26</td>
<td>The effect of JWB (H18) will be stronger when the victim is of upper class, compared to when the victim is of lower class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H27</td>
<td>The effect of PWE (H19) will be stronger when the victim is of upper class, compared to when the victim is of lower class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H28</td>
<td>The effect of SDO (H20) will be stronger when the victim is of upper class, compared to when the victim is of lower class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table XVIII. *Hypothesis support by victim responsibility (Study 2)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H#</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Supported?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H15</td>
<td>Participants will perceive the victim as more responsible for the incident when presented with a lower class victim.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H16</td>
<td>Participants will perceive the victim as more responsible for the incident when presented with a victim described as cold and unfriendly compared to a victim described as friendly and easygoing.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H17</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H16) will be stronger when the victim is upper class, compared to when the victim is lower class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H18</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H16) will be stronger when the victim is described as a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to when the victim is not described as a threat.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H19</td>
<td>The interactive effect of justification and threat (H22) will only occur when the victim is of lower class.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H20</td>
<td>Participants will perceive the victim as more responsible for the incident when presented with a victim who is a member of an outgroup, compared to victims who are members of an ingroup. This effect will only occur when the victim is described as representing a symbolic or realistic threat.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Partial effect: lower class participants presented with an upper class victim was described as described friendly and easygoing perceived the defendant more negatively when the victim was described as no threat, compared to realistic threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H#</td>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Supported?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H15</td>
<td>Participants will perceive the defendant more positively when presented with a defendant who harms a lower class victim, compared to defendants who harm an upper class victim.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H16</td>
<td>Participants will perceive the defendant more positively when presented with a victim described as cold and unfriendly compared to a victim described as friendly and easygoing.</td>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>Supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H17</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H16) will be stronger when the victim is lower class, compared to when the victim is upper class.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Not supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H18</td>
<td>The effect of justification (H16) will be stronger when the victim is described as a symbolic or realistic threat, compared to when the victim is not described as a threat.</td>
<td>Two-way interaction</td>
<td>Partial effect, lower class participants viewed defendant more negatively when presented with friendly and easygoing upper class victim that was described as no threat or symbolic threat, and upper class participants viewed defendant more negatively when upper class victim was described as friendly and easygoing and no threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H19</td>
<td>The interactive effect of justification and threat (H07) will only occur when the victim is of lower class.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Opposite effect: participants perceived defendants more negatively when presented with upper class victims, rather than lower class victims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H20</td>
<td>Participants will perceive the defendant more negatively when the defendant harms a victim described as no threat, compared to victims described as representing a symbolic or realistic threat. This effect will only occur if the victim is a member of the participants’ outgroup.</td>
<td>Three-way interaction</td>
<td>Partially supported, among lower class participants presented with an upper class victim described friendly and easygoing and as a realistic threat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>