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Violence between Equals:
An Investigation on the Ontological Concept of Change

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Abstract

Concept of violence is usually presented in the field as a concept closely related to power (Sorel 1976, Harendt 1972, Betz 1977, Dewey 1980, Graver 1970, Morriss 1987, or Paul Wolff 1969 among others). Nonetheless, after examining the existing bibliography, there is no consensus over the concept itself and there is no clear definition of it, beyond some more recent contributions (Bufacchi 2005, 2007) relating the concept of violence to social justice, dignity and human rights. After contrasted the fact of a gap or lack in the field with regards to this politically, socially and philosophically important concept, it remains relevant the relation of violence with power. After researching over recent French thinkers (Derrida 1978, Foucault 1968, Levinas 1994, Deleuze 1983, Badiou 2001, Lacan 1956-1959), I can establish a logical and formal relation between violence and power that is able to tackle any ethical debate surrounding both concepts.

This approach elucidates the ethical problem, posing the political dimension as the one that can be solely evaluated ethically, and defining violence as a function of change. The conceptualization of violence at this respect leads to a determination within three degrees – absolute, hegemonic and universal- according to the level of change that operates. Notwithstanding, this stratification responds to quality considerations, making
it possible an analytical approach to the redefined concept of violence. It is concluded how violence, as a function of ontological change in the most condensed sense of the term, has aesthetical means that are more notorious and self-evident in revolutionary processes. In addition, this approach opens the politically relevant question of the ontological status of modern states, since violence is able to operate over and beyond them, altering at the same time the subjectivity (capacity to act) and their nature as the only monopoly of force within the commons or people.
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Eskerrik asko denoi bihotzez!

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Presentation of the Aims of the Thesis

This thesis establishes the boundaries of the concept of violence according to its historical, social and philosophical context. The aim of this research is to prove how violence is a function to measure any degree of change, at ontological and analytical levels. Nonetheless, change as such does not condition or delimit any appearing in the infinity of the worlds, but violence as a function that establishes the boundaries of change as such will provide with the theoretical tool to understand and measure any revolutionary process. These revolutionary processes are not limited to social or political range, the definition and research undertaken in this study helps to relocate the importance and relevance of any process of change in revolutionary grounds either in scientific or social grounds. Change as such, regardless the level that operates, fits with the identification of the indiscernible in the world, where the undecidable is forced to a scission process that proves it as decidable.

1st Hypothesis

Violence and power are related only in dialectical terms. Violence and power are not in a reversible relation and therefore hierarchy and order are applicable to their relationship. Also, establishing the idea of a function of change for violence, we will be
As I have described above, the concept of violence has been evolving since the beginning of the XV Century till actual reality. This evolution is relevant to show us some key features of the concept and also to understand the actual position of the term in the social, cultural and political reality. Concept of power has been directly related to violence from the very beginning. Empowerment, thus, is the first step I want to study in order to provide a complete definition of violence. In order to do this, it is crucial to establish how a subject is directed to this empowerment and the circumstances where any subject is provided with power, existence and critical thinking as a primal source of power. Power and empowerment have an important role to play in this scenario, since these are the actors that endure the idea of permanence against the idea of change. I present politics as the praxis that endures any permanence and attachment to the Law. This perspective condemns power and its exercise in active or passive manner to face any ethical evaluation, whereby violence as a function of change is absent in this process. This scope establishes a mutation in the classical manner of facing violence as ethically evaluable as such, forcing a perspective more related to an analytical vision of violence and a critical perception of power. We can understand this perspective as well as the confrontation between an analytical study of violence versus a critical vision of power. In other words, the analytical approach to violence can provide a more accurate description of the mechanism of the phenomenon itself, whilst a critical vision of power can establish the basis of its very nature. Both still maintain an antagonistic relation, a non-reversible
mechanism in their relationship, that forces us to think them different and within a dialectical frame. This gesture can be read, as we shall see, as a classic debate between Plato and Aristotle with regards to politics and the Idea.

Power is not an isolated phenomenon. It is always related to relational environments. In consequence, violence is the result also of relational realities. Relations and relationships are based on communicational terms, therefore, I have studied concept of violence in its communicational basis. However, this communication is not an agreement laguna, a calm and isolated practice where a community resolves its own structure via language. Communication is a tool for change as long as the tool itself mutates. Badiou remarks this idea that embodies the whole idea of change in a sole paragraph:

The Greeks did not invent the poem. Rather, they interrupted the poem with the matheme. In doing so, in the exercise of deduction, which is fidelity to being such as named by the void (cf. Meditation 24), the Greeks opened up the infinite possibility of an ontological text. (Badiou 2005, 126)

Here Badiou is describing both the Greeks attempt to master the relation between the matheme (logic) and poem (perception of the phenomenon), or in other words, the ontological construction; but also is describing how communication happens to be: as an interruption of the imaginary realm (in Lacanian terms) by the symbolic dimension, which is the only way to grasp –back- the imaginary, whilst the site for this to happen is the real. It is relevant to highlight how poetry is present in this game of languages, as the only phenomenon that does not “happen” within language and that is not directed to those
that “appear” in the society. In other words, poetry is the anti-language gesture that is
directed mainly to those that are excluded from society, the rabble or the amputated limb
of any society.

2nd Hypothesis

Violence responds to the mechanism of change at ontological, sociological and political
levels, whilst power embodies the perpetuation of permanence. Change it is perceived at
three levels or moments: absolute, hegemonic and universal violence. The logical for of
any trace of change appears in the formula \( \int(x) \neq x \); which can be develop to cover the
tree moments or degrees of change.

I will suggest that violence, therefore, has its expression and its presence in the site where
the subject develops itself. Violence is involved in the infinite process of being, an
ontological reality that comes together with the world itself and its dramatic dimension.
World, as such, has a dramatic lack of being that is completing its positive being. Lack, in
the manner of nothingness, completes Being, and incorporates to it void, erasing the idea
of finitude, thus, the nothingness contributes in an affirmative way. Again, the idea of
infinite is disclosed by the idea of truth in the world. Badiou gives us the definition of
truths as follows: “I give the name “truths” to real processes which, as subtracted as they
may be from the pragmatic opposition of bodies and languages, are nonetheless in the
world (…) truths not only are, they appear” (Badiou 2009a, 9). Among this feature,
violece also has an appearing in this world, a manifestation within any application of
power. We can say at this point that power emanates from violence. The very empowerment of the subject—both politically and socially—is an act of violence.

Against old mottos that condemn violence as anti-civilized attitude I claim that violence is a valid mechanism for social change and a real motif for social cohesion in a positive shape. The aim of this thesis is to show how the previous conceptualizations of violence have been mediated by a vague interest of defining it in an accurate way and also determined by a misleading understanding of concept of power. Power is been isolated as a mere political term before the works of these authors among others, limiting a real understanding of empowerment. Power as a gesture for subjectivity is a more accurate reading of the phenomenon as such, that will provide the correct basis to establish a relation of no-relation with violence. We can affirm that power and violence share the contradictory relationship of the dialectical mechanism par excellence. Following a more Hegelian path, we can affirm that violence places the idea of the Master, while power is embodies the idea of the slave. Turning a hierarchical mode of order between them we assure the germinal role for violence, the source of any novelty and change in a world, a sigh of infinite that comes into a finite world. This relationship must be understood within a frame of non-reversibility. There is not an exchange or roles in this case, power cannot create new set of possibilities and violence must stay away from any path of repetition, if we want violence to remain as a function of change.

Accordingly, there is a crucial shift in cultural studies that is directly related to the concept of empowerment and social change coming from the rhetorical theory developed
by Kenneth Burke, Edward Said or Fredric Jameson. A complete new scenario opens up after his contribution with regards to the general conception of the rhetorical schema and the shift from passivity to activation of the audience, that is to say, to the twofold activation regarding the consciousness of the audience of itself and the stage it is in front of, and the passage from the reification to consolidation into a multiple subject. We can mention Spivak as the corollary of these perspectives adopted in the field of cultural studies.

In consequence, in the last part of this study, I will summarize the conclusions in three levels. First, the relation of non-reversibility between violence and power relates to the dialectical nature of change and permanence. Therefore, the anchoring of a relation of non-reversibility between both establishes the conditions for an understanding of violence as a function of change, marking the boundaries with any ethical evaluation and the contradictory nature of the relation with power. This perspective makes a scission of the worlds. First, we can address a theatrical world based on permanence and power. Second, there is the universal world based on change and revolution. This antagonistic vision, present since the division between Plato and Aristotle, does not emanate from them but from the very nature of the no-relation between violence and power.

3rd Hypothesis

*Violence articulates the vision of the Platonic dialogue applied to the theatrical environment of our social life. This vision is opposed to the Aristotelian perspective*
where theatre responds to a created necessity to amuse the audience. Recovering the Platonic theatrical vision and understanding how change operates to reinvent dialogues and language itself, we find the idea of beauty and poetry.

Theatre embodies what Badiou names as the “envelope”, or the group of belonging relations displayed in our social order, but also at a logical level, in the core of the ontological dimension. We will be developing a different political system and social order, depending on the theatrical dimension we find ourselves trapped in. Defending an Aristotelian approach to theatrical reality, as an identification and total mimicry with displayed happenings, will lead to a system where oligarchies govern in the expenses of the middle class that is more likely to feel amused with the very tragedy they are living than operating any effective change. Establishing a dialectical theatrical mechanism we are able to discern over the “real” reality and the theatrical one, making possible a dialogue between them and invoking a distance between them as well; this distance is always beauty in the mode of repression or catharsis.

4th Hypothesis

The idea of equals embodies the segment of the people that have no reality, no self-existence, and in consequence belong fully to the generic. It is within the generic that any articulation of what is impossible or unthinkable becomes a pure matter of choice.

Hence, the capacity to decide over what is undecidable rests fully on equals.

Finally, we cannot remain obscure and ignorant on the question of the subject. If we are able to develop an idea on the function of change, we have to ask ourselves who is going
to operate this change and how. I will claim that equals, because of their position in society, are the only agencies that are able to trace truth processes, emancipate poetry from language and finally be the political bodies for any revolutionary moment. This phenomenon only appears in the world in the mode of declaration and not as a consequence of any programmatic articulation.

**Description of methodology**

Bibliographical analysis is the main methodology used in this study. In order to conduct an accurate investigation, I have chosen to examine the recent French Philosophy and the most notorious thinkers of twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. As the main remaining reference in philosophy, it is this line of thinking the one directly related to the Frankfurt and Birmingham School respectively, and the posterior evolution into existentialism and the Platonic contribution of Alain Badiou at several levels of thought (ontology, politics, ethics and aesthetics). With regards to ideological positions as well as philosophical trends, we can conclude that the recent French School has taken the baton of these previous schools since they have elaborated theories according to positions described by authors like Horkheimer, Adorno or Hall. Both the lines of philosophy developed in the Frankfurt School and the cultural studies analyzed in the Birmingham school are the seeds where later authors like Derrida, Foucault or Badiou find raw materials for thinking new lines of research.
The study of the existing bibliographical material has been conducted in comparative terms. Doing so, there is not a single line of research but a comparative frame that merges the historical, social, political and philosophical approaches to the phenomenon of violence, in order to create an adequate environment for the study. This will lead to open the possibility for a novelty perspective in the study of violence. The dialectical relation between violence and power will be determinant in this approach.

I have not chosen to develop any personal interview due to the difficulties to really find any author in disposition because of their age and reduced chance to have a close approach to any of them. Nonetheless, thanks to the vast amount of material written by these authors it has been relatively easy to find interviews and video recordings where some of these authors are interviewed with relevant questions for this research.

Many articles have been included also in this work and the main method to analyze all the material has been undertaken on qualitative basis instead of quantitative terms. The very nature of this research demands a blend of abilities in different fields of study such as sociology, philosophy, political sciences or psychoanalytical theory among others. This complexity of the work requires a qualitative approach since each topic (philosophical, sociological, etc.) involves a multiplicity of motifs (universalism, cultural realities, etc.) that are not approachable from any different scope.
This thesis is aimed to have also a practical side, multiple scenarios where to prove its practical potentiality. The application of the conclusions of this study can lead to a better understanding of violence and its creative possibilities in social terms. Accordingly, it can be exploited not as a mere negative phenomenon but as a resource for creative and divergent thinking. In pedagogical grounds, it can establish new paradigms for education where old paradigms related to very concrete and obsolete interest are clearly outdated.

These potential users are embodied in scenarios where political conflicts are deriving severe conditions for citizens, situations where population is affected, excluded or alienated or targets that are working in the field of resolution of conflicts. The dialectical perspective between violence and power unveils a complete new set of possibilities to conceptualize the raising of new states in the European Union, the revisiting of the idea of nations without state in the twenty-first century, the coexistence of states with multiple nations and the development of policies for nations to establish a political subject according to the demands and conditions of any given social reality.

And least but not less, this research is also directed to formulate a new and better definition of violence as such. However abundant the mentioning of this term is in philosophical and political literature, it is not less truth that the accuracy of the definition of the term lacks concreteness and rigor. Authors dealing with this concept tend to easily
to take for granted any given definition of it. A better and more accurate definition of the
term could help the development of thoughts surrounding this phenomenon, which is
quite extended in literature as well as in daily life. In conclusion, it is pertinent to
contribute with a definition that can articulate conclusions that are show fidelity to acts
and events of reality society endure.
Chapter I

An Historical Approach to the Concept of Violence

I) Introduction

Historically, the concept of violence has been studied fundamentally related to power, more precisely linked to the phenomenon of empowerment and process where power structures have been threatened or destroyed. With this respect, we can mention authors like Niccoló Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes or Tomas Moro. It is this universe of power and its management by political structures that engages with the concept of violence and introduces it to the debate of means and ends. It is within this frame of studying violence as a purely political process where some regimes or kings are replaced by revolutions and transformations of political systems where violence is firstly studied.

Therefore, I will approach the question of violence first in its historical reality and I will explain how different historical moments engage with the question of violence from
different angles, in order to understand the complexity and the development of the concept itself.

In consequence, I am going to provide some examples to understand the evolution of the concept of violence depending on the historical circumstances and according to the philosophical thinking of each époque. Therefore, I will mention the historical moment of the creation of city-states, and Machiavelli´s contributions for the utilitarian use of political violence, because it is in its political notion where the concept of violence is firstly theorized. The phenomenon of empowerment has been a crucial issue in this debate, and this link to the problem of public management of power and justice is maintained even in post-modern thinkers, as we shall see. But this introductory chapter is directed to show how the concept itself has a development from a diffuse starting point where almost it is not mentioned but it is generally applied, to a more recent situation where it is vastly mentioned but it is tended not to be applied, at least in an explicit way. It is the aim of this introduction also to show the fallacy that is masked in the actual social level when violence is condemned, without having any theoretical knowledge or solid definition of it. It is the lack of any dialectical perspective in the analytical moment of studying the relation between violence and power what is at stake here. Clarifying and giving a proper definition of violence will help to approach with a complete certitude and rigor conflicts that arise that demand an equal, fair and intellectual response.
II) The Historical Approach to Violence

We know from the historical transformation of the concept itself that violence has been directly related to power, more precisely, to the aftermath of any advantageous position obtained by the use of violence with respect to political positions represented mainly by states. Nevertheless, this explicit relation to applied politics is relatively new. We will not find any direct mention of violence as a forcing expression of politics in Plato or Aristotle, for example. Politics are exercised and violence is a prejudice or harm inflicted from society must be protected by the establishment of a state. The defense of a state is the defense of its population, the republic is the best tool for the subject of a society to develop all its potentiality, in Plato for instance. As Plato remarks “what has been said about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and although difficult not impossible, but only possible in the way which has been supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopher kings are born in a State” (Plato 2004, 369). For Aristotle peace is the ultimate goal and the sign of permanence of a state. Power is irruption and transformation for the former, whilst it is the display of continuity and quietness for the later. As Aristotle remarks “[v]irtue, when furnished with means, may be deemed to have the greatest power of doing violence” (Aristotle 1920, 35). Violence has been approached as a tool for the achievement of political conquests, the study of the enemy in wars, the modes of defeating and conquering other civilizations, in short, as a good tool that must be sharpened by intelligence from time to time.
The development of violence as a mere tool for a political conquest, derived into a meditation of violence as something that was going against the nature of human being itself. Once wars, conflicts and conquering of different civilizations were over, destruction and starvation were displayed as direct consequence of any violent conflict. People started to avoid any massacre related to war times and desired a good life under the protective umbrella of modern states. In consequence, historically approaches such as the humanist (Machiavelli 1532) and the utilitarian (John Stuart Mill, 1863) appear in order to regulate somehow the use of violence. As John Stuart Mill poses “Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can be proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to be good without proof.” (Mill 1863, 6). Mill is thinking about power in terms of a bridge that mediates the desires of the population and the ruling class. These approaches are a direct consequence of the modernity and the political structures that were derived from modern thought. Since Machiavelli violence was adopted as means for a maintenance of power within the elites represented by local landlords and royalty. There are many references to the use of violence with regards to empowerment of the ruler in “The Prince”. The figure of the ruler is surrounded by different tools, such as the army or clerical establishment, in order to enforce the pyramidal structure of the system itself. Machiavelli sets up the debate in terms of means and ends. There is a main goal in the life of any ruler which is to maintain the status and power that must be secured at any cost. Thus, the forthcoming ethical dimension is defined by utilitarian rebuttals. It is helpful for the maintenance of power to maintain order and continuity in the daily life of any state. In his work Machiavelli also gives the recommendation of making useful and diligent decisions with different nations
in order to maintain the continuity of market exchange and the flux of wealth between rulers. It is Machiavelli himself that mentioning the different rulers that were able to reign Rome declares his sympathy to Severus. This figure was able to combine the strong oppression to the people with a accommodate relationship with other power structures, such as the army of the Senate. In Machiavelli words “because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures (...) it is necessary for a prince to imitate” (Machiavelli 2004, 112). Severus is known for his capacity to combine this two ways of government and be successful, in other words, to become a referential ruler with regards to a personal empowerment as a ruler. Machiavelli continues saying that “he [Severus] will find him geared and respected by everybody, and not hated by the army (...) his supreme renown always protected him from that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his violence”(Machiavelli 2004, 113). Here Machiavelli is describing both, a powerful man that is respected and feared by those who are being protected by him, but also he is mentioning how fear and violence work together in order to keep the power of the prince. It is the defense of the structure of power what is at stake here. The effect and the symptom are combined in this short description of Severus´ role.

Violence has a direct effect in the population and also in the army as a repressive method of the ruler. The symptom shows how power itself is immanently asking for a violent expression in order to cover any weakness. Machiavelli´s approach indeed poses the idea of a utilitarian debate, but it only does on political terms. In other words, the utilitarian
perspective is shaped by political interests that overcome any attempt to define what is
good, better or acceptable for the population, making a partial and unresolved debate.

Machiavelli describes multiple methods to maintain the power of the prince, and the
manner the ruler has to manage an empire with the virtue of the balance, whatever this
balance stands for. The prince, the ruler, extremes the precautions in order to show even-
tempered, sordid and impassive. Machiavelli deploys many ways for the obtaining of this
precious balance, without revealing that in the end, it is this very tendency for the prince
to keep himself in the top of any power structure which describes the clearest expression
of violence. Ergo, Machiavelli is proposing that any successful prince will change,
modify or manipulate any structure or political situation in order to remain within an
empowered circle. Violence, this way, is described as a mere tool, but it becomes a clear
end when we are able to see the last intention and fate of any ruling prince. It is the art of
transforming everything in order to maintain everything still what is finally brought out
of this process. Renascence is an historical period where intellectuals start to mingle with
the power derived from discovering of the possibilities offered by scientific findings,
intellectual production and the effect of education into the population. However, one
question reminds untouched, which is the problem of the Political that is no resolved by
the utilitarian perspective, where one is forced to choose between the better and the worse

1 Author’s Note: I will use the term the Political to call the procedures of power structured and
representatives in the art of politics, the management of the will and the development of
prosperous societies; opposed to the term politics where the arithmetic game of majorities
reduces the practice and responsibility of the citizen to the minimal expression.
scenarios that remain unknown since they only exist in a probably or conditional world. Machiavelli is able to display for us how violence is understood as a mere tool for the maintenance of power, more precisely, for the perpetuation of the pyramidal structure of nation-states where the ruler is the head and the anthropomorphic image is used for a practical application of the idea of the body of state, diminishing any participatory existence of the population in the regulation of civil society. Therefore, we can observe how this line of thinking (utilitarian and humanist perspectives), lack of two factors that are crucial in order to achieve any equal and fair society. First, there is a clear lack of universality, since a vast part of the population is restricted in their participation on the existence of the political system. Second, this participation is reduced to a mere merchant procedure, where there is no intervention of the subject and thus the responsibilities with society itself are automatically vanished. This two restrictions are condensed in the idea of discourse, more precisely, in the discourse articulated by power structures, deviating and dialectical turn, and perpetuating the narrative of the rulers.

After Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes (Hobbes 1651) substitutes the figure of the ruler, as the head and physical entity, by the concept of Leviathan. Hobbes maintains the anthropomorphic approach to the idea of relational power and its structure. The idea of the body and the head is maintained, it is not subtracted from the design of the state, but highlighted and enhanced by the idea of monstrosity implied in the Leviathan itself. We can talk about an excess of this anthropomorphic conception of power. Doing so, Hobbes is somehow anticipating the figure of the transcendental in politics, developed later on by Immanuel Kant in his philosophical system. Hobbes possess the question of power
opposed to reason. Violence then becomes a rational tool in order to preserve reason itself from the barbarism of the non-citizen. This approach is slightly different from the one developed by Machiavelli, who obliterated the rational factor. Following the ideas of Hobbes, when conflict and reason are combined, the idea of justice crops out within the reality of a given society. As Hobbes points out, talking about the political subject, “[t]he Kingdom of God is gotten by violence, but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? Were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? And if it be not against Reason, it is not against Justice or else Justice is not to be approved for good” (Hobbes 1909, 111). There is a certain grade of anticipation to Kant´s thought here. Hobbes is describing the relationship of Reason with violence throughout the idea of justice. It is important to remark that justice here is an ideal justice, some kind of Platonic justice. Therefore, violence is not a phenomenon that comes from divinity; on the contrary, violence is the human process through Leviathan is implemented. Violence is not the cause of any problem but just another solution, in order to preserve the agreement with the state, which is the transcendental entity out of any mundane dispute that contributes with the rules and means for a better life. It is a combination between the Aristotelian idea of politics, where agreement is implemented to ensure a peaceful environment and, at the same time, the idea of the virtue of justice that interrupts any human process with the transcendental weight that carries itself. It is the measure of the transcendental that is implemented in this case. And it is important to recall that violence mainly happens against equals, it is a mutual violence what the state protects from. Hobbes calls this agreement “the law of nature”, which is linked with the state, that is directed to protect human beings from mutual annihilation. This kind of violence operates
within the social whole, instead of operating between different power structures, recalls
the idea of a representative majority of the population that is framed within the idea of the
public opinion. We must recall here the different visions of what it is to be in the public
sphere, ideas that come from the Classical Greek philosophy and that still remain as
unsolved or problematic (see Foucault 2005, Foucault 1996, Dewey 1927 or Habermas
1991). However, this study tries to avoid a Habermasian approach, and it remains closer
to a more Foucaultian vision of the public sphere. In the Leviathan we find the first
references for welfare state, where the citizen acquires the rights upon an engagement
with the modern state. Hobbes describes this Leviathan as the safest and desirable place
of any possible, where peace is imposed against the wild nature where freedom is
compared with chaotic savagery. Reason and justice are the means to obtain this political
system where citizen is empowered only through Leviathan itself, what eventually will
derive into the definition of concepts like superstructure in Marx or Foucault. Reason is
not incorporated to the discourse of power to achieve knowledge or wisdom, but it
articulates the discourse of power itself, generating the idea of structure over the
structure, namely, superstructure. Notwithstanding, we have to recognize how Foucault’s
approach to the concept of power is quiet correct, since the proposal to link power to
knowledge embodies the structural reality of the Aristotelian vision of philosophy, who
tries to link it to the objective knowledge and thus to the very nature of perpetual power.
This knowledge, yet, remains encyclopedic and not as a motif of transformation of human
life. Knowledge, to this respect, established the boundaries for power and for social
organization. It is a design for a society of perpetual permanence, in a continuous
enjoyment of achieved limits. The enjoyment of finitude, however, does not conceive any
impossibility, anything outer the established boundaries of this kind of knowledge, in short, there is a lack of any conceptualization of real change.

The concept of violence gets more complex as so as we reach the end of modernity with Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche takes philosophy from modernity to the post-modern era, he is the twilight of modernity itself, so to say. The concept of violence is also transformed after Nietzsche´s contribution to philosophy. Nietzsche´s work in philosophy engages with the social, with the human factor, and so it does the issue of violence. As he points out in “Beyond Good and Evil” (Nietzsche 2002), talking about free spirits, “the mistrustful constraint in the communicability of thought, the discipline that thinkers imposed on themselves, thinking within certain guidelines imposed by the church or court or Aristotelian presuppositions, the long, spiritual will to interpret every event according to a Christian scheme and to rediscover and justify the Christian God in every chance event, -all this violence, arbitrariness, harshness, terror, and anti-reason has shown itself to be the means through which strength, reckless curiosity, and subtle agility have been bred into European spirit” (Nietzsche 2002, 78). Nietzsche is trying to elucidate the position of the free spirit according to the world. Notwithstanding, free spirit is surrounded by some imposed ethical aspects that Nietzsche highlights, such as the Christianity´s moral corset and its religious positions that alienate free spirit itself. Therefore, violence is a political position against human freedom itself. This position is clearly opposed to the one we find in Hobbes, for instance, where violence is used to ensure this freedom itself. In Nietzsche´s approach, violence is the mechanism that alienates humanity to its core. Violence is political violence against the essence of
political substance, that is to say, the political body itself. Nietzsche´s perspective is not a mere war calculation of how many servants we are about to lose or win, as it was in Machiavelli´s proposal, it is now violence against violence which is embodied in the freedom as such. Therefore, Nietzsche places the idea of immoralism, in order to show us the silent and deep driving forces that operate under the social reality. As he says “this world as it concerns us, in which we need to love and be afraid, this almost invisible, inaudible world of subtle command, subtle obedience, a world of the “almost” in every respect, twisted, tricky, barbed, and loving: yes, it is well defended against clumsy spectators and friendly curiosity!” (Nietzsche 2002, 117). There is a complete obedience placed to the spectator-citizen where active voice is alienated by imposed deaf violence.

We can understand this idea of the necessity of placing each idea or substance within the frame of a world, and this is the motif for Nietzsche to describe this obscure world, almost invisible where driving forces operate. It is not anymore a mere political issue but also derives into the social arena, becoming a strong factor in the design of postmodern society. We have seen how violence was been conceived as a political aim in previous authors (Machiavelli or Hobbes) and now we face the idea of violence also engaged in the public debate of social whole in the case of Nietzsche. We can talk about a socialization of violence, in the strongest sense of the term. Nonetheless, terms like gender violence or inter-racial violence are good examples of this evolution of the concept itself that comes from this incorporation of violence into the social discourse. Nietzsche is able to place the debate of violence according to ethical principles that are indeed imposed by another kind of violence, namely, a more silent systematic violence coming from states. With this regards it is interesting to specify in a concrete model what
Nietzsche tries to explain to us. Joxe Azurmendi, in his work “Democrats and Violents”\textsuperscript{2} (Azurmendi, 1997), gives us some good keys to understand this kind of violence. As Azurmendi points out “Even more, in order to assure itself, the system, in the place of the critical gesture, enforces and accelerates faith, which eventually legitimizes the entire system (as in a theocracy) till it becomes faith, not reasoning.”\textsuperscript{3} (Azurmendi 1997, 36). The democratic tradition will establish a complete debate among the rights and liberties and also will declare itself as the persecutor of any attack against these rights and liberties, declaring a monopoly on violence in order to prevent any violation of these social achievements. Nietzsche is probably the first thinker that comes to violence from violence, in other words, he is placing the question of violence from the very phenomenon of violence that operates by fallacious ethical grounds, especially the ones coming from Christianity in this case. The actual post-modern debate on the multiple forms of violence is a derivation of Nietzsche’s contribution on this respect. More concretely, the debate of gender violence as a violence against a minority that is oppressed under general rule that advantages a male’s world is embodied in Nietzsche’s approach to violence, where this oppression comes in a silent manner based on traditionalist moral corsets.

Notwithstanding, violence as a social concept dives into the individual psyche after the Freudian moment in the XX Century. Freud, and Lacan after him, places violence into the

\textsuperscript{2} Original title “Demokratak eta Biolentoak”, author’s translation.

\textsuperscript{3} Author’s translation.
human being as a subject of sublime drives that produce phenomena such as creativity, aggressiveness or libidinal energy. Somehow, with these new features, violence takes back a control role – a political determination - with regards to a subject of any act in the social scenario, which is the political subject or the citizen. This is the return of the political characteristic of violence from the modernist authors into the postmodern subject, conquering the insights of the subject itself. We can explain some of the social revolutions and revolts of the XIX and XX Century with this transformation. There is a clear reference to the phenomenon of the other in the Nazi ideology, a purely negative ideology based on the negation of this other but at the same time, transforming this negation as the sole base for the Aryan identity. Lacan will describe this aggressiveness encapsulated in violence, with the concept of the other. This turning point of the theoretical development on the concept of violence contributes to the understanding of violence not as an external political issue where the subject faces the world and the power he is able to impose to the coming circumstances, but as an immanent drive that is silently commanding the facticity of the subject. In other words, it is a change within the perspective of a purely transcendental phenomenon into an immanent transcendence for a first time. This process of conceptualization of an immanent transcendence commences when the subject is illuminated by “the other”. Lacan defines clearly the period when the figure of the other is discover in his famous mirror stage of the infant. The discovery of the other both creates the problem of the identity for the infant – and what Freud called the Oedipus conflict- but this also establishes the empowerment of the subject to respect to the other, somehow, his political position with respect to “the other”. Therefore, we are facing here the determination of the identity and the empowerment of the subject with an
entity that bears from the subject itself in order to escape from his perception at the same
time, namely, an immanent phenomenon that defines identity. This is the onto-logical
problem and the political problem that is presented at the mirror stage. Lacan´s
theoretical proposal is directed to discover the relational world where the three paradigms
of human activity take place: the imaginary, the symbolic and the real. This relational
description of human activity is directly included in any communicative reality, therefore,
communication –not only in a Habermasian sense of the term communication- as a
failure and critic, specially well described in literary world, take the role of violence as an
agent for social revolution, not in a metonymic sense, but as a metaphoric process. In
other words, it is not a change of words and combinatory sequence of meanings, but a
complete meaning of the world that is readjusted to a linguistic signifier what is at stake
in a revolutionary moment. Late XX Century and the beginning of the XXI Century give
a definition of violence far from the one coming from Machiavelli´s or Hobbes as we can
observe. Violence, in recent philosophy, is an agent within the political subject that in its
multiplicity of action has a being (being-qua-being) but also an existence (an appearing in
the world). This totality of its dimension surpasses any statement of monopoly over it by
modern states, and classification into gender, race or political thought and any partial
application of it by explicit methods. In consequence, violence is now a communicative
agent for change, inter-meaningful change that operates in literary basis for social
change.

We will observe, however, that the issue of relational reality of violence and power is
maintained as something obscure in some recent studies on violence. Moreover, there is
an effort to revisit perspectives that are embodied in the core idea of Machiavelli, Hobbes or Nietzsche’s approaches, whilst the Lacanian scope is somehow obliterated because of a certain difficulties to conceptualize the subject as a collective entity, dissolved in the multiplicity of beings, coming from the psychoanalytical dimension. We will see how these more recent studies, lack of some novelty in their approach and the theoretical basis can be traced down to past contributions.

There is a characteristic feature involving the link between violence and power, as inseparable diode, condemned to reach an agreement, under the frame of a relation of relation. This is opposed to the dialectical nature of philosophy, where links and relations must be explored under the maxim of relations of no-relations. It is in philosophy, after and more concretely in Plato, where any dialogue is transformed into something unexpected and impossible, unthinkable, after the resolutive direction of any dialogue that is maintained by two adversary thinkers. This is the aim of Platonic dialogues that will lead to Hegelian dialectics. Communication is confronted as the discontinuity of change as such, in its dialectical form. Nonetheless, we will analyze first the actual perspectives that, as we shall prove, lack of this attempt of dialectic dialogue of change between violence and power.
Chapter II

The issue of Empowerment and Relational Violence

Violence has been related to the issue of empowerment because of the close connection with any inequality situation and its derivation into a violent conflict that shares with the notion of power. This sort of analysis arises whenever modern states and their situational reality is analyzed. At any social range, different levels of empowerment are taken as the source of a variety of intensity of social disturbance. Any inequality usually is described as a violation of human rights, gender violence or situations of unbiased opportunities for different social classes. This is clearly a continuation on the humanistic tradition, where -in an Aristotelian sense- the good live must be preserved from humans in their predator form. This good live is rooted in virtue and wisdom, a catalogue of happenings that disturb the human reality and make it miserable. Aristotle, as a major and first representative of this frame of thinking, establishes the keystones for the later conservative derive of the humanistic tradition, where human is the object of
study, displaced from its role of active participant of social live itself. The mutation of an active voice present in the dialogic nature of the Platonic voice is displaced in the theatrical version of Aristotelian perspective, as we shall see.

I will begin presenting the classic approach to the problem of violence and power, since it is in this manner that we will establish a correct context for the later transformation of the term that this study presents. I will disclose the differences between power and violence, violent and violence or social inequalities and legal or political systems. Then I will develop a more recent approach that is not related to any moral issue, since I consider that morality does not play a crucial role when we examine closely the mechanism of violence. Nonetheless, this point will be developed after the presentation of the traditional studies on the relation between power and violence. Finally, I will expose how violence is not studied into its core, into the rawness, where we can find that violence is a process of transformation. More concretely, I will defined violence as a function of change, and we have to understand this change as an ontological, social, political and aesthetic change. This function of change is only graspable in the dialectic idea of the very relational nature of both concepts.

i) Empowerment and Social Justice

Empowerment is the consequence of inflicting power into a subject. Empowerment is not a consequence of choice, but an enforced infliction of power capabilities in a subject, generally this subject is inscribed within a community. This is
the first and most intuitive definition one can get of empowerment. Nevertheless, I will show that it is not any exteriority or entity that gives a subject this power. Power is not a gift or a concession of gods, constitutions or community rules. Power goes beyond these agents and it is closer to an expression of the subjectivity than any other thing, as we shall see.

Power is usually related to the use of power over another subject or object, generally this is the idea of power, something that is floating in the air, between people and that determines their social strata. Therefore, there is an implicit reference of the other in the conceptualization of power. It is also imposition, in the very core of this perspective. Something that is inflicted, with no previous discussion or assimilation process, over a subject. The capacity to impose an opinion, behavior or attitude over another person can be considered as an expression of power then. It is a matter of abilities and capacities too. It is the management of the process of how one subject has an influence over another. Power is related to almost any human activity that engages any interpersonal dimension, or interaction with other objects. However, I will tend to maintain a closer attention to this interpersonal interactivity for a better understanding of the concept itself. It is when any exchange of information, activity or influential endorsement appears into the light that power is revealed. We can encounter daily situations that reveal power in our eyes. For instance, whenever we are ticketed, billed or penalized, there is a manifestation of authority through the realm of law but there is an interpersonal exchange of information that acts in an immediate way, where two subjects
declare their *power* to the other by physical language, speech and written forms. There is a mediation of “powers” that takes place, whenever power is displayed.

According to a more recent studies on power, such as the one provided by Peter Morriss (Morriss 1987), power is described as a blend between abilities, *ableness* or force. As Morriss points out “[a]bilities, it seems, become ableness for everybody only in utopia, when opportunities are available to all” (Morriss 1987, 83). However, there are slight differences that provoke deep effects depending on which lead we follow in this definition. Therefore, Morriss tends to a more relational definition of power instead of opting for a more analytic definition of it. Morriss tends to understand power as a combination of abilities and capacities that make the subject the core of any moral decision. Consequently, it is a definition in terms of language itself where Morriss puts his emphasis, namely, a language of power; but also in a certain practical or pragmatic nature of power. Power is defined by Morriss only by conditional or factual characteristics. As Morriss states “[s]o abilities are conditional dispositional properties that depend on the actor activating them: one of the necessary conditions for exercising an ability is that the actor must choose to do so” (Morriss 1987, 25). If one is *able to* do something, therefore, he or she has some power on doing something when he describes certain facticity. On the contrary, one can do something -has certain degree of power on doing something- only if he can do it within certain circumstances. It is always, for Morriss, a matter of implementing a graduate amount of changes into something or somebody. Thus, power is power in relation to a direct object, in linguistic terms, or applied onto somebody, in practical terms. *Ableness* is opposed to capacity in the lack of
any conditional feature in the former. One is able to speak English but one can speak English only if he knows English. However, it is not an isolated or completely transcendental phenomenon. Power is *in relation to*, or power is not. Power, in ontological basis, has a being in the world but it does not excess being itself, it does not appear in the world as a particular phenomenon. If we want to put it in Heideggerian terms, we can say that power is just another referential system in the *Daseinish* world to grasp its intelligibility. Again, power is related to subject’s capacity to implement any change in the world he habits, but only throughout relational basis. Power is power to relate each other. This may introduce a deep change regarding the concept of power elevated by Hobbes or Machiavelli in their main works, where power is conceptualized as a totality equal to divine realities, namely, a transcendental entity that has this characteristic anthropomorphic form. Leviathan is not a mundane and mortal entity, moreover, it is an entity beyond our world, the almighty of any political structure, so is to say, the divine realization of politics without any relational necessity to social reality. This presumes the separation between the politics and the social, as such, the split between the structure and the subject. It is this very social reality that is obliterated on the divine conceptualization of power in the form of Leviathan.

Notwithstanding, Morriss offers a more detailed description of each stage of power. There is certain power that manifest itself in an explicit way and another kind of power that does it in a potential way. For instance, there is a capacity (power) of water to dissolve sugar, as Morriss puts it, and this is the mode of potentiality that power discloses in this case. And there is also a more assertive mode of power that has explicit outcomes,
such as an irruption into a meeting by the boss of the company when nobody expects him, a disruption of a continuity or routine that is taken for granted. This second example describes a behavior of the powerful agent with all the potentiality (decision making accuracy, leadership, presence, etc.) within.

At this point, we can foresee how different structures are described in the discourse of Morriss, in order to place the idea of power in its relational dimension with society. This demands, indeed, a conceptualization of the structure where power rests. In order to clarify the idea of structure I want to introduce Foucault’s approach to the question. It is fully relevant how Michel Foucault highlights this relational feature of power itself. It is not an isolated mechanism of human being as such, power is related at least to power itself, in a reflexive manner but also it is displayed within a human -Daseinish- world. As Foucault points out “the term itself, power does no more than designate a [domain] of relations which are entirely still to be analyzed (…) that is to say, in which one conducts the conduct of men” (Foucault 1978-79, 186). This is approach designates both the necessity of a site – a world where one can expand the domain- and also a subject for the relational aspect of the definition given. Any consideration of power in these terms, infers a relevant place where power’s expressions are deployed, so is to say, power has a manifestation in earth; and also there is a more intimate side of power that validates any change that happens within the subject as such, changing not only one element but the totality of the subject each time this influence takes place. The designation of power, as a result of being somewhere (site) and in concordance -correspondence- with a direct
interaction between subjects, gives to this definition of power the range of totality, namely, power is a total phenomenon.

Hence, it is relevant to talk about a definition of power that is directly related to violence, due to this crucial feature of both phenomena, which tend to show interactivity and influence over subjectivity itself. Power is not an entity or a transcendental subject that domains humans as was shown by Machiavelli or Hobbes. From definitions given by Morriss or Foucault, we can think that power is the domination of humans by humans, and this effect happens in the world, where any ability and ableness share its space. There is a correspondence of logics that envelop the entire capacity to transform worlds, either it is by the transformation of the subjectivity or by the incorporation of new possibilities into the world. We know from Foucault that power operates at any range of modern life, however, this influence based on an structuralist point of view, needs a site where can be operated. Subjectivity itself cannot be assured on logical grounds without a site for it, thus, there is no knowledge that can be achieved by the subject without a world or site. It is world (site) the condition of possibility to any manifestation of power, since this manifestation must take place somewhere, a dimensional site, where to address the transformative capacity of power. If we accept this statement, we can decide now what comes first, violence or power, and is incorporated to the logic of this world. As Foucault points out “power can in no way be considered either as a principle in itself, or as having explanatory value which functions from the outset” (Foucault 1978-79, 186). It is because its relational feature that it cannot be considered as a principle itself, since a principle is an isolated and hierarchical entity with regards to any other concept, not necessarily
related to other “minor” concepts. Neither can it be considered as an explanatory function, since it is power that provokes a chain of predicates that were not until the manifestation of this power. If power is a relational entity it must be considered within the area of influence of any interpersonal activity or communicational level. We can conclude here that power is to act, as being is to act from an existentialist point of view, in the sense of exercising any potentiality enclosed in the individual. At this stage, we can say that power is an act of existing. It is throughout a structural reality that this power is expressed, in a social range, where outcomes and consequences generated by it can be evaluated ethically. Nonetheless, we observe how power manages already existing possibilities and does not provide any unexpected or unthinkable scenario where to think or act, it is more related at intuitive level for the repetition of patterns and structures that safeguard the main structural reality.

Power can be a good approach to understand the phenomenon of violence since it seems that is a derivation or similarity of an application of power what we face in a violent situation. However tempting this statement could be, power and violence are not the same thing. Similarities are extinguished when we dig deep into their relation. Power would be the compendium of our abilities and ableness, whilst violence is the use of these abilities and capacities in such a manner that we are in position to inflict harm or prejudice, according to classic literature, as we shall see. This is, at least, the general understanding of what I call practical violence or explicit violence. This is the violence that is clearly perceived when there is an assassination, a bloody murder, a physical attack, a rape or a
war situation. It is visual violence mostly, or a type of violence that can be clearly displayed and reported.

This distinction between power and empowerment is useful to address the facticity of power itself, with regards to the exercise of power. We can deduce that exercise of power is implicit in the structuralist point of view of Foucault, whilst empowerment is not satisfied until the agent that acquires power articulates its manifestation in the world. We can inscribe the debate of passivity and active enrollment within these premises. Notwithstanding, an approach concerning empowerment is inscribed always within the idea of social justice, since it is regarding other social actors that oneself is empowered. We are relocating the relational dimension of power with this turn. Empowerment operates at social range, whilst power operates at political level, and it is also related to the idea of social justice, which will help to explain how empowerment requires of a certain idea of struggle and action, while power can be easily inscribed into passivity. We will see also that to be political does not mean to be socially integrated, or to pursue any social goals, according to current political structure’s practices or classic catalogue of political forms. However, the acquisition of power via empowerment, has a mandatory condition of being socially achieve and not reduced to a private sphere.

Nonetheless, it is crucial to make a distinction between power and violence. Here we face the same difficulties we had in the moment of defining power alone, since we can assure that power is a dispositional concept and violence is clearly closer to a facticity, a capability to act over someone or something. Whilst power is a potentiality, a capacity to
operate, violence is closer to the expression of this act but both phenomena do not merge at the same level. As Vittorio Bufacchi points out “violence is not something we possess or not possess, it is not a capability we either have or not have, instead violence is something we do” (Bufacchi 2007, 16). Act is the locus of violence, something that was reserved solely to power in our previous definition. Here we can understand how empowerment, closely attached to the idea of action, is somehow related to the idea of violence. Empowerment is an act, a shift in someone’s capabilities; and it is the expression of being in the world, since we cannot identify empowerment as such prior to a manifestation of it, whilst power can stay in its potentiality without showing any sign of its presence. But empowerment also can show this side of potentiality in the mode of political or social achievements or status. Empowerment in this sense is more clearly defined as potentiality itself.

We can now understand the complexity and relativity of any definition given on power, empowerment and violence. The three terms have certain degree of coincidence but it is necessary to elucidate how every of the three phenomena operate. We have to realize that we must pay close attention mainly to the relations that link each of the term, in order to elucidate their real nature. According to Bufacchi’s view, it is crucial to think in moral terms in order to understand how violence is and operates in social range, however a mere idea of violence as a the violation of human rights, for instance, would not satisfy a correct definition of violence, since we could agree that there “is” violence in some cases that do not break any moral law, violate any human right or go against any law. As Bufacchi says “the bottom line is that all attempts to defend the idea of violence as a
violation of rights suffer from the same predicament, namely, that violence becomes so common, so widespread, so pervasive, to be virtually unavoidable” (Bufacchi 2007, 131). It is a common place that share with the concept of power, unavoidable as well as violence in terms of social reality. Any social structure or reality lays on any derivation or consequence of power in a theoretical way, or violence as imposition if we talk about these social structures. This pessimistic moment of Bufacchi’s attempt however must be inscribed within an affirmative development of the concept. Been so spread and “unavoidable” makes of violence a pure relational phenomenon.

When we rethink power at this stage, we have to figure out how any incorporation of power in social life, has an effect of disturbing the desire of change by the permanence of the Law. In doing so, we are rethinking again the relational nature of power with society or people. Subject’s authority with regards to his status, must be elucidated in order to make a clear distinction between power and violence. There must be a region where power is inoperative and violence is explicit. Or, in other words, a point where these two terms lack of any relation. Thus, we need to find the this region that has to be isolated to any idea of human rights, humanist tradition due to the intrinsic link with power that they represent. In order to tackle this difficulty Bufacchi locates the definition of violence with regards to integrity and exploitation. The derivation into economical and moral terms of concept of violence responds to the idea of justice not directly related to violence itself. On the contrary, as Bufacchi points out “it is not simply a question of exploitation being violence, but violence explaining the nature of exploitation” (Bufacchi 2007, 152). Thus, it is through the way violence operates in social range that we are able to explain
exploitation. We can observe how a mechanism of transference -a indirect referential point to social conditions in order to identify violence- what Bufacchi uses in his attempt to define violence. The economical disadvantages are the manifestation of empowerment by an elite, over others. These other actors are equally subjects of a society, namely, citizens; but they are under the influence of deprivation of their dignity, and thus, they are exploited as citizens. Bufacchi argues that there are two main ways of giving violence a presence in the social dimension. One is the economical dimension where one actor is “taking advantage of another person’s vulnerability for the sake of securing an economic gain or benefit” and there is another model that lays on humiliation that stands for “degrading or humiliating another person, as a way of differentiating from them, and therefore in the process identifying with power” (Bufacchi 2007, 157). The relational factor again comes to elucidate how violence is related to itself in the mode of violation of integrity and with other actors in the mode of exploitation towards others. However, Bufacchi fails to give a purely isolated definition of violence that does not refer to a third factor. In other words, we are forced to talk about the disadvantages and calamities of a certain part of the population, in order to talk about violence. According to Bufacchi, the discourse that validates these practices is the center of any violence, since it is through this idealism implied in the discourse that unequal subjects – that is to say, subjects that share differences, however banal they can be- are forced to live within the boundaries of these discourses. We assume here that this boundaries protect a finite region where violence and power coexist. However, the nature of violence seems to be a challenging one, even for the concept of finitude. Therefore, we should explore also any definition of violence that exceeds these boundaries, which are established by power.
I will like to remark some crucial features that the definitions of violence presented above pose, in order to rethink violence as a function of change. First of all the proximity between violence and power is better understood by the feature of empowerment. Empowerment is the process and the culmination of power as being and as manifestation. Empowerment is the reflection of the potentiality and its application, since it is the moment of awareness or consciousness of the subject with regards to his or her capacities, abilities and ableness to impose himself or herself. Empowerment is also the main feature of any social structure since it responds to the necessities and dependencies created by societal organization itself. It is right to say that economical sector empowers itself as long as the importance or dependency of this sector is increased within this given society. Empowerment, therefore, can be analyzed by contrast to social justice as the way of balancing these dependencies and necessities for whole society. Consequently, following Bufacchi´s approach, there is an eradication of unfair situations that may end up into exploitation.

Nonetheless, we have been able to point out how the different approaches to the phenomenon of violence disclose a few key features of it. With regards to the relation between violence and power, we can establish a link whenever power is defined as an ability to act. However, power can be articulated within a structure too. Power tends to obliterate itself from any manifestation, it is absent in the manifestation itself and acquires a pure presence just afterwards. It is the residuary trace of manifestation itself. Power is similar to an exoplanet, that we cannot really trace its existence but we can infer
they location by the influence they exercise in the surrounding stars. Badiou explains this phenomenon when he states that “[T]he operator of connection here [the case of the trajectory of certain planets] is pure calculation, combined with existing observations. It is certain that if this [exo] planet exists (...) then the statement ‘a supplementary planet exists’ will have been veridical in the universe constituted by the solar system supplemented by scientific astronomy” (Badiou 2005, 402). It is a game of absence and influence, somehow. Power can be traced as the determination of pure being that is not completely accessible by existence, appearing in the world, because it would enter in the realm of transformation and change, instead or permanence and continuity.

Therefore, we should examine how violence is adapted to these schemas where power intervenes. I will trace the idea of three different sorts of violence, according to the relations that they have to power structures that reflect eventually the reality of a social dimension. In consequence, we will find violence classified according to articulations of power directly linked to the idea of balance or peace. It is an idea separated in three stages, however, establishing peace as an ultimate and return point for the whole schema. This idea represents the transcendental entity that is a final goal, in the case of the humanist tradition. I will use the concept of peace, as the concept of real in Lacan, that unbearable dimension that escapes to human knowledge, but that still represents a major reference. It is the forbidden territory, where the Law has its maximal degree of existence that excesses itself, becoming unbearable for Law itself. According to this idea, there are three main levels of violence that are resolved in a principal communal psyche, that may developed from the contributions made by Jacques Lacan in this field. This attempt is
aimed to articulate the deficiencies that are displayed in the idea of violence that operates as a mere destructive mean in so called democratic societies.

**ii) Subjective, Objective and Systemic Violence**

Beyond any distinction between the damage and injury violence may cause at an interpersonal level, it is relevant to make a distinction between the nature of procedure of the violence that is applied or used. Slavoj Žižek is able to describe six ways where violence is displayed in different layers. The main hypothesis of our research is not compromised by completed, since our aim now is to discern a perspective of violence that lacks of the dialectical analysis. I consider correct to demand a distinction between violence and social justice and its relation as Bufacchi does, however, it is more relevant to study which structures or manners are beyond this revelation. In other words, displacing the idea of social justice, we are able to grasp that violence does not operate only in the “wrong” side, in the morally questionable side, but it also operates in the “right” side, or in the democratic side.

Žižek’s main contribution in this issue is to classify violence as objective, subjective and systematic. There is an accepted perception -literally a perception- that a punch, bomb or a rape, are explicit images of subjective violence. In this schema we can observe how there is a subject and a reified subject that becomes the aim of the fury, aggressiveness or rage of the agent of the action. There is plenty of material in mass media that supports this view: war footage, daily news on urban violence or movies that reflect what is called
violent content. However if we dive into the consequences or causes that end up in such an atrocity, we face the consequences of deeper truths. Zizâk addresses the question to the unbalanced or cynical approaches to the unfair or unjust situations all over the world. In the example we just mentioned of a raped person, there is an explicit impose of a sexual harassment against a given person. The question is, however, what comes first, namely, is it the rape a consequence or a cause itself? If we place this question, we will be able to unveil the perspective of social justice as one that lacks of a deeper scope, since violence in is not analyzed as a consequence, but as a cause. If we pay close attention to the situation we will realize that there is a first perception of the victim as an object, a source of immediate pleasure and it is this reification of the victim what provokes any severe outcome for the victim in its completeness. As Badiou points out “it is not politics that has turned back upon itself in utter barbarism, but that it is on the contrary the end of this or that political sequence that opens up the State to its rogue career. I am convinced that any conception of the human being in terms of victimhood is the ideology of an essential contempt” (Badiou 2012, 307). The order to the elements do change the outcome in this case, and this happens due to the special relation that power and violence are linked. We are already walking through a relational level, since it is this awareness of the victim throughout the self-image of herself which ends up conceding reification of the role in relation to the rapist, in this case. Even this subjective violence -which is “easy” to identify due to its explicitness- is full of roots into more symbolic or objective violence, and this makes the analytical effort more complicated and complex. And this concealing of deeper discourses rooted in daily-life routines is also a symptom of how unaware any subject or society is about violence itself, about this violence that is affecting and
conditioning the daily life itself. Initially, it is at a discursive level where one can face the becoming of this reification, since we observe this violence rooted in a certain discourse that is called public, or it comes from public institutions. The discursive reality in the account of a rape is stuffed of elements that are obliterated from it, but that are maintained in the procedure, yet. It is not an external or outer change that happens in this kind of alienation. Subject is not only separated from itself, it is the transformation into an object, less than a thing, or a thing without name, a proper name as Derrida would put it, that comes after any reification. The mechanism of change that we can analyze in the form of a rape, is only a symptom of something that is not a change but a perpetuation of a Law, a social condition, a role. We face the idea of objective violence described by Zizêk in the objectivizing process itself. In short, we could talk about the exercise of a power – in form of capability, legality as socially accepted role of a man over a woman, a political status or physical ability- over an entity that is changed -from a subjectivity into a pure objective- abruptly. In other words, in the case of subjective violence, it is an exercise of power what we face, that is dressed with a previously given transformation of the actors for the final goal of the scene, in theatrical terms. We can link this meditation with the idea of perpetuation of roles that are rooted in power structures that inhabit modern societies. It is the transformation embodied in reification what remains silent, and the display of the rape is broadcasted as change, when it reality it only perpetuates a social situation that affects the society as a whole.

It is the lure of a hegemony over any other subject that moves the Master, in this case, to overcome any other entity and force it to be an object. This way, there is a denial of its
existence and bestow of its being. There is not any manifestation of the reified subject in
the world but as an object; and as a pure object, it becomes the main aim for its libidinal
desire. This all happens in the realm of language and it is due to the messages demanded
and accepted by both that a rape has its manifestation as an explicit violence. Although,
as I have explained above, there is a prior process that envelops the final outcome that
rests on language as mediating hegemony in between two agents that play the role of
“other” among themselves. However, we have to remember that violence is not a
structured communicational procedure, as we shall see, but the mechanism that allows a
relational possibility with the impossibility itself, namely, a relation of no-relation.

We will see how this subjective violence is full of reminiscences of objective and
systematic violence, that this approach is unable to solve. At a sociological level, the
reification of the subject, the transformation of individuals into objects, perfectly fits with
the narcissistic derive of bourgeois society. Traditionally, the elites confer themselves as
the only mankind creatures with direct link to goddess entities. The exclusion of the rest
of the population to this respect works in twofold ways. It is indeed an exclusion of an
important and more numerous group of people what happens, but it is also the
degradation of this people into a sub-human classification that precedes the practical
exclusion of them. Therefore, there is a split and also a degradation. The theoretical
assertion of this sub-human category is assumed on objective basis. Thus, we are now in
the realm of objective violence. Racism or slavery are good examples of these situations.
This objective violence however does not exclude language of the equation, as Žižek
points out “there is thus a direct link between the ontological violence and the texture of
social violence (sustaining relation of enforced domination) that pertains to language” (Žižek 2008-2009, 71). Accordingly Žižek cites Simone Beauvoir in order to pose the friction between the assumed explicit violence and the deaf deep objective violence regarding racism. Žižek recalls the words of Beauvoir in her America Day by Day (1948) as follows: “many racists, ignoring the rigors of science, insist on declaring that even if the psychological reasons haven’t been established, the fact is that blacks are inferior. You only have to travel through America to be convinced of it” (Žižek 2008-2009, 71). It is in the root of modern thought to assume certain degree of violence in a deaf and invisible mode, in order to focus all the attention into a more explicit subjective mode. This is the precarious approach to violence in the first decades of modern states, as we have seen in Machiavelli or Hobbes. Nonetheless, Beauvoir’s words are certainly truth, it is a fact that blacks were inferior in their slavery situation. It is truth that they were inferior in the social reality since there was no place for them in public transportation, public services or Government benefits, namely, there were out of any public sphere, literally. The role of the slave is not only to “work for free”, there is also an alienation – a dispossession of basic status of citizen with all the consequences that this carries - that makes the individual fall deep down the social scale. In the Hegelian tradition this group of excluded people has a crucial importance, as Frank Ruda has shown recently (Ruda 2011), with the concept of rabble, exported to Marxism as proletariat. It is completely relevant as well to have a social range or scale where individuals fit - a classification or stratification of individuals- depending on their own empowerment or the power given to them thanks to external titles, positions, wealth and so on. This is the bourgeois perspective as such. But the key point here comes down to the fact that the very relational
discourse is able to change also the existence of citizens, change their status or even dispossess them of any condition of citizens, as such.

Here we are describing a scenario that is usually posed as the ideal one of a silent objective violence. This oppression on an alienated part of the population is presented as a devastating harm against this stratified group of people. However, if we change our perspective, we can deduce that it is a structural power that is oppressing this people, African-Americans in this case, according to encyclopedic knowledge - fallacies based on pseudo-scientific facts- that actually are real, since they have real consequences (black people are inferior, are physically stronger and more ignorant, etc.). Therefore, we can think about the exercise of power as a manner to perpetuate a system what we are observing in the alienation and exploitation of black people during the slavery. If we want to think about violence, we can think about the change on the discourse because the acquisition of a new idea, namely, the idea of being equals to the white man. We can recall a woman that by simply sitting in the front seats of a bus changes the language in the public sphere, and the language to address to this very public sphere. I am talking about Rosa Parks, of course. This simple and tiny idea changes completely the scenario and vanishes any possibility for slavery to be effective in the world. By the abolition of the slavery one does not change the nature of the exploitation and alienation itself, it must be implemented at a universal range the idea of equality in this idea. But the discursive level not only attains to one of the parts, whenever we want to introduce a dialectical procedure we have to attach both antagonistic terms in order to articulate a synthetic outcome. Therefore, and as we can see in our current society, the elimination of the figure
of the slave becomes a vain fatality, if we do not try to get rid of the figure of the Master as well, arising the idea of the equals. Equals, indeed, not only implies the null viability of any slave figure, but also and at the same time, the figure of the master. Violence as a function of change here will be represented by the thinking of the impossible, of the unthinkable, that is to say, the idea of being equal to the white man. It is, as we shall see in Chapter IV, the thinking of the generic what is at stake.

In consequence, we are dealing here with a phenomenon that is able to introduce changes not only in the being, the more explicit mode of violence, of others; but it is also to modify or manipulate the existence of subjects. Racism and slavery are close in their effects due to this capacity of violence of changing the existence of black people in this case. As Žižek points out “[w]hen they are treated by whites as inferior, this does indeed make them inferior at the level of their socio-symbolic identity (...) the white racist ideology exerts performative efficiency” (Žižek 2008-2009, 72). There is a capacity in language to mold the world, the symbolic universe of the subject affects with all its effects the world where he expands his existence. The performative capacity of language is inherently to a primal violence. There is no room for a persuasive or alluring soft language. Žižek is right to quote Heidegger on this respect, since it is Heidegger too that arrange any violence to any given potentiality to change in the Dasein world. As Heidegger points out “violence is usually seen in terms of the domain in which concurring compromise and mutual assistance set the standard for Dasein” (Heidegger 1889-1976, 160). This is the more explicit subjective violence cited by Žižek as well. Heidegger attaches to the relational aspect of violence, therefore, violence is not an
isolated or isolating force that alienates by splitting any relational link erasing it. It is
communicating mainly in a negative way, if we follow the more evident or explicit mode
of it. This communication nonetheless refers to the idea of the relation of no-relation in
this case. Heidegger is able to discover this capacity of violence to create, in this case,
new limits. These limits are broken in order to achieve or glance deeper utopian situations
and scenarios. As Heidegger says “The one who is violence-doing, the creative one, who
sets out into the un-said, who breaks into the un-thought, who compels what has never
happened and makes appear what is unseen, this violence-doing one stands at all times in
daring” (Heidegger 1889-1976, 172). It is the unveiling of these new scenarios that make
the violence-doing a creative due to this capacity of saying what is un-said, beckoning the
language again, who makes an interruption in the language itself to add, throughout
creation, a new say. It is the return to the imaginary level, in Lacanian terms, since it is in
the realm of victory and defeat where we are moving again with this displacement
mediated by violence, as Heidegger points out “every violent taming of the violent is
either victory or defeat” (Heidegger 1889-1976, 172). Hence, Heidegger is also
describing the imaginary dimension of violence in this stage. It is a win-or-lose situation
at this level of explicit violence. Violence in this short description is embodied in the act
of deciding. “Victory or defeat” is a determination achieved through decision, there is no
place for the pure determination of neutrality. In other words, as happens in any decision-
making process, it is within the realm of chance that this violence operates. It is violence
within an imaginary (phantasmic) level. What Žižek remarks is also the symbolic
(discursive) violence that is located in the objective level that we are not able to capture.
The real truth is the one that we are able to grasp but we act “as if” it did not exist. The
traumatic event is always something that we deny but in the same way it is the very reason of the manifestation of our symptoms. In the same way, this objective violence framed into the discursive level is the source of our symptomatic behavior as society. In the same manner as Žižek, Badiou remarks too that the actual tendency of labeling our era as a non-ideological time, is indeed the manifestation of the symptom of the very ideological circumstance, the core of any ideology. Any lack of a symptom it is a symptom itself, since the lack – the void, the zero point or the absence- is also (always already) the main source of the most obscure and hidden symptoms. This lack of a symptom, that is usually accompanied with a lack of any proper explanation of the traumatic happening, is the point where the repressed returns hopelessly. Žižek explains how the meaningless riots that exploited all over the marginal neighborhoods of Paris where not directed to richer and more powerful social strata. They were directed to the very material means these individuals have to feel “integrated” or “tolerated” –depending on the multicultural or cosmopolitanism scope- within the French society. The fires were provoked against the schools, social centers and the very cars working people used to drive to their precarious jobs. They were protesting within a hermeneutic frame without no content, or we can talk about an excess of content that takes the form of the frame itself. In other words, the only reason for looting is the acquisition of the property right over the material items that are spread all over the neighborhoods. People in these suburbs of Paris had been educated to accommodate themselves into a society of consumption where all poetry is vanished. Poetry, as we shall see, is encapsulated in the generic class of society, namely, the poor or the rabble. Any challenge over the dimension of property is a direct challenge to democracy, according the neoliberal schema.
Following Žižek’s thinking, people in Paris were protesting because there is an explicit lack of materiality in their lives. It is an act of stealing and consuming at the same time, there is a consumption of the right of property itself. However, this consumption of the property right is exhausted very quickly, and vanishes provoking a high degree of frustration. There are more protests in the streets again with a clear lack of poetry again, a line of thinking that would articulate a different discourse on the relation of no-relation. In other words, the riots in Paris demonstrate how challenging the law (stealing and looting) can lead to a scenario where nothing has changed really, and the old laws and costumes are enforced (more security measures, control policies, etc.). After the protests and riots the law was slightly the same, but the idea of a society of consumption was not altered, but enforced. And this is exactly the major claim of every observer actor (media, politicians, other European citizens and analysts) with regards to these riots: there was no clear reason, in the mode of poetic discourse, which could be the basis for these riots.

There is an old story telling the canny feat of a mining worker, that Žižek suggests in one of his works (Žižek 2009) that may help to understand these kind of situations. The story tells how security guards knew that he was stealing something from the factory but no matter how many times they inspected him they did find nothing and the worker used to come out of the pit with an empty wheelbarrow every day. Of course, the moral is that what he was really stealing were the wheelbarrows. As Žižek points out “[a]nalysts who were searching the wheelbarrows for their content and the riots for their hidden meaning were missing the obvious. As Marshall McLuhan would have put it, here the medium itself was the message” (Žižek 2008, 78). What fails in Žižek analysis is that he misses
the point of the consumption itself as the main reason for these riots, even being the medium of the protests, no change was articulated after that. It was a reinforcement and reaffirmation of the system itself, a system that pursues the biggest and most profitable outcomes from a massive and uncontrolled consumption of material -and now immaterial too- goods. These happenings make us think about a small involution in the aim-nature of any protest in the public sphere, or a transformation-denial of the public sphere as such, to become a mere commodity. It is not the first time, however, that a traditional display of revolutionary elements serve to dress a fully manifested involution.

In conclusion, this is the contra-objective violence that has no meaning but it has all the manifestation. There is a complete display of rude and severe fires, riots, fights or looting. There is a physical violation of integrity and dignity and there is also a direct outrage against the pillar of current democratic materialism: the assault to private property in the mode of looting, burning and brutal consuming. However, this emptiness, with regards to its meaning, forces the perspective and moves the location of it to another theoretical frame. Old manners (the culpability in terms of racist, economic disadvantage, class structure or criminality theories) do not explain this kind of event. It is the very situation of this population living in the suburbs of Paris that produces this kind of meaningless violence. As Žižek says “Alain Badiou has reflected that we live in a social space which is progressively experienced as ´worldless´. In such a space, the only form protest can take is ´meaningless´ violence” (Žižek 2008, 79). There is a lack of materiality in form of a site (world), which is filled with an excess of materiality in the form of content: commodities. Nonetheless, this experiment does not have any poetic
moment, namely, a discourse where the idea is able to grasp the truth, trace it and know its consequences. As Badiou remarks “[t]he object, reduced to silence, does not enter the poem, even though its evocation grounds the poetic consistency. It is the absent cause. But the effect of its lack lies in affecting each written term, forced to be ‘allusive’, ‘never direct’, in such a way so as to become equal on the Whole to the silence by which the object was only initially affected” (Badiou 2009b, 72). This is a failure of an authentic event, there is a lack of a discourse that is able to intermingle with the subjectivity and the event itself. Subject stands at the intersection between knowledge and truth, between the law and the exception. Saint Paul, for Badiou, is at the intersection of following Peter’s path or revisiting the truthful idea of faith. Paul encounters this intersection in the no-place of the desert. The desert is the place of the indifference of any difference, the equality of the generic. It is necessary for truth to find this encounter in a place that makes possible the generic. Void in the mode of generic encounters the singularity of the truth, in this manner. There is no distance between the event and the void. This positioning provokes a lack of a site, a worldless scenario, which makes impossible the articulation of any logical discourse. The only alternative to this lack of discourse is a pure act, a rioting and looting over the materiality that is left after the fallacy of the world they are living, as excluded portion of population. This is a theatrical figure deeply explained by Aristotle, where the rioters identify themselves with the theatrical reality they are immersed in: commercials, publicity, weak democracy, giant economic powers, etc. Whenever we face the actual political dimension and the actual politicians, it is easy to trace the idea of witnessing a theatrical play, where the actors play in front of an audience that eventually is ruling the reality (knowledge and interpretation are left to the
audience and it is the audience who will judge and interpret the artwork as a drama, comedy or tragedy). However, opposed to the Aristotelian idea of theatre, there is always the dialogical idea of the theatre present in Plato, who is seeking a truthful dialectical and violent emancipation of the happenings represented.

We have to analyze this capacity to establish a communicative bridge with a discourse within the idea of a critical discourse that is able to alter any given reality. In other words, this communicative capacity with regards to any critical gesture, must be understood within the theoretical frame of the dialectical method. When we pose the dialectical method, we will subsume ourselves in the symbolical level of language. It is however this symbolic level which interrupts the imaginary level, in Lacanian terms, and brings a logical-structure for violence to expand. What we need to do is to question the use of the term violence for what are mere exercises (crystallization) of power (capabilities to act), because no effective change is implemented neither in the logic, nor in the materiality of the world. There is no incorporation of a new law and not new elements are added to this world, in fact, for the protesters of Paris in this case, it is a lack (worldless) what provokes the riots. And we find in lack, more precisely in the lack of lack, the dialectical gesture. Badiou is clearly right when he affirms that “[t]he lack of lack, which results from the annulment, is not twice the lack, according to the previously established law. It needs more, as witnessed in the grammar: an unknown lead, impossible to track according to the initial splacement, opens up to the poetic effect” (Badiou 2009b, 88). In the case of the riots that happened in Paris in 2005 there is a logical chain that support this riots that go against the imaginary discourse of the French citizen and the universe
that covers this very image. The imaginary discourse of the French citizen includes the idea of being a citizen within a culture that is able to admit the otherness in any form, and supported with a total materiality of consumption as a “normal” European citizen. Throughout this naïve admission of the other culture, the Other is still in command. Even the norm -do not steal- manifests in the world because someone breaks it, the Law -the democratic French system- is maintained and perpetuated. Therefore, there is not a real admission of change, but a very measured tolerance of the coming-from-abroad culture, in cultural terms; that is to say, the Law is not flexible and maintains that to be a regular French citizen, in other words, the first condition to be a French citizen is to be a French citizen. Repetition is a crucial feature of power. Through repetition the perpetuation of the power-structure is maintained. Repetition, as such, will serve us to explain how the politics -the exercise of power- is demanding a change as well in its interpretation, narrowly focused in the repetition of the structure, and in a certain lack of reproduction -reconstruction of the site- of the Political in current nation-states, that is, rethinking the idea of state and its ontological status.

If we conceive this idea of the Law, we are ready to pose the concept of hegemonic violence for a first time, to explain the mechanisms that operate at a logical level, that support the idea of the Law. What is at stake here is the figure of Master. It is hegemony on power what any Master holds for himself. It is this discourse strength over any other discourse what Master possess. Gramsci is able to give a very accurate approach to this concept with regards to social structures and political power. It is not a matter of monopoly or majorities. It is, indeed, a total appropriation of power and its derivation
what sustains the concept of hegemony in Gramsci. It is commonly mistaken with concepts like monopoly and majority, where hegemony loses its strength. Hegemony is directly related to any approach to a constructivist idea of language that mediates completely any human manifestation. We can affirm that language is hegemonic at this level. However, the strength of any hegemonic approach deals with Law, beyond the concept of language. There is a Law that discriminates, that separates the pure from the impure. For Gramsci the concept of catharsis stands for “(…) the passage from the purely economic (or egoistic-passional) to the ethico-political moment, that is superior elaboration of the structure into superstructure in the minds of men. This also means the passage from ´objective to subjective´ and from ´necessity to freedom´” (Gramsci 1971-1992, 366-367). There is a purgation in the Law that governs the economic and social life, in order to make it more equal and fair. It is the super-structure (the frame) that has a hegemonic control over the structure (the social reality). Law must operate over a world, and a world is always already ruled by a sequence of laws. There is no distance between these two realities. However, law can be changed and challenged, emancipating an excluded group and make it appear into the world. We have to recall that it is a condition of the excluded to be excluded precisely from what Law dictates: paperless immigrants in Europe, homeless people with no health care in the United States, or an entire country under a block in the case of Cuba, for instance. Gramsci explains it in a very accurate manner when he says that “from the moment in which a subaltern group becomes really autonomous and hegemonic, thus bringing into being a new form of State, we experience the concrete birth of a need to construct, a new intellectual and moral order” (Gramsci 1971-1992, 388). This shift can be considered as a hegemonic change, an alteration in the
rule itself that regulates the existence of the subjects in a given society. It is something similar to take command over freedom any individual has, however, this freedom is operating at a collective level when we alter the Law itself. This freedom recalls the Sartrean concept on radical freedom and the capacity of any subject to create his own possibilities instead of giving a more or less elaborated opinion over any given taken choice. If we want to put it in Lacanian terms, it is the symbolic order, which represents the hegemonic logic of the human world. It is only throughout language that any subject is able to express his or her existence in the world, we all trapped under the symbolic order somehow, and this is the constructivist vision at least. Language is what frames our experience. But it is the frame what gives real access to somewhere else. This site, the unknown somewhere else is the Lacanian real. Language, the symbolic dimension, gives access to the real only experiencing the imaginary. The combination of language´s signifiers will lead to a group of laws that regulate and filter reality and language itself in a reflexive manner. However, this combinations of different meanings and forms are stuck at a metonymic level, since there is no any incorporation of an irrupting meaning that will defy the Law of language itself.

Language, with its constructivist vision, aims a balance of procedures in order to have a peaceful (harmonized) vision of the world, where any breaking moment is made bearable with the adaptation of the meanings and linguistic forms to it. Language, somehow, is demanding permanence and continuity. As Derrida already pointed out, writing carries death because of this insistence on permanence, of becoming finite. This enclosed finitude is agreement as such, where all the pieces of different sources fit. The adaptation
continues if we observe cultural policies of integration, for instance, that were clearly a failure when they were applied in France in the 90’s, which eventually lead to these riots “without meaning”, with no point where any agreement or disagreement with them was possible. It was somehow a clear challenge to any Habermasian idea of total agreement by language. Habermas is wrong when he envelops language as a tool to have a successful and peaceful communication between subjects. The riots of Paris are a good example of this failure in the presentation of the arguments that I will try to elucidate. Against any Habermasian concept of communication and agreement as successful way of developing a valid citizenship what these riots showed is that an empty message is possible and even more, it is necessary when one faces a “wordless” scenario.

iii) The concept of Violence as Communication: A critique to Habermas’

Communicative Action Theory

I would like to pay closer attention to Habermas’ work with regards to communicative action at this point, in order to shed some light on the relational level of violence, more concretely in this side of violence that has a dialectical nature, which embodies the idea of a relation with no-relation.

According to Habermas “social actions are coordinated through reaching understanding, the formal conditions of rationally motivated agreement specify how participants´ relations to one another can be rationalized” (Habermas 1984, 339). This means that there is a rationalization, namely, a symbolization among subjects that pursue agreement as a
mode of understanding. Knowledge is acquired in an encyclopedic manner at this level, so it is an understanding of knowledge of pure facts, veritable happenings that can be corroborate. However, Habermas himself distinguishes between agreement and understanding later in the text saying that “(...) a lifeworld can be regarded as rationalized to the extent that it permits interactions that are not guided by normatively ascribed agreement but- directly or indirectly- by communicatively achieved understanding” (Habermas 1984, 340). The problem here is of course the concept described as “communicatively achieved understanding”. In fact, Habermas addresses the issue of the understanding, with or without agreement, as an agreement. The mere rationalization of communication describes a meta-language that does not exist. It is language, as such, what is at stake here. The definition of language can be conceived as a mean, or as a level of human experience. Is it indeed a Habermasian approach or Lacanian one, what describes better this problem? Is Habermas´ point concerning language as an structure that devotes all its functions to agreement among subjects, or is Lacan who is closer to a better understanding of language as repressing symbolic empowerment of any subject, following Heidegger´s famous statement “language is the house of being”? For Habermas any failure in agreement it is a failure in communication because this kind of situation develops a misunderstanding and misleading of reality as such. Here we face the nature of any dialectical schema. For Habermas it is a matter of opposing words and their meanings in order to show a failure in communication, therefore he needs a solid base of agreement (understanding between different opinions) in order to make
communication to appear as something “humanly” successful. Opposing words and meanings one only can encounter the counterparts. It is a game of contrasts. However, we need a deeper exercise in order to have access to something new, something that Habermas wants to give the novelty of agreement without accepting the interruption that bears any real novelty, any discovering of common positions even in the Habermasian sense of agreement. In short, Peter Sloterdijk is right in his affirmation that “more communication means at first above all more conflict” (Sloterdijk 2006, 84). Opposition is only the first half of any dialectical exercise. It is a matter of reaching the dialectical turn, which supposes more than overlapping opposing words or meanings. And here we face also the misleading concept of conflict and in consequence of violence too, in the case of Habermas. For Habermas “agreement can indeed be objectively obtained by force; but what comes to pass manifestly through outside influence or the use of violence cannot count subjectively as agreement. Agreement rests on common convictions” (Habermas 1984, 287). What Habermas states here is the need of a superstructure or “objective force” that allows an agreement, namely, a law. This is the very description of a modern state indeed. This legitimation of the State via the symbolic discourse is not new, we only have to recall Rousseau’s social contract to embody the same concept of symbolic power to create a superstructure. Symbolic enforcement here means a capitulation of the imaginary into the written language or Law. This is the strongest vision of any structuralist thinker. However, it is crucial to analyze the second part of the statement that says that any outer influence coming in a manner of empowerment or violent incorporation to the world is not a Law, it is not legal as circumstance that is incorporated to the discourse of “normality” or communication. Habermas tries to explain
how the enforcement, the empowerment through the discourse -what we can call the rationalization of any unthinkable possibility that is incorporated to the logic of the world- is illegal. His mistake is to announce it as a liberation of something impure, not belonging to the realm of communication, where he is not able to see that is the incorporation of these unthinkable – speechless, out-of-language or poetic- possibilities what makes give any chance to communication to happen. Nonetheless, this mistake goes further in the last statement when he places agreement as a motif (convictions). This means that it is from inside, immanence understood in a very *sui generis* way, that agreement comes to the world. Reason does not operate for Habermas as an exterior agent when a subject comes to an agreement with another subject, it is this immanence that makes possible to know the exterior other by an outer reason. We find the same argument in Descartes, in his final claim on God supporting all the whole idea of his method and reason. It is a mistake therefore to try to find universality in agreement from only an immanent position, since it is an excess of any immanence of transcendence what any universal position demands. And it is indeed this universality what Habermas is pursuing when he states that agreement is a natural outcome desirable for any society. The mistake again is to take a totalizing task as a universal reality (totality of immanence against a universal concept of immanent transcendence). It is the totalizing nature of the (symbolic) state power which is not at universal range. Besides, this attempt by Habermas to balance the interior and the exterior sides of any relational reality is already dismissed by Levinas that explaining Heidegger´s point of view over coexistence, affirms that “for Heidegger intersubjectivity is a coexistence, a *we* prior to the I and the other, a neutral intersubjectivity. The face to face both announces a society, and permits
maintaining of a separated I” (Levinas 1969-1979, 68). Habermas is pursuing this (already) balanced intersubjectivity through agreement taking advantage of some humanistic thoughts. But what Levinas discovers in Heidegger’s thought is that social reality is an unbalanced situation always already. World is not balanced but controversial, it is not unbiased but *Daseinish* for Heidegger. We can recall Heidegger’s words here saying that “[f]or one thing, it can be demonstrated, by considering assertion, in what ways the structure of the ‘as’, which is constitutive for understanding and interpretation, can be modified (…) ‘Assertion’ means ‘communication’ (…) Letting someone see with us shares with the Other that entity which has been pointed out in its definite character (…) One must keep in mind that this Being-towards is Being-in-the-World, and that from out this very world that has been point out gets encountered” (Heidegger 1962-2001, 196-197). This hierarchical reality of a prior *we* dives into the debate of the ontological reality conforming the logical (social) reality. This *we* precisely describes the eternal conflict that is not solved since it is in the game between the *we* and the *I*, which separation links both. It is this conceptualization of conflict as such what makes possible any communication, common or relational experience. It is what is not resolved what requires our attention, what makes us look behind and make a detour to solve it. It is somehow, the return of the repressed what makes communication a mean as such. As Levinas says “[i]n Heidegger coexistence is, to be sure, taken as a relationship with the Other irreducible to objective cognition; but in the final analysis it also rests on the relationship with *being in general*, on comprehension, on ontology” (Levinas 1969-1979, 67). It is the separation again that relates both levels of existence. Heidegger’s referential world of Dasein is controversial at all levels of communication. It is through conflict that
there is communication and comprehension. Habermas is wrong in the affirmation that agreement is the last and most valuable achievement of any communicative act. However, any purely established agreement vanishes by definition any possibility for critical thinking to emerge. This dispositional effect of Habermas locates him against the thought of Heidegger, Levinas and Lacan, of course. It is indeed the lack of agreement what makes any communicational activity worthy intellectually. As Žižek points out “for Lacan (…) human communication in its most basic, constitutive dimension does not involve a space of egalitarian intersubjectivity. It is not ´balanced´. It does not put the participants in symmetric mutually responsible positions where they all have to follow the same rules and justify their claims with reasons” (Žižek 2008, 61-62). There is an unbalanced situation discovered by language. We are able to construct narrative or discursive structures. Hence, Habermas in his Theory of Communicative Action is closer to a fictionalized balanced situation than analyzing the real unbalanced scenario. As Habermas points out “inasmuch as social actions are coordinated through reaching understanding, the formal conditions of rationally motivated agreement specify how participants´ relations to one another can be rationalized” (Habermas 1969-1979, 339). In other words, there is a natural flux of desire of agreement among societies and their members. This natural flux for Habermas is supported by rationalization, namely, an attempt to rule the imaginary of the social whole. The rule here must be read as the Law. Law for Habermas will bring up agreement, scientifically based understanding of the knowledge itself. It is misleading however, to attempt this kind of agreement only based in the symbolization of the agent, that is to say, the rationalization under scientific basis of the society as such. It is naïve to think that social actions indeed are searching for
agreement. This line of thinking may address to plain and uncontroversial social realities in one hand –the actual mystification of democratic system(s) is a clear example of this risk- but it does have a deeper error within. Any dialectical attempt in these terms must pursue the idea of the Two, that is to say, the idea of agreement “and” controversy. In other words, the dialectical gesture demands the thought of both at the same time in order to give a satisfactory explanation of communication, without falling in a too simplistic and naïve effort. If we pay close attention to Habermas´ proposal mimics a dogmatic schema. It is morally assumed in Habermas´ schema the wrong or harm any disagreement causes. Failure in communication is socially persecuted. Effects and consequences of failure in understanding are not desirable, thus, success in the mode of understanding and agreement must become the very target of actual societies. This schema has a clear parallel meaning according to social status, financial condition or social class dimensions. Success as a concept of understanding communication is also extrapolated to these other dimensions mentioned above, becoming another capitalistic argument of Western civilization´s model. Success, communication, agreement or diplomacy are terms that belong to middle class, whilst controversy, struggle, riot or failure belong to proletariat. Habermas is reaching some good lab conditions in order to justify this demand of Western democratic system, where disagreement and conflict are failures to be eradicated, and success means wealthy, famous and respected way of life, for a better functioning of politics that obliterate the real aim of the Political, which has to do more with the ethical question than with the success on communicative terms. Yet, Habermas in this way, is leaving behind all the imaginary of cultural reality that any society has within. For him “[l]iteral meanings are, then, relative to a deep-sealed, implicit
knowledge, *about* which we normally know nothing, because it is simply unproblematic and does not pass the threshold of communicative utterances that can be valid or invalid. “If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false” (Habermas 1969-1979, 337). It is imaginary in its appearance what is neither true nor false for Habermas. Notwithstanding, agreement represents very same situation denounced by Habermas with regards to the mythic or imaginary level: once we “reach” this point of balance or agreement, it is not “problematic” to assure this truthful reality it possess, or not. He misses the point that not-being-problematic is indeed the most problematic status. Vanishing of the problematic factor is the keystone to understand Habermas´ concept of agreement, as we can observe. Again, what we can reach with this sort of wisdom is only a fact, a neutral piece for an encyclopedic knowledge. Since it is an inner condition according to Habermas, it is a matter of consensus in the end and nothing has to do with the real truthful conditions of the examined reality. It is an attempt from Habermas to elucidate this agreement only based in symbolic grounds. This symbolic (communicational) level is not free of violence, controversy or imposition, yet. Žižek notes how Hegel already anticipated the violent content in any symbolic reality when he points out that “Hegel was already well aware, there is something violent in the very symbolization of a thing, which equals its mortification. This violence operates at multiple levels. Language simplifies the designated thing, reducing it to a single feature. It dismembers the thing, destroying its organic unity, treating its parts and properties as autonomous” (Žižek 2008, 61). Symbolization in the form of agreement in Habermasian terms is also under the same frame. Symbolic universe of agreement encapsulates the society in a mere relational reality, with regards to forms, administrative and bureaucratic
interaction. This tendency almost embodies the reification of individuals, converting them into “autonomous” things instead of purely free subjectivities. This limitation enclosed in the constructivist side will be also explained in Chapter IV.

However, we can conclude that a narrow perspective that only conceals language as the mediation of the subject and the world might have some limitations. It is also an attempt to reify the world itself and its relational frame. As Žižek adds “[t]he ´wordless´ character of capitalism is linked to this hegemonic role of the scientific discourse in modernity. Hegel had already identified this feature when he noted that for us moderns, art and religion no longer command absolute respect: we can admire them, but we no longer kneel down before them, our heart is not really with them. Only science-conceptual-knowledge-deserves this respect. And it is only psychoanalysis that can disclose the full contours of the shattering impact of modernity- that is, capitalism combined with the hegemony of scientific discourse- on the way our identity is grounded in symbolic identifications. No wonder modernity led to the so-called ´crisis sense´, that is, to the disintegration of the link between, or even identity of, truth and meaning” (Žižek 2008, 82). Without any trace of shame, Habermas conceives the “disagreement sense” in social arena as risky or dangerous, since for him the rupture of the link between truth and meaning is not problematic anymore, as far as there is any kind of agreement under the basis of “fake” understanding or imposition of this very agreement. We can recall the idea of risk presented by Ulrich Bech (Bech 1992) in order to dress this idea, and the idea of authentic and un-authentic presented in Sartre to think any “fake” (unfaithful) agreement. In other words, agreement is the ultimate goal and conflict if unresolvable drops into the
class of the un-problematic. However, we know now that it is agreement itself, in the mode of pacific turn, what creates conflict. Agreement turns to be the source of the unequal treatment, since it is the desired land for any citizen, no matter his or her initial conditions or circumstances, that is to say, any citizen ought to persuade himself to establish pacific ways of live, and pacific here means merely out-of-any-critical-thinking. The imposed neutrality associated to any idea of agreement condemns the term itself, due to a practical impossibility to construct any neutral site for it to happen, not even in a linguistic site. It is agreement in its administrative and bureaucratic versions what any citizen has to face, where neutrality itself is displayed in the form of the balance and almighty state. As Alberto Toscano notes (Toscano 2003), there are three main moments with regards to art, violence and political action; one first Hobbesian moment, one second ‘classical-modern’ ideal conceptualization of peace and war and thirdly “the hypermodern regime of war in which it becomes a genuine ordering power, while ‘peace’- now entirely immanent to, or a function of, war- is revealed as a motor of conflict: a demand for security that continually generates that capillary form of warfare which provides the only substance for the state of exception that defines our present (Agamben, 2002)” (Toscano 2003, 107). Agreement, articulated as an incited neutrality, indeed represents an immanent function of capitalism mode of imposition over any political structure. It is capitalism the hegemonic force that derives into substructures based on the symbolization of “security” in the mode of agreement, demanded by the vast majority of individuals reduced to permanent things in their process of reification. It is again a perfect description of Žižek’s objective violence what operates at this level.
iv) The Question of Universalism and Hegemony according to Violence

We have been tracing the idea as a function of change and how we can understand this change in political terms and linguistic terms as well. However, we have to raise the question of universalism in order to see how deep or wide the influence of any change operates. Universalism is often confused with hegemonic in the political field. It is crucial to draw a line between these two concepts in order to see the real nature of violence, related ubiquitously to universal range instead of any hegemonic display of it in social life, as far as we consider this violence as a source for a real change. Violence responds to a universal condition of itself with regards to the necessity of appearance in the world, in a worldfull world. We can grasp the idea of appearing in the world, from a non-existent condition, as a first step in this process of real change. It is the very link between being and existence, namely, the process of appearing of the non-existent among those-who-exists. Therefore, violence cannot be a mere display of singularities or individuals, it deploys the existence at universal range, it makes possible any action or being in the world. It gives access to a referential world in the mode of universal access to the very world. It gives access to condition of possibility to be visible in the world. Thus, it is power a consequence of violence, the very consequence of it indeed, and not vice versa. We will develop this idea of non-reversibility and a certain degree of hierarchy between violence and power, once we examine the ontological reality of change. However, it is worth to note how violence displays this change in ontological order in the world, where the logic of the world itself will host the change and assume it as a process of empowerment or a status (structure) of power.
With regards to these ideas, Žižek is right when he affirms that “the standard Marxist hermeneutics of unearthing the particular bias of abstract universality should thus be supplemented by its opposite: by the properly Hegelian procedure which uncovers the universality of what presents itself as a particular position” (Žižek 2008, 154). Unveiling the very possibility of universalism, we are disclosing the site for violence as a function of change. It cannot be reduced to any particularism, namely, any merely explicit and particular happening commonly displayed in any news report of a remote war situation, for instance. However, we can think it as a singularity. If we name any particularistic happening in any given site, we will conclude that positions, structures and elements are not changed, but combined; using an existing meaning in order to make the combination intelligible for the subject. However, what we want to trace is a real change where there is no traceable meaning that can cover the change itself. Meanings in languages ensure the multiplicity of differences that language must have in order to face the real. Therefore, we are forced to think that exceptions emancipate these differences. In other words, truths emancipate differences for language as well.

We are well aware how particularistic view of violence is presented in everyday journalistic expositions. Any happening related to explicit violence is presented in mass media in order to pose the object of any hidden desire for it as something brutally undesirable to obtain an inner *jouissance* over it. It is not a matter of bombing, shooting, raping or violating any integrity according to the Law. Violence operates at universal range, precisely at the universalism described by Žižek that completes the vision of
Badiou with regards to this concept. If violence takes place in the universalized site, this universalism must be sustained apart from any concrete particular identity. As Badiou points out: “neither can a truth procedure take root in element of identity. For if it is true that every truth erupts as singular, its singularity is immediately universizable. Universizable singularity necessarily breaks with identitarian singularity” (Badiou 2003, 11). Accordingly, violence cannot be under the predicament of any identity. If we develop this argument, we will conclude that it is difference as such what is universizable, it is through -and not in, upon or over- difference that change operates. It is not a matter of gender, political, religious or social predicament. If violence operates at universal range, it is out of this particularism that through an excess of itself becomes universal. Violence is always and excess but it is also what truth presents as its traces. Simultaneously violence is a formal excess, namely, an excess that takes place at formal (symbolic, logic or linguistic frame) that gives access and contains at the same time any materialistic content (fantastic, imaginary or onto reality). Interpellating any happening with the particularistic endorsement of a partial shot of the scene, we are not dealing with the entire phenomenon, but placing an assumable name for an unbearable phenomenon. Displacing the attention of our analysis to a problem that has the particularism of being gender, domestic, political, race or religious based, we only obliterate the very mechanism that operates under these particularisms. We have to dig in the inner mechanism of violence and what is changed after the modification or combination of the actors and elements involved in the happening to understand if it is something that happens in the surface of the social structure or really goes deep in the very structure that rules the society. In other words, reflecting the weight of violence in terms of gender,
domestic or political issues, we do not analyze violence itself—as the very condition of the happening—but we transform it into a circumstantial factor. In short, placing ideas such as gender-violence, domestic-violence or political-violence, we only try to solve the problem of the name of violence, and we do not focus deep enough on violence as such. In this case, language poses an invisible barrier, which is more explicit in other moments, at the moment to deal with the real. This limit or boundary is the sin of the constructivist vision, however necessary as a mode of repression, but it does not allow the correct perception of some phenomena if it turns into negation. Negation, as the unresolved conflict, demands a mechanism of repetition. Whenever we face a limit, the impossibility (frustration) to cope and surpass it transforms the limit into the negation to surpass it, and therefore, into a mandatory necessity to revisit it in a form of mechanism of repetition. It is this negativity what starts a vicious circle of revisiting endlessly the traumatic moment. Negation, and repetition as a direct consequence, are the factors to establish a neurotic mechanism. Once we discover the obliteration of the dialectics of Master-slave, we can engage the lucid moment when roles of victim and executioner are vanished. We revisit gender issues, political problems or domestic conflicts in order to name the name of violence, without engaging the phenomenon as such.

We just proved how misleading can be to talk about gender violence or political violence, if we really want to trace down the very mechanism that operates within violence. When we attempt the intellectual exercise of thinking this oppressive situations (gender, political, domestic or religious violence) in terms of exercise of power—structures of power, habits of power, traditional power, family and power, etc.—we realize
how close we get to the reality of what we observe. It is a mere exercise of power what
we observe in any happening that is labelled as gender or political violence; it is therefore
a gender empowerment or political empowerment what should be analyzed and evaluated
ethically afterwards, which locates the question of these “catalogued” violence in a closer
position to be studied within the hegemonic power structures than the exceptional rude or
severe situations.

If we rethink violence as the incorporation of any change, even if it is social, political,
biological or scientific transformation, we can conclude that violence is the trace of any
truth, in this sense. That is exactly what Badiou notes here: it is at an excess of singularity
where universal crops up. It is by exceeding the formal singularity, where content is filled
by matter, no matter this materiality is real matter or pure appearance, the effects -
consequences or the lack of this consequences- are real. It is a reflexive, immanent and
transcendence communicational capacity what violence displays. Nonetheless,
communication happens in this case in a situation of relation of no-relation, between
power and violence. This incommensurable situation where power and violence face each
other, the articulation of a relation between them falls into void. It vanishes as soon as it
appears, since the presence of both at the same time collapses the site (world). It is not
again a matter of means or ends. Its communicational nature gives to violence the
possibility to exceed the means and ends debate. It is a means that is itself a condition of
possibility of any end. It is by exceeding the formal aspect of communicational means
that the existence of any ends takes place. As Badiou remarks when he talks about the
different approaches to the evental phenomenon and its power to mediate he insist saying
that “for many of those faithful to it, the revolution is not what arrives, but what must
arrive so that there can be something else; it is communism’s mediation, the moment of
the negative (...) For [Apostle] Paul, by contrast, just as for those who think a revolution
is a self-sufficient sequence of political truth, Christ is a coming [une venue]; he is what
interrupts the previous regime of discourses” (Badiou 2003, 48). It is by violent
interruption that revolution makes its place within the historical hegemonic discourse.
Considering the advent of something concrete (what arrives) we reach the realm of
power, since in power resides the idea of concrete situation within the structure that rules
that moment. In other words, the finitude embodied in the concrete idea of what arrives
vanishes the possibility of a real advent, of something that will arrive without previous
notice or knowledge. It is thoroughly the interruption what opens a window of inner
history linked to void, the unforeseen future. Violence is about to break the linear
discourses, it is the communicational phenomenon that universalizes the coming event. It
takes place in the symbolic order, in Lacanian terms, in order to affect immediately into
the imaginary level. This eruption however is an excess of the real itself, which operates
both in the symbolic and imaginary level. We have to remind that in the classic Lacanian
idea, we have access to the symbolic via the imaginary that puts the exact distance with
the real to be bearable by the symbolic. However, in the idea of the event, the process is
inverse. Badiou, with regards to the common split of reality within an overused
dichotomy, adds that “the pure event can be reconciled neither with the natural Whole,
nor with the imperative of the letter” (Badiou 2003, 57). “Whole” here evokes clearly the
Hegelian Whole, but it this distinction between the imaginary or symbolic level what is at
stake and not the deterministic opposition between the fantastic or the written word what
we are forced to choose. The event in Badiou takes place within the negative boundaries of the real, however in an affirmative manner. Violence operates at this level and only through this level of non-existence, since it is also the shift or change from this status to the existence, via announcement (manifestation in the world), and not by a fake emancipatory programmatic advertisement, as Badiou repeatedly remarks. Evental process cannot be dependent on any predicament attached to Law of a site, and its failure or the fantastic counterpart of the imaginary. The possibility to failure of the Law is what the symbolic order rescues from the discourse of universal rights that is attached to the imaginary order. Rights cannot fail, since they are in the imaginary order, failure is not conceived. They are not “problematic” in the Habermasian sense. It would be a failure against failure itself. Whilst, Law fails against the written statement of the word that law is incommensurably attached. It is against this possibility of failure of Law, no matter if it is legal or divine Law, that the discourse of rights takes place. Nonetheless, this schema where Law and rights are opposed, does not complete any dialectical mechanism. Violence erupts in the discourse of both, imaginary and symbolic (Law and myth) in order to complete them both and make itself the condition of possibility of the three. There is not any reality of a proper door without the complement of the three elements: the obstacle to the unknown but imaginable, the hegemonic structure of power that sustains it and the communicational procedure of dialectics that erupts in any direction or level. Any attempt to erase therefore violence from civilian, social, political, religious or mythical discourse is a vain attempt to restrict human reality to a narrative dimension, where any challenging moment is erased or sacrificed, destroyed or offered to deities.
Modern societies invented rights in order to counteract the Empire of Law and its natural tendency to fail. Law fails since it is a hegemonic superstructure that does not reach the universal range, this limitation is its Achilles heel. Rights cannot fail since they are evoked under the range of singularities or subjects. Subjects obey law and create rights in a quasi-magical gesture that allows the symbol against any magical story to be even more magical than itself. As Žižek says “naturalistic explanations are more magic than a resort to supernatural intervention” (Žižek 2008, 184). Divine Law fails, thus, humans fail and commit sin. We can recall the infamous moment on Kubrick’s “Full Metal Jacket” (1987) when Private Pyle is forced to eat a donuts in front of the entire company, he has to eat the sin, his sin, his failure and the rest of the company is punished for it. Yet, through an excess of the symbolic, the imaginary order crops up, becoming a hierarchical order of the symbolic and placing the symbolic order in a more mythical position than the imaginary itself. It is this game, where every symbolic element is displayed within the strong reminiscence of the imaginary, what takes place in this situation. It is more than a supplement that poses the meaning of the symbolic itself, it is the second level that needs a third one, in order to complete the dialectical turn of the phenomenological knowledge, of a knowledge that is not only encyclopedic and bears any connection with a truth procedure, a knowledge beyond any fact. A knowledge beyond all the facts, indeed.
v) Narrative dimension, Discourse’s structure and Language of Critique according to the concept of Violence and Cultural Studies

Violence, as a socialized practice, often is debated in terms of dichotomies of realities and opposed pairs. It is a win or lose scenario, a good or bad situation, or true and false reconstructions of reality. However, I claim that violence goes deeper than these dichotomies, breaks the false distance between these approaches and opens any disposition for a creational space of void that goes beyond any narration of the imaginary or logical construction under discursive terms. In other words, violence as a function of change is able to construct a relation of no-relation and thus create a scenario for an affirmative dialectic. This approach, as we shall see, has a direct impact into cultural studies since it is critical thinking what overcomes both discursive and narrative dimensions, as the source for both and –in the very end- where their existence in cultural reality acquires its maximal expression. Authors like Edward Said (Said 1993) or Terry Eagleton (Eagleton 1990) disclose these ideas from literary perspectives, whilst others like Félix Guttari (Guttari 2004) or Corlenius Castoriadis (Castoriadis 1997) enlace with these thoughts from a more sociological scope. However, critical thinking vanishes narrations of mystical desires but also the logical science of Historical rhetoric linear thinking, giving them for a moment a maximal presence in cultural range in order to overcome them immediately.

Therefore, it is an interesting exercise to make a distinction between the concepts like narrative and discourse, according to their relation with violence. With regards to this
distinction, we can begin to analyze which are the factors that make divergent both concepts. Discourses and narrative, along with poetry, can be used to describe the literary production, taking into account what we have explained about the hegemonic and universal ranges, where the artistic, intellectual and social productions are established.

Literary production does not escape to the contemporary power relations and their influence over the produced works, imagined worlds, painted landscapes or recited verses. Literary production is a political production as far as it is produced by a political subject, an argument defended by Sartre long time ago (Sartre 1965). We can begin with an example to give a correct context. For instance, human rights are inscribed within the universal narrative of Western civilization. Very briefly we can explain why they have the intention to be universal. Rights are applicable to any human being, they are declarative and they endorse the responsibility of been articulating within belonging relations to the big sphere of humans. They are universal in their nature since they are addressed to any human being, and in the moment there is one exception that excludes one individual, at that very moment, we are in the position to affirm that we are talking about privileges instead of rights. It is a narrative interpretation of reality what rights stand for, since there is no “logical” background to sustain any genesis for the concept of Human Rights itself.

We can use the term artificial, however inappropriate, to describe their behavior. Nonetheless, this artificiality is sustained with a vast literature that evokes a lack of genesis and a modern mythology in order to sustain the very idea of universal right.

Therefore, we are in the position to affirm that Human Rights narrative belongs to the imaginary of Western civilization, it is a narrative of illusionary facts that however have real effects. Yet, it is a narration that does not belong to a purely logical structure.
Meanwhile, discourses are the structures in languages that support any logical statement. It is predicament in its form and not in its content. It is admission of predicament as a form, whilst in narrative mode the predicament is the ultimate aim of the language. In discursive mode language does not seek the predicament but the form that offers to any predicament its dwell. Accordingly, discourses also bear a rhetoric form, since eventually they are the place where any logical “knowledge” or scientific statement rest on. They are not mystical narrations of interpretative realities. Discourses support what academics dictate to society, however, they cannot related merely to intellectuals or those who are able to understand the different cycles of knowledge among diverse disciplines. There are many approaches to this issue, namely, the attempt to define a public intellectual. Among others, John Dewey (Dewey 1957), Jürgen Habermas (Habermas 1991) or Michel Foucault (Foucault 1980) try to define and narrow, both the concept of public and the figure of the intellectual. However, depending on the source, we find the public defined as the private sphere of the existent citizens (Habermas 1991) or the universal place of a freedom of thought and speech (Foucault 1991). This distinction digs to the core of the dimension of the universal and the place of the intellectual only can be rooted as the figure that is able to be aware of the universalism that emanates from the public sphere. That’s why, among other things, Antonio Gramsci deploys the concept of organic intellectuals but not organic scholars or organic institutions. Gramsci is well aware that the intellectual is organic as long as he has a discursive link to what is public. Intellectuals excess the boundaries of private and public and expand the dimension of the public to a universal level. Meanwhile, discourses are used generally by scholars to
support “official” knowledge, wherever this label of officers comes from, since it is one of the ways hierarchical knowledge is coined in society whether it is a scientific statement or political assessment, what is generally known as the private sphere.

Any subject articulates a communicative act in order to impose a certain meaning into the world, it is not a mere use of a tool (language) in order to communicate a subjectivity emanating from it. Somehow, there is a chance to create throughout language or communication, if it is attached to a truth procedure. For this to happen, we can talk about writers, painters or poets that develop their intelligent towards the world, their site. Their relation with language changes depending on the activity they develop.

But we have to be cautious to understand when and where language can adopt the form of an emancipatory structure. Notwithstanding, language also tends to be an obstacle sometimes, wall or the house of being of all these subjects. As Lacan points out “[t]he subject is separated from the Others, the true ones, by the wall of language” (Lacan 1954-1955, 244). We have language but language does not have us, it is not our reign, it is languages reign what we have to get across in order to find the Other, that entity that do not even exist, or at least we do not have an awareness of its existence yet. Lacan continues saying that “when we use language, our relation with the other always plays on this ambiguity. In other words, language is as much there to found us in the Other as to drastically prevent us from understanding him” (Lacan 1954-1955, 244). Understanding the Other does not mean in Lacan that we are able to unveil Other’s thought, but we are only able to discover our thinking throughout this detour, where language does not help
to know each other, but to mark the gap we have to overcome. This violent gap—language as such—carries violence since it is designed mainly for this duty. Language does not adopt any pacific or hostile attitude, does not make us feel comfortable in a democratic regime or in a tyrannical environment. What language makes perfectly well is this transportation and transformation of violence. Language mediates our experience, our phenomenological dimension as such, in order to particularize the Other for us. The gap exists in the moment language breaks into our lives. Even silence, obliterated language, can be as strong as a loud voice. Therefore, we find violence in each step we take into language. Mediation through violence is mediation through language, we can assume now that violence is a mere communicational event or phenomenon we experience in daily live, no matter if this violence is explicitly deployed in a public square or privately maintained with a linguistic imposition of customs. At this point we can be tempted to exclude any in-significant or un-intelligible violation or forced action as something belonging to animality and therefore, classify it as an aggressiveness. This could be perfectly the perspective adopted by Konrad Lorenz (Lorenz 1966) that will not be explored here.

In order to make a correct approach to what I will call the faithful’s subject poetry, we have to define a language that breaks with any tradition in the continuity of discourses and the mildness of narrative expression, if we really want to find the key features of violence within language. We must find a formula, beyond discourse and narrative exercise, in order to pose a language that is able to fill the gap between the subject and the real, and which still finds itself pointing out to the gap itself. It is an exercise of
finding the gap to mark the void in order to fill it, at least pretend to fill it with language or our symbolic power, and find ourselves again in the midst of that very gap, that void that gives access to any real(ity) again.

I will develop this idea on critical language around a piece of text of Fredric Jameson on Sartre’s literary style. It is relevant to distinguish between the concept of critical language and critical thinking at this stage. This dispositive nature of language that is able to bend and twist language itself and thus reality is not but one of the parts for a successful incorporation of a critical idea of any reality. Here Jameson evokes Sartre’s *Nausea* (Sartre 1964) and explores the limits of Sartre’s work with regards to social reality and subject’s position; as a writer, as a citizen and as an agent:

Things can take place before our eyes, and then be discussed as well and enter a purely verbal mode of existence. It is thus possible for a play to have its area of facticity: the brute visual facts, the moments of pure happening; and its area of assumption: the speeches in which there events are taken up into language. And once an aesthetic of the theater is established on basis of this opposition, the events themselves begin to come loose from the play and slide out of it: dialogue establishes itself on the stage before us and the off-stage becomes the place in which things ‘really’ happen. Or in another sense it is in the language that things are really taking place, and the events themselves, off-stage or on, become merely necessary and not sufficient. This seems a curious description of a theater so full of violence, so little ‘poetic´ in the bad sense, as Sartre’s; but it is precisely the violence, the most exaggerated kind of facticity, that ensures the meaning of its opposite, and without in the language would weaken and become gratuitous embroidery, a sterile poetry. So that along with the naturalism and the melodrama, there is a another perspective in which all these violence events turn out to be illusion and only the language really happens: the plays are strange examples of an inherited melodramatic form which has been subverted into
literature, into occasions for the elaboration of a new language. 

This piece of text draws the core of what critical language is and how it develops itself in order to exist. It is important to remember Badiou’s remark on truths when he says that truths not only are but also exists. In the same manner, language can reach this point where it is not only a being in-itself, in Sartre’s words, but also embody a subjectivity that makes it exist as a being for-itself. It is a very peculiar feature, the one that makes possible to be and to exist, what is exemplary explained in this text. It is the nexus between the onto part and logic part what is at stake in this short description of Sartre’s work. However, the ontological whole drives us beyond a mere summarize of both. In its dialectical turn, this peculiarity makes possible communication as such, in the mode of a certain give impossibility that makes the possible (still) to come. Communication happens between the being as such and the existing idle. Communication also happens in a reflexive way, it does communicate being as being with itself and also of course in the existing level of existence and dialogic processes. Dialogic processes should not be limited only to an oral process, this oral process is the venue for written language, therefore existence is both oral and written, and it is oral since it is written as Derrida points out.

Jameson starts this short text with the perception of the reality through the images we can experiment in a strong phenomenological way. Jameson says that “things can take place before our eyes” in order to remind us how important is the perception of reality, the
deceptive perception that yet it is the one we use to construct a stronger (more deep and logic) reality. It is the constructive level which takes command then, the language that constructs our reality, the reality that is logical and formalized in language. Nonetheless, this “brutal facts” and their facticity is eventually assumed, interiorized into a codex, and it becomes the script where we base our (more) real experience. At this point we enter into the theatrical dimension. However, the antagonistic nature of both (reality and language) is maintained in this vision of theatre where dialogue is maintained as a dialectical procedure. Jameson is well aware of this when he says that “dialogues establishes itself on the stage” and it is language that makes the distance, the script marks the pace but also splits the play and the reality, the place where audience is not idle but an uncompromised (militant) agent. This vision, however, clashes with the traditional Aristotelian vision of theatre, one that vanishes this distance and pursues the complete identification of the audience – a compromised attitude here, with regards to the enactment itself- that observes a tragedy and enhances its own experience of the world mediated by a play that is external to itself. We will see how this split on the very vision of a Platonic or Aristotelian theatre really describes many aspects of the enactment of riots and protests. Nonetheless, Jameson decides that it is the Platonic manner of visioning the theatre the one that better describes the history of the facts, that facticity unbearable for subjects that must attain themselves to a violence language in order to have a complete experience of that facticity itself. If we vanish this distance that is provoked by the dialogue, the split of two actors and two levels of reality, theatre becomes a “sterile poetry”. Poetry is sterile when does not place a distance, a point where the subject can be at the intersection, not at an equidistant position, but at a subjective
intersection within a proper language and established knowledge. Established knowledge is presented in a theatre as the mythological procedure of facticity, happenings that have a moral to tell from the neutrality of the historical distance. However, violence is able to articulate the split of this knowledge and establish a poetry that breaks and provokes this very scission, the subject and the political, the poetry and the theatre, truths and knowledge. Jameson celebrates the ultimate step of poetry, the creation of a new language in the torsion of the old language -the old narrative- that is able to incorporate a new set of possibilities, an infinity that exposes the fragility of the law. It is the Law in its perpetuation of repetition and negation that is surpassed by a new language incorporated in this theatrical stage. There is a hierarchical order in this process that written language in his duty of carrying death makes possible any oral collaboration. A new language, finally, embodies a new political subject, the scission provoked by the subject is returned and reproduced in a dialectical turn that does not admit a neutrality disguised in a reversibility in the relationship between contradictory terms. This reversibility is twisted too and hierarchy is imposed in order to provoke a non-reversible situation, an impossible repetition of the past, due to this antagonistic relation between violence and power in the theatrical stage.
Chapter III

An Investigation on the Ontological Concept of Change

After introducing, within the historical context, the development of the concept of violence, I am about to start the conceptualization of violence in terms of function of change. This process will try to achieve mainly two goals. First, the definition of change itself with regards to philosophical and social order transformations, that is to say, change as such and change within social frame. Secondly, it will establish a hierarchical and logical order between power and violence. Classic literature in political philosophy tends to link both concepts as exchangeable terms, whereas, the approach presented here establishes an order of logical preference in the sequence of the link between them, which provokes a complete new approach on ethical grounds to the problem of violence.

Accordingly, violence is presented by different degrees of change, affecting to distinct levels of social and political order. Change as a concept is developed as ontic (being as such), logical (pure existence) and political manifestation. However, the interpretation of the political level is influenced by the term “the political”, addressing to a higher level of
political activity beyond a daily presence of politicians, namely, addressed by the problem of representation. This implies an aesthetic view of politics. This approach coincides with the conclusions observed on the possibility of power for being evaluated ethically. Ethics, in this sense, can only be applied to the exercise of power, to the consequences of executing it, and not to any ongoing process of change. This question is solved by the direct link between ethics and aesthetics.

Notwithstanding, change occurs at three different levels according to the dimension of change itself. The classification of violence into three different levels of change contributes to elucidate the philosophical implications with regards to ontic, logical, and hegemonic and universal orders. This means that the classification itself goes beyond any stratification of violence and helps to understand how violence happens and at what level is operating, which contributes to draw any further conclusion on the actors, victims or witnesses.

*Establishing violence as a function of change, we are demanding from violence to trace differences in order to grasp truth processes, since truths emancipate any difference and open the possibility to new modes of identity.*

Therefore, I want to claim that violence first of all is not an ethical issue. Yet, power generated by violence, especially political power, is the aim of any ethical analysis. Accordingly, violence traces the change, even more, different degrees of violence support the idea of different degrees of change. Thus, violence becomes an operator of change
only visible as a function of it. We can trace violence on levels of change on social, political or economical grounds.

**The Philosophical Concept of Change**

It is a classic philosophical discussion the one concerning permanence and change. It is a debate concerning identity and difference. Identity belongs to the realm of permanence, tradition and the idea of conservation, whereas difference belongs to the realm of change, transformation and infinity. I would like to go beyond the classic approach between Heraclitus and Parmenides here, though. My approach includes the contributions made by Derrida, Levinas, Lacan and Badiou with regards to this concept, in which I consider a *retour* rather than a detour, within the perspective of global society and late modern states. The global perspective comes from the cultural backgrounds of these authors. Culturally all of them can recall the notions of permanence and change, since they all belong to a generation that comes from a colonial era. Colonialism with regards to cultural approach, to a more anthropological approach indeed, summarizes the attempt from an imperialist order to impose permanence, the finitude of western civilization and ethical axes, into the outsider, the one that changes, transforms the very inner concept of culture as such. Accordingly, I will prove how violence and power are related logically into a non-reversible relation, namely, there exists a hierarchy of appearing into the world, coming from violence as a function of change in a giving site or world, that makes power be a consequence of violence, without being able to draw any statement.
concerning the producing of violence by the use of power. We will analyze three moments or degrees of change.

i) Change and Existence

At any ontological level, it is crucial to elucidate what brings us to the first thinking of existence and being. However, in order to identify any degree of difference at ontological level, it results easier to configure our thinking with regards to existence, rather than to pure being. In existence we find ourselves in a constant dialogue between being and existence itself, since it is this being, which appearing in the world, promotes itself to the degree of existence.

Let’s begin supposing that we change any given substance of an object. We can do this at any time, for example, adding some new material to the components of an object. We can take the example of any chemical experiment to dress this approach. Any chemical experiment combines different elements to “create” another one. It is material-based change, but it is indeed a combination. There are not non-existing elements that can be added. In fact, the elements must exist, must be already present in our world, to be added or combined. Heidegger´s ontology realizes about this vision where being is profoundly identified with content and materiality, without a clear unmark between being and existence. We call this the change of content as such and within the dimension of being, it is closely related to the concept of identity.
Nonetheless, there is a deeper concept of change. Formal change involves the very change of the form of entity. It is not substance what is combined in this case, but the containing formal structure that determines the disposition and development of the content what changes or transforms. This approach takes into count the capacity to experience difference. With regards to difference itself, Badiou explains the necessity to be able to go throughout differences when he says that “(...) the Christian militantis must traverse worldly differences indifferently and avoid all casuistry over customs” (Badiou 2003, 100). Badiou is referring to the figure of Apostle Paul in this text, addressing both the problem of universalism and also the commitment of Paul with regards to understand difference within a nomadic frame. Difference is not a condition for Badiou, it is what conforms form itself, it is more than the content, it is what marks the difference, not against identity but completing identity from immanence. Form cannot be thought from finitude. Form and difference are within the process itself of establishing the existence of being in a world. We can address ourselves to literary world. Here we find two main figures describing the meaning of words. Both metonymy and metaphor address to content of words, the very tissue embodying the body itself of words. However, metonymy can be reduced to metaphor but this process does not happen all the way back. If metonymy can be reduced to metaphor we can conclude first of all that there is a hierarchy of these literary figures. Both figures describe relations, namely, the relation of language and reality, meaning and world. This can be translated into mathematical figures of belonging and inclusive relations, within the logic of the transcendental. Metaphor as a figure holds certain degree of hierarchy over metonymy.
Therefore, metaphor can be developed only as metonymy or stay as pure metaphor. We can describe thus metonymy as mainly a combination of “old” meanings into a remake of “another” meaning attached to a word. Whereas, metaphor implies a really new meaning, coming from nowhere—with no traceable references coming from cultural or social roots—that is attached to the word, conforming a completely new form itself. It is a happening of the coming of the “new” what brings out any metaphoric figure. As Badiou remarks “[i]t is one of Mao’s strengths to have insisted that the revolutionary Marxist is the lookout for the vanishing term, emblem of the new within the old. He or she is the active guardian of the future of the cause” (Badiou 2009b, 71). Metonymy can be understood as a change of the content of the word, but metaphor is more a formal change of meaning itself as meaning. I pose this example to elucidate better how close language- words and meanings- and bodies are with regards to truths.

Lacan is recognized as a great master on language, he himself addresses psychoanalysis as the real philosophy of language. Indeed, the study of language is a propitious field to observe and understand difference. Difference in the sense of “diffarence” as Derrida puts it, too.

In short, we find difference as the envelope that supports the form of identity, which contents any predicative aspect of any entity or element in a world. Difference is also a trace of existence, of an appearing in a given world. What Heidegger describes as a complete set of references in the world is more directed to ascribe the content of this world to a subject, than to really work on the concept of difference as trace of existence.
of Dasein. This approach is overcome by Badiou, posing the idea of universal truths and explaining how the ontic comes to the logic. In other words, Badiou gives access with his thought to the idea of universal subjective form of truths that are developed in a world, where the multiplicity of beings may come into existence within the frame of difference, and therefore, displaying a change in the site. As Badiou points out “(…) reading Primo Levi or Shalamov, one sees that (…) the death camp produces exorbitant differences at every instant, that it turns the slightest fragment of reality into an absolute difference between life and death, and this incessant differentiation of the minute is a torture” (Badiou 2003, 109). This “exorbitant” and “absolute” difference has to deal with the very existence of the subjects, however distinct they are to each other, there is a common different between them, with regards to existence. This argument relates to the idea of universal truth, the mark of change if we want, that can be graspable within the frame of the idea of some violent power immanently latent. Badiou continues saying that “(…) one of the necessary conditions of thought as power (which let us remind ourselves, is love) consists in he who is a militant of the truth identifying himself, as well as everyone else, on the basis of the universal” (Badiou 2003, 110). If truth represents the idea of difference and change, it is interesting how Badiou encloses truth as an idea that identifies itself, that is to say, there is not a reflexive movement but an immanent movement. So to speak, we are facing the possibility of an immanent transcendence. Accordingly, we can trace in Badiou’s words the idea of difference linked to the cease of existence in the mode of death. For this approach Badiou himself has a more complete and rigorous explaining the process of appearing of an atom:
we call ´atom of appearing´ a component of a being A which appears in a
world such that, if two ontologically distinct elements of A, x and y, both
belong absolutely to this component, then x and y are absolutely identical
in the world. Conversely, if x and y are not absolutely identical, and x
belongs absolutely to the component, then y does not belong absolutely to
it (Badiou 2009a, 216)

In this paragraph Badiou explains the idea of component and appearing of atom.

However, we can trace the idea of identity in these words, where identity is described as
the mark after the appearing happens. Identity is what stays after the appearing, before
that, everything stands as a degree of identity, namely, difference. Yet, this paragraph
deals with the entire phenomenon of appearing. At this point we can trace a clear line
between being and existence. Being reminds with the solid idea of permanence, of
objectifying indeed any entity or substance; whereas, existence means to appear into the
multiplicity of worlds. It is important to notice that the difference that supposes to appear
in a world implies change. In fact, this idea is implicitly suggesting change at a
predicative level (being) and at a formal level (existence). Following this line of
argumentation Badiou states as follows:

Given a multiple A which appears in a world, every element ´a´ of A
identifies an atom of appearing, via the function of A to T defined above
by the degree of identity of every element x of A to singular element ´a´.
Such an atom will be said to be real (Badiou 2009a, 218)

Here Badiou gives the definition of a real atom. For Heidegger this would be an atom
inscribed in reality, since for Heidegger being expresses itself into the “daseinish” world.
In the contrary, Badiou denies this approach and concedes to the real atom, not the ability
of expression, but the condition of change implicit in the degree of identity that appears
into a given world. I have briefly exposed how the dialogue between existence and being occurs, how is the relation between permanence and change is addressed and how it is related to the idea of identity and difference, in short, how the degrees of identity can only expressed with the idea of difference and how this difference is only displayed by the concept of change, in the mode of intervening (into the) world.

With regards to the relation between existence and change we can affirm that appearing in a world requires a total change. It is what is non-existent that comes into the world, an advent of certain subjectivity that happens, an interruption of permanence in an event wrapped by completely new belonging relationships. Badiou has showed that since Cantor’s contribution to mathematical field and set theory, we can explain it in a formal manner. Any element defined within inclusion relations in a set is captive of permanency. It is inclusively condemned to stay in that set with elements captive of the same degree of identity. So to speak, there is nothing coming into existence in that set, beyond the elements of the same degree that are included into the closure of the set. Thus, we can affirm that we only can combine the elements of the same degree of identity of the set to conform reality. At this point is relevant to authorize a definition of existence, since it is existence or appearing into a world what is at stake now. As Badiou puts it “[g]iven a world and a function of appearing whose values lie in the transcendental of this world, we will call ‘existence´ a being x which appears in this world the transcendental degree assigned to the self-identity of x” (Badiou 2009a, 208). First, we can observe in this definition that it is the very being of x what comes into existence, and not merely x as an element. Secondly, we need a transcendental degree, an index of appearing in the world,
assigned to the self-identity of x. As Badiou points out “[w]e observe that the value of
dependence for two ordered transcendental degrees is evident at least in terms of the
direction of order: if \( p \leq q \), then \((p \rightarrow q) = M \). This is the case for classical categorical
inclusions. If ‘man’ is a subset of ‘mortals’-which indicates a transcendental
subordination- then the implication that leads from ‘Socrates is a man’ to ‘Socrates is
mortal’ is absolutely true” (Badiou 2009a, 172). It is in the transcendental\(^4\) where this
logic relies. In other words, identity comes after difference and it is on the degree of
identity coming after the appearing of it in a world that we can talk about existence. We
trace existence by the degree of identity existing in a set, so to say. Therefore, we degree
these degrees by the perception of change. However, these degrees of identity-difference
are not defined by inclusive relations, they would be too restrictive and are only able to
bear the point or moment of crude identity. In conclusion, existence develops itself
according to belonging relationships; opened to change, inscription, criticism or
ultimately universal truthful propositions. Existence, so to say, is enveloped in these
belonging relations. As Badiou continues saying “[existence] is a category of appearing
(of logic) (...) ‘to exist’ has no meaning in itself (...) ‘to exist’ can only be said relatively
to a world. In effect, existence is nothing but a transcendental degree.” (Badiou 2009a,
208). Certainly, Badiou is addressing a key point to understand how existence happens.
Links of existence with a world can only be set as belonging to the world and not
included in the world. Probably this gap is the one separating the thought of Badiou and

\(^4\) The logical explanation of what is the transcendental algebra in Badiou can be found in the
addendum.
Heidegger. Heidegger proposes a complete set of references included in the world for Dasein, whereas for Badiou this inclusion in the world does not happen. It is under the umbrella of a complete set of belonging relations where subject develops the existence of his being.

We have explored the idea of existence and change, and their relationship to identity and difference. Also we have seen how existence interrupts the world, appearing into it with a complete new set of belonging relations. This is precisely the moment where identity acquires a name. We can use of metonymy and metaphor again to trace these ideas. Metonymy does not generate any really and purely new meaning, since it is attached by inclusive relationships to “old” meanings, thus metonymy only is able to provide a remake of meanings as a result of combining existing meanings. Metaphor, in the other side, acquires a complete new range of identities due to the interruption of the old meaning with a complete new meaning. It is not a mere creationist moment, but an advent of the event itself what we grasp in a metaphor, since there is always a fine and unbearable trace connecting meanings. Nonetheless, word appears into the world fully different, changed and violently guided by belonging relations to the cultural reality of this or that language. It is accepted that what happens in metonymy is a combination of meanings, whereas in metaphor is a substitution of meanings. This implies that there is no advent of meanings in metonymy but that metaphor is how we name this advent indeed. As Badiou points out, existence has no meaning itself, but we name the consequences of this existence, this irruption of appearing in our world. We can enhance our approach precisely incorporating Badiou’s definition of the world with regards to an operation or
happening. Badiou says that “[t]he place where operation happens without leaving it is the place where a being attains its identity—it’s relatively consistency. Thus, a being is only exposed to the thinkable to the extent that invisibility, in the guise of an operation that localizes it— it names, within a world, a new point. In so doing, it appears in that world” (Badiou 2009a, 113). Finally, we are approaching to the localization of existence and its conceptualization with regards to change. Following Badiou we can affirm that it is by naming that this phenomenon happens, however this naming comes after the appearing within the indexing of the transcendental of this “relative consistency” of being. Being is only exposed to the thinkable, to subjectivity as such, mediated by the difference, the trace of change that can be thought really. A new point is a point surrounded by relationships of belonging to the world. Being in a world is under the law of permanency at such extent that this being is not changing, it is not named under different set of meanings. If this happens, change happens in the mode of irruption into existence of new set of meanings, completely new set of belonging relations and ultimately a completely new set of (real) possibilities. Under a logical mode of analysis, Badiou is able to discern this with the concept of envelop. It is the complete umbrella of belonging relationships that cover the world with respect to existence what an envelope is for Badiou. As he points out “[t]he ´dependence´ of an apparent B with regard to another apparent A, is the apparent with the greatest intensity that can be conjoined to the second whilst remaining beneath the intensity of the first. Dependence is thus the envelope of those beings—there whose conjunction with A remains lesser in value than their conjunction with B” (Badiou 2009a, 134). It is under the rule of “lesser value than their conjunction with B” which gives us the clue to deploy our conclusion with regard to
belonging relations. It should be equal or greater than the conjunction with the other set
to develop an inclusive relation. Belonging relations is where differences develop, whilst
it is not possible to develop any inclusive relation without jumping into a status of
identity, a circumstance of identifying itself with the difference.

If we recapitulate what I have exposed so far, we can draw some interesting conclusions
with regards to the relationship between change and existence. First of all we find the
degrees of identity, always with regards to a transcendental, in the moment of appearing
of being into a world. It is throughout difference that we perceive any “moment” of
identity, some relatively consistency. However, these differences are not the identity
itself, only the trace of identity. This is important to note for a further analysis on ethical
grounds. As Badiou remarks, along with Sartre or Heidegger, existence has no meaning.
There is no “sense” attached to existence, and we can conceive it as a pure difference, no
matter how relative this purity of difference can be, since it is always related to a
transcendental indexing. In consequence, if we acquire the common perception of
differences, in daily basis, we can now draw an approach concerning them within the
frame of universality. It is an act of passing throughout differences what is needed in
order to perceive existence itself and the subjectivity and universality of truths. This is
what Badiou tries to explain when he evokes the figure of Apostle Paul. He does this
remark at the very beginning of the book concerning Paul and the foundation of
universalism (Badiou 2003) with regards to the identity of the subject when he says that
“[w]hat it essential for us is that this paradoxical connection between a subject without
identity and a law without support provides the foundation for the possibility of a
universal teaching within history itself” (Badiou 2003, 5). In this short quotation we find a good clue to understand what “generic” status is for Badiou, something I will develop in Chapter IV. However, it is very interesting to observe that these two conditions, namely, the lack of any structural solid identity and the absence of law, give entry to universalism. At this point, we are able to connect the concept of difference with change. It is by change that difference introduces itself into the world, without acquiring any identity in absolute terms. It is a law without support the consequence of coming into existence of being. Law as such is changed completely. Any previous possibility is vanished in order to offer a completely new set of possibilities within a world. However, this irruption of being into existence is covered within an envelope, so to speak, a set of belonging relations with regards to this appearing into a world. The “degeneration” of belonging relations into inclusion relations is observable in the phenomenon of alienation in political terms. It is the destruction of dynamic belonging relations and replacement with rigid identity inclusive relations what makes person be detached of any human condition. The degree of identity then is erased and embodied in a capsule of sameness. It is not, as we shall see further on, the complete reduction of human to an object what happens in any alienation process, but the obliteration of the condition of human; that is to say, the substitution of belonging relations by purely inclusive relationships. At this point any possibility of change with regards to existence is limited, restricted or abolished. However, in this realm of permanence, there is always the possibility of the transcendental to interrupt in the mode of immanence, in mode of event in Badiou’s vocabulary. We can conclude in this line or argumentation that permanence is to identity what change is to difference. In other words, permanence is where identity resides in this
“relatively consistency”, this consistency is the very “support” of the law. Meantime, difference appears on the indexing of identity, degrees of identity that will support the creation of the law, but that they represent the very process of existence or appearing into the world. Change is what irrupts in any process of existence of the multiplicity of the being, offering a new set of possibilities in this world, that were not there before this irruption. Nonetheless, we can still ask how this process of change happens in the world and which its degrees are. Badiou marks the point of degrees of identity and how an envelope is ready for the elements of any set to be fully existent in the world. But we need to address change and existence as something that we can localize in the world. Therefore, we need a function that measures this change in the world with regards to laws of existence. This function is violence, which represents the function of change. We can detach violence of any predicative postulate addressed to drama, hatred, brutality, violation or empowerment and relocate it as a purely function to trace change and existence at this point. Again, this is not an exercise of regulation of violence, instead this is an analysis concerning the very regulation of change as such and any alteration of a regulation sustaining this phenomenon. It can be visible in daily basis, since it is living itself what represents change too. Human activity as such, at any level of civic dimension, is endorsed by transformation and change. As Badiou points out “[t]o live is to participate, point by point in the organization of a new body, in which a faithful subjective formalism comes to take root” (Badiou 2009a, 35). It is an active participation what Badiou demands, in the transformation of the form, the regulating laws that need the supportive boost of existence in the mode of change. This rooting process represents the establishment of degrees of identity with regards to the transcendental. However, we
must recall that this transcendental is an immanent force for Badiou, since truths as universal forces remain subjective. In addition, Badiou explains that “under the name of ‘subject’, is the history of a new form, as it is incorporated in works” since “[t]he real of a subject resides in the consequences (consequences in a world) of the relation, which constitutes this subject, between a trace and a body” (Badiou 2009a, 81). Therefore, Badiou reminds loyal to an idea that describes his whole thought, namely, the one that states that there are only bodies and languages, except that there are truths. It is the materiality of bodies and the formalism of languages what is interrupted by truths, subjective and universal they are. In consequence, change as interruption of this continuity between languages and bodies is what is at stake, and the degree of this change is only measurable and understandable from the perspective of violence. Violence embodies any mechanism that formalism (languages) and materialism (bodies) take part simultaneously. We can note this approach is a direct consequence of Badiou’s perspective in the moment he describes accurately the kinds of consequences and the modalities of the subject:

The first modality is an opening: it continually opens up a new possible closest to the possibilities of the old world. The second modality (…) is a point. In the first case, the subject presents itself as an infinite negotiation with the world, whose structures it stretches and opens. In the second case, it presents itself both as a decision –whose localization is imposed by the impossibility of the open- and as the obligatory forcing of the possible (Badiou 2009a, 82).

In this twofold conceptualization of the faithful subject Badiou is outlining the irreversible nature of subject itself, trapped in the secular struggle between identity and
difference; into a world that is ready to negotiate in the basis of nothingness, out of any foresee calculation. Here Badiou is opting for an interpretation of negotiation that Derrida already posed. As Derrida points out “[o]ne does not negotiate between exchangeable and negotiable things. Rather, one negotiates by engaging the nonnegotiable in negotiation” (Derrida 2002, 13). It is a negotiation upon what is not possible, yet. And it is exactly what Badiou presents as new set of possibilities, an opening on the possibilities itself. It is a negotiation upon nothingness, the impossibility of possibilities. Thus, it is a negotiation for change and a management of the consequences of this change what subject has to face. It is a forcing the possibilities, it is not a gentle agreement between multiple actors about the terms of a civic society has to be. It is forcing throughout differences of each element in society what brings out a new set of possibilities in politics, social and intellectual arena and aesthetics, acting from a hierarchical position. In short, this statement poses the idea of a relation with no-relation. It is a mode to criticize a Habermasian approach to the problem of identity what Badiou is doing. It is not agreement but acceptance of the transcendental in the mode of consequences and understanding what comes after it as a new set of possibilities that were not there in the old world, what he is trying to explain. Badiou develops this argument explaining how this faithful subject enters the process of universal truths that interrupt the continuity of the old world. Hitherto, we are trying to describe change with regards to existence. We must note how change and existence are closely link as the interruption of being as such, in its multiplicity, and the development of new set of belonging relations or meanings to the world. Violence, as a classic term introduced for describing interruption or an abrupt schism, presents itself as most appropriate function of change itself. It encloses the
unbearable transformation latent in change in the one hand, and the unleashing sustain of freedom in the other. Nonetheless, Badiou describes the process of incorporating subject into truth process with regards to four signals:

Four affects signal the signal the incorporation of a human animal into a subjective truth-process. The first testifies to the desire for a Great Point, a decisive discontinuity that will institute the new world in a single blow, and complete the subject. We will call it terror. The second testifies to the fear of points, the retreat before the obscurity of the discontinuous, of everything that imposes a choice without guarantee between two hypotheses. To put it otherwise, this affect signals the desire for a continuity, for a monotonous shelter. We will call it anxiety. The third affirms the acceptance of the plurality of points, of the fact that discontinuities are at once inexorable and multiform. We will call it courage. The fourth affirms the desire for the subject to be a constant intrication of points and openings. (Badiou 2009a, 86)

I claim that terror, anxiety and courage –along with platonic idea of justice that we shall add next- can be reduced to the idea of violence. Whatever the outcomes of terror in the mode of imposition upon the idea of the conditional –an always worse- world can be reduced to the possibilities of existence of the faithful subject in the actuality of the world. Anxiety, clearly referring to a Sartrean approach to the term of anguish, is a subjectivity effect that change provokes altering the continuity of the subject and world at the same time, erasing any distance between them and transforming both instantly. Sartre points out how “my anxiety would come from lack of knowing the real and effective incentives which in the darkness of the unconscious determine my action” (Sartre 1956, 33). We have to remark that for Sartre action equals to being, and thus, anxiety is also a determinant factor for the being of the subject, which has to deal with the infinity and unthinkable of the real. Anxiety is the moment of the advent of the revolutionary event.
Finally courage, as an act of fidelity of the faithful subject, needs to be attached to a deep change, a memorable and even historicist change in the world where to locate this fidelity and assume the consequences of this change. Violence as a function of change can measure, as we shall see in Chapter III, the degree of change that responds to this point of view, describing the change operating at this level, namely, the level of existence. With regards to the concept of existence, Badiou continues saying that “[w]ith respect to the pre-eminence of becoming-subject, it affirms the equivalence of what is continuous and negotiated, on the one hand, and of what is discontinuous and violent, on the other” (Badiou 2009a, 86). If this equivalence is possible must be enclosed in a point of the pre-eminent subject in its becoming process is emancipated of any determination. This leads to surpass a negative dialectic, a keystone of the Hegelian dialectic, and dig into an affirmative dialectic, a dialectic that from a complete lack of determination is able to provoke an equivalence between the two dimensions. In doing so, a negative dialectic will lead to a process of repetition, since negation (even within a dialectical mechanism) owns the feature of revisiting the situation that is negated. Whilst, an affirmative dialectic incorporates an openness that will have the undecidable (an openness in the midst of the subjectivity moment of truth) as a main feature at the moment of intervention. If this equivalence happens in a moment named event is because of the unruly irruption of violence as a function of change, changing the coordinates and axes of existence qua existence. As Badiou points out finally “[t]hese are merely subjective modalities, which depend on the construction of the subject in a world and on the capacities of the body to produce effects within it. They are not hierarchically ordered. War can have as much value as peace, negotiation as much as struggle, violence as much as gentleness. This
affect, whereby the categories of the act are subordinated to the contingency of the worlds, we will call justice” (Badiou 2009b, 86). If there is not yet a hierarchy order on the values of creation is because there is not yet an ethical evaluation on progress. These means that the equivalence previously described rests on the incapacity to evaluate a process of change that affects existence as existence. There is not still an aesthetic refutation that is a keystone for any ethical valid evaluation, beyond any humanistic approach of course. This point of view validates the fact that violence, as a function of change, cannot provide a legit ethical evaluation of the situation; yet, the exercise of power, created precisely in the moment of change, can be linked in respect to violence as change. And this link can indeed be ordered hierarchically, grounded in logical axioms, to establish a non-reversible relationship between them, due to both the ethical issue and the existential dimension. We can establish this order in the basis of the world, the faithful subject and the generic and universal dimension of the change. In consequence, it is relevant to establish the basis for this subject that appears in the world. Badiou summarizes the idea in the sentence “[t]he generic name of a subjective construction is ‘truth’” (Badiou 2009a, 85). What does Badiou mean with the subjective construction? This construction is not a given being, a mere object that is ready to be thrown into the world, as Heidegger would point out. It is a construction that must make truth bearable, in the generic dimension of identity, with regards to the degree of differences. This subjectivity is not ready-to-hand or present-at-hand pre-status. As Badiou points out “[h]ow can one make the truth of the audible heard without passing through the in-audible? It is like wanting truth to be ‘human’, when it is its in-humanity which assures its existence.” (Badiou 2009a, 85). It is this in-humanity, emancipated of all determination
possible, the one that acquires humanity in a new world. Appearing in the world, therefore offers a new condition due to the change promoted by this appearing. It is necessary to go through the void of possibilities, the null point, the only way to reach the goal of our perception of the world. Phenomenology therefore acquires a new dimension in Badiou. As he points out “our operational phenomenology identifies the condition of possibility for the worldliness of a world, or the logic of the localization for being-there of any being whatever” (Badiou 2009a, 103). There is a localization, a necessity of a world, however there are multiple worlds according to the multiplicity of being itself. In a simple and axiomatic way, Badiou describes this phenomenology as follows:

a. A minimum of appearance is given.
b. The possibility of conjoining the values of appearance of two multiples (and therefore of any finite number of multiples).
c. The possibility of globally synthesizing the values of appearance of any number of multiples, even if there is an infinity of them (Badiou 2009a, 103)

In consequence, phenomenon appears at least in a minimum degree in a world with a set of conjoining values or belonging relationships, and with a possibility to synthesize or understand under the laws of logic this appearing. In other words, law is what comes to the encounter of the change in its logical dimension, existence is embodied in law once the process is stable as a dynamic entity. However, the indexing of existence evokes that change is not a change of material nature. This breaking point with the old world’s possibilities forces to draw consequences of a world with complete new possibilities, unreachable before the event, which irrupts with no attachment to ethical evaluation due to a formal impossibility to have an aesthetic development, yet. Here, we are describing
the same scenario we were placing at the beginning of the chapter. We have a faithful subject that expands the multiplicity of its being, which comes to existence in the moment of most pure lack of determination. This status provokes a deeper development of belonging relationships in what Badiou calls “envelope”, which introduces to the Law of the world this subject. However, the degree of identity defined by difference is not a determinacy, but a process to achieve generic dimension and construct subjectivity towards the universalism of truths. In other words “[t]he key to thinking appearing, when it comes to a singular being, lies in being able to determine, at one and the same time, the self-difference which makes it so that being-there is not being-qua-being, and the difference from others which makes it so that being-there, or the law of the world which is shared by these others, does not abolish being-qua-being.” (Badiou 2009a, 117).

Differences are not banished but they define the degree of identity, however elusive to the real of existence. It is the human condition, in the mode of existence what is elusive. As Lacan points out very brief but strongly “[t]he Thing is, in effect, involved insofar as it is defined by the fact that it defines human factor – although, as we know, the human factor escapes us.” (Lacan 1959-1960, 124). This, however, does not affect at the ontological level. Thinking appearing involves twofold thinking. And this is because of the crucial role of change in the whole process. It is what is unbearable in a constant mode, as the Thing is for Lacan, but however dehumanizes subject for that effect. Violence as a function on change exploits the vision of multiple worlds that do not vanish the Thing itself, or being-qua-being as Badiou points out, but creates a new set of possibilities, beyond any futuristic approach that transforms collectivity status with regards to the world. It goes beyond changing localization, it intended to change what change represents
itself. As Badiou continues saying “[i]f appearing is a logic, it is because it is nothing but the coding of these differences, world by world” (Badiou 2009a, 117). It is the codification onto a formal language, language of mathematics in our case, what makes possible to think appearing as such. Existence belongs to formal structure of thinking. There is a multiple factor for the localization, and this links with the idea of Badiou of breaking a local finitude with a universal infinity. We only can think existence -the phenomenon as such- with the human factor that escapes us because is immersed in a change process, always already. This unbearable nature of the phenomenon is what causes what both Badiou and Sartre bring up the concepts of “anxiety” and “anguish”. In Badiou´s words “´anxiety´ is to be understood here as a creative affect, to the extent that this creation still governed by the opening rather than by the abruptness of points” (Badiou 2009a, 87). This is a development of what Sartre calls “anguish” in his investigations on being and nothingness. It is anguish what precedes in this case the conceptualization as an open source for creativity of anguish. As Sartre points out “I am my Future in the constant perspective of the possibility of not being it. Hence that anguish which we have described above which springs from the fact that I am not sufficiently that Future which I have to be and which gives its meaning to my present: t is because I am a being whose meaning is always problematic” (Sartre 1956, 129). We can read here that self being is a problematic always due to its twofold nature, as we have read from Badiou. It is divided and only thinkable only at the same time as an opening and closure of possibilities offered within a world that can be at the same time old and completely new. It is this elusive identity, based on an indexing of transcendental and embodied in existence of being, where Sartre sees the problem of anguish and Badiou
overcomes this perspective with anxiety. It is anxiety of existence, of change at a
hegemonic level. It is a change that affects the Law. It is again a return to the Law with
another Law which we do not know, yet. At this point an opera serves us to describe
throughout a theatrical level some features that are obliterated from the “real” level. In
other words, the split between virtual reality (theatre) and real virtuality (reality) is
described in Badiou´s words when he talks about the opera by Maeterlinck-Dukas, posing
it as an example of appearing when points out that “[t]he opera is essentially about the
visibility of deliverance, about the fact that it is not enough for freedom to be (in this case
under the name and the acts of Ariadne), but that freedom must also appear, in particular
to those who are deprived of it” (Badiou 2009a, 115). There is the deprived group,
generated by the system itself that more than using freedom as ready-to-hand tool, must
make it appear into the world. Here Badiou gets close to the concept of radical freedom
in Sartre, developing even in a sharper manner, observing that it is not freedom what is at
stake, but the very possibility of freedom what must be granted. Once existence is stored
in the world, it becomes mere probability, a future known in excess. Then, we are forced
to talk on mathematical language about it, about being. Somehow, this concept of
freedom of appearing can be described with the magic tricks of a magician. Making
objects appear and disappear by the artist is not freedom. In fact, it is a game of illusion,
where freedom is based more strongly on delusion. It is not the capability of the magician
to make appear a rabbit out of his hat, but about creating the possibilities for a rabbit, or
an elephant or a transatlantic to appear. As Badiou marks recalling Ariadne´s words in the
opera “‘First, one must disobey: it’s the first duty when the order is menacing and refuses
to explain itself’” (Badiou 2009a, 115). If one disobeys the Law is creating a discontinuity
within it, namely, a change. Since Law establishes a hegemonic routine, change affects the hegemonic dimension. We know from Gramsci that the idea of hegemony addresses to “the phase in which previously germinated ideologies become ‘party’, come into confrontation (…) until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail (…) creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups. It is true that the State is seen as the organ of one particular group, destined to create favourable conditions for the latter’s maximum expansion. But the development and expansion of the particular group are conceived of, as presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the ‘national´ energies” (Gramsci 1992, 181-182). Gramsci is able to gather in this piece of text the elements conforming any hegemonic situation; namely, political, economical, social and intellectual elements that shape the condition of hegemony. It is Law what rules over these levels. And it is the imposition for the finite prevalence of Law what is describing. Violence on hegemonic level supposes, as we shall see below, changing Law. Ariadne´s claim is to disobey precisely this Law that is not explained or argued beyond the realm of opinions and journalistic associations with reality. It is a duty with regards to the idea of fidelity to justice, or the prevalence of values between contingent elements of acts, with regards to contingency of worlds. Justice and punishment are themes that belong to the core of philosophy as such. Only gods are able to apply in one sole movement punishment and justice at the same time. Humans, since Greek tradition, debate measuring the factors that are applicable for citizens in order to exercise one or the other. Punishment and justice display the antagonism forces that drive any ethical question for humanity, however unsolved and opened to debate. This antagonistic battleground can be
overcome only in terms of affirmative dialectics. Existence therefore is deployed in the world with a complete set of belonging relationships, and not only a set of references where to articulate the expression of this world.

We can “translate” all what we have said until now to a political or social arena, we can explain better cases of dictatorship, free-fighters and terrorist dichotomies, counter terrorism and state terrorism cases or criminal activity versus revolutionary processes. Any activity mentioned above has a common feature the relationship it establishes with Law. It is the defense, defeat, struggle or imposition of Law what it´s at stake in these examples. Nonetheless, this mediation cannot be understood without the function of change with regards to existence. It is Law, in the mode of logic, what regulates and makes thinkable existence of being. But it is also a reality that Law is ruling the civic existence of subjects. In consequence, when we talk about violence as a function of change, we must conceive it as the set of possibilities that are not probabilities, yet. Any change on the status of possibilities into real probabilities modifies the existence and status of Law, giving or suspending it´s crucial support.

In other words, in order to establish any distinctive characteristic between a creator of terror or freedom fighter, we can take into account the possibilities that each of them can place into the world to be ready-to-hand as real probabilities. In case of terror, which is no more than a constant threat with a conditional existence of a worse scenario (an alternative world that is already created in the mind of the terrorist), there are not really new possibilities offered but a clear and stern fixation into the desired probabilities by the
terrorist, so to say, closer to a religious or political claim by imposing an existing status quo. Whilst, in case of freedom fighter, there is an attempt to create a new set of possibilities in order to construct normally a group of political probabilities that do not only affect a reduced group of population –which is the common case of a terrorist threat- but an universal change in the social and economic conditions of an entire society. Two conditions are reached at this point. In one hand, there is a recapitulation of existence itself, bringing into the world new possibilities with regards to social universe. Secondly, there is a universal conceptualization of subjectivity itself, a universalization of society indeed. In consequence, any hegemonic change involves a change in Law, in the mode world is ruled. This may imply from possible worlds conceived only in physics theory, where actual physic laws are altered, to worlds where social rules are evolved, transformed or improved. This links with the idea of envelop as a set of belonging relations Badiou presents. It is a change on the ruling system of these belonging relations that are established within society, what real changes on the existents that are represented in society. Violence presents in this way the most adequate perspective to understand the degrees of change, since violence itself extends its implications from ontological grounds to existential dimension. It is the irruption of violence presenting a complete set of degrees of change what interrupts the continuity of the old world and also all the entities (atoms) that constitute the forming subjectivity of that world.

At this point of the process, we can observe that no ethical consideration is relevant, since there is not a sequence of facts but a subsequence of possibilities that start to rule the world a provide a new support to the Law. It is after, a not before, the consolidation of
possibilities into probabilities where any ethical grounding is relevant. Power operates over probabilities, and violence on possibilities. In other words, power manages any real possibilities, whilst violence provokes the emancipation of impossibilities. In addition, and completing the argument with Lacan’s approach to the ethical issue, at the moment of change there is no direct access to beauty, as main factor to underlie any real ethical evaluation of the situation. As Lacan points out “moral law, the moral command, the presence of moral agency in our activity, insofar as it is structured by the symbolic, is that through which the real is actualized – the real as such, the weight of the real” (Lacan 1959-1960, 20). It is the unbearable access to the real, through the symbolic dimension of Law that embodies any possibility of Real itself, what actualized, renewed by a new set of possibilities that cannot be accessible, ready-to-hand, until an aesthetic thought is deployed. As Lacan continues saying further on “Freud evokes there [in the Thing] his sublimation concerning the death instinct insofar as that sublimation is fundamentally creationist” (Lacan 1959-1960, 213). Sublimation is attached to an aesthetic dimension, always already. In other words, beauty as sublime actress mediates with the unbearable. This unbearable scenario, the place for impossibility, is exactly the backyard of the old world with finite set of probabilities. It is throughout beauty that desire becomes bearable. At this point, we notice how far desire is from violence, and how close results to link it to power, even at a first intuitive level. However, if desire definitely dresses power, we can understand how beauty manages this desire, and in consequence provoke a scenario where ethics are possible. As Lacan points out “it has been no less apparent – from the thought of antiquity down to Saint Thomas who has some valuable dungs to say on the question- that the beautiful has the effect, I would say, of suspending, lowering,
disarming desire. The appearance of beauty intimidates and stops desire” (Lacan 1959-1960, 238). Only through sublimation we acquire an ethical mode of thinking, and only throughout beauty sublimation appears and makes beauty appear at the same time. Here, if violence is a function of change with regards to existence, we cannot link it yet, as we shall see, to any ethical evaluation. Violence as a mere function of change, when it comes to existence, manifests the irruption of being into appearing. In other words, presented being becomes represented within a site or world. This change, not merely changes Law of being, but changes Law of site, connecting it through void to a new set of possibilities. These possibilities can only be deployed in a conception of void that emancipates possibilities that are not yet. If this status of advent or getting involved into existence is truthful, we are ready to affirm that violence as a function of change at logical level, emancipates existence from being, since it is change on basis of representation of being in the world what results from this change. Change at level of existence is not related to phenomenology, but to the change of being with regards to a given world or site, where this being appears. Violence, dressed as a function, is there to establish the degree of change, in this case, the hegemonic change with regards to social and political grounds within the historical frame.

ii) Change and Being

The phenomenon of appearing in a world is internally connected to the nature of being. We face the mathematical reality of being any time we try to cling with the essence of it.
Nonetheless, there is room for change in being. We are facing here a more “chemical” understanding of being with regards to change. We face a twofold paradox when we start to analyze being in its ontological reality, with regards to the concept of change. The paradoxical situation attends to the impossibility of being to know itself, with regards to the change an event provokes in a site. Here we face again change as something unbearable by being, but paradoxically entitled to it as the mode of being of the Other. And it is the Other, as the main name for the void, what executes this paradox. Badiou puts us on the right track when we says that “[t]he paradox of an evental-site is that it can only be recognized on the basis of what it does not present in the situation in which it is presented. Indeed, it is only due to it forming-one from multiples which are inexistent in the situation that a multiple is singular, thus subtracted from the guarantee of the state” (Badiou 2005, 192). The evental-site stands for the historical moment in a world where an event takes place. However, event as such is recognizable in the paradoxical way by what is not presented. Multiple refers to the multiplicity of being-qua-being, and it is on the basis of this multiplicity that there is an access to presentation, or to the presentation of presentation (representation). As Badiou points out, in the gap between the representation and presentation, there is only throughout void that change can be grasped. This paradox, yet, must be assumed not as a pure negativity invoked by void, but as an affirmative dialectic breath.

Void, so to say, is the source of Hegelian spirit, one might say. Paradox, beyond a dead-end, implies an impossibility. But this impossibility for mind to be counted, and therefore to be involved in the process of forming-one, must be regarded as a source of
possibilities. Change operates here at the stage of pre-counting access to the counting of
the multiple, into the one. Change also provokes the sequence of historical and natural
condition of being. In this manner, we can see clearly the sequence between them and
also the crucial gap separating them. As Badiou notes “[i]n the ontological situation, a
pure multiple is natural (is an ordinal) if it is founded by the void alone, and if everything
which belongs to it is equally founded by the void alone (since everything which belongs
to an ordinal is an ordinal). It is a void-foundation of void-foundation.” (Badiou 2005,
189). This statement evokes the lack of a lack. We cannot talk about creation with regards
to the presentation of being as a multiple in a site. We only talk about foundation, in this
case precisely, on basis of void and only by void that this multiplicity presents in a world.

We must keep in mind, how existence reminds creational via sublation, whilst being
reminds foundational. In the other hand, Badiou explains that “[i]n the ontological
situation, according to the axiom of foundation, to every pure multiple there always
belongs at least one Other-multiple, or site. However, we will say that a set formalizes a
historical situation if at least one Other multiple belongs to it which is not the name of the
void. This time it is thus a simple foundation by the other-than-void.” (Badiou 2005,
189). There is a transcendence therefore that provokes a foundation other-than-the-name-
of-the-void. Void, as we can see is only nameable, restricted to our experience and only
incorporated as what-is-not-yet, namely, its name. Ironically, event is only recognizable
in same terms. However, event as the main name for the Other, has the capability of
gathering a foundation of multiplicity. Being since it is something else than void, it
cannot escape to the mathematical axiomatic nature of itself, forcing this foundation to a
historical site. Even in an intuitive manner, we observe the gap between ontological and
ontic-ontological positions of foundations, with regards precisely of void. We can
perceive better this gap with Badiou’s words when he says that “a gap is noticeable
between ontology and the thought of other presentations, or beings, or non-ontological
presentations, a gap which is due to the position of the void” (Badiou 2005, 188). In the
mathematical reality examined by Badiou with regards to being, ontological universal
multiplicities are able to present themselves and the world at the same time in a manner
that is not purely mathematical. This is the gap Badiou is able to discover, however, not
in a unique manner since Lacan relates to a same nature of gap with respect to void, or
lack. As Lacan points out “[t]he gap of the unconscious may be said to be pre-ontological
(…) [this] becomes apparent to anyone in analysis who spends some time observing what
truly belongs to the order to the unconscious, is that it is neither being, nor non-being, but
the unrealized” (Lacan 1978, 29-30). We can observe that this lack comes to be realizable
but it is in the process, it is an advent. Badiou tries to display the same scenario in his
schema, where void plays a significant role, not as a negativity but as a source of some
kind of affirmative dialectic.

The consequences of this perspective locates void in a determinant position with regards
to being, multiplicity onto the world that is countable as one and become a natural entity.
However, as Lacan and Badiou remark, void or lack present their presentation and come
across multiplicities from a transcendental and become into an historic approach of the
happening. Nevertheless, we observe how void is that middle of the center of the
perspective adopted by both. In consequence, void represents a status of pre-ontological
order that can only rooted by the Other that is still to come, the advent in the form of
presenting itself and the being of itself at the same time, namely, the event. Again, we
face the fact that it is change in mode of natural or historical consequence of being what
completes the conceptualization. Accordingly, we find Lacan claiming for the same idea
when he says that “there springs up a misunderstood form of the un, the Un of the
Unbewusste. Let us say that the limit of the Unbewusste is the Unbegriff – not the non-
concept, but the concept of lack” (Lacan 1978, 26). The concept of unconscious serves to
Lacan to approach the meaning of lack. It is not about placing an object that is absence to
address to lack. There must be a site and an affirmative outcome coming from lack to be
determined as such. If Lacan affirms that unconscious is a pre-ontological is because
unconscious comes before the act of counting as one from the subject. It is a pre-
mathematical status if we want. And there is a pre-mathematical status in Badiou´s
approach as well when void is determining the natural or historical ontological situation.
If void determines the reference as The transcendental, we are talking about a
transcendence that surpasses transcendence itself, therefore an immanent force that
formally determines any transcendence. In consequence, following this line of
argumentation, change is perceived with regards to natural or historical ontological
situation but any change has an absolute value. This is because any absolute value is what
is posed in any degree of identity or lack of difference.

Again, there will be no real change of meaning, since we are dealing with the
emancipation of being from void, both in natural or historical situation with regards to a
site. In consequence, we face a metonymic phenomenon in this case. It is a change of
content with elements that *are* already there, there is no new material and possibilities emerging. However, change happens in mode of *transference*. We can understand this transference phenomenon if we analyze how ontology does not allow any event, or major change in the law and form of the site and elements of a given set that have direct intervention. Let’s depart from Badiou’s words when he says that “[i]t must be taken quite literally: ontology has nothing to say about the event. Or, to be more precise, ontology demonstrates that the event is not, in the sense in which it is a theorem of ontology that all self belonging contradicts a fundamental Idea of the multiple, the Idea which prescribes the foundational finitude of origin for all presentation.” (Badiou 2005, 190). We must be aware that ontology, mathematical form, does not allow an event. Radically denies any possibility of change of the Law, event as a possibility is not allowed to hold any possibility for a foundational moment itself. As Badiou remarks, this would end with the Idea of multiplicity, an infinite demonstration of the finitude of all presentation. In other words, Idea as an infinite multiplicity does not fit in the finitude of the ontological description of the site as being-in-the-world. As Badiou continues saying “[t]he axiom of foundation de-limits being by the prohibition of the event. It thus brings forth that-which-is-not-being-qua-being as a point of impossibility of the discourse on being-qua-being, and it exhibits its signifying emblem: the multiple such as it presents itself, in the brilliance, in which being is abolished, of the mark-of-one” (Badiou 2005, 190). In sum, as the count-as-one represented by the mathematical form of absorbing being-qua-being is abolished, any presentation of the multiplicity in its infinite form breaks into the site. This means that ontology—the mathematical language of being-qua-being—only will be able to talk about the consequences of the event, or major change, that
interrupts any world’s Law. It is not possible to talk about the impossibility as such from a world limited by possibilities, in this sense.

Nonetheless, we can dig into this perspective and present the idea of ontological change as this “unthinkable” transformation or interruption in world’s Law. Whenever we analyze what is in a world, any interruption of this mode of being can be grasped intuitively as what we are. Any interruption of what we are, in social, biological or political basis, is easy to trace down. However, this changes that are captive of the ontological theorem, are only bearable by the consequences of this change. We can place the example of dying here, which will be explained below, to describe the degrees of change and the theoretical implications of them. Every time someone dies, nobody else is able to experiment his death, and we only can get closer to this major change by the surrounding consequences of it. Such an event, even when is “experienced” in first person, is unbearable following world’s Law. It is an interruption of this Law that mathematically is only observable on the basis of the consequences generated. It supposes an absolute change that however, is recomposed in the Law of the world as a retroactive happening. Again, whenever any major genocide happens, it only is recognized as such once it is inscribed into an historical discourse that follows the Law of the world.

However, these consequences are not scientific certainties, but are rooted in a complete undecidability. As Badiou points out “the consequences of an event, being submitted to structure, cannot be discerned as such. I have underlined this undecidability according to
which the event is only possible if special procedures conserve the evental nature of its consequences. This is why its sole foundation lies in a discipline of time, which controls from beginning to end the consequences of the introduction into circulation of the paradoxical multiple, and which at any moment knows how to discern its connection to chance.” (Badiou 2005, 211). Badiou inscribes the consequences of any evental phenomenon as the historical motif to incorporate them into the Law of the world. Paying close attention to these words we discover how even after being incorporated to the discipline of time, the consequences of any event are still undecidable, out of any certainty, since they are not indexed by the Transcendental, and are only incorporated throughout the mathematical language to the Law of the world, as elements with a belonging relation to the world, and not an inclusive relationship to it. This is where “chance” is playing its role, leaving opened a window for the degree of identity with regards to difference as a determining factor for it. Badiou ends up this statement adding that “[I] will call this organized control of time fidelity.” (Badiou 2005, 211). It is a fidelity to the Law of the world and to the evental nature what is claimed here. This twofold fidelity in the line of historic narration ensures the belonging relation to the world but shows an opened attitude for any coming and unpredictable event. It is a fidelity that is embodied in the chance for change at ontological level, that is to say, a fidelity to what is impossible, to pure infinite impossibility, in this case.

However, and this is the keystone of being twofold, this fidelity can only be rooted from a being-there-in-the-world, namely, in a finite situation ruled by Law. We understand this paradoxical position when Badiou defines the even saying that “[t]he site is only ever a
condition of being for the event. Of course, if the situation is natural compact, or neutral, the event is impossible. But the existence of a multiple on the edge of the void merely opens up the possibility of an event” (Badiou 2005, 179). We only need some kind of interruption of finitude on the edge of the void to open up the closure of established impossibility and have access to a complete new set of possibilities embodied in the event. In other words, the event that provokes this absolute change at ontological level is impossible-as-such that can only be related by its consequences. Badiou continues saying how “(…) the event [is the one] which belongs to conceptual construction, in the double sense that it can only be thought by anticipating its abstract form, and it can only be revealed in the retroaction of an interventional practice which is itself entirely thought through.” (Badiou 2005, 178). There is no count-as-one reality in the event, since it is pure being and in consequence pure multiplicity what presents in the world, and yet event has a double link to the construction of the concept of itself, and the revelation of the event through thinking process that can only go through it, since it has no graspable structure to stop by on it. Continuing with Badiou’s approach, he estates that “the event is a one-multiple made up of, on the one hand, all the multiples which belong to its site, and on the other hand, the event itself.” (Badiou 2005, 179). This twofold nature of the event poses the question of certainty. If being is certain is because of the finite set of possibilities that are attached to a given world or site.

The event interrupts this certainty with the incorporation in the mode of consequence of itself belonging at the same time to the multiples of the world. This means that we can equal certainty with finitude and uncertainty with infinite. However, we can observe that
the natural uncertainty is already an inscription in the “post-world” since it is this world which is in the edge-of-the-void as a site. We can understand better this uncertainty nature of the event following Badiou’s words when he adds that “[t]he inscription of a *matheme of the event* is not a luxury here. Say that $S$ is the situation, and $X \in S$ ($X$ belongs to $S$, $X$ is the presented by $S$) the evental site. The event will be written $e_x$ (to be read ‘event of the site $X$’). My definition is then written as follows: $e_x = (x \in X, e_x)$” (Badiou 2005, 179). There is, as we can observe, a belonging relation prior to any inclusive relation. Belonging relations rest upon uncertainty, there is no knowledge of the exclusivity axiomatic knowledge that can assure an element belonging to one set that is not under the scrutiny of doubt as a method to make such an affirmation. First, there is a presentation and after that there is a presentation of presentation in the world of the event. This order however is not divided into a timeline. There is an order of logical hierarchy that nonetheless makes no separation or split between the two phenomena. We must understand this uncertainty in basis of undecidability. In other words, Badiou says how “its [event’s] belonging to the situation of its site is undecidable from the standpoint of the situation itself” (Badiou 2005, 181). Only when we cannot decide about any possibility, the phenomenon of impossibility appears. It is, in other words, the unthinkable what presents first as itself and then there is a (re)representation of inscription into the world. This distinction happens to be a historical one, however, as we have mentioned above, there is not distance between presentation and (re)presentation, and this is what precisely provokes this undecidability. At this point, we are in a better position to appreciate how change operates at level of being. It is this change, an absolute change, what interrupts the world. It is absolute with regards to the decidable situation of
the world itself, to the finitude nature and certain status of it. As Badiou points out, there is an historical and natural operational ground in this case that fits for change. Violence, in this case, supports the idea of change at the level of absolute. It is a change of natural and historical foreground, but at the frame that is containing the content as content. It is a change of the content, not at hegemonic level, but at an absolute level. It is world as a material entity that changes absolutely. We can see this clearly when Badiou points out that “an event is not (does not coincide with) an evental-site. It ´mobilizes´ the elements of its site, but it adds its own presentation to the mix” (Badiou 2005, 182). It is easier to grasp this idea with the rhetoric figure of metonymy, presented to us as a combination of meanings already presented in the cultural background of the speaker. There is an addition of meaning to the whole of the cultural reality that is presented in this case. However, there is not a change of the culture as such. Event does not coincide with the evental site in this very sense metonymy operates as cultural mobilizing effect. Whilst metonymy represents a limited example of the image of the event versus the evental-site, we can affirm that the change itself supports the idea of the evental site with regards to the presentation of the event itself. Violently presenting itself in the world, event does not change the world but incorporates the event to itself. This supposes again an absolute change, a change that operates mainly on ontological basis, at this stage. We cannot measure this change without thinking violence as we shall see further on, namely, as the function that gives access to the very idea of change in purely ontological grounds.

Another good example for this manner of changing can be observed in ideology. Ideology is the envelope of human activity at many levels. However, any ideological perspective is
perceived as filter that can distort or transform the view of reality. This not affect to reality itself, but to the perception of reality. There is no coincidence between reality and this perception, but there is still a relation. Ideology transforms reality without having any contact to it and yet is able to preserve a relation to it. To put it in a Marxism claim “they don’t know what they are doing, but nonetheless they are doing it” instantiates the classical view of ideology. Slavoj Žižek analyzed this mechanism in his film “Pervert’s Guide to Ideology” (Žižek 2013), determining that ideology is a mode of necessary evil to deal with truth. Truth is not something comfortable, and as a matter of fact hurts, therefore ideology operates upon reality in order to make it bearable and subjective at the same time. Anytime an event operates in a site we have something very different that can be called a critique of ideology. This places the idea of a subject facing the distorted vision of reality facilitated by ideology, acquiring a consciousness of this distortion and being able to think an Idea that can transform this rigid scope incorporated by bare ideology. Again, change operates at absolute level both in classical ideology or critique of ideology as such.

Finally, I want to add a last example of change that is observed in a post-evental site. We shall contribute with two concepts that have a crucial role in this type of situation. This importance will be observable especially once we are able to translate these theoretical approaches into social or political grounds. Therefore, we have to introduce the concepts of intervention and function of choice. We can firstly analyzing the function of choice, that must be understood separately from the definition of freedom. There is a crucial characterization of the subject in the concept of freedom that is not presentable in the
function of change. We can address ourselves to the definition of radical freedom in Sartre to see this distinction more clearly. In Sartre the subject is able to create, through void, any new chance or possibility to be able to choose afterwards. It is not a matter of choice but a moment where the subject is still able to go throughout nothingness in a moment of creativity to asset for himself a new set of possibilities. It is the intellect of the subject the one that is able to scrutinize the limits of the world and set a postulate with regards to the conditions of present. What is at stake in the function of choice is the problem of presentation and representation. Basically the function of choice rests upon the features of illegality and anonymity. Let’s explain what this means following Badiou’s approach. As Badiou points out “[i]n its final form it [the function of choice] posits that given a multiple of multiples, there exists a multiple composed of a ‘representative’ of each non-void multiple whose presentation is assured by the first multiple. In other words, one can ‘choose’ an element from each of the multiples which make up a multiple, and one can ‘gather together’ these chosen elements: the multiple obtained in such a manner is consistent, which is to say, it exists.” (Badiou 2005, 224). In this manner, any representative can be considered real or existent. We can develop this idea further and obtain in consequence a formula like this:

$$\forall \alpha \exists f(\alpha) [(\beta \in \alpha) \rightarrow f(\beta) \in \beta]$$

We can read this formula saying that for every multiple \( \square \) exists a function for this multiple correspondent that chooses a representative in each of the multiples. This
choosing process crops up in the world, as an inscription into existence. However, it is not presented as a countable moment. It is abstracted from this count-as-one level. As Badiou points out “[t]he function of choice is subtracted from the count, and although it is declared presentable (since it exists), there is no general opening for its presentation. What is at stake here is a presentability without presentation.” (Badiou 2005, 227). It is a paradoxical situation what is described in the function of choice, where it is a choice of presentation without being presented as such. We have posed here the idea of representation in the mode of choosing an element that exists and making it existent on basis of transference. Representation however appears to be a presentability without presentation, namely, a presentation of “something” that exists but in the mode of representation is not able to grasp presentation itself. In other words, it is not countable in the world or site. Therefore, the axiom of choice regulates what is not presented yet, in a future anterior somehow. This is the mechanism that operates over what is not decidable. The best manner to display the idea of what is not presented yet but regulated somehow by a decision over something undecidable is the formula that stands as \( \int(x) \neq x \), where the function of change is where the decision happens over something that is not the element of that decision, something that is not yet.

At this point, we are able to connect the function of change with any predictability coming from any happening intervention in the world. As Badiou claims “within ontology, the axiom of choice formalizes the predicates of intervention” (Badiou 2005, 227). If the function of choice is able to formalize any predicate of intervention is because of the separation between intervention and the eventual site. Ontology cannot
attribute any predicate to the event. However, intervention, as the formalization of the consequences of event, is able to “talk” about these consequences throughout mathematical formalization. Or, as Badiou points out, we can say that “[t]he undecidability of the event’s belonging is a vanishing point that leaves a trace in the ontological Idea in which the intervention-being is inscribed: a trace which is precisely the unassignable or quasi-non-one character of the function of choice.” (Badiou 2005, 227). Representation in this manner fixes the predicative existence of intervention throughout the function of choice. It is the trace of Idea, in the mode of consequence within the site, what is predicatively possible. It is an addition coming from the evental happening what is traceable in the mode of representation, namely, a presentability without presentation. Here we are closer to perceive how illegality and anonymity are the fundamental characteristics of function of choice, which in the other side, are the foundational characteristics of intervention. If intervention and the function of choice share this conditions we can assure, in Badiou’s words, that “[t]he axiom of choice tells us: ‘there are some interventions’” (Badiou 2005, 230). We can observe a more developed statement of the same idea with regards to the event, when Badiou remarks that “it [the axiom of choice] does not guarantee the existence of multiples in the situation, but rather the existence of the intervention, grasped, however, in its pure being (…) with no reference to any event.” (Badiou 2005, 230). Taking into account how anonymity and illegality operate at ontological level, we are in condition to affirm how the function of choice operates with regards to infinity. Infinite set and notion rests in the impossibility to name it and the illegality of locating it within a finite site. However, infinity as such emanates from an immanent nothingness. Since it is a choice of an
element that exists, still we cannot affirm or concrete any isolated element of the chosen set, since these elements are indistinct for perception in the site. In other words, if we choose an element and make it existent throughout the function of choice, we cannot name it, and it will escape the legal frame of the world itself. Being within this illegal situation confronts a problem with language as such. To make completely clear what it is to be unnameable we have to return to Badiou, and pay close attention to the implications of the following paragraph:

*What is chosen by a function of choice remains unnameable. We know that for every non-void multiple β presented by a multiple α the function selects a representative: a multiple which belongs to β, \( \int (\beta) \in \beta \). But the intellectual character of the choice – the fact that one cannot in general construct and name the multiple which the function of choice is- prohibits the donation of any singularity whatsoever to the representative \( \int (\beta) \). There is a representative, but it is impossible to know which one it is; to the point that this representative has no other identity than that of having to represent the multiple to which it belongs. Insofar, as it is illegal, the function of choice is also anonymous. No proper name isolates the representative selected by the function from amongst the other presented multiples. The name of the representative is in fact a common name: ‘to belong to the multiple β and to be indiscriminately selected by \( \int \). The representative is certainly put into circulation within the situation, since I can always that a function \( \int \) exists such that, for any given β, it selects a \( \int (\beta) \) which belongs to β. In other words, for an existent multiple α, I can declare the existence of the set of representatives of the multiples which make up α, the delegation of α (…). This type of oblique in-extensionality of the delegation indicates the anonymity of the principle of representatives (Badiou 2005, 229-230).

We can grasp in this paragraph how the function of choice is crucial to understand the distance between the intervention and the event, the pure subjectivity and the unnameable irruption of the truth. Unnameable declares in this situation a statement that is unthinkable. However, there are details that are very useful for our goal to determine the
function of change and its capacity to transform any world. The character for us is the problem of representation. Change is able to provoke this phenomenon in the world that is purely presented before any intervention. Hence, function of change and function of choice are parallel functions that are able to describe the mechanisms operating at ontological level, in order to provoke both the presentation and the representation of elements in a given world. Nonetheless, the implications of the function of change give form to the manner the function of choice operates. If it there is any opportunity to establish a hierarchy by the function of choice it is because of the manifestation of the function of change. Function of change, first of all, determines the presentation of the elements that are non-existent, and the function of choice is able to establish a hierarchy between the existence former elements and their representation. However, we have to remember that the function of choice makes its selection upon what is undecidable. In other words, there is a necessity of a subjectivity to decide over what cannot be decided. Furthermore, the selection is made over a set defined with relations of belonging, a mode of relation that remains opened and thus escapes from negation. Avoiding any negativity, the function of choice validates the function of change, or the intervention in the world, since it is not a closure but a dialectical openness what is described between the decidable and the undecidable.

In sum, we now approach the main to dispositions that function of choice is able to offer. In one hand we can see the novelty of historical intervention as a mark of order or even hierarchy, which will be crucial at the moment to observe the relation of violence and power, as we shall see below. If we are able to develop this idea of order, with regards to
intervention as a mode of change, we will be able to advance the idea that there is a hierarchical order between violence and power as well. It is on the basis of the relations between intervention and change in one hand, and power and permanence in the other that we can affirm this hierarchy and order between violence and power. With this regards, we can establish a non-reversibility principle between them and therefore affirm that there is a hierarchical order between violence and power. We base our contribution in Badiou’s affirmation when he says that “[g]rasped in the isolated form of its pure being, intervention, despite the illegal appearance it assumes, in being ineffective, ultimately functions in the service of order, an even (...) of hierarchy.” (Badiou 2005, 231).

Intervention separated ontologically from event, however is designated as unnamed and illegal, but poses the idea in its pure being of order and hierarchy. Thus, the function of choice establishes the predicate emanating out of intervention that is able to escape the impossibility coming from these two conditions, namely, the no-name-predicate and illegal condition. As Badiou remarks “intervention does not draw the force of a disorder, or a deregulation of structure, from its being. It draws such from its efficacy, which requires rather the initial deregulation, the initial disfunctioning of the count which is the paradoxical evental multiple – in respect to which everything that is pronounceable of being excludes its being.” (Badiou 2005, 231). Therefore, intervention is not a deregulating force, moreover, it requires an initial evental dysfunction of the world as the logical site for itself, where its being is excluded from the proposed possibilities, thus, incorporating the evental possibilities that give access to the unnamed of the intervention.

When we try to focus this problem from the concept of change as such, we can observe how intervention is operating as a change itself, within the change provoked by the event.
Whatever the set of possibilities are in the beginning of the given world, these possibilities are “deregulated” by the incorporation of the event. This evental contribution changes any previous set of possibilities. Nonetheless, the new world as given situation of logical thinking, is proposed to be under the function of choice as the representation of the new set of possibilities that remind illegal and no-countable. In other words, to have a new set of possibilities does not guarantee the crystallization into realities, probabilities or count-as-one objects. As Badiou points out “[t]he possibility of the intervention must be assigned to the consequences of another event. It is evental recurrence which founds intervention” (Badiou 2005, 209). But again, this operates as a major change within the new world itself. It is the incorporation again of the infinite as impossibility what is named under the service of an order or hierarchy. Being so, violence occupies a hierarchical order with regards to power. Violence, as the main function of change, operates within the impossibility of the unthinkable (unnameable) that will give access to the Law and name in the new world, after the evental process. By excluding its being out of any pronounceable enunciation of the being, change operates as the obliteration of being throughout intervention, which rests at the same time under the coverage of function of choice.

This approach will help to understand the difference of degrees of change. These three degrees (absolute, hegemonic and universal) operate a three different levels, and the degrees of violence are determined by the logical site where change intervenes. If we want to observe this level of change with regards to ontological (mathematical) level, we can pose the example of what did happen within the concentration camps during the
Second World War. We can explain, very briefly since we will develop this approach in chapter III, how the process of degeneration of humanity is captive of this conceptualization of change, and in consequence, within a certain degree of violence that we will name as absolute violence. Any approach to the problem of concentration camps during the Second World War engages with the issue of the profound dehumanization these people suffered during their imprisonment. The length of the captivity of the prisoners was also a developed and deeply studied feature within the idea of the final solution. If we observe this phenomenon, we will be aware that there was not an urgency to make disappear all the bodies of men, women and children of these camps. There was certain feeling of delay in the entire process. Both, the conceptualization within a process and the delay of completely executing it, conform the main basis of the concentration camps. The process itself has to do, not with the physical elimination of a race, but with the elimination of any human condition of the subject before he dies. We only need to observe the images of the physical and mental conditions of the prisoners, to be able to capture the idea of dehumanizing as a final goal of the concentration camp. Accordingly, there is a rational understanding of this dehumanization. The methods applied, widely studied in the literature of the field, describe the rationality that goes beyond and dramatic or terrifying reading the happenings in these camps. However, what is at stake here is the process of change of the very condition of what is to be human. Bodies and minds are deprived of any conditional feature that would remind as a feature of humanity as we understand it in the Western civilization. This means the execution of the ideological background of Nazism with regards to the purity and supremacy of Arian race, versus any other specimen. Nonetheless, it declares its impossibility to achieve this
goal in the manner of the methodological execution of the theory into practice. In other words, the affirmation of the exclusive condition of humans in the Arian race requires of the biggest and most perseverant effort in history to vanish this condition from the rest of the population. This means that any attempt to destroy any link considering the main features of what we will call the human factor, in the case of the Nazi regime, takes almost more effort than actually the whole military offensive all over Europe.

Consequently we face in one hand the impossibility to erase any condition of humanity in these subjects. In the other, there is the impossibility to transform the endless process of change of the condition of human into non-humans. As we shall see, involution in Nazi terms is an action of kidnapping and keeping identity as such, whilst the revolutionary processes where differences are emancipates are based on truths.

However, the result is not a complete satisfaction, since it leads to a dead-end. As a result, the first impossibility conducts to a second impossibility in the Nazi ideology. Furthermore, there is no such an impossibility, but the recognizable identity as a possible, too possible, to achieve. In other words, the set of possibilities that describe the change that the Nazi regime is proposing do not contribute with any new possibilities at all in the old world. This means that there is no real impossibility to dehumanize a collective, it is a problem of reference of the human what makes it impossible. Whenever the standard of human condition is defined within the Arian idea, it makes impossible to reach any dehumanization, since it is in the non-human where this idea stands. If we want to make an argument that makes the reverse way, we can incorporate the idea of human as a too human identity on Nietzsche (Nietzsche 1995). The excess of the human factor, what is
lacking in lack itself, encounters the human in its absence and not in its pure presence.
Thus, the first impossibility -the one to cope with the complete erase of the human factor from the human- is the possibility itself of the Arian ideology to exist- and thus opens the possibility for the second impossibility -the one to complete the process within a community- regardless the function of the reason in this process of dehumanization in the concentration camps. In consequence, the degree of change is posed in the ontological reality of these subjects, without any success in a real change in their ontological change but in a complete dependence in this ontological status of the Jew. With this regards, the contributions made by Jean-Paul Sartre (Sartre 1948) and Emmanuel Levinas (Levinas 1963) on the Jewish question are remarkable. Yet, they will not be developed in this study, due to the problem to summarize them in a proper manner. Nonetheless, it is fully relevant to confirm how their ideas fit in our discourse of change and permanence. The idea of Levinas of being for-the-other fully fits in this delusion of Nazi ideology, erasing any distance between the one and the other, and therefore in their attempt to fully consume the other in the mode of destruction (Shoah). We read a similar approach in Sartre when he affirms that “there is a passionate pride among the mediocre, and anti-Semitism is an attempt to give value to mediocrity as such, to create an elite of the ordinary” (Sartre 1967, 23). Mediocrity as such is the excess of content and determination, a massive amount of identity based on negation. Hence, it is through repetition that this identity is reaffirmed within the frame of mediocrity and ordinariness. In sum, there is an absolute degree of change at theoretical level in the process of the concentration camps. This change involves the very ontological status of the subjects, as members of an existent collective. However, this change does not achieve its goal due to
the limitation of the finite nature of the ontological structure, therefore, change as an infinite function is not able to fit in the finitude of the site. In other words, even if we are able to determine the first possibility, the importance of the absolute change as a function of violence in the concentration camps, this change is not as deep as we can think, mainly because we can think it. In other words, any absolute change is a change within the finitude of the real possibilities, avoiding any facticity relation with impossibility as such.

iii) Change and Language

I would like to introduce the concept of change with regards to language as a method to analyze the cultural background of any social or political change. Language, and literature as a direct outcome of it, is a good field to analyze the process of change. The complexity of change itself in language comes from the unbearable nature and the impossibility to be completely accurate at the moment to trace a change in language. As a mirror of thought, language is a perfect spot to look if we want to trace the function of change in the most pure status, and its reflection and influence within society. Accordingly, the literary production of a cultural collective may lead to a complete change at intellectual or even political level. I consider quite relevant to understand the function of change and the violence involved in any publication or mode of language that inscribes a line in the rupture of historical discourse and in History itself. This perspective can be framed, among others, in the contribution made by Kenneth Burke in his book *Permanence and Change*, where he investigates the different registers of language, text, words and meaning in order to establish a comprehensive frame with
regards to change itself. In other words, he tries to find the keystones in order to identify change and experience permanence. However, whenever we face the dichotomy between permanence and change, we are also trying to elucidate the debate of finitude and infinite. It is in permanence where things are settled down and exist according to a finite universe of possibilities. It is in change where things are indeterminate by undecidability, they are across the desert of infinite. It is the constructivist vision what we are trying to incorporate, the one that denies the undecidability itself, but that is able to track down many cultural aspects with regards to the generic and violence, understood as a function of social change in this case.

We can complete Burke’s perspective with Spivak’s notion of the subaltern and the denial of speak is understood in these terms: the subaltern is a repressed agent of society that is not allowed to contribute to the general opinion with his or her speech. I will argue that it is not this argumentation what Spivak’s text is unveiling. Furthermore, I will argue that it is throughout violence that the subaltern speaks, loud and clear. And it is not about the subaltern what the subaltern speaks. It is about truths that the subaltern speaks. Adopting this perspective we will be able to define some actual cultural realities that are showed within a normality but that keep an ultra-reality within, namely, social unconscious. Spivak in her famous article “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (Spivak, 1988) is addressing the question of speech in two directions. First, there is an impossibility that arises in the very question, that is, the assumed impossibility of the excluded to have a proper voice within society that comes from within and not as a hostile exteriority. Second, the very concept of subaltern and its relation with language is at stake in the
question that Spivak is posing. If we analyze the text, we discover how Spivak is thinking about the phenomenon of violence in epistemic terms. It is knowledge what is under the concept of violence, the impossibility to access to knowledge more precisely. Spivak points out that “[i]n subaltern studies, because of the violence of imperialist epistemic, social and disciplinary inscription, a project understood in essentialist terms must traffic in a radical textual practice of differences” (Spivak 1988, 80). Social and disciplinary inscription is the historicist vision of the academia. The universities are in her opinion under the spell of this violence that denies knowledge to the subaltern. This assumption takes for granted two premises. There is no knowledge apart from “official” knowledge. And subaltern is a singularity that is not able to develop any other language, apart from the “official” one. It is within the frame of the “official” language where Jürgen Habermas (Habermas 1989), for instance, locates the public sphere, without being aware of the limitation of this language to cope with the existence of the entire population. This is why she ends the statement with a reference to the “textual practice of differences”, where the subaltern is excluded methodically. The textual practice, the writing process of any historicist reality, is based on the difference, with the unique referential of the “Same”, the big reference where the subaltern does not fit. It is this distorted concept of the “Same” that is a wrong version of the organic intellectual described by Gramsci. In the social reality described by Spivak the inscription is coming from a transcendental order defined on difference, above all, in a strong and unitarian sense of identity. The organic intellectual is designed in Gramci´s mind to overcome this sense of an exteriority as a unique reference, an organic immanence that provides an epistemic reference. We have to incorporate again the notions of finitude and infinite. At an intuitive level, we
would agree that is finitude what is an immanent notion and infinite a transcendental one. Nonetheless, we will prove that it is just the contrary, and it is finitude what is under a transcendental degree and infinite that comes from an authentic immanent level. We need to encounter the epistemic moment for that. According to Gramsci “there is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded: *homo faber* cannot be separated from *homo sapiens*” (Gramsci 1992, 9). Gramsci is talking about the intellectuals, when he makes this statement. But he is also saying that there are *not* non-intellectuals, and accordingly one cannot talk about these non-intellectuals because they do not exist. The non-intellectual sector is not in Spivak’s terms the subaltern. And this is one easy mislead of the question that can happen if we are not accurate enough at this point. Subalterns are both, *homo faber* and *homo sapiens* at the same time. Therefore, their speech is epistemic in their silence too. We can recall Freudian notion of silence of Nietzschean contribution to this debate of mute subject. According to Freud “[t]hese small things [unconscious acts], faulty actions and symptomatic or hazard actions alike, are not so insignificant as people, by a sort of conspiracy of silence, are ready to suppose. They always have a meaning, which can usually be interpreted” (Freud 2010, 2224). We can observe how the silence operates at two levels. There is an assumption that these things do not happen, and there is a conspiratorial silence enveloping their reality at the same time. Silence is the common denominator for both levels. There is an implicit silence that unconscious act do not happen. There is an explicit display of silence that these small things do not happen to us. What Freud is claiming is that this silence is full of meaning and that can be interpreted. We are not far from the denomination of silence that Spivak presents us. Subaltern’s silence, its impossibility to speak, operates too at an
implicit and explicit levels. However, it is not a mute silence and can be interpreted because it has some meaning. If this is true, then we are facing an epistemic moment. We will call an epistemic moment any reality that is graspable throughout a meaning by a subject. The epistemic moment is not a purely transcendental, but immanently transcendental. In other words, epistemic moment is articulated once the impasse of the void (impossible) is presented in the world of possibilities and therefore is nameable. It is the inscription within the constructivist vision what provokes the epistemic moment. However, constructivist vision cannot talk about what is undecidable and yet we can conclude that “what is not” exists, namely, void. It is in the limit of the constructivist vision where we can encounter the solution to its finitude. Accordingly, we can frame this “finite” epistemic moment with the notion of speech and language. Any limit for communication can be seen as a limit within the organs that mediate in order to produce a fertile communication. A twofold mediation is happening anytime a language is articulated. There is a physical (material) mediation of the organ and there is an idealistic (Idea) mediation of languages and meaning. It is fully relevant Derrida’s perspective with regards to this issue when he analyzes Nietzsche’s Otobiography. The excess of organ’s size are presented in order to display a continuity on the non-existence of certain subjects within society and the educational problem, closely related to the later with the epistemic moment. Nietzsche has indeed some moments where elucidates how silence is fully present in any exaggeration of its absence. Nietzsche says that “[there are] few things I do not even want to remain silent; namely human beings who were missing everything except the one thing they have too much of: human beings who are nothing more than one big eye, or one big maw or one big belly or some other big thing- inverse cripples I
call such types” (Nietzsche 2006, 109). Besides describing the postmodern reality of the excess of the citizen where an exaggeration of one dimension is designed to cover a lack, Nietzsche places the idea that Derrida will develop with regards to the only organ that subject is not able to master in his childhood, namely, the ear. Derrida, quoting J.M. Kennedy’s translation of Nietzsche’s text, points out that “quite often, the student writes as he listens; and it is only in these rare moments that he dangles by the umbilical cord of the university” (Derrida 1982, 248). We can pose the idea of subaltern as the student facing the epistemic moment. The term umbilical also refers here to the idea of being vernacular in linguistic terms. Therefore, the student as subaltern is able to link itself to the Other in the mode of the institution that is provoking its silence and at the same time is excluding him and defining it as a subaltern\(^5\). We must recall however that the subaltern is an agent, in silence, excluded but in a mode of presence of not-present. Derrida remarks the idea of this active listening as a mode of passive being-there. It is a listening process what precedes the writing in the case of the “subaltern” student. Instead of the reproduction of the system throughout academia, there is a repetition of the agents that are contained within. Student, the silent subaltern, is intended to be the substitute of the professor, but it is only a mimetic copy what is allowed (legal) by system itself. Silence, beyond a false neutrality, is the militant voice of the silent. Derrida is aware of this particularity when he says that “we should be attentive to this: the omphalos of which

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\(^5\) In the original translation, it is to the “alma mater” that is this umbilical cord linked. We can understand Derrida’s thought where university is the alma mater of the epistemic moment. In other words, for Derrida the alma mater is fixed under the idea of the University of the “Other”. It is in the realm of the other where any alma mater is located, since it is the place of the other that comes to us that the essence of any institution is placed.
Nietzsche makes you dream resembles both an ear and a mouth” (Derrida 1982, 248).

This conjunction between the capacity of the mouth to speak –phonetic sound- and the conviction of the ear for the capitation of this phonetic history recalls the idea of epistemic violence presented by Spivak. The navel is the dialectical synthesis of ears and mouth. It is indeed the umbilical cord mentioned above, since it is the final and crucial part of this cord that completes the meaning of being umbilical. Ears are repetition, they are a pair, they are the subaltern mass since they are more than one, in fact, they are a pure multiplicity that is countless since it is undecidable what we hear and it is commonly attached to rumors. The mouth is the reproduction, the speech ready to be corrupted into written text. The navel represents this synthesis merging the repetition and reproduction into the formation of the written language, however, it is going to be a new language coming since there is a gap for interpretation in the epistemic act. The epistemic violence occurs resembling both organs. Derrida continues saying that “this cavity remains, however, invisible, restless and sensitive”. Here we can easily trace this description to the one of the cave, that cave that accompanies us because we cannot get out fully from the cave according to Derrida. But here also Derrida describes the mandatory condition of the subaltern, which is the lack of any autonomous choice. This posits the organ in the position of “hearing the silence”, since there is no capacity of negating this hearing. The totality absorbs the organ in such a way that the subaltern earns the capacity of hearing the silence. Paradoxically, the total lack of any autonomous will for the ear, makes possible to open itself to the potentiality of the silence. Ear, in the mode of hearing silence, is the absolute organ where Nietzsche bases his thinking in Derrida´s opinion. If we recapitulate our preliminary thoughts, we can observe how lack is a faculty in this
case, and it is a faculty coming from void. Void embodies the impossible -for language-
and infinite -for mathematics- at the same time. However, the event, emerging from void,
postulates a new language -incorporation of new meanings for the old language- and a
new world -a complete new set of possibilities that alters the logic of the old world-
erected over the faithful subject.

Kenneth Burke is posing this idea too when he describes the transformation of language.
Burke says that there was a big change with Dante and the use of vernacular when he
points out that “[w]e must note that the vernacular was not merely bad Latin, nor was
learned Latin the vernacular perfected. They were two different instruments, for two
different kinds of effectiveness which the block-like vocabulary of the artificial language
omits.” (Burke 1984, 57). This violation of traditional meanings is in fact a procedure of
violence as a function of change. There is an irruption of the eternal (infinite) faithful in
the use of language that alters the meaning of words and therefore achieve a cultural
transformation. In other words, language has to face the faithful subject with the trace of
infinity, what causes an alteration of language itself. Burke notes how opinions in
newspapers are created in order to disguise the effect of infinite and “change everything
so everything reminds the same”, and thus cover certain degree of social psychosis
present in the first years of postmodern era. Burke points out how “[t]oday newspaper
English probably marks the flowering of the technological psychosis as carried beyond
strictly scientific communication. The appeal of the informative here is clearly bolstered
by psychotically engendered needs, since people will pore over column after column of
information so low-powered, that, a few hours later, they cannot even remember what
they had been reading.” (Burke 1984, 57). The author has a twofold approach to language in this moment. In one hand, he reminds faithful to the capacity of language of transforming; and in the other, there is a mistrust to the effects of “low-powered” language that creates only opinions colored in banality. It is here where constructivism shows its weakness. There are blind spots for constructivism that cannot be denied but that cannot be proved throughout constructivism methods. It is very interesting also how Burke’s rhetoric poses some ideas on dramatism pentad, where he explores the different levels of articulation of reality and subjectivity at the same time, identifying the intensification of different elements in order to classify the determinant factor or distance between agent and agency (Burke “A Grammar of Motives”, 1969).

Constructivism uses the articulation of concepts that are previously constructed in order to prove that they are verifiable or not. And this is the main distinctive point that Badiou notes when he criticizes this line of thinking. As Badiou points out “[t]he radical nominalism enveloped by the orientation of constructivism thought is no way disturbed by having to declare that a situation does not change. Or rather, what is called ‘change’ in a situation is nothing more than the constructive deployment of its parts. The thought of the situation evolves, because of the exploration of the effects of the state brings to light previously unnoticed but linguistically controllable new connections.” (Badiou 2005, 290). It is where language loses the connections with truth procedures where the (generic) faithful subject appears. Therefore, truths are procedures that are not within language and that are incorporated into language by subjects, within the sense of infinite that are embodied truths themselves. It is the duty of language to resemble these truths into finite
concepts of particular issues in order to construct an epistemic moment. Badiou continues saying that “[t]he non-place of the event calms thought, and the fact that the intervention is unthinkable relaxes the action. As such, the constructivist orientation underpins neo-classicist norms in art, positivist epistemologies and programmatic politics.” (Badiou 2005, 291). Throughout the faithful subject four dimensions of truths are traced back: artistic, political, love and scientific. These constructions however evoke truths but not know them. And this is the main restriction and at the same time the keystone of any construction: its finitude encloses any possibility that is feasible in the world, but it is what is not what interrupts the world in the mode of exception. Notwithstanding, we can commute this restriction and use the constructivism dimension in order to analyze any cultural transformation that is derived from an exception. Thus, we will analyze how the cultural reality is studied through comparative studies, in order to fill the gap of what is between comparisons with more comparisons. This unbearable impossibility is elucidated as feasible reality in several social and cultural expressions. Each element displayed in these expressions is the aftermath of permanence or the consequence of truth processes.

At this point, we can introduce in this debate the contribution made by Jacques Derrida. What is the reality of writing according to Derrida’s perspective? How is inscription represent language in subject’s reality? How does deconstruction operate in the debate of constructivism? Derrida places inscription (writing) in the origin of the illness of language. Derrida describes writing as “the dissimulation of the natural, primary, and immediate presence of sense to the soul within the logos” (Derrida 1974, 137). There is certain degree of obliteration involved in writing according to Derrida. There is also a
link between language and knowledge, which is the bridge connecting the reality and the concept. It is a mediation, but it is not a pure and neutral mediation. Writing embodies a culpability according to Derrida since “[i]ts [writing’s] violence befalls the soul as unconsciousness. Deconstructing this tradition will not consist of reversing it, of making writing innocent. Rather of showing why the violence of writing does not befall an innocent language” (Derrida 1974, 137). The trace of a guilty act is attached to writing according to Derrida. We must question the process of guilt yet. It is not Evil what is under guilt but the question of being unquestionable or perfect. It is, as Derrida will point out, God what is beyond writing as an act of violence. Nonetheless, God is a transcendental entity for Derrida, and being so, it only can be linked to language in its mode of inscription. It is the Other, an entity that Emmanuel Levinas will defend in any ethical evaluation as the being for-the-other (Levinas 1963), what is pure transcendence. This exteriority is the main reference to gain a sense of measure.

This is precisely Badiou’s critique on constructivism. However, we must develop further on Derrida’s approach to have a better understanding this articulation. Yet, this exteriority is limited, and Derrida unveils this paradox when he says that “I have only one language, yet it is not my mine” (Derrida 1998, 25). However, this argument is developed within a dialogue in “Monolingualism of the Other”, a dialogue intended to maintain with a pure transcendence. Nonetheless, it will remind as a monologue with language itself. The identification of pure transcendence and language at this point is clear. We can introduce another example of this identification when Derrida says that “[w]ell, I’m remembering God this morning, the name, a quotation, something my mother said, not that I’m looking
for you, my God, in a determinable place and to reply the question (...) and neither my will nor my power is today to "go beyond," as SA wanted, istam uim meam, quae memoria uocatur,**but to quote the name of God as I heard it perhaps the first time, no doubt in my mother's mouth when she was praying, each time she saw me ill" (Derrida 1998, 117). God is not the exteriority transcendental but the name of God. Since God is the (proper) name of God, there is no space to locate it “in a determinable place” or world. However, language is still the exteriority that due to its perfection (finitude nature) is not bearable from another exteriority to the subject. There is no neutral-anthropological viewpoint available for the analysis of language, out of language. Lacan claims this “limitation” of language too, when he recalls Heidegger’s perspective of language as “the house of being”. It is however a house in a form of cage in Lacan’s words. Derrida describes this notion of a cage when he says that “[y]et it will never be mine, this language, the only one I am thus destined to speak, as long as speech is possible for me in life and in death; you see, never will this language be mine. And, truth to tell, it never was” (Derrida 1998, 9). The inclusion relation of the Other with regards to the subject, is displaced in order to establish an undecidable relation based on belonging. It is not “mine” but still I belong to this language. I am not included in this cage where I am trapped, but still I am trapped in this language. Even more, this relation according to Derrida is broken in its atemporality since he destroys the present and the past relation between the subject and language when he says that “it never was”. This conclusion is even more clear when Derrida points out that “[i]s language in possession, ever a possessing or possessed possession? Possessed or possessing in exclusive possession, like a piece of personal property? What of this being-at-home [etre-chez-soi] in language
toward which we never cease returning?” (Derrida, 1998, 24). We revisit the idea of Heidegger of language being the house of being here. Nonetheless, Derrida is aware of the lack included in the idea of possession, since it is property what is based on inclusive (exclusivity as a negativity of inclusive) relations. And there is a fallacy in every inclusive relation, because inclusivity can be reduced to belonging but this process does not go backwards.

Thus, the fallacy resides in the totality that inclusive relation over an object – language in this case- can develop, since it is not a totality because its finite dimension. The house of being is captured by the subject. Property relations for Derrida cannot be achieved within language because of this permutation of the relation itself. It is not the language that captures the subject anymore. It is the faithful subject that captures language and since then is condemned to return to it in a restless process. Lacan describes this process as well with regards to the concept of repetition in Freud. As Lacan points out “that [the principle of repetition in Freud] specific action will always be missing something. It is not distinguishable from what takes place when a motor reaction occurs, for it is, in effect, a reaction, a pure act, the discharge of an action.” (Lacan 1959-1960, 41). It is a return to a missing point what repetition is as a restless process. Derrida says that is an endless returning process what language disguises. But for Derrida it is language itself that is involved in this enforcement to return to a vanishing point. Language is only able to name the name. It is not directly signifying the Other, but naming a name of the Other. This unbearable gap is “filled” by void. And it is this void that is not knowable, it is not available for any predicative chain.
Thus, there is an impossibility in language with regards to something that is outer language. No matter how unbearable is impossibility is displayed in language, it is still the only open window for any new set of possibilities. Derrida is aware of this when he says that “[f]ar from sealing off anything, this solipsism conditions the address to the other, it gives word, or rather it gives the possibility of giving its word, it gives the given word in the ordeal of a threatening and threatened promise: monolingualism and tautology, the absolute impossibility of metalanguage” (Derrida 1998, 29). The restriction of the count-as-one of language into One and the tautology of a truth that is not knowable, represent the impossibility of a metalanguage in Derrida´s perspective. We clearly approximate at this point to Saussure and his contribution in linguistics. If we want to tackle this problem we need to understand that this impossibility is always a reality for language. There is a crucial question at this point related to the very basis of linguistics, namely, the existence of language. With regards to this issue, Saussure tries to answer to the question analyzing the different connections and conditions language has. There are four conditions for Saussure that determine the existence of language. Saussure starts saying that “(1) there is no linguistic entity possible which would be directly accessible through the senses, because none exists apart from the idea which can be attached to it;(2)that there is no linguistic entity among those available to us which is simple, since even when reduced to its simplest expression it requires that account be taken simultaneously of a sing and a meaning, and to question or forget this duality is tantamount to denying its linguistic existence and relegating it for instance to the domain of physical facts” (Saussure 2002, 5). Saussure as well tries to overcome language´s
restriction and also points to its strongest weakness at the same time. Language is attached to the idea, but it is an idea of an object always already. Language is complex because its complexity is the endless detour to the original moment that is pure lack. Language as linguistic entity is in the relation of no-relation with regards to the object. Badiou remarks this point when he says that “a relation is a connection between objective multiplicities -a function- that creates nothing in the register of intensities of existence, or in that atomic localizations, which is not already prescribed by the regime of appearance of these multiplicities” (Badiou 2009a, 301). This means that the object is with regards to the relation – a linguistic entity in this case- a keystone that determines what is indiscernible for language. In other words, Badiou reminds us that “if an object enters into combination with others, this combination is, if not implied, in any case regulated by objects” (Badiou 2009a, 301). We can to introduce the idea that Being has the last word. This regulation of the relation itself reminds us how strong the capacity to determine Being is. Let’s observe how Saussure is working in the same idea when he claims that “(...) if the unity of each linguistic entity itself results from a complex reality consisting of a union of elements, it results moreover from a union of a very particular sort in that there is nothing in common in essence between a sign and that which it signifies” (Saussure 2002, 5). If this is correct any essentialist drift omits any possible coherence, since these discourses are articulated believing a complete correspondence between language and object.

It is difficult to maintain this correspondence when we prove that at ontological level there is a gap that is only thinkable through mathematics but it is not graspable by
language. Saussure continues saying that “(...) when we attempt to suppose, classifying the facts of a language we are thus faced with this problem: classifying couplings of two different objects (sings-ideas), and not at all, as we are led to suppose, classifying simple homogeneous objects, which would be the case if we had to classify either signs or ideas. There are two grammars, one flowing from the idea, the other from the sign, each is wrong or incomplete” (Saussure 2002, 5). It is clear why the grammar of the sign is incomplete. It is due to this lack of pure origin, an endless return claimed by Derrida to a point that is vanished, that the grammar of the sign is always the chain of signifiers of other signifiers. Meanwhile, a grammar of the idea is located in the blurry territory of undecidability, what makes possible not to talk about wrong or right sided approaches.

When we posit the notion of undecidability we address the question to the core of being-qua-being. It is in its more profound and deep conceptualization of being where we are able to discover that “something” that we can name the name of it. Badiou expresses this idea when he says that “it is precisely around the exclusion of the indiscernible, the indeterminate, the un-predicable, that the orientation of constructivist thought is built. If all difference is attributed on the basis of language and not on the basis of being, 

*presented* in-difference is impossible” (Badiou 2009a, 19). Badiou makes this affirmation when he examines in a critical manner Leibniz´s approach to the question of being.

However, it is clear how Saussure´s first notion of complexity and undecidability of language appear in Badiou´s thought too, in order to establish that language cannot cope with being in its impossibility as indeterminacy. Saussure, with other words, is claiming the same idea when he posits that classification in language cannot be restricted to the sign, but it is the form and the meaning at the same time what is at stake at any linguistic
entity. Badiou returns to these ideas, not only to pose the weakness of the former approach, but also to propose that this impossibility can be articulated in a linguistic manner if we adopt a materialistic dialectic that would lead to an affirmative dialectic.

This very relation between language and object is a symptom of how change is developed and frustrated at the same time, with regards to any chance for change to happen. Furthermore, this articulation of the linguistic theory will help us to locate the reality of actual cultural discourses in many fields. The current social vision of reality is articulated precisely in a false idea that linguistic reality can dominate the object itself, however the real nature of language at its restriction are displayed in an obliterated manner in some cultural expressions in our daily experience. The idea of the form and the meaning as a combinatory reality that is inseparable will serve us to analyze how the social vision is retrovision of a reality itself that is imposed in the form of unbearable for society itself.

In the chapter IV and V we will see how the scope of civil society is transformed in the screens in such a manner that is able to show the real concept of the Other in the actual society, how this theatrical level is also a mirror where reality happens, rather than reflected. Moreover, we will also show how this perspective also affects to the articulation of discourses of conflicts, more precisely, to the ethical question and the question of memory and its treatment by public representatives; and how these discourses also show that form and meaning are intermingled always already, and in consequence, violence as a function of change, is also “if not implied”, also regulated by objects. In
order to clarify this point we will also pose the idea of the subject with regards to the
ontological question of truth.

iv) Three Degrees or Moments of Violence

After examining the different aspects of any ontological reality in any given world; and
after analyzing the linguistic dimension of any philosophical enquiry, we can finally
focus on violence and define it as a function with regards to any process of change. This
change will be analyzed mainly in regards to three degrees or moments. The importance
of each degree will be determined by its area of influence with regards to any given
population (multiplicities of being) and the ontological and real elements (atoms) that are
changed or transformed.

Following these ideas, I claim that there is a relation between violence and power,
however the previous stage of any situation of power comes from a certain degree of
change that is embodied in the very concept of violence. Accordingly, there are three
degrees or moments of change that are capable to elucidate the vast majority of situations
with regards to their influence and relation with the people. These moments of violence
are articulated by a notion of subject previously presented in this study that will be able to
elaborate an Idea (form) that is able to grasp the density and importance of any of these
process of change. We are talking about the faithful subject that, according to Badiou,
“[s]uch a subject realizes itself in the production of consequences, which is why it can be
called faithful -faithful to ε [the group of relations of belonging that a world is conceived,
the envelope of the world) and thus to that vanished event of which ε is the trace” (Badiou 2009a, 53). We have analyzed too how change can be thought on regards to being and appearing. However, there are certain moments where truth processes interrupt any historical discourse. These moments are identifiable by a complete and radical change in the vision of history itself and also by the transformation of the rules and norms that govern a society. Moreover, there is a twofold interruption what is at stake in these moments of a radical change. First, the change is applied to every single element (atom) of the society, therefore, claiming a degree of universalism on this process. Second, a complete new set of possibilities are incorporated to an infinite world, contributing to the sense of eternal and unthinkable related to these truth processes. Thus, this degree or moment of violence, is universally experienced and eternally conceived, even though the moment itself tends to vanish right after its particularity is refounded in its universality, always already.

Therefore, I will propose an analogy in order to explain this perspective in a better way. I would like to place the idea of a door. A door, generally speaking, is composed by three elements. I will use these three elements to explain the three degrees or moments of violence with regards to any given world.

Adopting this example we are able to dress the theoretical frame that we are proposing in this study. These elements give the meaning for a door that communicates two sites or worlds. The door do not make any communicative effort between the sites, but it does mediate and stabilize the flux of anything element between these two sites. Even more,
the door as a structural unity does not have direct contact with the elements that are going to “move” from one place to another. In other words, the mediation of the door is palpable in a material manner that is not direct, there is no real correspondence relationship between the unity of the door and the elements that are transferred.

However, the door is a crucial element to understand this very transference, which can be perceived mainly in three degrees or moments, depending the element of the door that we are able to articulate. Accordingly, returning to our analogy on the door and its elements we are ready to pose the idea of universal violence. We have been observing how absolute violence, with regards to any mechanism of change has a twofold nature. In the one hand, there is not real change since all the elements are still present after the transformation of a given situation. However, the very change on the being, in the case of the concentration camps during World War II, teaches us how the change on the essence of humanity may cost the permanence of reification of the subject. These changes or rules for permanence of the elements do not deal with any idea of the Law, the frame that sustains the organizational reality of a society. Any change that transforms the Law as the main reference that supports a society may considered as a hegemonic change, since it is the regulatory element what is transformed in this case. We can think about the incorporation of a new law that regulates the punishment of a certain criminal activity, however, it is more than the incorporation of a law that regulates a particular situation (new modes of criminal activity, regulation of bio-ethical issues, etc.) what is at stake here.
Another way of change according to transformation of law can be considered as the mere interpellation of the existing Law. This method, nonetheless, it does not incorporate any new possibility to the world, and in consequence change as such is not achieved. A hegemonic change must be addressed to establish a new legal and administrative frame. We can consider the creation of new states for nations without state to understand the concept of hegemonic violence. Therefore, it is the hegemonic power of the structure that frames the activity within a society what is the aim of the change. When we attempt to analyze any revolutionary moment, whether it is a social or scientific revolution, we observe how the frame that regulates the life of the citizens is changed. The incorporation of new ideas to the previous world transforms the world that will be vanished and reinvented according to these new ideas. Following our analogy, the change of the frame implies the alteration of the element that regulates the location, the position in a given site, of the access to another site, a communicative act or a set of new possibilities. Changing the frame of the door we can adjust the coordinates that place the possibility to go from one room to another, to enter a house from one side or another. But also we can regulate the elements that can surpass that limit or access point. We can alter the frame and make it minuscule or we can make it even bigger than the room or the structure itself. Whenever the frame is bigger or smaller than the structure itself -whenever the Law has a maximal or minimal degree of existence with regards to a given world- we can think about different modes of structures. States always are these structures in social and political terms.
Thus, following the analogy, the transformation of the frame (Law) has a direct relation with the mode of the structure itself (state). A state with a smaller presence of law may lead to a more chaotic mode of organization of a given society, whilst a maximal presence of Law makes us think about a completely regulated and oppressive mode of state, whenever this implementation of the state is not an organic one. The degree of presence of the Law is not directly related to the degree of intervention of the state. In other words, a maximal degree of presence of the Law does not mean that we are facing a completely interventionist state. The transformations and adaptations in migration and international laws that were the consequences of the happenings of September 11th are a good example of this statement. There were adaptations to policies and ideologies with regards to the ruling Law in order to enforce a certain vision of the world and society previously constructed by these ideological positions. These transformations were affecting the society in a hegemonic manner. There was a certain sense of perpetuation with regards to the ruling adaptations that were approved. However, this hegemonic change was indeed hegemonic but not universal. There degree of influence of these adaptations and new regulatory policies was limited and yet hegemonic.

If we return to our analogy with the door, we can admit that the frame is a very important element for a door, but it is not the crucial one. There is still an element that determines and breaks at the same time the concept of the door by a scission. These elements are the hinges of a door. Whenever we establish a concept of a door, with all the semantic implications of the term, we must include the hinges as the crucial element that completes the sense of a door, how we perceive it and how the mechanism of the door functions.
The hinges articulate the door itself to provoke the opening or the closure of it. It is the operational gesture of movement between two antagonistic elements - the door as the obstacle to surpass and the frame as the regulatory evidence of the limit itself - what hinges make possible in mode of torsion. At a political level, this torsion has a dialectical meaning. As Badiou points out “Marxism seeks to change the real of revolutions through the symbolic grip of which it assures the political subject of such a real, a subject for which, as we all know, it reserves the name ‘proletariat’, which is neither more nor less appropriate than the (dubious) word ‘unconscious’. This is also where Marxism must ordain its torsion” (Badiou 2009b, 129). We can observe how torsion deals with the antagonistic nature of the political subject in the case of Marxism, which has to articulate this torsion in order to maintain the antagonistic elements in order to achieve any dialectical turn. Badiou understands at a certain moment destruction as a mode to articulate a force that deals with a dialectical strength with any contradiction. Badiou continues highlighting the relation between lack and destruction as the manner void and materiality are connected, even at a political level. As Badiou points out “[t]his [Lack and destruction] gives us focus, all the more so in that this dialectic is transversal to the one of the algebra and topology, which commands all materialism” (Badiou 2009b, 131). Lack is not mere lack here, lack is indeed lack of lack. And destruction therefore must embody torsion, a circular moment that reproduces its circularity with an absent closure.

This term is no longer used by Badiou in the manner he uses it repeatedly in his work “Theory of the Subject” (Verso, 2009). Nonetheless, it is interesting to incorporate this conceptualization of destruction as a mode of change, as a previous step for any force or intervention in a given site. I will use destruction in the sense of reproduction and catharsis, and not only in the manner of pure negativity to erase any given situation. In doing so, we can understand destruction as the pre-change moment that purifies any previous world.
As Badiou remarks “[d]estruction means torsion. Internal to the space, it ravages its places, in a laborious duration” (Badiou 2009b, 131). Arising this statement to a political level, we encounter Badiou defending the idea of the antagonistic elements as the elements that are meant to destroy within the idea of a materialistic (affirmative) dialectic. Badiou points out that “[t]he proletariat exists everywhere where some political outplace is produced. It is therefore by purging itself that it exists. It has no anteriority over the organization of its political survival. To expel the bourgeois politics by compressing its own organism-support and to bring into existence the proletarian politics, apparently, are one and the same” (Badiou 2009b, 130). We encounter here that at any moment of torsion there is a scission that divided the one. And at this intersection the subject (proletariat) has to deal with this twofold scenario that is antagonistic itself.

Hinges in a door are determined to establish a relation between elements that are antagonistic as well, hinges pose the idea of a relation of no-relation (a lack of lack). In our three dimensional world, doors and hinges articulate the movement according to this three dimensional environment. Furthermore, the frame normally is not under the coordinates of movement, it remains still. It is the door -the obstacle to the limit in a form of a double negation- what is moved in order to make accessible a limit. If we think in a mathematical universe where we can adequate multiple dimensions the elements of the door gain and expand their meaning. We can imagine then how the hinges do not provoke the torsion of three dimensions but that they are able to provoke this torsion among multiple dimensions. In doing so, we do not limit ourselves in the optical illusion of moving the door, but we can imagine the hinges moving the frame and finally we can imagine the hinges provoking the torsion of the door and the frame at the same time.
If we compare this gesture of a torsion with a dialectical gesture, we can easily contain in our minds the idea of two contradictory terms that are not confronted by surpasses (Aufhebung) by a third term that do not purely negate this antagonism but by the excess of it produce a synthetic term. The confrontation of antagonistic positions is conserved after any revolutionary process with the exception of incorporating to the new situation a sequence of ideas that completely change the world itself. Hinges, as revolutions, provoke the dialectical turn and change completely -at universal level- the perception (phenomenology) of any given world.

This analogy of the door will help to understand these three different degrees of change that are directly related to the concept of change with regards to being, existence and language that were previously presented in this study. These three degrees of change determine both the degree of change and the perpetuation of power that affects to different and similar social situations. Each level deploys its own characteristics with regards to the function of change as a way of intellectual and social improvement of the situation.

Therefore, I am going to focus on each element of the door to explain the different degrees of violence, and how change is determined by a function with regards to reality and its elements that are implied in each situation. We can start inspecting the door itself, the first barrier that avoids a direct communication or transference of any element between two sites. If we want to provoke a change in the door as such, a violent change,
we can break the door. Breaking its internal structure and leaving an open space between the two sites we could assert that communication and transference are possible. However, this only an illusory situation. Achieving communication between the two sites was a matter of probability, before and after breaking the door. If we want to cross the door itself, after breaking the door itself, we still have to cross the frame. It is a matter of probability and not possibilities what we have to face before and after breaking the door. Moreover, the door itself is broken but its internal structure is not altered at a crucial level. The chemical elements of the door are all still there. After breaking it, the elements are in a different combination, but there is no any other elements incorporated that were not there before. We can claim that is an alteration of the order of the elements that we witness. In other words, there is not any incorporation of anything inexistent after we break the door. In sum, all we do is to change the combinatory formula of the door that stabilizes its own structure as a door. If we break it, we do not alter the language and its correspondence with the object. The farthest we can go is to add and adjective to refer to the object. We can recall here the idea of the role of any relation with respect to an object. That is to say, that any relation is subsumed in the reality of the object itself, if not implied, it is regulated by the object itself. This is to place a hierarchical order between the materialist vision of the real, and the constructivist approach to the ontological question. If this is correct, the relation between the two sites also must be, if not implied, regulated by this “object” we are using in our example, namely, the door.

If we translate our conclusion to linguistic perspective, we can observe how any alteration of the chemical elements of the door, after breaking it, is a purely combinatory
alteration of a chain of signifiers. If what we alter is only the chain, the order, of the combinatory sequence, we are only witnessing a metonymic phenomenon at this stage. We are using the same set of elements in a different order that provokes a rebuilt sequence, that it has a reflection in the language used to designate the object, usually adding and adjective or a very similar word. In other words, the shared meanings of the cultural reality that we use to designate an object are not changed, and it is language itself that is adapted to the new reality of the object, in this case, the broken door. Violence, as a function of change, operates at absolute level here, but also we will discern the restrictions of this degree of violence. First, it operates at an absolute level because the correspondence between the elements presented before and after the alteration is absolute. That is to say, the elements that are in the first set that embodies all the subsets of the door, are in the same manner but in a different order in the set that embodied the broken door. There is a minimum moment of existence, not as pure presentation but as a represented elements, when this order is altered by the intervention of the breaking. This momentum is elusive, and it vanishes as soon as the intervention is presented in the site. In other words, the intervention breaking the door provokes a change in the order to the structure of the door, its combinatory sequence is altered and some elements are presented twice. This repetition provokes a minimal representation of this subset that however is not allowed to leave the discipline of the inclusion relation embodied in the word “door”. The linguistic hegemony provokes the disciplinary recall of the elements to their pure being, and be relocated from their moment of existence. The act of breaking the door, observed by the perspective of the function of change, unveils the crucial mechanism that operates at this degree. On the one hand, the metonymic nature of the
change has a twofold restriction with regards to the world. It does not interrupt the real possibilities of that world, and in consequence, it remains as a probabilistic scenario what is presented before and after the breaking. And accordingly, language used to designate the object is imposed over the elements of the subset included -as an excess of belonging- in the object designated as “door”.

In consequence, the chain of signifiers certifies an illusionary game between signified (object) and signifier (word). This illusionary perspective is observable in psychoanalytical studies as delusion and psychosis. As Lacan points out “[w]hen the other is captured as an object in the relation of ostension, we can only encounter this relation as a subjectivity equivalent to our own on the imaginary plane, the plane of the \textit{moi ou toi, I or thou}, one or the other, all confusion is possible concerning the object relation. The object of our love is only ourselves, it is the \textit{tu es celui qui me tues, thou art the one who kilst me}” (Lacan 1955-1956, 303). Lacan here is trying to relocate the idea of the object, the subject and the other. Nonetheless, Lacan observes that the delusion “is characterized precisely by that special form of discordance with common language known as a neologism. At the level of meaning, its characterized by the following, which will appear to you only if you set out with the idea that a meaning always refers to another meaning, that is, precisely that the meaning of these words can´t be exhausted by reference to another meaning” (Lacan 1955-1956, 33). However, we can rethink our example and pose the idea of a bullet in any war. In this case, it is our door-element in form of bullet what is thrown. Anything that this “bullet-door” breaks -whenever any bullet kills a solider for instance- we are facing the same degree of violence, namely,
absolute violence. The killing of a soldier or of a citizen is only distinguishable when we measure the power (status) of each actor. In other words, what makes difference to kill another soldier or an unarmed citizen is not the violent act itself, but the status of each of the actors when this change happens. Moreover, citizens can be the main objective in a conflict due to the power that emanates from them: they are the units of the general will that will rule the democratic systems, but also where any tyranny eventually will lie. Therefore, ethics are situated where responsibilities lie, that is to say, where power has its maxim expression: citizens. Absolute violence reminds in the metonymic universe where the combinatory elements are altered, and we can say that nothing crucial is really altered. If we want to evaluate ethically the difference of killing an enemy soldier or an unarmed child during a war, we have to analyze the truth of the situation with regards to the intervention of the change and the permanence of the state (status) in the aftermath of the change. Thus, we do not really find any elements to measure their ethical truth in the moment of change, however we can evaluate the facts and verify their power status and elucidate the ethical question after that. By doing so we avoid any de facto prejudice. This means that, considering the ethical question, establishes a relation of power and aesthetics that can verify the idea of beauty, its sublimation and the truth in a retrospective manner.

If this is correct, we face the fact that absolute violence is poorly based on any real change and that normally the power status of the agents are very well defined in different levels, previously established by the Law. This characterization of change at absolute level is recognizable at a more explicit level when we observe the process of change in
the mode of dehumanization endured by the prisoners of concentration camps during the Second World War. This Law, can be a purely linguistic entity or empowered by another social structure. This approach gives the opportunity to revisit certain happenings that have been repeated during the last decades in different cities. I am talking about happenings that were classified as racial riots (Los Angeles 1992), French riots (France 2007), non-sense violence (London 2011) and anti-system vandalism (M-15 movement in Spain 2011). I will show how there are deeper mechanisms than absolute violence in these happenings. Also, there is traditionally a distinctive position given to the Arab Spring with respect to the above mentioned happenings.

Nonetheless, I want to begin this approach from the riots that represent the germ of all these outbursts all over the world. It was precisely in Seattle in 1999 when the protests of coming years have a clear reference. This riots mark the beginning of a mode of protest that does not fully recognize the nature of the antagonistic positions that are displayed in the streets, and therefore, they keep falling in the same blind-spot, namely, the lack of authentic poetry that may lead to a universal (revolutionary) change. If we analyze the riots of Seattle, we can observe how there are three actors in the scene. First, there is the WTO that represents a global, not identifiable and despotic power structure. This structure is defended by the police, as a unitary force that is able to stop and repress mainly with physical methods any force that contrasts and faces the previous hierarchical power, which conforms the second actor in this theatrical scene. Finally, we have the third actors that are the massive protesters that come from many regions and countries. If we descend to an ontological level we can describe these three actors regarding their level
of existence. In consequence, we have a ruling class without a proper name, which degree of existence is maximal in the ruled world, and a police force which degree of existence is depending in the degree of existence of the third actor, that is, the mass protesting against the ruling despotic minority class. However, in this theatrical scenario, we discover that ruling despotic class represented by WTO is not that of the minority, but of the one majority, since the rest of the actors, the police and protesters, are in a smaller degree of existence than them. Somehow, a democratic rule of majority is imposed with regards to their level of existence. Nonetheless, we go deeper in our analysis, we can observe that the riots of the protesters, their claims and methods, address generally to the abolition of such a ruling class, the suppression of an brutally repressive police and the magnification of the demands claiming for a more fair world, the glorification of the particularities of each culture and respect for a democratic system.

Following these events, one is able to distinguish how the protesters are divided into groups, but they have also some elements in common. We can say that there is a relation between them, according to the elements that they share in a belonging relationship. We can analyze again the protests that took place in Seattle in 1999. From the very beginning we observe that there is not a mass, but a split of parts and not of elements in the protesters. We can recall here how the masses are the very actors of any revolutionary moment posed by Marx, that Badiou recalls saying that “[w]e call ´masses´ the historical interruption as such, the real of the cut” (Badiou 2009b, 173). Nonetheless, there are not masses in Seattle, but a collective composed by parts, which is a completely different nature presented by a multiplicity of a mass. Also, there was a bunch of people, dressed
on black, covering their faces and developing a more explicit protests, such as breaking windows and doors of many shops and commercial places. This group of people was named as “the anarchists” by the media that was covering the riots. These places that were assaulted were mainly franchises of huge corporates that were in charge of these chains. We can clearly address this model of business -big corporates that hold a chain of franchises all over the country where workers are in worse work conditions than the average- as one of the big targets of the protests themselves. In sum, the target of “the anarchists” was the same as the general target against the WTO meetings in that city. However, the anarchists were accused of being the instigators of the violence, by the breaking of the windows and doors of each commercial site, the anarchists group was pointed as the provokers of any violence that was taking place in the city. Nonetheless, there is some irony in the big picture of the theatrical scene. The big mass that is protesting against an organization, a structure of power, is against any attack to any material structure of the same structure of power. In other words, the big mass of people is opposed to “act” against the structure they are against, whilst they intend to block the streets and abort the meeting at any time on the streets marching and manifesting. This is the point where any determination between peaceful or violent protest begins to lose its meaning. Again, what we face here is the protest against a structure of power, WTO, that is in charge of the economic decisions that affect the entire world, regardless the cultural and national borders, to transform it into something else: fairer, more equal, less financial and more economical in the Marxist sense of the term probably, and with a higher participation of the people in such decisions. However, when this attempt to change, to intervene and participate, becomes very explicit (the anarchist group’s actions against the
windows and doors of banks and commerces) it becomes unbearable by the big group of people. Destruction, in a mode of catharsis, is also the mode of participation at a political level. When destruction is a process of purification establishes the basis for a participatory mechanisms that, albeit irruptive, demand a vanishing moment of a representative structure and provide a purely direct participatory possibility. This displays the irony of the situation: whenever a big mass desires a change of certain power structure, the change itself is considered too brutal, explicit or “ugly” to be bearable by this very mass of people, and a transcendental change – one coming from the structure of power itself- is longed, instead of transforming this truth immanency into a transcendental reference. It is somehow that the unpleasant part of the change is not bearable and is avoided. This is a direct result of not having (yet) a subject-language that is able to deal with this “unbearable” and “ugly” dimension of any real change.

We can conclude how the above described as absolute violence is able to cover theoretically the change that these doors and windows go through when they are shattered into pieces in the streets of Seattle, namely, a bigger structure of power that is explicitly presented in the streets in form of corporate buildings. Nonetheless, we can perceive a clear feeling of how nothing changes really, except from a perception of certain grade of metonymic alteration of things in reality: banks and shop windows are tagged and marked, some of the doors of the shops are broken, some benches and street furniture is destroyed but eventually, we can say that the world keeps spinning. We can say that the decoration of the street is altered at a visual level. In short, the set of the theatrical scene is prepared for another play, another background for the play is ready, but the play itself
never arrives. We can observe how the masses can be amazed by the theatrical play that they are witnessing, without being aware that they are always active spectators. However, these riots all share the urban factor. The architectonic reality that surrounds these protests make a visual scene of the play that the spectator mediates by its passivity or active role. The most significant outcome of any absolute violence resides in unveiling certain contradictory approaches to the same idea or many ironic perspectives for the same goal. In the example of Seattle in 1999, the anarchist somehow manage to point to a certain grade of contradictory facts that involve the general idea of protest. For instance, there are some “good intentioned” ideas about trying to change the WTO, in order to adjust the ideals of this organization to a more fair and ethical scenario respectful with nature, with ecological sense, without any genetic manipulation of the food, with a better labor conditions for workers etc. However, any of the requests above would go against to the core itself of one organization that pretends to rule the global economy on behalf of the private interests of an oligarchy. The very nature of WTO is to govern against the interests of any subject that was present in the protests and marches. In other words, there is no chance to pursue this change in the core, without the total destruction of an agent like the WTO. This is because the very idea that is under the nomenclature of WTO, an organization regulating the traffic of goods at global level, has necessarily very narrow interests that do not cover any necessity of the rest of the world. There is not any other method or manner for this organization than to go against the most basic interests of the vast majority of the population of the world, in order to obtain the huge profits they tend to get each year. Thus, the hierarchy promoted by the WTO is also under the reign of logical order and hierarchy that we can assign to the axiom of choice. In other words, the
intervention that the protesters intend to make in Seattle is only faced when the group of anarchists exploit the dynamics of change, in an absolute manner that, however, provoke a reaction of repulse by the majority of protesters. There is a certain mirror effect that provokes repulse when the protesters themselves are able to explicitly watch what they are demanding. Their claims will have as a result, no matter how politely and nicely done, the end of a form to develop capitalist businesses. This implies the loss of jobs, the abolition of certain shops and commerces, the reinvention of places for businesses, etc. The argument of making it in a pacific way is a complete fallacy. There was a general claim in the majority of the protesters in favor of using non-violent manners to approach the protests. This was effectively understood as not fighting, no hurting anyone, pursuing a passive resistance of protesters, etc. In short, they were trying to avoid what has been described as absolute violence at any cost. There is a good reason to avoid this kind of violence, since as we have argued it is only a metonymic change what operates under that, and in consequence, the degree of real change achieved is not significant. However, as we have seen too, it is good in the sense that is able to unveil a certain grade of incongruity attached to any split between means and ends.

The adoption of this very explicit degree of violence by the group of anarchists unveils the very transformational process that the big mass is demanding if they really want to implement a change with regards to organizations like WTO. However, they tend to use a “recycling” policy with regards to the process of change itself. Instead of a real change, they want to recycle any unfair, harming or simply criminal side effect of the WTO politics into “alternative” ways of developing healthy food, fair economic relations
between nations and better labor conditions for workers. The big picture, and it is here
where the absolute violence placed by the group of anarchists starts to reach its meaning,
is that it is necessary a complete change of the set in the theatrical scenario to implement
a new play. In other words, it is necessary also to change the materialistic perception of
reality in order to construct a new poetry that will dress our reality. This is the only
meaning of absolute violence: it provides a structural change that may be perceived, if it
is addressed correctly, as a change in the vision of reality in its material level. The
destruction of street furniture and the private corporations shops entitles the questioning
of both property as a valid relational frame and as a maximal profit goal as a fair
mechanism for social progress. This destruction must not be observed as a banal and
senseless havoc. Moreover, it is an attempt for a catharsis what we face at this level of
violence. Lacan resumes this idea perfectly when he says that “[t]ragedy -we are told in a
definition that we can hardly avoid paying attention to, since it appeared scarcely a
century after the time of the birth of tragedy- has as its aim catharsis, the purgation (…) of
the emotions of fear and pity” (Lacan 1959-1960, 247). It is not a mere destruction of
public domain what the group of anarchists are trying to achieve, while the empower
their anonymity covering their faces and dissolving their identity within a multiplicity of
being, they are attempting to overcome the tragic problem that the protesters are claiming
in their marches: the purgation and purification of a system that is forcing all of them to
survive within a frame that only stimulate exploitation modes of relationships. As Lacan
points out again “[i]nvolved in what I had to say to you about catharsis is the beauty
effect. The beauty effect derives from the relationship of the hero to the limit, which is
defined on this occasion by a certain Ate.” (Lacan 1959-1960, 286). It is clear now that
the relation between catharsis and the aesthetic idea of ethics is deep and strong. Lacan always directs the ethical question to the moment when fear and pity are overcome. This ethical moment, however, cannot be conceived within a process of change, but it needs the perpetuation of a situation to establish the conditions for a fertile ethical question that is directed to the question of truth. This catharsis or purgation by the heroes, the group of anarchists in our example, displays the theatrical scenario within the values of a relation to beauty that is able to repress reality to make it bearable. We can here center the debate and observe how we are witnessing a class struggle. As Badiou remarks “[t]he bourgeoisie/proletariat antagonism designates the relation of classes as impossible, whereby it delimits the real of Marxism. This is not the same as its object, for the object of Marxism (...) is none other than its subject: the political subject” (Badiou 2009b, 127). The struggle between the collective of the protesters and the subgroup of anarchists displays this very antagonistic situation described several times by Marxism. Yet, the anarchist group is still considered as an exogenous element in the protests by the media and the participant of these protests. In doing so, they adopt a theatrical attitude designed to identify themselves with the goal and not with the subject; antagonism does not aim the object but the subject of the struggle and the majority of the protesters regret of the subject and completely identify themselves with the object of the political struggle in the streets of Seattle. In other words, there is a clear drift to adopt a strong Aristotelian theatrical vision rather than a Platonic dialogic perspective.

The destruction of objects in the streets of Seattle has this meaning too. It is the previous step to make the scenario “ethical as such” what is at stake. The breaking of the doors and
windows do not suppose in themselves any deep change, moreover the alteration of their intrinsic elements, but they have an effect of catharsis and therefore of beauty. The displacement of the background scenario of the theatrical set of the protests involves a differentiation on the perception of the reality they are protesting. In other words, what this degree of violence places is the contradiction and somehow the necessity to repress reality in order to place a knowable scenario. After the alteration of street furniture in such a manner, everybody is waiting for a poetic claim that will complete the theatrical play.

In short, we can resume the outcomes of these attempts to change that took place in Seattle in 1999 in two conclusions. First of all, there is a clear split in the mass of protesters between the ones that advocate for a non-violent scene, whatever the proper definition of this un-activity is, and a very small group that protesters that are breaking the material structure that power structures materialize and display, namely, shops, banks and urban furniture. This split however is addressing one clear relation of no relation, between the WTO and the anarchist group, whilst the non-violent group is trying to have a relation (agreement of minimum, a rule of majority) with WTO. In other words, the protesters aim to elaborate an agreement within the possibilities available in that world (Seattle, year 1999, social panorama, political scenario, etc.), and at that moment. Whilst, the group of anarchists start destroying the very possibilities of that world and moment, in order to face any new possibility to come Badiou expresses this idea in the following terms: “The revolution is the existential of antagonism. It is therefore the name of the impossible that is proper to Marxism” (Badiou 2009b, 128). Whenever a certain degree of
impossibility is incorporated within a given world, there is a chance for a revolutionary process to take part. As Badiou clearly questions “What does the revolution name? The sole historical form of existence of the relation of class, that is, antagonism, which turns out to be the destruction of that which did not exist” (Badiou 2009b, 128). In doing so we change the conditions and premises of the world, of the logic of the old world, and we can incorporate a new set of possibilities that did not exist. If we want to explain it with a theatrical perspective, we can say that we do not change the script (the discourse, the language), neither the actors (the bodies) but we incorporate the traces of truth that the subject is able to split to recover the antagonism in the play with the dialectical turn. It is the change of scenario, the breaking of the urban elements that compose the continuity of civic live, what demands a poetic intervention. That way, the majority of protesters try to recycle the moment of change and keep it between the boundaries of continuity, both regarding urban elements and ideological limits. We have explored the idea of catharsis before, as the phenomenon that pushes the hero to the limit, within a tragic environment. We can observe how the majority of the protesters try to avoid any catharsis, limiting the hero and not letting them to reach any limit that would entail the rupture of any possibility for agreement, in a strong Habermasian sense of the term. As the mild version of any ecologic movement, the massive protesters tend to flush any problematic ugliness of the process and reconvert it as bearable element within the continuity of society. What we are unveiling at this point is that the group of anarchists face the situation of relation of no relation with the WTO displaying the destruction of both private and public property, material elements, in order to point out for a lack of authentic poetry that would
fill this gap of relation of no relation, that goes beyond and enthusiastic number of claims that were deployed in songs and proclaims by the majority of the protesters.

This lack of poetry provokes an effect of repetition, both in the claims and in the protests themselves, since this gap is never filled by the protesters, because there is not a single idea, a strong singleton, that supports the relation of no relation, the pursue for a new scenario with a complete new set of possibilities. In Badiou’s words “the singleton is a term of the state of the situation” (Badiou 2005, 521). We have to define poetry at this point, however, that results to become a key point in order to understand its importance and the strong relationship with the ethical question or the complete lack of it. In short, we have to face the fact that poetry is not a mere expression of some kind of human emotional congestion by a lucid subject in the middle of a template and balance scenario. It is more into the strong violent movement of transformation where poetry operates. It is the transformation itself of all the shapes of language when poetry appears into the cultural dimension. In short, we can talk about poetry as the moment of the interruption of certain continuity and tradition in poetry itself. This break or irruption is not a random one, yet. It must be rooted in the very concept of change when change operates as such. Therefore, we can talk about the theatrical scenario described in the riots as a theater without poetry, a scenario without dialogue. And it is dialogue in its strong platonic sense what is at stake. We can resume this battle between the philosophical tradition between the approach of Plato and Aristotle to the method of dialogue in order to pursue the ultimate philosophical goal. For Plato dialogue is the war zone for the commodity on the philosophical act. Philosophy is not a catalogue of knowledge in the case of Plato, but the
act to transform thinking itself. Any derivation of critical thinking is coming from this perspective. Meanwhile, for Aristotle knowledge is the ultimate goal for philosophy, responsible of cataloguing different and diverse knowledge for the good life of humanity.

We can introduce the distinction of good live and truth live here. Any disposition coming from the perspective of a good live will lead to Kantian ethics, where good live is embodied in the maxim of good act and virtue, in a system that elevates the ratio over the truth. As Badiou remarks “[b]eing-in itself, for Kant is the placed inexistent from which it follows that it possesses force of law for the transcendental subject” (Badiou 2009b, 118). This transcendence of the being-in itself is relation to the system that Kant creates in order to construct an ethical structure that regulates the human condition, yet, this human condition vanishes itself whenever is faced with itself. Any disposition coming from true live will lead to ethics of truth and transformation by act of thinking. Good live catalogues life and knowledge, whilst true live changes and acts through thinking.

Therefore, we have to analyze the theatrical scenario of Seattle as a good example to expose the failure in the theatrical event of manifestation to produce a truthful poetry that accompanies the manifestation itself. In other words, the lack of real poetic procedures are the symptom and the reason for these protests not to really achieve any real effective change in the days of the protests and the aftermath of the riots. We have the mass of protesters trying to establish an Aristotelian theatrical dialogue with the WTO, whilst the anarchist group tries to pose the real conditions of the scenario’s set in order to start a platonic dialogue with the ruling oligarchy.
What we have in this theatrical representation of the conflict is, indeed, the old philosophical question of the relation of thinking and the world, and the relation of the subject and the world. In one hand, the Aristotelian tradition bridges the subject and the world with thought, whilst the Platonic tradition relates the subject and the world with the action or dialogue. It is, however, the aim of any philosophical attempt to transform the world and subjectivity itself. Therefore, the transformation of the Aristotelian tradition comes by means of the transcendental value of knowledge, as a depository reality of human existence in the world. Nonetheless, we can affirm that this approach is based on facts that are analyzed by philosophers. Facts are veritable but truths are not. In fact, truths are the source of any transformation and facts are the consequences of these truths. We know that facts are consequences of truths because we already established by the function of choice how there is an order (hierarchy) that postulates the selected choice in the world that can be classified (as a veritable fact) afterwards. In consequence, we can talk about the Platonic approach as the one that defends a true life, against the Aristotelian approach that defends a good life. However, and if we reframe our theatrical scenario where the set is transformed but the poetry does not appear, we can conclude that it is a lack of truths what is missing in our example. In Seattle, at the moment of riots, there is a protest that tends to construct an image of the protester that is able to identify itself with the claims that are arising in the marches. There is no any further inquiry about the problems, the very reason to march. In this sense, there is a lack of poetry in the claims coming from this specific source. This lack of poetry, in the case of Seattle, is not completely explicit, but we can intuit this fact by the appearing of the
anarchist group and how they construct their discourse in the middle of the marches. This discourse is poetic, it is poetic because it lacks any connection with the solid reality of the marches. It is dislocated and it establishes a first step for any dialectic approach to the question of the protests themselves, namely, a first gesture of relation of no-relation.

There is a first attempt to intermingle with void in order to put some distance between the proximity that envelops the majority of the protesters with regards to the WTO member’s meeting.

Again, strictly speaking, there is no attempt to change anything within the vast majority of the protesters that pursue an agreement and a collaborative effort from the WTO. There is an attempt to decorate the links and bridges that are already established between the WTO and the protesters, which are the power relations of the oligarchy with respect to the dominated population. Whilst, the anarchist group, acting and transforming the very set of the place (site), makes an attempt to strain void within this very power relation that would provide the measure of distance for the resolution of a problem. The capacity to change has to deal with void, surpass it, in order to provoke a real change that will last and be part of any historic account. Desire opens the gate for this destruction in the mode of purification. As Badiou points out “[p]rescribed by the loss of its object—thus sutured onto the real by the lack of being—desire divides the subject, being inextensive to the ‘nothing’ from whence it proceeds” (Badiou 2009b, 133). Badiou describes the detour that the subject faces in the mode of torsion, reproduction but not repetition. It is desire what can be repressed but not denied. Repression is not a negation but a regression to overcome a conflict that is surpassed by a dialectical dialogue. Negation, in the contrary,
establishes the elements for a perpetual repetition. Desire opens the possibility for
deciding over the undecidable that a drive denies. Destroying and breaking the urban
furniture, the anarchist group is not placing any determined and decidable reality in the
debate that is going on while people march in the streets. It is exactly the contrary, it is
the articulation of an undecidable gesture what is placed in this theatrical disposition of
elements of the riots.

There is a first attempt in the anarchist group to break the Law, to get out of the legal
frame that regulates the civil society. They do not go against the furniture when they are
breaking the windows, but they are placing the problem of a Law that is imposed over the
vast majority of the population, that is regulated by the markets and ruled by the WTO. It
is an advent of change, however incomplete but full of meaning. The theatrical envelop
we have used to describe these protests, serves us to see how subjectivization in the case
of the protesters opposed to the oligarchy works. The majority of the protesters tend to
establish communicational actions with the elite they are opposed to. There is a clear
attempt to use peaceful means in order to establish this relation that is completely
reasonable and within the boundaries of the possible. However, the anarchist group tries
to establish a dialogue when dialogue is not possible. It is a claim for another type of
subjectivization. At this point the approach of Badiou on subjectivity clarifies this
scenario. As Badiou points out “[s]ubjectivization, aporetic knot of a name in excess and
un-known operation, is what traces in the situation, the becoming multiple of the true,
starting from the non-existent point in which the event convokes the void and interposes
itself between the void and itself” (Badiou 2005, 394). Again, we face how the void, in
the border of the situation, encloses all the impossibilities that are about to be traced by the subjectivity as a faithful operator of truths. Situation (Seattle during the protests) is traced by the subjectivity of the anarchist group, in this case, since the majority of the protesters establishing a reasonable and peaceful communication are not tracing what is an excess in name (unreasonable and illegal according to language itself) and un-known since it is only under the dimension what can be known that the peaceful protesters are able to communicate; that this theatrical scenario becomes the site for a first engagement of the void. Anarchists, this subjectivity that is breaking the scenario in order to provoke a change, are convoked within a process of truth (the material reality or explicit manifestation of what WTO is in the form of bank, shop or urban continuity) in order to interpose this very event between the void and the event itself. This capacity of the event to be articulated in the border of void and interpose void itself in between, is the key functionality that marks the anarchist group as the one that understand better the necessity of a relation between something that makes unbearable this relation. There is no possibility to establish any relation between the excluded (by the oligarchy) and the oligarchy itself, due to the nature of oligarchy. Therefore, anarchist group poses the trace of the consequences of this impossibility, enhancing the mural continuity of urban reality, and attempting to provoke an intervention on it. Any peaceful attempt to make a manifestation will end into a lack of intervention in the reality that is aimed to change. Thus, violence -not as a destructive force or fatal reaction to a situation- must be understood as an affirmative articulation of a relation with no-relation, namely, a dialectic of the affirmative.
What do I mean when I claim that there is a lack of poetry? What is vanished from the spirit of the marches that makes a failure of them? Why the protesters do not achieve any major goal, or change any of the policies of the WTO? In order to understand this failure we have to finally understand what poetry is. We have to start defining it in Badiou’s words “[p]oetry may serve as our guide in this matter insofar as it is only by breaking up all ordinary prose that it extends the limit of the communicable and pushes back the inaccessible frontiers of lalangue” (Badiou 2009b, 159). Here Badiou poses the idea of poetry as the moment of the rupture of language with language. It is dismemberment of the elements and rules of language (form) in combination with a disturbed relocation of the relations with the world (meaning). Poetry embodies these characteristics. However, we can observe that a distance must be taken from the poetic statement and the subject of this statement. As Badiou points out “a subject is at the intersection, via its language, of knowledge and truth” (Badiou 2005, 406). It is clear that the subject is at the intersection, since is the inhabitant of a world (site) with multiple rules. However, there is a rupture with the continuity of the world, and an incorporation of a truth via intervention. Subject, if is the inhabitant of this intervened situation, may be able to foretell what is indiscernible, and undecidable at that moment. This is the relation of the intersection between knowledge and truth. Badiou continues explaining that “[l]ocal configuration of a generic procedure [subject], it is suspended from the indiscernible. Capable of conditionally forcing the veracity of a statement of its language for a situation to-come (the one in which the truth exists) it is the savant of itself.” (Badiou 2005, 406). It is a situation to-come in the manner of an advent, that is not within the existence of the situation where the subject inhabitants. However, there is a chance to construct a
language that will be forced to be veritable according to the truth that suspends the world with its intervention. It is a struggle between the infinite and the finite again what is at stake here. As Badiou remarks “[a] subject is a knowledge suspended by a truth whose finite moment is” (Badiou 2005, 406). Poetry encompasses this description where the infinite nature of truth is embodied for a brief instant in the finitude dimension of the subject as such. Language plays the role of revealing (emancipating) truth from its infinitude and subject from its finitude. Badiou is well aware of the distance between knowledge and subject when he affirms that “[a] subject measures the newness of the situation to-come, even though it cannot measure its own being” (Badiou 2005, 406). However, this is the distance that any real poetry maintains too. Eventually the poem is the advent of a newness that is not discernible but traces in retrospective manner the intervention of a truth process. If we pay a closer attention to this scope we discover how poetry is engendered in the generic, namely, the set that is indiscernible and undecidable before an intervention comes. Badiou, quoting Mallarme explains that “Mallarme’s statement: ‘The poetic act consists in suddenly seeing an idea fragment into a number of motifs equal in value, and in grouping them’. It is a statement of the subject-language, a self-mentioner of the state of a finite configuration of the poetic generic procedure” (Badiou 2005, 404). Thus, the subject is articulating a language that is not ready to bear the reality that is to-come, it is a moment of an advent what language is not able to cover yet. Nonetheless, it will eventually lead to the identification of the facts and the construction of encyclopedic knowledge, once truth is traced down and all the subject become inhabitants of the new situation. We have to remark that there is no destruction of any condition in the world, once it is altered by the advent of the truth. It is an
incorporation what happens. However, as Badiou remarks, it is crucial to adopt forcing - in the situation- as a key way for the undercover articulation of truth and language. As Badiou points out “[f]orcing is what a knowledge can discern of the relation between the above statement [the one of Mallarmé on the poetic act] and this or that poem: the conclusion to be drawn is that if this poem is ‘representative’ of post-Hugo poetic truth, then the statement concerning the poetical act will be verifiable in knowledge (…) in the situation to-come in which this truth exists” (Badiou 2005, 404). There is a chance, for language to intercept truth in a retrospective way, that is indiscernible at the moment that subject makes the statement, if the infinite possibilities of truth are materialized in the finitude of the correspondence by forcing via deciding what is undecidable. What follows is what Badiou calls the fundamental law of the subject which states that “if a statement of the subject-language is such that it will have been veridical for a situation in which a truth has occurred, this is because a term of the situation exists which both belongs to that truth and maintains a particular relation with the names at stake in the statement” (Badiou 2005, 401). This fundamental law of the subject indicates this twofold belonging of the subject that splits in a particular (local) moment and location, which is exceed as universality, if both locations are linked by the subject-language. In other words, any revolutionary change is also a change in the statements (ideas) of subjects that are able to be inhabitants of a twofold situations. That is to say, a subject is “[the one] which decides an undecidable from the standpoint of an indiscernible. Or, that which forces veracity, according to the suspense of a truth” (Badiou 2005, 407). The locality attached in the subject (finitude) is for one instant reflected in the indiscernible and undecidable nature of the infinite truth. This inscription by the intervention of the subject comes by a
statement (language) to a situation to-come. This idea of how force makes the decision is a reminiscence of Marx’s idea on force. Marx states at some point that “[t]here is an antinomy, right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchanges” (Marx 1999, 155), when he talks about the creation of the surplus value and the design of the working day in the first volume of “Capital”. However, he resumes these ideas saying finally that “[b]etween equal rights force decides” (Marx 1999, 155). Somehow Marx is managing the ideas that Badiou is developing when he mentions the concept of force as a deciding entity over something that cannot be decided. Forcing the veracity, the subject intervenes in the world, he makes an announcement in the world declaring his or her existence, too. It is important to recall that this subject, however, has a being according to the standards of the generic. In consequence I propose the following formula that summarizes these ideas:

\[ \int(x) \neq x \]

Where the function of the element \( x \) establishes a relation via its function that emancipates \( x \) from \( x \). In other words, by the intervention of truth, the differences of \( x \) are emancipated from \( x \) and it is the process of change what is elucidated. Truth is always the emancipation of differences.

In sum, we have a subject that obeys to a law which admits the forcing of veracity, according to the incorporation of a truth procedure into the world. However, this subject is able to force this commitment deciding the undecidable and provoking a knowledge of
the indiscernible. We can conclude that what subject is able to articulate its generic nature at the moment of belonging as inhabitant of the situation and the world that is left, going through difference before acquiring any knowable identity.

If we return to the examples of the riots all over Europe in the past years, that have a clear germ in Seattle, we can develop the concept of subject we have just presented. Hence, we will be able to determine what failed during this riots not to become real revolutions. In short, which were the key elements that were not established in the relation between the actors and the situation that produce no poetry in the edge of the world.

**a. The restriction of the function of change**

During the riots of Seattle in 1999, the population that is claiming for a social change and the socialization itself of the WTO is not accurate enough in their claims in order to establish a grade of universalism in their manifestation. In other words, the claims and manifestations of the majority of the protesters does not reach a scenario that will emancipate the totality of the elements inhabiting that society. This restriction forces the entire protests to fall into the particularities of claims that are enforced already by the social policies and corporate stratification of society itself. The design of the main frame is not altered, at most, it can be interpellated. This means that more particular claims are incorporated in the sequence of the Law that rules the social reality, but eventually, Law is not altered as such, nor is the spirit of the Law.
What the group of anarchists does by the interruption of the protest by a protest is to make a step forward to sign this restriction and put the scenario for a relation of no-relation within the marches. In consequence, the group of anarchist is trying to alter the Law in such a way that reaches a range of universality with respect to the total population ruled by these policies of the WTO. They do not try to interpellate the Law but by interrupting the interruption itself, they disturb the Law, creating a language that is forcing the decision over the undecidable and promoting a knowledge of the indiscernible. It is undecidable as such the fact of breaking windows and banks front doors with regards to oppose the neoliberal brutal policies that are disguised under these architectonic structures. Nonetheless, this apparent destruction of the architecture of what is neoliberal, this minoritized group interrupts the game of having relations over what is decidable. Negotiations do no happen over what is negotiable, but on what is completely unnegotiable, if we want to use Jacques Derrida’s words (Derrida 2002). By doing so, the group of anarchist does not accept any neutrality over policies that are present and explicit for the totality of the population. They give, in an act of explicit display of theatrical effect, a range of universalism to be traced by a language that must support this articulation, namely, a subject-language with the capacity to make it bearable any indiscernible in an anterior future.

**b. The relation between real possibilities and the Ethical Question**

The second failure of these protests is based on the lack of any articulation of relations within boundaries that do not accept these very relations, shielded in an ethical vision of
particularities. In other words, non-violence -or a peaceful manner of protest- is used as an ethical shield, in order to restrict the arena of reality to the actual possible and certain facts that are already given. The ethical question of not harming, altering or struggling in an active manner against what is real (policies that neoliberal mode of government is executing against the interests and will of the population) dilutes any articulation of a really radical critical thought. First, because of the analysis of the situation is sweetened by fallacies that cover the ugliness beyond these unfair policies enforced by the oligarchy represented in the WTO. Second, it is a continuous attempt to perpetuate a mode of continuity that is the core of the policies directed by the oligarchy. The ethical question, addressed from this point of view, obliterates sublimation itself. It is an endogamic mode of protest what we face. If we pay attention to the riots of London in 2011, we will observe how the protesters are mimicked by the same lack of poetry that the protesters in Seattle are. Any ethical evaluation that is not anchored in the trace of truth procedures will obliterate any sublime moment. The obstruction for truths to bloom, no matter how abruptly and “violently” this may happen, is a false protection that endures the obscene situation where people is trapped.

c. The lack of poetry

Analyzing each episodes of recent outbursts that occurred all over the world, we can conclude that there is a certain lack of poetry in them, because of the lack to articulate a language that is challenging enough with reality itself. Any emblem we hear or read is a repetition of old claims that do not have the desired effect or strength anymore. However,
there is a methodic idea of making these claims with a recurrence to poetic manners. The creational and inventive attempts to make a protests sympathetic and nice goes beyond the attempt itself of making a purely peaceful ironical or sarcasm statement. We have analyzed how sarcasm or humor helps to cope with that factor of reality that is not bearable. Nonetheless, it is our duty to go beyond humorous statements in order to articulate a subject-language that breaks history and grasps any trace of truth. Thus, this language has to cope with two aims. First, there must include a claim that emancipates the non-existent into existence and provides an appear-into-the-world for him or her. The generic is announced into the world by sake of statements. We must recall that the generic is the indiscernible that make a decision (intervention) over the undecidable. Any knowledge that basis its raison d’être in facts will be deployed after this announcement. Second, any discourse that is able to rebuild the obliteration of infinite and the sublimation of finitude will produce a poetic structure where the generic will grasp any truth procedure. Going back to the riots of London, Spain or Los Angeles, we observe how none of the premises we have just described takes place. We can trace a line between the riots in Seattle, Egypt, Spain and Ukraine more recently, and the riots that happened in London, Paris and Los Angeles. The former, they all share an ideological and political claim for better conditions within a democratic system and more participatory means for general will. However, they all share as well the urban factor, which is crucial to understand the capitalist development in last decades (David Harvey has developed some interesting insights and ideas on this nexus between urban architecture and capitalism in “The Urban Experience” and “Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution”). We can talk about an entire urban-set in the theatrical play of the revolts
that mediates the language that is happening during the protests. However, we can notice that in these riots there is some lack of a poetic moment where a new language is introduced to challenge the language, the set and the actors themselves. In other words, some minor changes in the set happen (the breaking of urban furniture, etc.) but the script for a complete new play never arrives. In the other hand, Los Angeles in 1992, there was a display of rage and anger against a condition of a part of the population, their “dispositive” to deal with social reality as subsumed within the determination of being inferior, not non-existent. Black people that were living in the poorest neighborhoods of Los Angeles were the existent part of a capitalist society that was demanding a stratification of society in order for the system to keep working. They were not an accidental determination but a necessary one. The example of Los Angeles in 1992 serves us to dress the argument that there are some riots that do not cope with any revolutionary aim, but they do serve to unveil some hidden realities that are obliterated from the general set of the theatrical play, so to speak. In Los Angeles, in London and in Paris the excluded sector of the population, the ones that not appear in the theatrical play and that do not have any language as Spivak would point out, decide to articulate the vernacular language and transform the theatrical set to highlight the social inequalities and severe situations. Therefore, we can still talk about a necessity, not only to make appear the excluded segment of population within the theatrical level, but also at a social real level. Somehow, in these riots there is a lack of real existence within the social reality of these people, even after these riots.
Therefore, any poetic articulation was lacking of lack itself. In other words, there was not a truly poetic discourse in these riots because any demand was based in a copycat version of society they wanted for them: they were asking what white man had, the oppressing role included. In London in 2011 something similar happened. The system is not intended to be challenged, but there is an outburst for spontaneous consumption of goods, looting is the message embodied in these riots.

Again, these riots were not pursuing any poetry in the language that they develop. In case of the Arabic Spring and Spanish 15-M movement, the conclusion is the same, although the process is more subtle and complex. We face indeed a situation that was changed in a manner of vindicating a democratic era in both countries. In the case of Spain, there was a self-named transition period where democratic system was told to be implemented in the end of the 70’s. In the Egyptian case, there is a ruler that is supported by self-named democratic countries. Nonetheless, the particularities that come from the internal dispositions in the case of Spain (self-regulated transition, internally rooted political disposition) and the external characteristics established in the Egyptian case (the support of the United States to a specific ruler) are not comparable at this stage, and it would take a long analysis and discussion to settle it here. In sum, prior to any enjoyment of any real change in revolutionary change periods, there is a poetic moment that is articulated within the coordinates of subject-language, where subject is the very intersection where its existence and trace of truths coincide. We can analyze too the massive killing happened in Utøya (Norway 2011), where a subject catalogued by media and some politicians and analysts, as a “lone wolf” assassinated 77 people and injured hundreds.
The official discourse and the imaginary relate of what happened that day coincide. This means that there is a correspondence between the symbolic order and the imaginary order, at the moment of articulate a logical (and logical-imaginary) language around these tragic events. This very correspondence must make us suspect that there was something else than a “lone wolf” acting that day.

There is always a distance between the language articulated from a logical point of view (the symbolic interpretation of the facts made by forensic science, in this case) and the imaginary surrealistic transmutation of the events (the use of animality to classify a subject as a wolf, in order to obliterate its subjectivity and deny a certain portion of crucial humanity within). However, this distance does not exist in this case and Anders Breivik is fully integrated at the very same time in both discourses that share too many elements between them. In order to articulate a more profound and valid analysis we have to take our position in the place where this very distance ought to be.

Therefore, we find ourselves between the real distance marked between a traditional protest and the case of Norway, where distance is mimetic with identification. It is helpful to frame these two conditions with both theatrical scopes that Plato and Aristotle articulate. In one hand, we have Aristotle perception of theatre as an identification presented in front of an audience that is a compromised part of the spectacle. In this case, the identification intends to be total, in other words, the distance between audience and play is vanished, as it is vanished in the case of Breivik. There is a total identification from the perpetrator of the massacre. This lone-wolf embodies any articulation of a
societal reality in the idea of the One: justice, executive power, administrative pace of the steps, literary propaganda and leader pseudo-intellectual positions are melted in one sole person. The tragic play of the event process as planned, with one start and one clear and final goal. Tragedy is displayed in this manner in any theatrical disposition following an Aristotelian thought.

In the other hand, we find the idea of Plato and the dialogical logic of any satisfactory theatrical display. In this case, dialogue itself places a distance between the Two, the one and the self, but it is a distance that makes out of a scission a relation by itself. Therefore, we can diagnose a failure in the theatrical display on the riots coming from Seattle till actuality (M15 movement, Occupy movements, Arab Spring moment, etc.). Why is it a failure of the theatrical display in these cases? As I have mentioned before, there is a certain lack of poetry in this protests, because of a lack of dialectical gesture that could blend the entire uprising. Poetry embodies the scission of language with language, of meaning with meaning. What fails in the protests mentioned above is the step from absolute and hegemonic violence into universal violence. It is not a game of majorities that must be ruled out from a demonstration, quite the contrary, it is a degree of change that is able to affect and intervene within a universal range what any real revolution must pursue. Thus, we can observe how in the first case -the Aristotelian theatrical vision and the pure identification of the elements in Breivik- the distance between elements is blurred in order to obtain a false sensation of jouissance that is based in pure joy. It is this mistake what condemns the dialogical proposal coming from Plato in order not to enjoy but to suffer-the-sublime through the dialogical pursue of the truth. Similarly, we can
connect some killings that happen regularly at High Schools and Universities in North America to the schema we have described in the case of Breivik, where the identification with a lack of state is a symptom of an excess of necessity to defend and an overload of a sensation of risk. It is within this coordinates -lack of state and risk- where this type of pseudo-ideology finds a fertile ground to flourish. In a situation of a lack of state, it is a perception of losing the rights and privileges as a citizen what consumes the subject and transforms him into a particularity or individual. The sense of community is broken at this stage and weapons substitute any rational argument, but this emotional relationship to weapons also comes from a mythology and tradition of war and armed conflicts. It is by means of force and imposition of political conditions that conflicts are resolved, according to a concrete tradition in North America (War of Independence, Second World War, Vietnam, etc.). It is within this tradition that a certain version of what is to be identified is established, a white middle-class young boy is usually the actor of this tragic play that will end up with the assassination of surrounding friends, and it will be justified by banal pseudo-reasons. We can easily adequate to our schema of how identity, as a closed and perpetual place for the subject, limits any articulation of the difference, of a sense of fragile and vanishing nature of identity (as a lack of difference) as such. In consequence, the distance between the object of identity (mythology) and the subject is vanished in the case of killings of Columbine in 1999, Red Lake Senior High School in 2005 or Oikos University in 2012, just to mention some of the recent mass killings examples. When this identification with the object touches this extreme, the subject itself is vanished and it completely becomes the object of this mythical identification (ideology, mythology, war tradition, etc.). Therefore, most of this mass killings consumes the
subject itself, in the mode of suicide of the killer. These happenings, nonetheless, do not fit our definition of change, since they do not break or modify any of the established laws, norms or human condition. Even though, as a result of the killings, the lives of many families are altered and seriously affected, it is within the realm of power that this happenings must be analyzed. They display the very and bare exercise of power that is perfectly evaluable in ethical grounds, something that does not attain to any process of real change. Here again, we can observe how the relation between violence and power remains as a non-relational reality or a relation between antagonistic positions, where our proposal to understand violence as a function of change operates as the synthetic resolution to the antagonistic reality.

In consequence, we face the idea of pure identification with an imaginary dimension in the case of Breivik, a total identification with the images of the past, the pictures of ancestry and an idea of purity reflected in the immobility and permanence transmitted by these images. The stillness is embodied in the images of the Arian idea as the supremacy over any condition. Stillness is the feature of the past, the permanence of a historicist version of History itself. Plato is well aware of this risk and he does not trust the pure image as a source for truth. This is something clear in his well-known myth of the cave and in the idea of reminiscence of the ideas and not in the (real) display of them. There is no poetry happening in the cave, only the delusion of adopting the imaginary as the symbolic force. It is this absence of authentic poetry, a mode of language that challenges language itself, what is absent in that cave.
In consequence we have both ideas that take place in actual conceptualization of violence as a function of change that lead to the understanding of the relation between violence and power. Since change itself is not traceable, we have to focus our attention in power, in the perpetuation of the system that supports the system itself, and that is able to give us some clues to understand what the system is not. However, change is the place (topoi) for these elements that keep as non-existent, or out of the system. They are the indiscernible elements that cannot be judged on ethical basis. In the cases of different modes of riots or conflicts described above we can trace our idea of violence as a function of change. The nature of function is the evaluation of an element with regards to a transcendental that inscribes the force of difference in the realm of sameness. In consequence, depending of the degree of change that any of the happening faces, we will be able to evaluate the power that enforces or the possibility of the non-existent that incorporates. In other words, when we talk about gender violence, happenings in Norway or the repression of protesters, we clearly witness an enforcement of power and its structures. Power relies in the necessity for reaffirmation, a double affirmation that changes the nature of affirmation itself. Reaffirmation does not double the strength of any affirmative claim, but condemns it to a perpetual repetition that only pursues the continuity of the established conditions.

Hence, power reproduces the idea of a network that in its fragility speculates with repetition in order to maintain and perpetuate the finitude of a world. In doing so, it is a reproduction of the Aristotelian vision of theatre, directed to amuse the audience and forcing the identification of the historical facts displayed on the stage with a lack of any critical vision on them. The reaffirmation, the double affirmation on affirmation,
produces a negation, a fixation on the negated object in order to return to it in a closed circularity. This closure also prevents any critical thought that may open the closure for its exposure in public basis.

The happenings that conduct the killing of civilians, the extermination of races, the alienation of complete national communities and the reification of individuals are mere exercises of power at an absolute level, a level that absolutely chases to perpetuate the conditions that these communities or individuals have, displaying a message fully based on the identification of the “good life” with certain values and principles that must be maintained at any cost.

We can catalogue also the commonly accepted violent attempts to overcome the ruling codex, the Law itself, and the reactionary effect of reinforce this Law as hegemonic violence and reactionary power exercise. There are few attempts that may be considered as hegemonic violence, the attempt to change the social Law for an incorporation of a political subject that interrupts the previous Law with a political corpus that enables a different system. I will mention only the Cultural Revolution in China or May 68 in France as clear examples of hegemonic violence that, however, did not reach a degree of universal change. The reactionary exercise of power is clearly featured by an attempt to achieve a correct combinatory sequence in the rules, norms and Law -and any symbolic element present in society- in order to maintain the core structure of power. In consequence, we are dealing again with an exercise of power by power, a display of ruling capacity by the ruling class if we want, that remains reactionary to any attempt of
change. The strongest and most dramatic example of this reactionary exercise of power is the Nazi regime, which completed the attempt to disguise an involution as a social revolution. The elements of power structures that survived in the Nazi regime were only on demand of a perpetuation of an image, a bare mythological imaginary, which was the disguised imaginary element as a symbolic structure. Therefore, it is the main characteristic of a reactionary regime to propose an involution as a final solution towards any revolutionary idea.

Finally, when we try to revisit the idea of a revolution, we face the giant effort to evaluate if any change has been deep enough to affect thoroughly the historical, political and social levels at the same time. This may result simpler when we observe a shift in the scientific field (Copernican contribution, Newton’s ideas on force and gravity or Einstein’s theory of relativity and energy). However, there are also “minor” scientific contributions that are able to struggle with the laws that govern this field (Schrödinger’s equation on quantum physics or Cantor’s contribution on set theory) that yet give us the keystones to pursue “major” changes. Hence, in our previous critics to the failure of a revolutionary moment, we are addressing the questions that are not conceived in the protests and revolts. There is indeed a negation of the possibilities of the infinite possibilities are still to come. As we see in the scientific revolutions, what is incorporated in the world is something that is still to come. There is no knowledge that supports these theories before they are incorporated as something impossible into the “old” world. In the case of revolts and protests, this negation of impossibilities vanishes any real chance to repress what is still to come, and in consequence, make it bearable and knowable. There
is also a lack of a self-language, a language created by the political subject that transforms reality. This is what we call a lack of poetry, as a significant feature to transform and change language, literature and the world at the very same time. And finally, there is a lack of awareness of what reality is in its appearance of being reality. There is no analytical effort to disclose the relation between real possibilities and infinite impossibilities, a relation of no-relation based on a lack of lack of the impossibilities and the subject that is able to articulate this scission in dialectical terms. In short, the subject is castrated in her intellectual capacities: it is restricted to a private “version” of the public sphere (a real virtuality that is opposed to a virtual reality), and it is a failure of critical thinking since the identification with the imitation of a real virtuality vanished the necessary distance for a critical gesture itself.

We just addressed the questions related to our four critical points to the hypotheses described in our introductory chapter. First, the relational nature between violence and power is dialectical. The antagonistic positions that both concepts hold display a necessity for a dialectical turn in order to achieve an approach that will solve this very contradictory nature. Adopting a perspective that perceives violence as a function of change we are overcoming the premise of power that will be opposed and in need of legitimation at any moment violence is displayed. We place the idea that there is a hierarchy and order between violence and power and this relation of order is non-reversible. We can produce power whenever a real change is displayed, but we do not obtain violence whenever we exercise power, since power itself demands a perpetuation of power, and thus, goes against the nature of violence that is mainly described as a
mechanism of change. When change becomes at universal range or moment, we can observe -mainly in revolutionary moments- how the events that take place are able to put a distance between history and themselves. This second feature is the one that emancipates change from history. History is the activity that traces differences during periods of time. This activity, however, needs of a mechanism of torsion, a beginning that comes from a place that is interrupted in the continuum of history itself, in order to emancipate the differences -in the mode of consequences- that are emanated from this interventions. Truths are the proper name for the emancipation of these differences. Therefore, we are able to attach this mechanism to our second hypothesis, where change is the emancipation of these differences with regards to three levels or moments: absolute, hegemonic or universal violence. We express this idea in the dynamic formula \( \int (x) \neq x \), where an element \( x \) displays something else than \( x \) when a function measures its degree of change. This idea cannot be developed without a site. In a wordless situation, there is a factual necessity to develop a mechanism of total identification on the stage of the theatrical level of the social life. However, theatre develops as a negation of reality, and in consequence in a fixation with the negated object, in the case of the Aristotelian vision of it. Nonetheless, we propose a dialectical vision of theatre that represses reality (the facts that are presented twice on the stage, and thus, re-presented) that avoids a duality of presentation but offers a multiplicity of presentations. In doing so, a Platonic vision of theatre does not deny the capacity of theatre to deal with reality, but what really does is to challenge any subjectivity of establish a dialogue between what this subjectivity conceives as an absolute facticity and hegemonic imaginary. As a result of this dialogue, we will be able to obtain a critical thinking that is able to trace the change
at historical level but also at an a-historical level, a chain of facts that become facts only in a future anterior, only after the advent of an event. Therefore, we must sustain this idea in our last hypothesis, the one that proposes the equals as the generic subjectivity that is able to grasp a proper language that is not yet a language, and that is able to deal with the aesthetic dimension of the ethical question. In order to cope with the totality of our task, we need a subjectivity that vanishes itself at the same moment that event is flourishing in order to disappear as well. This mode of subjectivity must feature the theatrical level as an aware audience that does not predicate the play (give the opinion of how the play was, the actors, how the technical characteristics were, etc.) but how the play is able to complete his real with the imaginary of the play, and establish a dialogue between this two dimensions. We must be clear at this point that this scission between this two dimensions of reality must come from the subjectivity itself. Therefore, this must be a faithful subject, a subject that is able to be at the intersection between truth and knowledge, and completing the antagonistic scenario with the tracing of consequences of truths and feature the function of change. Violence is the natural state of this mode of subjectivity.
Chapter IV

The Concept of Equals

Introduction

Whenever we talk about change as an ontological concept, we draw our attention of the agency that will command or endure these changes. Nonetheless, subjectivity is a crucial issue if we want to understand violence as a function of change. This very function will have an active role only if we are able to posit the idea of the generic, embodied in the concept of equals. Moreover, when we talk about the subject-language or the generic set, we are idealizing the concept of equals as the subjectivity that is able to fit in the frame of this world that is actively changing. We can adopt different names to designate the group of people that is excluded conceptually from society, achieving a status that is not nameable or even thinkable. The degree of existence of these groups of people yet opens the impossibility of an inner status that will lead to a singularity that will become a universal phenomenon. If we observe any revolutionary moment we can understand this
unique mechanism where the un-existent becomes fully existent as a singularity that provokes that the universality of truths change any given site or world. I will explore different dimensions where equals are designed by the generic, but in this affirmation of their negativity, in the old Hegelian manner of Aufhebung.

i) Equals and Language

The relationship between poverty and poetry seems to be of one lacking some kind of connection, however, it is fully relevant to open the idea of a pure relationship between both, namely, a relationship based on the subtraction of a group of persons that their existence is denied, but that do belong to the community and that are incorporated as negative dialectic. Eventually, we will prove that they will earn a presence within the societal whole due to a natural relation to poetry. Nonetheless, it is necessary to complete this approach with a notion on affirmative dialectics, one that overcomes a primary negative dialectic, an idea that covers a site (world) for any impossibility to take place, in order to give a chance for any possibility to exist. In other words, how is possible for poetry to be the mirror and the tool -to belong to a particularity (finitude) that will be materialized via a universality (infinitude)- for these people to earn presence in a given situation (world) and become even a reference with regards to social and political dimension?
Poetry is the act of language where the poorest, the excluded or even the ones that do not exist yet, make a radical change, and confront the truth, both in an immanent and transcendental way. This dynamic is solved by immanent transcendence that is achieved by an excess of the immanence itself. It is in basis of poetry where the excluded can find a place—a situation or world—within the society. Poetry is the gate not to enter, but to create a space for the ones that were temporarily excluded. The concept of gate evokes both the presence of a limit as impossibility and also the path or track to enter throughout this impossibility into a new set of real possibilities. It is an incorporation of possibilities what occurs, in this sense.

Even though this people are excluded, “evacuated” or purged from society somehow, they still have a name. Here we face a problem of second degree, the one that deals directly with language and linguistics. The problem of proper name is widely discussed and it is not my intention to contribute to this debate. However it is relevant to include the process of how people that are excluded from society is named. They are catalogued and named, they are included into the language in such a way that makes undeniable their repressed presence in society. In other words, they are included in one sort of encyclopedic knowledge that has a section for the ones that are not but still may exist. It is our duty to elucidate how this transition into existence occurs. Nonetheless, it is language again, namely, the process of naming, what gives access ex nihilo to a site where existence may happen. Poetry copes with this task as a revolutionary tool, but also as an act of militancy, however rediscovered and reinvented itself always already.
Poetry is constantly revisiting itself in this reflexive but not enclosed way, without a mimetic repetition, but incorporating any difference that is encountered in the process. It is a poetry that appears in the world throughout the subjects that inhabit this world. Badiou remarks this feature when he says that “[t]he key to thinking appearing, when it comes to a singular being, lies in being able to determine, at one and the same time, the self-difference which makes it so that being-there is not being-qua-being, and the difference from others which makes it so that being-there, or the law of the world which is shared by these others, does not abolish being-qua-being.” (Badiou 2009a, 117).

Badiou is talking about the struggle between the mere being-qua-being and the logic that permeates the appearing in the world. It is a language, namely, a formal language embodied in logic what makes the appearing in a situation possible. Badiou follows saying that “[i]f appearing is a logic, it is because it is nothing but the coding of these differences, world by world” (Badiou 2009a, 117).

The logic that Badiou takes into consideration is the one related to the transcendental. Transcendental for Badiou is the world out there in the form of truth, a truth we are able to code in logic. This notion of the transcendental serves Badiou for the crucial labor of indexing any element in the world. However, it is not an individual dimension what is at stake when we talk about poetry, but a collective one, where the truth erases any particular determination or vernacular possibility. In consequence, our task requires to talk about poetry as the vehicular element to intervene into reality, since it is the access to aesthetics what is interrupted by matheme as we shall see further on, in order to open the possibilities to ontology as such as Badiou himself reminds us when he says that.
First of all, in any analysis of the status of a pariah, of an outcast a first dialectical scenario crops up. We can call it a silent baptism in this case. It is a fact that whenever a group of persons or a cultural community is excluded, it must be named first. It is the act of mentioning them, putting a proper name and creating a meaning of this name for them that happens first. At this first stage two processes share a site or world. Both sublimation and obliteration coexist in this moment of dialectical process. I will focus firstly in sublimation I will use the approach provided by Lacan, in order to give a complete sense within the frame of the poetic gesture.

It would take too long to discuss in deep the implications of this term in Lacan versus the one coming from Freud, however it is necessary to trace the concept down in its basic form in order to articulate my argumentation in a proper way, moreover taking into account how sublimation has an intimate aesthetic link that has developed in parallel of after the psychoanalytical contribution. Lacan follows the Freud´s thought in order to locate sublimation as the social recognition of drives. In short, these drives that are not firstly bearable by individuals, are shared socially in order to make a first approach. However, sublimation for Lacan is the integration of subject’s drives in the social whole, but in the way of expanding them in a veiled form. As Lacan points out with regards to poetry itself and the development of the child “[t]he problem of sublimation has to be posed early, but we don’t for that reason have to limit ourselves to individual development. The reason why there are poets, why a poetic vocation may
suggest itself early to a young human being, cannot simply be solved (…) considering genetic development and the new characteristics that appear at the moment when sexuality becomes an issue in an obvious way” (Lacan 1959-1960, 157). This paragraph shows how important is poetry for the infant, how a subject is able to develop the imaginary paradigm and start to flirt with the symbolic strength of the law of language at that early stage. Lacan demands our attention with regards to this term to understand how close is in the management of desires and drives, especially and mainly with libido and sexual drive. Lacan continues developing this idea when he points out that “[i]n the definition of sublimation as satisfaction without repression, whether implicitly or explicitly, there is a passage from not-knowing to knowing, a recognition of the fact that desire is nothing more than the metonymy of the discourse of demand” (Lacan 1959-1960, 293). Lacan is posing the question of metonymy in order to hide the one of metaphor, namely, the creation of absolutely new meanings. It is a combination of objects by substitution, as happens to be a metonymy, what operates at desire level. It is not a repression of a given satisfaction what occurs when we are in presence of sublimation, but an operation over a certain type of subject that is able to gather some characteristics compatible with these linguistic features.

Thus, sublimation requires some levels of identity and determination in the subject itself, in order for the sublimation to be a successful procedure. Nonetheless, we can recall some of Lacan’s words in order to understand how metaphor is articulated in this dimension of sublimation. Lacan talks in these terms when he is mentioning the
impasse condition of death drive in Freud and says that “It points to the site that I designate alternatively as impassable or as the site of the Thing. Freud evokes there his sublimation concerning the death instinct insofar as that sublimation is fundamentally creationist” (Lacan 1959-1960, 213). We can recall three elements that give this crucial meaning to Lacan’s words. First of all, we can observe how poetic elements are not mere individual concerns or happenings, no matter how early they appear in child’s mind. It is a collectivity what is mirrored in this premature poetic attitude. Secondly, there is a metonymic nature of desire with regards to the object (the Thing) that is not available and in consequence must be chased forever. It is change as such, as Lacan remarks, what desire is. And thirdly, sublimation represents in Freud a creationist moment, a moment where something comes into existence *ex nihilo*. This creational moment also stands on the concept of the thing as Lacan himself points out. It is a key concept to understand the ethical question. Sublimation as satisfaction without repression is a turning point and a breaking point too, since it is the response to the unbearable notion of the real, the object or art or the experience itself.

Art *happens* in a similar way in the social arena, since it is not directly that the aesthetic, in a form of message, is adopted by a community. It takes place in a given situation or world, it is a site what art happens and not where. Moreover, there is a veiled signifier that moves the drive of the aesthetic energy into the deepest consciousness of the community itself. Sublimation is the integration of the drive but by its repression too. Somehow we are about to face the impossibility as a real
possibility this way, because it is a previous impossibility to bear a circumstance (truth) what envelops our scene, and it is throughout sublimation that the subject starts anticipating the impossibility as a true purely possibility to incorporate in his world. If we adopt impossibility in such a way, then we are ready to create a determination in the form of affirmative dialectic to understand this impossibility as a source and not as mere limit. It is thanks to a destructive negativity that is bearable for the society. Drives otherwise will not be able to the recognized by society, they need some kind of bypass in a veiled form that assures the participation of them in the coming understanding of the different world that takes place after them. Aesthetic thinking – from literature to painting, films or even mechanical work- as long as changes the whole perspective of communal thought, must go throughout a similar process. It adopts a signifier for the aesthetic drive that is embodied in a negative dialectic in order to produce an affirmative creation, allowing the citizen to observe the world in a different perspective. This observation does not occur from a witness point of view, as soon as this observation takes place the subject must be able to understand (create a subject-language) this new situation. Heidegger is talking about something similar when he remarks the importance of intelligibility and its relation to the being-there or Dasein. However, we must note that Heidegger does not anticipate any truth procedure with this perspective, but only remarks the importance of perceiving the world as something that must be intelligible. Sublimation, in short, is the impossibility of the subject to cope with real(ity).
Accordingly, obliteration is the act of veiling something not to keep it apart but to peek into it a little bit after. We stop ourselves just for a little while just to come back to the same point in a different way, we take a detour, but we execute a grade of repression first. It is as if we would be able to dress an argument with a short skirt to keep everything that is desirable in the argument opaque and hidden. However, it is easy to give away with our desires and try to peek under the skirt, look under it and check what our drive is trying to obtain at any cost. Poetry is merged under this phenomenon too. It is an act of obliteration of the language what happens in poetry, since it is not possible for any subject to cope with the real of language as such. Poets play this game of jouissance, namely, the management of pain and pleasure, using language to achieve this goal. It is impossible to bear this symbolic dimension, to trap the language as such, therefore the poet plays the role of suffering in a joyful manner the language in his poems. It is the game what we use to bear what is unbearable as truth. The ludic dimension envelops the truth in order to make its appearance bearable for us. Poetry plays with language and uses and abuses the words, the structures and above all, the meanings. Poetry is an act of metaphor, which is the sublest method of obliteration. Poet denies language by using language in that mystic and opaque manner, hides the old meanings but without erasing them, in order to create new ones, leaving behind a slight trace of the old ones in the process. Words are exchanged in order to achieve a complete new set of perspectives towards the world.
It is a similar process the one happening with the exclusion of the poor from society in a veiled form. Any form of alienation or reification of the society is in deep a form of obliteration. Where is that poetry finds the civic society? Which is the social strata that poetry takes its inspiration? Poverty is a consequence but it is also a phenomenon. It is a condition and a status but it is also an opportunity of change. It is in the bottom line of society where things are perceived more clearly. Poetry and the poet are exclusively engaged with the poor or excluded, since their language is not directed to a high social class, but to the most mundane of the human condition in this society which is the lowest and most disadvantaged one, namely, the one that is out of any determination and is founded within an impossibility. This lack of any determination mingles with the idea of the generic presented by Badiou. As Badiou says “[i]t [the generic] is the concept, inside the fundamental situation, of a multiple which is indiscernible in that situation.” (Badiou 2005, 371). The generic as a concept is indiscernible, which is a clue to understand that it exists in a situation because of its lack of any determination.

With this regards, I will use the term rabble, not as a pejorative approach but as a concept that may embody the very equality in social terms. This idea of the generic was partially developed by Hegel and the concept of rabble, which will evolution into the proletariat in Marx. Poverty, poor or rabble is where the very impossibility of the civic is placed. Poverty is the site for poetry in this way. Poverty is the best place for poetry to happen. Any aesthetic movement that is taking place within this dimension of poverty allows to the enjoyment of the aesthetic object with no other distraction or spectacle dissolution. The society of spectacle or even the art of spectacle are common phenomena in postmodern society. Walter Benjamin in his “The Work of Art in the Era...
of Mechanic Reproduction” Benjamin 1935) or David Harvey in “The Condition of Postmodernity” (Harvey 1991) denounce the banality and surface meaningless value of this sort of perspective. Society and art of spectacle is merely directed to the consumption of the rich or “petit bourgeois” as Sartre would put it talking in “What is Literature?” (Sartre, 1959). In short, sublimation is only possible in a poor – repressed- environment, in a situation where art has the lowest grade of mediation, it will still remind hidden in part due to its oblitered nature, however, it will remind in poor conditions always. Obliteration, in sum, is the impossibility to cope with language.

In order to make any progress in this discussion we are forced to make a dialectical turn. In this particular case, I would like to claim for an affirmative dialectic. In order to merge both sublimation and obliteration into an affirmative dialectical turn, we must reintroduce the term Aufhebung from Hegelian dialectics. However, it is important to rescue this term as an affirmative concept. Sublation is more than a negation or obstruction to knowledge or experience of the phenomenon. We should be able to adopt the term as a creational moment of change. Creation here must be understood as the incorporation of languages, bodies and truths. I would like to attach this affirmation momentarily only to the literary dimension, in order to have a correct approach to my proposal.

This new approach must situate sublation not as a possibility of synthesis but as the very impossibility as such. Therefore, this exercise poses an approach to impossibility
as a twofold procedure, where the limit as a negation is also the first step for repression 
over this very limit as an affirmative dialectic turn. That way we can encounter a fine 
line where to develop an affirmative dialectic which rediscovering or revisiting negation 
throughout repetition of the “traumatic” event, a new event or set of possibilities are 
unveiled by a faithful subject. Sublimation is the act of opening the gate for satisfaction, 
but it is the first step to develop a dependency over that phenomenon too. It is the next 
step after the negativity of Hegelian dialectics. Sublimation operates over collective 
realities, it cannot be afforded by a particular individual solely. Sublimation is the 
repressed side of the three faced coin where sublation and obliteration operate. 
Moreover, sublation in Hegel still represents a form of repression and negation, 
however, this twofold scenario is based in the universality present in impossibility as 
such. The indiscernibility that operates over any impossibility provokes the blooming of 
the generic. In other words, we must be able to articulate impossibility not as an 
absence, but as the very inscription of the thought and assertion by the subject.

Obliteration is a game of veiling a reality in order to enjoy reality in a deeper and purer 
manner. We can even say that obliteration as a dialectic process, not it’s synthesis, plays 
a ludic role. Ludic parameters always embody a certain occultation of an unbearable 
truth with the addition that this process happens through repetition. It is by means of the 
ludic that one can afford to face certain situations, since it is not an evasion (delusion), 
we encounter the situation in such a form that can be bearable. Humor, irony and 
sarcasm expressing crude situations are a good example of ways of obliteration. We are
here describing in a parallel way the pleasure and reality principles developed by Freud, where reality principle is represented by obliteration and pleasure principle by sublimation. Lacan explains how pleasure principle operates when he says that “[t]he world of our experience, the Freuthan world, assumes that it is this object, das Ding, as the absolute Other of the subject, that one is supposed to find again. It is to be found at the most as something missed. One doesn't find it, but only its pleasurable associations. It is in this state of wishing for it and waiting for it that, in the name of the pleasure principle, the optimum tension will be sought; below that there is neither perception nor effort” (Lacan 1959-1960, 52). Beyond this limit the subject becomes idle and, as we shall see, this is one of the characteristics of rabble. With regards to the reality principle Lacan explains that “[i]f the psyche has any meaning, if there is a reality which is called psychic reality or, in other words, if living beings exist, it is in so far as there is an internal organisation which up to a certain point tends to oppose the free and unlimited passage of forces and discharges of energy, such as we may assume to exist, in a purely theoretical way, intercrossing in the inanimate reality” (Lacan 1954-1955, 60). Therefore, we are dealing with the impossibility of this structure or organization, namely, language.

This immanent structure deals with an exteriority unbearable for the subject. As Lacan puts “[t]here is a closed precinct, within which a certain equilibrium is maintained, through the action of a mechanism which we now call homeostasis, which absorbs, moderates the irruption of quantities of energy coming from the external world.” (Lacan
It is a repression of the external world in the manner of balance or homeostasis what is subject experiences for real.

Nonetheless, in this act of rescuing Aufhebung into an affirmative dialectic, we have to grant sublation with a different role. In the classic approach, sublation is the mode to deal with the Whole in a negative level. Nonetheless, it is important to know that this whole represents the holistic view of any possibility as an enclosed One. However, this Whole entity does not exist. It does not exist for Lacan and it does not exist for Badiou. As the later puts in the grounds of any transcendental logic “[t]he stages which develop this [this knowledge of being and that of appearing (onto-logy)] have as their point of departure the impossibility of determining a being of the Whole (...) there is no Whole” (Badiou 2009a, 102). This mode dialectical process is able to unblock an awareness of totality, in the case of Hegel for instance, but it does not deal with the capacity of creating something new out of a void or nothingness. Existentialism has been involved in this process of creating ex nihilo since Sartre. Sartre´s effort in this sense, is a first attempt to deploy an affirmative capacity to nothingness, namely, the one of be the source of being itself. In other words, Sartre is trying to attach this possibility of grounding possibilities to the impossible entity par excellence, namely, nothingness. If we go deeper in sublation as affirmative dialectical gesture, we can complete the process. Sartre´ś and Hegel´ś approaches are complementary in this case. At this point we must be able to mark a difference between sublimation and Aufhebung. Sublimation is still attached to the negative dialectics where idealism erases any materialism in order to provide The One, in the case of Hegelian dialectic, the range of totality that it
demands in this philosophy, in short, a concept of Whole and the Whole in these terms lacks of logical potentiality and presence in the world. Accordingly, in the process of the idealism there is a constant focus on the materialism in order to defeat it, which has a side effect, namely, a clear miss of the formal dimension of any problem: the matheme dimension of any ontological truth in Badiou´s philosophy has proven. It is a matter of interrupting the Greek poeme with matheme, in Badiou´s words, what opens the possibility to ontology in its universal form. Here we are talking on the same Whole but with a different origin. In this sense, we encounter the claim for the form (matheme) – and the formal language in consequence- against a totally materialistic critique by German idealism proposed by Hegel.

With regards to the form and style is relevant how in literary dimension, the form or style is taken in. As Jameson puts in his work on Sartre´s style “[b]ecause we have been told that it cannot be told, we realize what it is, we take possession of it through the very words that seem definitively to forbid us access to it, and the reality rises in the place of absence marked out for it by the futile language” (Jameson 1961, 27). It is the impossibility of the form the very access to the outer world. Lacan also is aware of certain incompleteness on Hegel´s proposal with regards to his analysis of the discourses in Sophocles´ “Antigone”. It is a mere formal attention what the poem deserves for Hegel, since he is analyzing the discourses and the meeting point –or point of agreement- of them in relation of a Whole. It is an advance into reconciliation what is pursued in this play, according to him.
Notwithstanding, there is a complete dialogue of desires and death instinct what is described in Lacan’s words. As Lacan explains “Hegelian view that Creon is opposed to Antigone as one principle of the law, of discourse, to another (…) Goethe, on the other hand, shows that Creon is driven by his desire and manifestly deviates from the straight path; he seeks to break through a barrier in striking at his enemy” (Lacan 1959-1960, 33). With regards to this passage, Hegel is attached only to the symbolic dimension of the law, and what Lacan proposes is the incorporation of a complete set of desires that represent the change in the play itself. This change, movement or dynamic is what makes Antigone advance as story, but also what unveils the nature of human knowledge and desire in front of the unbearable reality. We are now aware of the importance of the theatrical dimension in order to articulate a valid interpretation of what we call “real world”.

Nonetheless, if we revisit the literary idea, we can express this issue using the figures of metonymy and metaphor and, in this way, redirect the argument to the original approach concerning the poverty and poetry as complementary displays of one unique phenomenon that we will call subject-language. As Badiou points out “the meaning of a subject-language is under condition. Constrained to refer solely to what the situation presents, and yet bound to the future anterior of the existence of an indiscernible, a statement made up of the names of a subject-language has merely a hypothetical signification” (Badiou 2005, 400). At this point is relevant to analyze what is the
indiscernible or non-knowable. Moreover, what is properly conceived as knowable, not as something that is not known yet, but that is not possible to know or the knowledge that projects is unbearable for us. It is the unbearable what is at stake all the time enclosed in these ideas. As Lacan puts “on the level of objectification or of the object, the known and the unknown are in opposition. It is because that which is known can only be known in words that that which is unknown offers itself as having a linguistic structure” (Lacan 1959-1960, 33). The unknown offers the structure to the known. The impossible is the limit but the source for completely new possibilities to crop out. This can be translated to the creation of meanings in language and culture. We can describe this scenario where a new meaning is introduced as a gate or door into a new dimension. It is in this mediation where I want to pose the dialectical turn since it is where all the “previous” or given universe rests but also where it is bent, the absolute and hegemonic levels are changed into something completely different by the intervention into the situation of a process of truth. It is the execution of change what is at stake because of its close link with sublation. It is an affirmative sublation however what operates here. Thus, *Aufhebung* is neither the frame nor represents the elements that are altered the moment after the intervention occurs. *Aufhebung* represents the very incorporation of forms and meanings that articulate the intervention as a gesture of change, also the whole universe according to new critical lines of thought and that are based mainly in metaphoric (critical) thinking. In other words, the adoption new meanings in old words in order to reach new set of possibilities that may or may not be accomplished as such represent this alteration of the theatrical set and definitely mark the beginning of a proper new era. This adoption of new meanings into old words happens through “inscription”.
Any gate or boundary is a limit at any level, therefore it is a utopia any attempt to overcome this limit. Limit the impossible but always in an affirmative sense.

Hinges, in a door, are the only elements that are able to bend dimensionally—at a universal level—any situation (world). In short, this is a fact that can be observed in the History of literature. The books that trace a deep difference along the History are not the ones that have the highest sales or amplest popularity, in the contrary, the ability of the writer to expand a new set of interpretative realities along the readers is what makes an oeuvre last and be recognized by society. A writer that is able to propose realities that are intelligible is also a writer that is able to bend any actual reality according to new realities proposed in his work. It is, properly speaking, a social event, because it introduces a change. This alteration supposes an absolute change according to the current social conditions. The reality of the civic society is transformed and society can reach the highest level of equality. Equality in this case does not mean a mere egalitarian situation close to any given social justice situation. Equality is the moment of any pre-outrage or revolutionary moment. Equality means an emancipatory moment of history. Equality is displayed in this sense towards the world with a concrete attitude or conduct. It is in this moment where poverty is erased as a social class and it is rescued as social conduct. Ruda describes how this conduct or attitude is perfectly described also by Hegel as a crucial element. As Ruda points out talking about rabble’s attitude “[a]ttitude is defined as 1. Certainty based on truth; 2. Volition which has become habitual as result of statist institutions; 3. Trust which consists in the belief that my interest in
the realization and self-determination of my freedom comes into its own as it defines the state” (Ruda 2011, 100). As we can see, attitude is essentially that link of the civic society with the State in a truthful manner. However, as Ruda remarks “this in turn means that 3. The state does not appear to me as the other but I recognize myself as free within it and that only in this way does my freedom become fully real, i.e. objective” (Ruda 2011, 100). It is the process where subject objectifies itself by the mediation of the state. It is a repetition of the activity of being civic society what is apprehended in this concept. It is more than a doxa how Hegel puts it according to Ruda, since “for attitude understood as certainty based on truth and habitualized volition is first and foremost a result of statist institutions and thus always already more than subjective and arbitrary doxa” (Ruda 2011, 100).

Philosophy is generally understood as a discipline that requires a high dose of action in its development. It is however the combination of acting and thinking what philosophy demands. This combinatory power of the Two (act and thought) reinscribes the condition of rabble in this case, as a proper generic depositary of the attitude, or what Rousseau would call “general will”. Nonetheless, general will cannot subtracted to any manifestation of unity, uniformity or ultimate conformity in a manner of representation. General will equals to the will of the generic, not a mere undetermined will with no concrete goal. Badiou is able to trace this idea in Rousseau, where general will is this undetermined generality, not subtracted but manifested or announced. As Badiou remarks “Rousseau’s hostility to parties and factions -and thus to any form of parliamentary representativity- is deduced from the generic character of politics. The major axiom is that ‘in order to definitely have
the expression of the general will, [there must] be no partial society in the State'. A 'partial society' is characterized by being discernible, or separable” (Badiou 2005, 348). Thus, beyond evoking an idea that goes frontally against any Deleuzian approach to the One, is a clear statement supporting the idea of the generic of the subject, as a multiplicity of beings that are as such in a site or world. General will, emanates by announcement (manifestation as appearing), and not as a programmatic reality constructed at different levels in the society. There is a compromise with this generic group that is not in any inclusive relation to any other set, but that is purely enhanced by belonging relations with the indiscernible, with any truth procedure. In other words, this compromise is faith in the hypothetical statement announced in their appearing, that will be veritable as a consequence. Faith here means a compromise with what cannot be compromised, which cannot be represented by a parliament in Rousseau’s words.

Any classic oeuvre, besides the context of each époque, demands a compromised reader, idleness is not an option in this case where the situation demands an interpretative duty. This kind of “reader” is a compromised reader as it is the writer as Sartre claimed in his “What is literature?” As Sartre points out “whether he (writer) is an essayist, a pamphleteer, a satirist, or a novelist, whether he speaks only of individual passions or whether he attacks the social order, the writer, a free man addressing free men, has only one subject- freedom” (Sartre 1959, 17). It is also a claim coming from the new rhetoric proposed by Kenneth Burke that we shall analyze further on but that contributes with the
recognition of the audience as active and necessary part for every discourse. We can recall authors like Charles Bukowski (Bukowski 1979) or Bertol Brecht (Brecht, 1930), and poets like Victor Hugo (Hugo 1862) or Stephane Mallarme (Mallarme 1887) here.

Any classic book tells a story that may become History and be integrated in the collective imaginary only if is able to complete this step of erasing poverty as a class issue and redirect it into a conduct matter. Any of these classic books is a revolutionary act, not as a timeless moment, but as a spark in the civic in-consciousness. In the most extreme and clear way this happens in poetry where the engagement of the reader comes from the very first line to the last since it is a constant effort and painful track the one she has to follow, in order to achieve a final meaning of the perspective offered by the poet. Is not this painful and constant sorrow the very place for jouissance? It is the management of both pain and embodied pleasure in each tough moment what is pleasure principle about. Poetry is the last stop for poverty in the mode of rabble to encounter a meeting point where an affirmative dialectic is possible. However, it is through violence that rabble is able to achieve this task, not an explicit and vulgar violence, but an aesthetic violence as a metaphor that provides the means for that as a creational and critic mechanism.

Sublimation and obliteration are processes that contribute in order to build up art, but Aufhebung as an affirmative dialectical turn opens the possibility for art to be universalized from the bottom of society, namely, from poverty. This is what we call subject-language: “A subject generates names, whose referent is suspended from the
infinite becoming -always incomplete- of a truth. As such, the subject-language unfolds in the future anterior: its referent, and thus the veracity of its statements, depends on the completion of a generic procedure” (Badiou 2005, 523). The generic procedure responds to the procedure over the indiscernible and it is also applicable to the sector of population where determination is forbidden. There is a poetry emanating from the condition of the excluded as such. Badiou enforces this idea when he states that “[t]he crowd is the vanishing term for art, the clinamen which from language as usual -trading currency without a concept- sets apart the poem -as the proper linguistic organization to render explicit [relations]” (Badiou 2009b, 66). The ones that are non-existent are able to articulate a language that is not “the one” that is knowable in the current situation of a site. Badiou remarks this idea when he mentions the language of these subjects that is not included to a situation -let’s say a factory where all its employers are dismissed- and still belong to this situation -as workers of a factory- that cannot decrypt the signifier´s meaning. As Badiou points out “[s]ince the language with which a subject surrounds itself is separated from its real universe by unlimited chance, what possible sense could there be in declaring a statement pronounced in this language to be veridical? The external witness, the man of knowledge, necessarily declares that these statements are devoid of sense (´the obscurity of a poetic language´, ´propaganda´ for a political procedure, etc.). Signifiers without any signified” (Badiou 2005, 400). The external witness, the one with a purely inclusion relations with its environment, cannot but verify any statement. But if this subject-language is able to articulate a merely hypothetical language, with a pure belonging nature with truth procedures, it makes completely out of any sense to valuate it as verifiable or not. Impoverished subjects -beyond being involved
into a reverse or negative process of empowerment are able to articulate this subject-language that is purely indiscernible and thus unverifiable.

Poetry is, in this manner, the subject-language for impoverished people. It is the elevation of this social class into compromised conduct that gives to poetry its range of universality. It is an engaged reader the one that, coming from poverty, discovers poetry and erases the social class barrier. It is the communication of a limit and the overcoming of this very what occurs. It is never a definite overcoming but a temporal one, until the next barrier or limit crops out in our search for truth processes. A similar process happens when metaphor is used in poems: language is reinvented in a compromised attitude towards language and society itself. Language and society compound the twofold reality, namely, the one composed by language and bodies. Thus, it is an immanent and transcendental process, where sublation occurs. Sublation is always an act of violence as far as incorporates a real change. Poverty is engaging society in everyday basis, since it is this part of the whole that does not exist which keeps an immanent being. “Rabble”, at a certain point, is but it does not exist, yet.

This condition of being non-existent ensures the most adequate access to poetry, the one with less spectacular superficial additional condiments in order to establish a relation of jouissance with poetry itself; the one that opens the possibility to pleasure by pain. Jouissance is never a direct enjoyment, it is an affirmative conduct towards pain and pleasure. Lacan explores this idea with a strong fixation with Sade, in order
to explain this phenomenon which is very used in poetry. As Lacan points out “[t]he resistance to the commandment “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” and the resistance that is exercised to prevent his access to jouissance are one and the same thing” (Lacan 1959-1960, 194). This means that there is a resistance to the recognition of the other, as a multiple entity. This leads to the civic society and it is also to the very same resistance that operates in order to have access to an aesthetic experience provided by jouissance throughout sublimation. Resistance can be read here as repression. This resistance, however, is the reversal of negation, therefore, it is an affirmative resistance what operates in this situation. As Lacan remarks “from a certain point of view Verneinung represents the inverse of Verdranung, and there is a difference of organization between them with relation to the function of avowal” (Lacan 1959-1960, 65). Negation and repression lead to complete different conducts. Negation leads to repetition, an eternal return to a traumatic event, due to incapacity of solving it; whereas repression is solved by beauty as a process of dealing with the unbearable Other. Repetition´s importance is highly reflected on speech. In Lacan´s approach we find that “it [repetition] always had been from the beginning of his [Freud´s] entire theory of memory, on the question raised for him by the insistence of speech which returns in the subject until it has said its final word, speech that must return, despite the resistance of the ego which is a defense, that is, the adherence to the imaginary misconstrual of identification with the other” (Lacan 1955-1956, 242). Therefore, there is an insistence against this resistance provoked by the ego, namely, the key factor of narcissism. It is an eternal return because of this very resistance. Lacan finally says that “Repetition is fundamentally the insistence of speech” (Lacan
1955-1956, 242). It is throughout speech where we find this detour to the beginning point of the problematic event that in the end does not exist. This problematic or traumatic event par excellence is the encounter with the other.

*Aufhebung* is the process of repression of this social group, namely, the ones apart from society by being poor, but also the elevation of them as soon as they earn their presence back in society. Elevation is the process of emancipating what *is not* as a valid participant of society again. At that moment they become themselves as the unnamed, they are no longer the rabble, but they do not have a proper name. It is at this moment where an affirmative dialectic combines their repression and elevation in order to sustain an existential potentiality of their bodies and thoughts. This sublation does not act as a negative process but as a metaphoric invention of itself under the rule of violence as a function of change.

**ii) Equals and the Political: An Exploration on Hegel´s concept of Rabble**

In order to gather a proper approach to the concept of the generic, I will explore the idea of rabble in Hegel. I will use Frank Ruda´s work for that. Ruda explains the dimension of this term and the process of creation of the reality of the rabble in capitalism and how Marxism is able to reproduce it in dialectical terms. However, Hegel in his “Philosophy of Right” plays with the concept of the rabble with regards to its development into poor
or rich rabble. According to Ruda, Hegel poses the idea of the excluded as the rabble. However, Ruda describes how relevant is to consider rabble in two different levels: rich rabble and poor rabble. Notwithstanding, there are concepts like universality and particularity at the bottom line of these terms, that make possible to affirm the reality of the rich or of the poor rabble. This distinction ends up with a reference to the contingency and necessity of each situation. It is because a “voluntary” contingency that rich rabble acquires its situation; and it is a given or involuntary contingency the one that draws poor rabble’s condition. Ruda points out how “the rich rabble declares a right without right because it makes contingency into the only form of right and with it the right into something contingent. This right necessarily relies on both an inner and an external dependence on contingency itself” (Ruda 2011, 62). In short, it is a double dependency due to their incapacity to depend into any entity outer this closed schema. Whilst rich rabble establishes a reflexive monologue, poor rabble has a clear idea that its contingency comes from an outer contingency element but also an inner dependency, created mainly because of their capacity to desire. Necessity is the consequence of this contingency and desire the motif. Since Freud we also know that necessity is the state of emergency, as Lacan points out “[t]he state of Not is the state of emergency in life” with regards to Freud’s approach to vital needs, need and not needs that are not fulfilled in the case of poor rabble and that are exceed in the case of rich rabble. Whilst rich rabble alludes to luxury in order to complete a contingency reality of itself, poor rabble stands in necessity of his arbitrary situation in the midst of survival conditions.
Hegel’s approach is based in the idea of a society protected by a state. This means that it is crucial for any individual to get involved with both the rights and duties of a state in order to *live the Political*. It is the immanence of the politics what is represented in the Political. It is a deeper reality that also transcends this very form that embodies the politics by exceeding its limits both by necessity and in contingency. Hegel affirms more than once that there is a contradictory reality beyond the state, since the affirmation of protecting all the means and individuals under the structure of state provokes *sine die* the lack of this protection for some of them, in short, not all of the individuals would be protected but all of them would be intended to be ensured. As Ruda points out “[t]he possibility of maintaining the right to subsistence of all in society means at the same time the impossibility to ensure the right of subsistence for all” (Ruda 2011, 36). It is an impossibility itself what opens the gate for new possibilities that are to-come, or new forms of state. It is this signifier that is the condition of possibility, in such a way that there is a negation first and a repression in a second stage. Saussure exposes the definition of form in such a way that envelops its nature in a certain grade of impossibility. For Saussure form is “not a *possitive* entity in a given order, and a simple order; but an entity both *negative and complex* (lacking any metrial basis), born of *difference* from other forms COMBINED with the *difference* of meaning of other forms” (Saussure 2006, 19). Thus, signifier is an impossibility first to attach to any reality, as Saussure rightly points out, and after that it is the language what represses our perception of reality through any meaning. There are not enough resources, whatever the nature of these resources are, to share in equal and perpetual manners within any given society based in a state’s structure. It is deduced then that the very structure that is
designed to protect and promote dignity and healthy live among the members of that society -what Aristotle will rightly call “the good life”- will provoke poverty and eventually rabble, in short, rabble is a latent status in any civic society. It follows that state as structure will end up trapped in struggles with rich and poor rabble and not in the struggles of a “dignified” middle class.

Nonetheless, any approach to this problem will lead to the distinction between desire and drives presented in Lacan, as we have mentioned above. In his Seminars Lacan explain clearly how desire is a chain of signifiers that will lead to nowhere but to the other. It is other´s desire which is my desire. Eventually it is the Other´s desire what I desire. It is the figure of the other was is key here, since it is this very figure that supports any societal structure. In Hegel family is the first unit of any state. It is a structure also based in the idea of desire, repression and negation with regards to (death) drive. Desire is the motif of poor rabble. It is the key symptom where the poor rabble stands, in order to feel any indignation, and eventually react against certain civil situations. It is not a desire for luxury. A conclusion with regards to a desire involving simple luxury will lead to a too pedantic and simplistic argumentation based on the idea of continuity of the established system. It is the other´s desire what is unbearable for the poor rabble at any revolutionary movement.

Yet, some more primal is in the basis of rich rabble, which is the drive that is not more than the death drive. As Hegel points out, rich rabble is established under the deep
determination to consume any good *sine die*. We can track down this idea from Ruda´s work where he points out that “rich rabble declares a *right without right* because it makes contingency into the only form of right and with it the right into something contingent. This right necessarily relies on both an inner and an external dependence on contingency itself” (Ruda 2011, 62). This necessity as we shall see it is not the *need* (state of emergency) that is present in poor rabble.

We shall make a distinction between the needs that rich rabble has to cope with, and the lack as such which poor rabble assists to. Luxury is achieved only when this luxury represents the total consumption of all goods. Rich rabble is condemned not to enjoy their consumption, but to extinguish it. It is a delusion constructed in front of the fetishistic object of luxury, it is a symptom in the mode of not enjoying the very act of consumption and that becoming the very reason to repeat the whole action endless. This final consumption never comes, since rich rabble is condemned to repeat the operation endlessly, and Lacan will describe perfectly what the pathological meaning of repetition in this sense is. In other words, it is similar to a nymphomaniac attitude conducted in sexual terms, which are at the bottom line of this conduct. Luxury it is not more than the total annihilation of the goods by the subject, however in this process it is the subject what is objectified and eventually reified. As Lacan points out “[t]he movement that world we live in is caught up in, of wanting to establish the universal spread of the service of goods as far as conceivably possible, implies an amputation, sacrifices, indeed a kind of puritanism in the relationship to desire that has occurred
historically” (Lacan 1959-1960, 303). It is the amputation of rabble what Lacan remarks in this passage too, and it is with regards to desire and the consumption of goods, the service of these goods for luxury what is at stake as well. Accordingly, this is the very difference between the poor and rich rabble. There is a death instinct that operates beyond the limit in rich rabble as a negation of desire. When the rupture of the limit where rich rabble is abandoned to itself, it is deprived of its desire and it is only in the basis of primal instinct that is moved is when this distinction becomes clearer. As Lacan says “[i]t is important to explore what is contained in that moment when, although he (Oedipus) has renounced the service of goods, nothing of the preeminence of this dignity in relation to these same goods is ever abandoned; it is the same moment when in his tragic liberty he has to deal with the consequence of that desire that led him to go beyond the limit, namely, the desire to know. He has learned and still wants to learn something more.” (Lacan 1959-1960, 305). The concepts of desire and knowable Thing are at stake here. This process shows how the death drive is displayed in rich rabble, consuming the subject into the consumption process of the goods. It easy to draw a line between the scientific knowledge of this era with regards to technology, and the explanation of Lacan of how once the limit of desire is overpassed it is only matter of the known and the unknown. If luxury represents something is the total lack of connectivity with the idea of beauty. Luxury’s natural obscenity is no more than this deep absence of a self-desire, it is a necessity created by narcissism. Lacan continues emphasizing this idea of narcissism when he recalls Shakespeare’s King Lear to remark that “King Lear, too, gives up the service of goods, gives up his royal duties” (Lacan 1959-1960, 305). There is a first step to waive a right, the right without right. Lacan
continues saying that “[t]he old fool believes he is lovable and, therefore, hands over the service of goods to his daughters (...) Shakespeare formidable irony mobilizes a whole swarm of destinies that devour each other (...) Lear as Oedipus shows us that he how enters that space, whether it be by the derisory path of Lear or the tragic one of Oedipus, finds himself alone and betrayed” (Lacan 1959-1960, 305). And it is by negation that this mechanism operates, following Lacan’s words again when he explains that “Oedipus last word is that phrase μή φύναι (...) it embodies a whole exegesis on negation” (Lacan 1959-1960, 305). This type of negation does not have an effect of disappearing of the object that is negated, but it is a revisiting action over this very object that is negated. Thus, negation is established as sublation tool in order to construct a dialectical turn, the narcissistic is not well aware of yet, that functions as a first emancipating action in the sequence.

There is no access for the rich rabble to the sublime object, the rich rabble only will play the obscene game of obliteration with goods perfectly perverted until their final consumption. At a theatrical dimension this has the effect of total identification with the play, the Thing, without having a complete awareness of being involved in this process and, in consequence, accepting false truths (verified facts that only are) instead of establishing a dialogic relation with truths. This consumption, to the very surfeit of it, is negation itself. At this respect, rich rabble represents the execution of the negation of desire, therefore, involving itself as collective into a delusion of total disposition for death instinct. In the ancient and classic manner, rich rabble is certainly closer to thanatos than to eros.
In the other hand, any mention to beauty and literature forces us to speak on poetry again. Hence, it is crucial to understand how both rabbles have access to poetry. In the case of rich rabble poetry is a good, a commodity. It is not just another good, it is the good that gives access to any sublimation attempt that will end up into an obliteration of the good by the subject in the narrowest perspective of the rich rabble itself. However, any attempt by the rich rabble to achieve any sublimation, encounters the limit of beauty. Rich rabble, due to its fixation to luxury, cannot have any access to beauty.

Consumption, in the most primal manner, which is to eat, is what is behind the art consumption by rich rabble. Eating is the very negation of the good we are eating, it is a drive (necessity) to be filled by negation. As Lacan rightly points out “[t]he true barrier that holds the subject back in front of the unspeakable field of racial desire that is the field of absolute destruction, of destruction beyond putrefaction, is properly speaking the aesthetic phenomenon where it is identified with the experience of beauty- beauty in all its shining radiance, beauty that has been called the splendor of truth. It is obviously because truth is not pretty to look at that beauty is, if not its splendor, then at least its envelope” (Lacan 1959-1960, 217). It is beauty that forms this barrier to hold and repress the unspeakable and make it bearable. It is the putrefaction of the excluded by society which holds the desire on beauty, not the ones that are based in the necessity of goods for a final consumption that have access to this barrier formed by beauty. It is beauty in poetry what poor rabble is able to know and understand.
It is beauty at this aesthetic level what this limb chopped of the body of society is still in communication with. As Ruda points out “[p]utrefaction, Verfaulen, is therefore defined as a process that is inaugurated as the result of an inadequate relationship between concept and reality” (Ruda 2011, 81). The cut off and repression of the poor rabble from society follows into a putrefaction of this cut limb, but not to its death. It is the very impasse of not being-death-yet what is at stake here. It is important to denote that at this stage, there is a twofold status that belongs both to the ontic and logic nature of any entity. They appear as unsolved for the rabble, and that is why they have no access to presence, to the combination of being and existing as a real presence in the world.

The process of becoming asocial has at least two consequences. First, the subject is reversed out of the society, namely, there is an action happening to forget the other. Luxury is what rich rabble eats in order to survive, in fact it is only luxury what copes with his necessity to survive. The horizon is not to grow a family, have descendants or improve the actual conditions for living, it is in a continuum status of idle. Family is the first unit of state as Hegel pointed out. As Ruda remarks “rich rabble (…) would be an idle and at the same time (following his own self-understanding) omnipotent god” (Ruda 2011, 53). They are idle and gods, divinities, and as in ancient celebrations, sacrifices are offered to them, as a process of catharsis. We face here the agent of witness. It is the idle witness (god) the worst and most inhumane of all. It is not good almighty, which awards or condemns the sinner, the one that one has to be aware of; it is this phantasm of idle witness, the one and only objective observer, the most inhumane of all.
It is by means of *eating* luxury that rich rabble makes its way, his utterance is stuffed by objectifying materialism. He is a forger of society, displacing solitude with loneliness. It is a particularity based on death drive operating at the consciousness of rich rabble that enables this isolation.

**iii) Equals and Love: The Function of Beauty**

With regards to the capacity to repress embodied in beauty, there is a natural barrier to mark the boundaries between rich rabble and sublimation. Lacan explains how beauty works repressing truth. He reminds us that beauty since Saint Thomas is the agent present to stop desire, it is a repression not a negation of desire. Rich rabble´s desire is always the desire of the other; this other is the inner other or the other within. However in this case due to the narcissistic nature of the rich rabble it is almost a reflexive other what is at stake. It is this peculiar desire that operates in rich rabble, a narcissistic desire that ends up subjectivise the very subject. Rich rabble is trapped in the role of the subject, poor rabble in the contrary adopts free will, in order to overcome this seizure. As Ruda points out “the person as free will does not appear in the world of objectivity as long as it does not become objective for itself (…) for, as explained, ‘the free will is not to remain abstract, it must in the first place give itself an existence’ (HOPR, 51). Only in the objectification has the person reached objective existence” (Ruda 2011, 126). It is this process to engage with the objectification where the subject acquires
existence in the objective world. It is poor rabble where this process takes an important role in any revolutionary moment, since it is in poor rabble where the process is able to acquire existence in the objective world. It is a process of repressing subjectivity in order to make a detour, and end up in a recognition of objectivity through subjectivity, this is the mechanism of beauty.

Thus, beauty will only repress this desire while feeds any drive present in the unconscious as a collective class departing from a particular dimension. Beauty will not stop any drive that is embodied in rich rabble, since this type of rabble only sustains its tendency to maintain idle in the death instinct, therefore it is reviled from any access to art or poetry. Poetry and beauty are mere objects of consumption by rich rabble in order to undertake any luxury within. Luxury is the last desire that can be transformed into a pure object and destined forever to the death drive. In Lacan this is called the problem of Das Ding (The Thing). As Lacan points out “the world of our experience, the Freudian world, assumes that it is this object, das Ding, as the absolute Other of the subject, that one is the supposed to fin again. It is to be found at the most as something missed. One doesn’t find it, but only its pleasurable associations” (Lacan 1959-1960, 52). So, through this non-finding process subject is forced to repeat the mechanism endlessly. Negation and repetition are one only thing. It is this last consumption of the beauty as such what causes a real problem to the rich rabble and in the other hand emanates a solution for the resentment to the poor rabble. Beauty is always expressed in poetry, this is the subject-language for poverty as well. Due to the incapacity of the rich rabble to deal with desire and condemned to rule their lives merely under the realm of death
instinct, poetry is not accessible in its whole dimension to this social class. Any
contribution of poetry to social justice comes only from poor rabble. It is poor rabble
which beauty envelops, in order to achieve the highest proximity with what is expressed
in poetry. However, we know that it is not possible to have a complete access, though.
We can recall Lacan’s words when he says that “[t]he Thing is (…) involved insofar as
it is defined by the fact that it defines the human factor- although, as we know, the
other to determine how good and bad are creational aspects of ethics. Within the concept
of rabble this especial feature fits like a globe into a hand. It is rabble the inhumanity
that escapes us, in order to have any access to our “natural” humanity, it is what is
unknown what gives us the key entrance points to the known. Nonetheless, the human
factor is the key factor, yet, hard to determine, since it escapes us always already. It
makes a detour, a bypass through objectivity in order to find itself in a different way and
stage. It is a mode of materialism without materialism what we encounter at this stage. It
is beauty, in the mode of affirmative repression of this subject what makes it unbearable,
that is the reason because it escapes us.

It is beauty’s task to deal with this impossibility and, by an act of sublation and faith,
contribute to a healthy –in its form of catharsis– access to any metaphoric event present
in the poem. Beauty represses by an act of violence, whilst desire is repressed in order to
cope with reality and not to negate it. Thus, poetry is the really lack of rich rabble, this
impossibility to get out their narcissistic status derives into a lack of desire and an excess
of death drive, whereas poor rabble is established under the lack of their condition with regards to the society. However, creational poetry reminds obscure to rich rabble, due to the representation of the final possibility on it. Death instinct drives the subject to the last possibility, it is the very possibility of anguished certainty. Death itself represents this certainty, the certainty of all possible possibilities indeed. It is the possibility par excellence at its materialization as well. In the social construction, instead of conceiving poetry as an impossibility, for rich rabble as a mode of consumption, poetry represents the very object, das Ding, and its nature is substituted by the one representing the last of the possibilities, the pure certainty.

It is important to understand that desire is a strong intellectual phenomenon, whereas death drive is a more physiological (thanatos) reality. Desire involves a shared reality, an incomplete access to the Lacanian real that comes from a denunciation and acceptance of the other.

In conclusion, rabble is a latent possibility to any civic structure. However, in actual societies, the distinction between rich rabble and poor rabble is fully relevant. Elements such as luxury, death drive and reification are key features of rich rabble and the reason for its impossibility to access beauty. We can briefly display the image designed by Weber, relating the actual economical and political development in Europe with their religious condition, in order to grasp the idea of luxury and economical status as Max Weber described (Weber 1930). In the other hand, rich rabble is unable to articulate this
possibility of possibilities that are presented to poor rabble, because of their total lack of desire as such, and excess of death drive. Therefore, any ethical issue addressed to rich rabble is thought in particular terms, particularity as such operates without giving any space to universal judgment of ethics. Ethical issue is approached only by partial entries, neutral facts if we want. It is a recognition of the other that will lead to an incomplete evaluation of any communal situation, if this recognition establishes a particularity in form of neutral fact. This is the main possible objection to the realm of facts commanded by opinions.

Let’s take a brief view to a famous example given by Peter Singer (Singer 1997). In his ethical approach, Singer poses the idea of saving a kid that is drowning in a pond. Moreover, the ethical question deals with the fact of having a couple of expensive shoes (quantitative), and how much money will the saviour would “expend” saving this kid. The reason -the utilitarian misleading and deceitful path- addresses Singer to question about how much money he can save, people can redirect, in order to save more kids drowning in ponds, starving to death, involved in wars, etc. First of all, it is completely intended to make the most objective example ever, in order to have a neutral lab conditions, when he posits the idea of a “innocent” kid drowning in a pond, instead of the killer of his wife, for example. Second, there is a purely financial argument, since it is a mere money-effort to save someone from starving. These two positions lead to a twofold fallacy. First, there is not such an ideal, completely neutral, almost divine scenario, where a kid is drowning in a pond that pretends to be a purely neutral fact. It is
always an unbiased world. Second, it is not a perpetual superiority scenario (adult man-young kid, rich country-underdeveloped country, expensive moral individualistic society-cheap wild society) where a paternalistic perspective is highlighted, what the situation demands. In Singer’s example what is at stake is not the decision of taking under consideration the exercise of power within the frame of the ethical question. What Singer proposes is the eradication of some uncomfortable truth that does not fit in the perfection of the idealistic Western civilization. Thus, we will be able to disclose the aesthetic dimension as a subjective universality that is able to contest the idea of justice with processes of truth. If we take Kant’s ethical imperative, rich rabble will only cope with the first part that says “act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”, in short, rich rabble cannot enable to a universal law. Particular individuals rule their only ethical narcissism which is a clear pose of being still in front of the mirror, in Lacanian terms. Lacan explains how that mirror stage were the infant discovers the other, is the traumatic event that opens the possibility to the symbolic dimension. However, this trapped game for rich rabble is the ignorance of the ethical problem as such. It is the gap “between the globe and the hand”, in Lacan’s words, what is at stake in any ethical issue. This distance is the representation between the right act and the law. This distance is always, in an anterior future, a process of truth. As Badiou remarks “[a] truth, if it is thought as being solely a generic part of the situation, is a source of veracity once a subject forces an undecidable in the future anterior” (Badiou 2005, 433). Thus, we are dealing with a phenomenon that is not decidable but it is decided by a subject as a consequence in a future anterior. This temporary gap is the topological gap described by Lacan as well, between the hand and
The contrary and a contradictory process takes place in the case of poor rabble. Poor rabble is inhabiting a place with a complete lack of rights, honor or dignity. Badiou reminds us that “an inhabitant of S [a situation] can only believe in the existence of an indiscernible- insofar, as if it exists, it is outside the world.” (Badiou 2005, 373). Therefore, there is a faithful position of the inhabitant of a situation that belongs to this situation but has a complete lack of existence with regards to a given world. As Badiou sums up “[t]o exist meaning here: to belong to a situation” (Badiou 2005, 372). It is a belonging relation that maintains “captive” the inhabitant of the world, avoiding any inclusive relation to the world, something that would tend to a mere particular mode of existence in the world. This absolute lack of existence (rights, political presence, even presential visualization) is directed straight to an excess of desire. Desire’s articulation cannot elude contact with beauty as mechanism of dealing with this distorted reality, which poor rabble –deprived of all rights- has to deal with. The latency here works in a different way, since it is in poor rabble where all the conditions match for a better hypostasis of beauty as a factor to generate any sense of freedom (impossibility of possibilities), right or justice in their claims and manifestations. We have to recall that emancipation is an announcement rather than a programmatic articulation. This claim is firstly announced by Rancière and supported by Badiou as well. As Badiou remarks “[f]or
me, that equality is declared rather than programmatic means that equality is, in reality, the invariant axiom of all real sequences of the politics of emancipation” (Badiou 2012, 116). It is where the out-of-right via his resentment declares his right and his presence beyond his being. They claim their existence in a pure poetic manner, firstly in a drastic denial of the ruling rights in order to cope with a universal violence the right of existence beyond the civic. In order to access to beauty must come a chain of signifiers dealing with death drive first, this excess of desire due to the previous repression of this entity, provokes the articulation of beauty –in aesthetic dimension- and a subsequent development of revolutionary meaning as a total change, namely, as a complete new set of possibilities. Beauty stands for this relation between situations where all conditions are overwhelmed. If we have to define this relation, we can clearly adopt Badiou´s concept of forcing, when he says that “[o]ne can define, in the situation, a relation between conditions, on the one hand, and the formulas applied to names, on the other. This relation is called forcing.” (Badiou 2005, 428). However, this relation discerns the veracity of the situation and the facts involved. In any revolutionary moment, where any set of possibilities is incorporated to a site where they were not existed yet (future anterior), this relation is established by beauty, where veracity is determined. As Badiou points out “veracity in a generic extension is controllable within the situation by the relation of forcing” (Badiou 2005, 428). Forcing stands here for the articulation of the decision with regards to something that is indiscernible. What beauty processes within an aesthetic moment, is the decision to repress what is too real to be bearable, and therefore articulate poetry in this case as a method to deal with the indiscernible. Art is this method, in form of poetry.
Any revolutionary period starts with this claim for existence by the ones that are excluded from the society. We all can recall any claim of any given revolutionary movement where it is from the very beginning this attempt to verse all the slogans in a certain way, no matter how primal or simplistic may they appear. It is firstly an outrage based on primal drives what occurs, but it is only the first stage of this process that will mingle with beauty in order to construct any truthful revolutionary aim that does not want to be a mere aggressive exposition of unjust situation. This poetic gesture crops up within any process that involves a close contact with beauty, as the frame where this first outrage is repressed, in order to obtain the aesthetic pleasure of revolutionary movement. It is a moment where even the totally free revolution adopts a legal frame (lawful), no matter how official or strong it is, it derives into a symbolic order as well as an imaginary act. This twofold phenomenon is only possible by aesthetic aims, and it is indeed a poetic gesture. It is poeme the feature that is able to deal both with imaginary outrage and symbolic law in order to become a solid aesthetic contribution in revolutionary terms. Poetry envelops the rupture and the incorporation of any intervention in a given situation.
iv) Equals and Revolution: The Intellectual rabble

Finally, I would like to contribute with an original definition of violence in terms of literary and social revolutionary thinking. Along with the previous definitions of violence, the novelty of this definition will pose the problem of metonymy and metaphor and its relation with social movements and social classes in Western Culture. It is not going to be a plastic and explicit usage of violence what I want to expose. It is the inner mechanism of violence and the dimension where it operates what I want to explain. It is generally assumed that we already know what violence is and how it works, at least in a general approach to it must be familiar to any of us at any range of social and vital experience. Nonetheless, it is the most obvious of the problems the one harder to solve. Any conflict or violent situation is analyzed in terms of military, physical or more recently psychological harm, as we have seen before when we have analyzed historically the contributions made with respect to this issue. These coordinates only try to measure the consequences of these severe situations happening in wars, family affairs, gender and racial misconduct or direct fighting situations. Consequences cannot be the same of the origin of these consequences. It is not a matter of deductive chain what is at stake here. It is a dialectical structure what we have to attend in here. Moreover, such consequences are wrong as far as they are understood as a dispositif in the Foucoulitian sense, and false facts of truth procedures.
Any time violence is mentioned we usually have it related to power. It is a consequence of the good or the bad use of power that we have “good or bad” - it is commonly addressed as proportional use of violence by state forces- violence in any state, it is said. It is the execution of power what derives into the personification of a good or bad ruler, henceforth provokes as a result of it a good or bad violence. We can anticipate that this vision envisages a utilitarian ethic. Notwithstanding, it is in the structure of a state where we can elucidate better this vision. It is the state, in any classic theory that holds the monopoly of violence in order to produce social justice. It is said too that this social justice is a peacefully or non-violently achieved. However, it is not accurate or even realistic to think that a state has de facto any monopoly of this violence. The farthest we can get is to affirm the legitimate use of violence by any given state. This means that violence is applied according to certain legal agreement or juridical frame, and in addition is supported by an ethic based on utilitarian arguments. Here we face again what Lacan calls the eternal question of the ethic that deals between claiming the law or what is right to do at each moment. Furthermore, it is this very gap what ethics are, the gap between the law and what is right, or the idea of justice. However, the legal frame in any given state yet is sustained by political parties and legislative power, which is by means of power structure closely related to political parties again. This gap that defines the idea of justice, as it defines the ethical question, is resumed in the struggle between punishment and justice. Gods were able to punish and make justice at the same time, whilst humans are condemned to be at the intersection of the corruptibility of punishment with regards to the purity of justice or virtue.
This chain of argumentation on the political plasticity of violence can mislead the dialectical nature of violence as such. Violence goes deeper that the classical debate between the legitimate use of it, the utilitarian argument or the legal frame for it to be its contrary, namely, non-violent. It is a repression and expansion of this first process, the process of communication and mediation, what ends up into what is classified by an encyclopedic knowledge as political, race, gender or social violence. I will start adopting Žižek’s perspective with the addition of including dialectical violence as the one that occurs in literary level, in poetry more precisely. Žižek affirms that violence is not a reflexive but immanent and latent condition for communication. As Žižek points out “Lacan condensed this aspect of language in his notion of the Master-Signifier which ‘quilts’ and thus holds together a symbolic field. That is to say, for Lacan (…) human communication in its most basic, constitutive dimension does not involve a space of egalitarian intersubjectivity. It is not ‘balanced’” (Žižek 2008, 62). It is even meaningless violence that has not any narcissistic conditional but pure immanent strength. This lack of narcissism is a key feature in order to establish a distinction between reactionary and revolutionary outburst, for example. The idea of the generic must be imposed over the narcissistic idea of particular individualism. It is the aim of any real function of change to achieve a universal range.

Once we are able to think that any relation between power and violence as hierarchical one, we can advance into an ethical idea based on a process of truth. Henceforth, it is
important to delineate the meaning of a relation in its purest manner. For Badiou a relation does not alter any of the elements, since a relation is “the measuring of identities and differences, including that degree of self-identity which is existence” (Badiou 2009a, 336). As a matter of fact, power is a consequence of violence and not all the way around. The difference and the self-difference of existence are meant to make a dialectical turn in order to establish any identity, which power is constituted. There is no chance to articulate a reversible process once a dialectical gesture is executed. There is not any reversibility principle that can be applied to the relation between violence and power. In metaphor there is a complete change of meaning, there is not a combinatory principle that rules the situation. Violence is a communicative mechanism that changes the meaning in an anterior future by a subject-language, not with regards to the content, but to the signifier. It is the change of the signifier as such.

The most latent and creative violence always comes from the lower spheres of society, that by the way, are not the lower spheres but the deepest ones (the most repressed too), since they adopt the individuals that sooner or later conform the structure of rabble. We have analyzed previously the work of Ruda on Hegel’s concept of rabble and accordingly had set up the basis to understand how the ones that are but do not exist come to presence by poetry. This process, which is not a mere combinatory process of any individual considered gambler, is a process of literary violence that creates new set of possibilities that include the very presence of the ones that do not exist yet. There is at least one condition that approves the presence of a subject-language that forces the
veracity of the undecidable by the indiscernible. Rich rabble is associated with the figure of the gambler to the combinatory nature (contingency) represented in his attitude.

Gambling only requires a combinatory principle that measures the chances of being winner or loser. As Ruda points out “it is 'lacking sufficient honor to secure subsistence by his own labor and yet at the same time claims the right to receive subsistence’ means for the rich rabble to claim its wealth as the only valid right, this is why it thinks as a gambler that he could suspend the existing right and subsist without activity and work” (Ruda 2011, 62). Rich rabble is a mode of gambling on the world. Gambler is always latently rabble due to this factor. Chance is a combinatory science and not a science of substitution (change). There are not new elements or possibilities after a successful gambling, chances are always the same, it is a world of possibilities what gambling articulation requires, there is not room for any impossibility. Impossible is the very factor excluded and any gambling operation by definition. Infinite is not presented, since it is only a particular measurement of the chances what is at stake. Universalism requires the capacity of infinite change, the capacity to influx absolute or total change too. It is the capacity to host infinitude on an infinite subject that, with the mediation of a subject-language, will be able to trace truth (infinitude) as an incorporation in the world.

It is at most a partial awareness of this truth what can be written. Literary world is the mirror where this truth can be showed. As in the Platonic cave the light is too strong for the captives to see it directly, truth as such is unbearable and must be distorted and written in what Derrida calls a process of death. Thus, violence interrupts the logical
structure that is framed by the symbolic paradigm and gets into the imaginary dimension of society. This dialectical turn allows us to think violence. It is plausible in linguistics since Saussure, where it is detected from the very first moment this duality that is operating in language not as a factor of difference but as a joining reality that distorts reality itself. As Saussure points out “he [the linguist] classifies the ideas, and then considers the forms, which seems logical enough; or instead, he classifies the forms and then considers the ideas. In each case he fails to understand what constitutes the formal object of his study and of his classifications, which is, nothing other than the point of connection between these two domains” (Saussure 2006, 4). It is the junction of form and meaning that changes both form and meaning. Subject is defined by this intersection by Badiou, since it is a subjective topos where language and topos merge. As Badiou remarks “a subject is at the intersection, via its language, of knowledge and truth (…) A subject is a knowledge suspended by a truth whose finite moment it is” (Badiou 2005, 406). Accordingly, there is no other mechanism that can make this junction but the violence operating at communicative level and in consequence at linguistic level. As matheme violence is present in the belonging relation, as poeme violence is present a metaphor. In a dialectical turn, we can say that violence is the unexpected mechanism that opens the impossibility to a new set of possibilities. When we “repress” belonging relation we obtain inclusion relations, this explains in other words how inclusive relations can be reduced to belonging relations and not all the way around. The same happens to metonymic phenomenon that can be reduced to metaphor, but this operation is not possible in the contrary direction. It is by violence and in violence that the condition of possibility of impossibilities as such arouse. These new set of possibilities
emanate from this immanent impossibility called void, nothingness or real. This will be the proper definition for emancipation as well.

Nonetheless, this new set of possibilities must have an origin. It is the deadlock of establishing this origin what we have to overcome. As Alain Badiou puts it, *there are only bodies and language, except there are truths.* It is the eruption of truths that originates these sets of new possibilities that did not existed *yet.* It is important to remark that they *were not there yet* and not that they were not there *before.* However, we must be aware of a deep sense of impossibility too, embodied in violence. It is this sense of impossibility that gives an affirmative connotation to the dialectical frame. Affirmative dialectic must endorse its site and its time, but for this to happen, affirmative dialectic must have complete control over temporal dimension. Thus, it is the sense of an advent what we have to highlight here: an anterior future that is ready-to-hand after the intervention of a subject. It is an advent of the ones that did not exist *yet* in any society that faces a revolution. It is not a phenomenon chained to temporality but to existential and logical chains, it is again within the chain of signifiers. Now we can expand this hypothesis to the revolutionary movements that took place along History. We will observe how the shift from riot to revolutionary moment is based on the subject-language and the advent of an event. French revolution gives presence and *existence* to the poor rabble that was not part of the civil structure, namely, the ones that were holding rights and had an occupation. This combination of rights and duties where rabble is exposed and in a conduct related to death drive provokes an outburst of
indignation, and rage that will be complemented by a poetic act of creating a new relational structure within society itself. This relational environment is the world itself, where a change is incorporated. We have to recall here that the nature of relations in the world, according to Badiou sustains the idea that a “world is ultimately a system of objects and relations which makes an infinite collection of pure multiples appear, and prescribes for them an atomic composition which relations leave invariant” (Badiou 2009a, 339). It is the very relations developed between the two moments that create a third one, namely, the violent moment of change of status and coming into presence of these members of poor rabble. I want to remark here that it is not an apology of any violence with regards to fatal casualties, severe human loses or any other form of misery what I want to promote here. It is a new reading of these happenings with a different scope what I propose. Violence as a creational mechanism of literary and social values is what I claim for. Any change introduced in these coordinates means a change of the whole, even this whole is an impossible. Certainly, it is this impossibility that opens the possibility to any further new possibility. We cannot create possibilities out of existing possibilities. Also, it is ontologically proved that void (impossibility as such) is a master source of any being. Jean-Paul Sartre (Sartre 1956), before Badiou, as existentialism source for philosophy to develop deployed this idea where causality is not applicable to being as such, and it is from void itself that being is emancipated as a generic phenomenon. This advent of the new being is an absolute change, it is the change of change itself. As Badiou points out “[f]or Paul (...) just as for those who think a revolution is a self-sufficient sequence of political truth, Christ is a coming [une venue]; he is what interrupts the previous regime of discourses” (Badiou 1997, 48).
Interruption is a change within the very dimension of change. This means a universal change, not a partial combination of different meanings in order to provoke an alteration of the content. If we fix our position to a mere change of the content we are again in the same error mentioned before by Saussure, namely, considering only partially a complete reality as such, partially admitting the existence of form or meaning but not the very mediated site that mark both dimensions.

Poetry is also based in this principle of change. Poetry, the real one, the one that rests in the idea of literary relevant, provokes a complete change on the meanings and the patterns (forms) of language as such. Saussure clearly remarks this principle of change naming it as difference, the static notion of change. Saussure claims for the twofold nature of language with regards to form and meaning. Badiou also establishes his logic in the basis of the different intensities of elements with regards to their identity, in short, difference as a key factor for any logical form. However, Badiou as well praises the split of the One into Two, since it is Two the dwell of any being. With regards to any given social reality, we understand this creation in the moment of coming into existence of those that were not included in the community yet. The coming into existence of these people that were excluded creates the new set of possibilities that were not there yet. It is an aesthetic moment since it is full of poetry, in short, a total change on the meanings of relational actuality of the former members and the self-claimed members coming from the formal structure. It is by exceeding (forcing) this formal structure that new content is possible. As Badiou remarks “this ultimate connection between the indiscernible and the
undecidable is literally the trace of the being of the Subject in ontology” (Badiou 2005, 428). Moreover, this excess of form expressed in the gesture of forcing describes how “the event returns in the mode according to which the undecidable can only be decided therein by forcing veracity from the standpoint of the indiscernible” (Badiou 2005, 429). Therefore, the generic (indiscernible) is able to grasp the trace of this excess in the form that affects the world as an inhabitant of this world, and develop a declarative decision over something that is undecidable.

In poetry there is not an excess of content, it is always a combination of formal and meaning-violation what gives sense to a poem. By exceeding form, the poet is able to achieve higher levels of awareness in language. In this case, it is a metaphor whereas traditionally is a change of meaning (content) here it is a universal change of change itself (form). Poet can foresee this novelty by the using of this language in an anterior future. The possibilities are there somehow, but they do not exist yet. This does not mean that possibilities will become realities but they are and exist from that moment on. In other words, contributing with an example based on limits too, when Everest was impossible to climb it was said that impossibility did not give access to the new set of possibilities to climb it from such and such side, face, path, etc. It is after climbing it, even without oxygen at some point, that both the Mountain and the climber come into existence and draw a completely new set of possibilities. There is the mountain and there is the climber before the achievement, but it is by overpassing this impossible limit that the come to existence. The main difference it is not embodied in the sentence “it is
possible now to climb it”. Besides, it is embodied in “it was impossible to climb it”. This previous impossibility is always already, this means that Everest “was not possible yet”, it is a limit in the form of advent. Again, it is a sense of an advent necessary in this gesture. It is an advent since it is the very gesture of connecting the immanence with a transcendental phenomenon. It begins with a sublation but goes further. It is under the belonging sort of relational facticity that these new reality is managed.

We can expand the example to the relational dimension, since it is through relational models that subjects are able to deal with these new set of possibilities offered by the change-onto-violence. With regards to the relational models included both in rich and poor rabble, there are some distinctions to make, though. Inclusive relational structures are coming from rich rabble due to their incapacity of developing desire as such. Beauty is not accessible from inclusive relationships, it demands a mingled reality, a jump into other’s desire, a sense of multiplicity of being if we want, to experiment beauty as an aesthetic phenomenon and, in consequence, have an access to sublimation.
Chapter V

Irrupting into Continuity

i) Conclusions

We have been observing the different approaches to the phenomenon of violence, historically, politically and philosophically. However, we are now in a position to draw the conclusions of this study. In order to do so, I will start from the theoretical aspect, to continue with more practical examples of addressing violence in ongoing conflicts. The conceptualization of equals cannot be excluded from these conclusions, since it is within this idea of belonging to a common situation where violence operates at the peak of its potentiality. Drawing conclusions in this manner will also show the antagonistic realities that Western civilization operates nowadays. These antagonistic realities must be considered under the dialectical prism, which will allow to split into a scission those realities in order to articulate an affirmative synthesis, posing a solution without a solution, or an idealism without idealism, which is embodied in the idea of dialectical materialism.
a) The nomenclature or the transformation of proper names

After analyzing the conceptualization of violence in all of its aspects, we are forced to rethink violence and the usage of this term in each circumstance. As we have seen in this study, violence does not belong so clearly to the execution of severe, anti-humanitarian, forced or against dignity situations. If we adopt violence as a function to understand the concept of change, we have to revisit each circumstance according to this new perspective. This means to change our utilization of the term as well. It is important to cover all the dialectical dimension of the relation between violence and power, giving the exact weight and position to each term according to any given theoretical or practical scenario. Jewish tradition ensembles all the complexity of the idea of God using the proper name of God and the assignation of God in the world. In doing so, this tradition wisely covers what God is and what God is not. The van to pronounce the proper name of God stands for what God is not (he is not a man, he is not just another one, etc.), and the term “god” stands for what God is on earth (almighty, supernatural figure, etc.). Jewish tradition is not pursuing the complete and absolute determination of god giving to it a “Two” term based concept, instead of “One” based idea. What they are doing is placing the antagonistic dialectical affirmation between the “One” and the “Whole”. Following this analogy, we must understand the function of change (violence) with regards to the perpetuation of a situation (power).
The very relational nature of power and violence in its dialectical terms, condemns power to be relegated as an outcome of violence, but without any reversible mechanism. In other words, we have proved that violence can produce power, but power as a mechanism for perpetuation of the structure itself, cannot provide any violence in terms of change. In consequence, the articulation of the exercise of power in many circumstances that demand an optic of violent reality, changes the perspective itself at the moment of analyzing these situations. The transition from violence to the exercise of power provides a clearer vision of what is happening every time any excess of power is applied over a determined sector of population. Violence as a function of change operates as a revolutionary reality that conveys the antagonistic positions into the dialectical gesture. As Badiou points out, examining the nature of dialectics itself:

“The structural [materialistic] dialectics is certainly a form of dialectical thought (this is materialistic side) in the sense that (…) it stems from two crucial ontological principles:

- the primacy of process over equilibrium, of the movement of transformation over the affirmation of identity
- the primary of the Two over the One (contradiction)” (Badiou 2009b, 53-54)

If we make the mental exercise of substituting any mention of violence in any discourse that claims itself to be pacifist, humanist or humanitarian, by the term power, we will observe that we are effectively fulfilling these two requirements mentioned by Badiou with regards to a materialistic dialectic. The obliteration of the reality, articulating
violence in any of the sub-forms adopted in actuality – we can enumerate some of them as gender violence, race violence, domestic violence and so on- only blocks the antagonistic nature of reality itself. We can see the same pandemonium of circumstances that block the thinking of the capitalist world towards any other possible articulation of politics and eventually economics. The old karma of violence being Evil as such against the Western society is the overused motto to sustain policies of intervention in many countries to deploy governments, civil institutions, international Law systems and finally the public will where any sovereignty stands. We can observe this mechanism more clearly after the end of the Cold War and the war policies (War against Terror, Axes of Evil, etc.) that mainly the United States and some ally countries have developed. These conflicts, as self-fulfilling prophecy agents, lack of any formal declaration of war, which is a clear signal of perpetuation of power structure and relations, since in any formal declaration of war what is at stake from the very beginning is the structural reality of power realities of the countries involved. When we flip the concepts of power and violence and we place them in their correct moment and place, we realize that peace becomes the antagonistic term for resolution. Peace embodies the idea of a final solution where any global agreement is achieved for the best of the scenarios of the general population. This generalization, nonetheless, rest on the idea of the perpetuation of power, a scenario where continuity enjoys its perpetuation. Resolution demands a militancy, a reinvention of solutions for endless new situations that appear in social live. Hence, we can observe how important the usage of the terms in their respective place and moment is.
The resolutive nature of failure is rescued in this manner, to serve to the idea of reproduction of any political system. We now address again the difference between reproduction and repetition with regards to philosophical and political dimensions. Repetition in these terms, stands for the perpetuation of the continuity, whilst reproduction demands a reinvention of the conditions and circumstances that make all the motifs for change arouse. The actuality is trapped in the finitude of the repetition. The unforeseen future reminds indiscernible for the subject that decides over the undecidable infinitude of possibilities that can be introduced in the “old” world.

Only in terms of the antagonistic dimension of the dialectical pre-structure of violence and power with regards to their relational reality, any articulation of a resolutive nature is possible. In other words, resolution must be a dialectical exercise in order to preserve the antagonistic nature of both terms and at the same time embody the universality demanded in such exercise. Hence, resolution is not the repetition of a solution to a problem, but a reproduction of the dialectical means in order to achieve a point where discourses claim a universality that is denied in language.

This dialectical turn, yet, is not possible if we are not able to posit the change in the vocabulary itself. It is a faithful action to revisit every scenario that is catalogued violent and make the mental and intellectual effort to rethink it in terms of exercise of power. In
doing so, there is a chance (a pure chance) of obtaining the correct analysis in the right scope. The perpetuation of situations that damage and harm different population strata are under realm of the perpetuation of roles, relational structures and political structures of power itself. The idea of certain neutrality rooted in the concept of power obeys to an assimilation process endeavored by middle class population, which is the maximal expression of all the classist and unequal mind frames in modern History. The positioning over a fiction neutrality of middle class has assigned to this class the privilege of locating itself in the object of the socially desired position. The place (space) of the social reality of middle class is determined by the very object for this social strata: success, materialism, social disassociation, individual conquer of commodities or castrated vision of beauty. In short, within this social frame, middle class marks the boundaries between the public and the private sphere.

We encounter the middle class right after an exercise of catharsis. What is left after middle class is class as such, the excluded, rabble itself. We must understand any change in coalition with poetry in the class of no-class. It is the position where the dialectic turn establishes its battle field, so to speak. In consequence, we face the figure of equals in grounds of non-existing beings that come to appear in the world as political subjects or bodies.
b) Equals: the form of no-form, the locus for immanence

We have analyzed how the concept of equals is crucial to understand any concept of change. Accordingly, equals inhabits a world that has certain possibilities that exclude any manifestation of equals as such. The relational link of inclusion (and exclusion) overwhelms the very possibility of equals as the manifestation of an emancipatory force, in a situation based only in relations of inclusion. Equals, in this scenario, reminds as a purified circumstance, that is to say, the portion of population that as a matter of justice and lack of success in democratic societies, does not reach the degree of manifestation (existence) to be considered inside the circle of official and “public” society. This obliteration of the portion of population that is excluded, however, is misleading and contradictory, since it determines the basic antagonistic position, namely, the one that stands for the existent and non-existence individuals (elements) within a society. Therefore, to be “equal” is really a condition, and not a circumstance.

If we displace the nature of equals from being a circumstance, or the referential reality constructed under the standards of a capitalist society with regards to a portion of the population that is not included under these standards, to a conditional nature, we will be able to identify the strength of the concept of equals and the logics of the place that is assigned wrongly to it, by the bourgeoisie tradition. We will concentrate in the term of lack, in order to articulate a valid argumentation over these conditions. Thus, Badiou determines any philosophical task under four conditions: love, art, science and politics. We have to recall that it is not a simple lack what we face, but the lack of lack. Each
condition therefore, establishes its relations with this lack of lack. Eventually, it is translated into a set of relations of no-relations.

It is necessary for a dialectical mechanism to be grounded on the basis of antagonistic terms that will not exploit any relationship by themselves. Thus, each condition determines the undecidable by a decision coming from the subject at the intersection, the faithful subject that cannot be determined, namely, the generic. Badiou summarizes this idea when he says that “[t]he generic name of a subjective construction is ‘truth’” (Badiou 2009a, 85). We have to be well aware again that this generic set is in the midst of the lack of lack process, therefore it is “inaudible” for language and it is non-existent for society. Badiou completes this thought when he questions “[h]ow can one make the truth of the audible heard without passing thought the in-audible? It is like wanting truth to be ‘human’, when it is its in-humanity which assures its existence” (Badiou 2009a, 85). Equals are involved in this lack of lack situation, therefore they can intervene tracing a truth process. Equals are at the intersection and only they are capable of articulating a third degree change, namely, a universal change.

This immanence posited by equals gives form to the set without form, without any determination, which is the generic set. Subject is the access point for truth processes not due to the particularity of any subjective position, but to the capacity for scission embodied in the faithful subject to incorporate antagonistic positions by an affirmative dialectic. Badiou remarks this idea again when he says that “[t]he fundamental
consequence of an event, the crucial trace left by the disappearance of the inexistent was transcendentally evaluated by the minimum; it is now, in its post-evental figure evaluated by the maximum. That which inappeared now shines like the sun (...) that is the generic form of the evental trace (...), the trace whose position with regard to the body tells us on which subjective type that which comes to be under the name of truth relies” (Badiou 2009a, 394). Again, we have to fix the idea that equals are not merely commons or queers. It is not a universe that they share in the same conditions. They are the condition for equality since they come from a generic situation of the truth. We can only talk about the name of the truth and deal with the post-evental consequences of these truths, yet, equals are in this position that does not absorb equality but provoke by intervention and change this very equality. Equals are the hand that can articulate the dialectical gesture of universal change and the inscription of affirmative dialectics.

c) The implications of non-reversibility on the relation between violence and power

We have analyzed how the relation between power and violence has been studied by classic text and studies. However, it is hard to determine at which level both phenomena are united, mingled or completely diluted. Power stands for a certain degree of facticity, a phenomenon that has direct relation with the real. However, we have examined the concept of power in a different relation with violence that does not generate or restrict any production of violence at the expenses of change. Any previous definition of violence with regards to power is directed to provoke a reversibility between them. In other words,
whenever violence is acting a portion of power is generated. It is by means of violence that power structures maintain their position. Violence makes possible the maintenance of order and a legitimation is needed to use it. There is a conceptual version of violence and a concept based on commodity that can be produced and “consumed” by modern states.

In consequence, as a derivation coming from the axiom of choice, we can affirm now that choice is always inscribed within that that cannot be chosen. In other words, change precedes permanence. In doing so, we establish a relation of order between violence (change) and power (permanence), and even more, we are in the position to affirm that this relation is not reversible, there is not a causality between power and violence but there is a relational chance (but not a veritable a relational concreteness) between violence and power. If there is a hierarchy and order, via the axiom of choice, impossibility makes its way throughout the possible world by the scission of the faithful subject, ensuring the dialectical nature of antagonistic situations and terms (languages and bodies), where synthesis is never reversible.

d) Logical Development of Change

We have mentioned before how our hypothesis is transmitted on logical grounds. I will develop this ideas in three levels, according to the logic expressed in this study. We have defined violence as a function of change. A function serves to evaluate a situation. In our case, this situation is dynamic and operates at three levels. However, we need to establish
some basics in order to put the elements that display this function of change. Our most basic mode to manifest our idea of change is the following:

\[ \int(x) \neq x \]

In the following three points we will establish the formulae to construct our three degrees or moments of change, according to the logic of the transcendental.

a) How change is expressed in absolute terms, or how violence enables the function of change into elements:

Given any \( x \), \( \exists y \in \alpha \) that is not \( x \), then \( \exists x \forall y (\int(x) \neq x) = z \)

b) How change is developed at hegemonic level, or how violence enables the function over the Law in any given situation or site:

In a situation \( \alpha \), we can say that there is a situation \( \beta (b_1, b_2 \ldots) \geq \alpha (a_1, a_2 \ldots) \rightarrow b_n \geq a_n; \) and \( \forall \alpha \exists \beta (\int (\alpha) \neq a=\gamma \text{ where } c_n \geq b_n \geq a_n. \) The interpellation of Law is bigger and small infinites are displayed in the process

c) How change can be universalized or how violence operates at a revolutionary level, and the generic encounters truth:

\[ \int(\varphi) \neq \varphi = -0^7 = \infty \]

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7 Due to a lack in the symbols of logic to display a symbol of repression, I will use the symbol of negation to express the repression of the general point of void (0) in order to think the universal singularity (\( \infty \))
Given the conditions © for ♀, S (♀) is indiscernible and undecidable, until the intersection (the belonging relations (envelope) of every element of ♀ [existent and non-existent] in form of subject) whenever is declared in public basis the affirmation of this very decision. This “blind” decision over what is not knowable operates upon the figure of repression, it is the repression of the void (and not its negation) what makes any singularity universal (and infinite).

We can make this affirmation based on the axiom of foundation. Badiou is able to assert the following: “[g]iven a world m, we call modification the variations of intensity (or of appearing) that affect the elements of an object. In other words, if (A, Id) is an object, every difference in the transcendental indexings of the elements of A is a modification of A in terms of its appearing.” (Badiou, 390). We place the concept of change with regards to appearing in the world. Yet, we have to remain faithful to the subject too. It is not viable to operate any universal change without the faithful subject. Again, as Badiou remarks “[m]odifications are therefore that form of change which is but the unfolding of a multiple in its appearing, in its becoming-object. We can thus write the following equation: modification=objectivation.” (Badiou 2009a, 391). Modification poses objectivity on the process of change, but multiplicity lacks of concreteness in the mode of particulars, but this objectivity is referring to a materiality, not to a particularity. With this regards, Badiou continues saying that “[a] site is therefore the sudden lifting of an axiomatic prohibition, through which the possibility of the impossible comes to be” (Badiou 2009a, 391). However the axiom of foundation does not allow self-belonging. If
we combine these ideas we can assure that any function of change must measure the
degree of appearing of differences, the incorporation of elements and situations to a site.

Finally, Badiou remarks that “[a] site is a vanishing term: it appears only in order to
disappear. The problem is to register its consequences in appearing” (Badiou 2009a, 391).
How can we register the consequences? It is only by the function of change that we are
able to register and measure change inflicted in an element, situation or site. Again, truth
always emancipates differences and violence is able to trace the differences
(consequences) coming from truth processes. Here we have to remember that the real
atom not only *is* but also *exists*. But truths share this condition as well. In order to
distinguish between them we need a subject with his own language that is able to
articulate some other language that the existing one, about what exists. Considering that
the function of change measures what is emancipated, we articulate the maxim that
affirms that truths emancipate differences, resolving the generic in this process.

Finally, we have to stretch this argument in order to encounter the subject in the midst of
knowledge and truth procedures. Therefore, as Badiou does, we have to affirm that:

[a] subject is what deals with the generic indiscernibility of a truth,
which it accomplishes amidst discernible finitude, by a nomination
whose referent is suspended from the future anterior of a condition. A
subject is thus, by the grace of names, both the *real* of the procedure (…)
and the hypothesis that its unfinishable result will introduce some
newness into presentation. A subject emptily names the universe to-come
which is obtained by the supplementation of the situation with an
indiscernible truth. At the same time the subject is the finite real, the
local stage, of this supplementation (…) A subject is the self-mentioning
of an empty language (Badiou 2005, 399-400).
In short, we can observe how the subject merges the truth and the local limitation of the world’s language finitude. To complete this process of tracing the truth, subject is not, has no determination, namely, must be generic. This condition conserves the universal nature of the generic that influxes into the subject that is able to break the closure of the limitation of the possibilities and introduce the presentation of the intervention, the breaking point of any interruption by language and poetry in the old world. Only in this way the newness (the set of new impossibilities that become real probabilities) are incorporated in a process of change, of catharsis, in the world (site). However, this incorporation implies the assumption and assimilation by the people. Hence, we have to set a twofold scenario that will identify or collapse with these new possibilities.

ii) The Theatrical World

I name the theatrical world the site that operates in the basis of identity. This site excess the place for identity and reduces any belonging relation to inclusive relation. In other words, the restriction that is posed over belonging relations has as a direct outcome the negation of the difference in order to enforce the sameness. In consequence, this total identification with the sameness is based in a total negation of the difference, which demands a never-ending repetition process in order to enforce the idea of total identity.

On the stage, this mode of theatrical expression is defended by Aristotle. It is in Aristotle when we find a clear line that defends the total identification with the play on the stage. Aristotle defends the theatrical dimension but only in its theatrical dimension. In short,
there must be a complete separate activity that enforces the idea of arts as a way to achieve the good life, a life that is based on a departmental knowledge and a totalizing vision of joy and civic society. The tragedy is represented rather than presented to the audience. Dialogue is erased in order to pursue an agreement on the historical narrative that is supported out of the stage with the official discourse.

In consequence, there is a lack of lack, a lack of that language that pursues the lack of language, namely, poetry. Aristotle´s perception of theatre lacks of dialogue, and in consequence, there is an excess of identification from the audience with the play, with the tragedy itself and eventually with the facts that are explained. This effect of erasing the distance between the imaginary and symbolic dimension is called overacting when it affects to the actor. Nonetheless, there is an awareness that it is within the logic of a play that this overacting occurs. If we dismiss this very awareness in the audience, and the audience is not aware of the theatrical dimension of life in its daily basis, the split between the theatrical level of the play and the theatrical level of life disappears, generating a total delusion of what is real and what is fictionalized. Eventually, this originates an impossibility to escape from a pure identification and the perpetuation of the fiction, the imaginary level that is blocking a symbolic irruption.
iii) **The Universal World**

We call the universal world the one that is able to establish an envelope with the existent, the over-existent and the non-existent levels of human experience. In theatrical terms, it refers to a world where imitation is vanished by the strength of truths. Indeed, any universal world, needs to be framed in dialectic terms.

*We call a universal world, a site where its logics are based on an infinite irruption of truths that intervene through the decision of subjects. Subjects are not meant to provoke the union of the One, but the scission of the Two. Accordingly, universal worlds are worlds emancipated from differences, articulated by political subjects and separated by ethics based on the sublime idea of beauty.*

By this definition we are able to disclose our four hypotheses in one singularity and place. These revolutionary worlds are not meant to last, they are vanished at the very moment they appear, however, the consequences of these entire worlds have fully resonance on other worlds that do not accommodate their logic to the logic of truths. We find ourselves in the necessity to establish a world that is able to cope with the antagonistic nature of the symbolic and the imaginary, in order to have any chance to access to the vanishing real. It is the real what marks the boundaries that do not exist yet, but that are delimited by the symbolic dimension. There is a theatrical world trapped on the symbolic dimension that is not able to grasp the idea of a universal world where the chances of the impossible are accepted as such. Universal violence needs for a universal world to develop, otherwise the political subject is reduced to pure audience, an audience that protests against the very leaders they are responsible for. It is a
misleading attitude to blame the leaders and not take the responsibility of putting those leaders in charge, which reveals that really the slave is in charge in the dialectical vision of the Master and slave. In consequence, the site for truth processes must be conceived as vanishing points, points that acquire their existence but that are repressed soon after their appearing, that give the logical support for any subjectivity to grasp the consequences of truth processes.

In a universal world the dialectical relation of violence and power is not only a relation but also demands a function of measurement. In order to do so, we have proved how change operates at different degrees or moments, where world itself is challenged in its central logic. The function of change shows how the logic of one site has to bear with the possibilities, the Law and the impossibilities in order to conduct an architecture of the real. This logical architecture of the real is the one that accepts and incorporates the scission of the worlds in itself.

 Adopting an indiscernible formulation for change \( \int(x) \neq x \) qualifies us to adopt as well a subjectivity that is able to deal with this indiscernible nature of change as such. A faithful subject engages with the goal of adopting a decision over something that has no relation at all, a relation that results antagonistic for the relation itself. Not only a new dialectical relation between violence and power can be developed following this equation, where violence precedes to power, but also there is a hierarchical order establishes between both. We can say that violence survives to power, whilst power is
defeated endlessly by violence. Moreover, this formulation requires of a subjectivity that is able to adopt a language that will endure this situation. Therefore, our subjectivity must “survive” to a universal world, since the time of appearing of this world is limited and ephemeral. Thus, this subjectivity must have a certain degree of immortality, a link with eternity that escapes the appearing itself of the event. This close relation with infinity developed by the faithful subject is the link that connects both and at the same time the theatrical world and the universal world. This is the exact moment when being prevails finite but existence endures death.

Finally, in a universal world the faithful subject would not survive as such without establishing the conditions for equality as community. Any particularization of the subjectivity in terms of individuality would lead to a mere display of the universal world as a theatrical world and the realm of opinions and false knowledge. Equals are the site for subjectivity to survive via its existence through truth processes. Equals are the place for poetry emerge and establish the symbolic boundaries for the post-evental world. Without a characterization of the generic, the subjectivity of the evental world (the one subsumed in a process of universal change) is condemned to the determination of itself. Without a link to the void, in form of lack of lack, subjectivity establishes its identity based on processes of negation, with no connection with the idea of the sublime and repression of the real as the unbearable place, and in consequence, with no ethical grounds to build up any coherent power structure. This very lack of coherence figures as
one of the main features in the failure of the states: corruption, lack of presence in society, overdetermination of the structure itself, etc.

In sum, a universal world deals with truth processes that bring up a generic subjectivity, which provokes a scission between a vanishing world (universal) and a concrete world (theatrical), establishing the conditions for a dialectical gesture between them.

iv) The Rehearsals

Finally, we call rehearsals all the politically influenced riots that are happening, from the events of Seattle in 1991, and that despite the lacking of an authentic poetry, are trying to establish the basis for an authentic theatrical play that will lead for a truthful change. In these rehearsals, all the efforts are put on the examination of the system, the critique to the ruling class and a feeble analytical effort to describe the weakness of the current mode of organization in order to activate a flurry of support over the very same organizational system, layered society and the power of the powerful to change our current situation. I will assume that revolts involving cultural coordinates are reducible to political motifs, which enhance the idea even at an imaginary level of the perpetuation of the conditions established by power structures, whether they are developed in pure political terms or cultural grounds.
Nonetheless, all the rehearsals have the aim of purifying the message that is going to be displayed at the moment of the play. The stage, an elevated position over the audience, represents the idea of a higher site, a site that is based on a higher logic, which will adequate all the coming impossibilities (unthinkable theoretical discourses and poetic language) first into the elevated stage and after that shared into the audience. However, as we have seen, there is a failure to articulate a language that copes with this aim. The different attempts to persuade the change had end up demanding a more elevated stage, to say so, instead of articulating an antagonistic stage where to address any coming dialectical gesture. This failure, the failure of finding what we have called a universal world, is only one of the failures that there rehearsals were not able to solve. In the other hand, the language that is used in any rehearsal is the adequacy of the ideal script with the actors (subjectivities) in the play. There must be a relation of coherence between the ideal aim of the script and the facticity of the actor on the stage. This relation of coherence becomes obsolete when we want to change the theatrical dimension itself. Whenever we try to change the place of the place, the architectonic logic of the play, we have to face that the coming language must symbolize this architectonic logic. Therefore, the second failure of these rehearsals has been to articulate a dialectical script, not between the presented actors of one sole system (democratic political background shared in both side of the same side), but between the antagonistic procedures and ideological natures of the actors of any protests. Instead of searching for a communal fragile articulation of any agreement, a dialectical gesture must imply the presentation and the representation at the same time of the antagonistic perspectives of the same side. This will lead to a language that is only adapted and developed by the
subjectivity, which based on the generic idea, is able to change the language from language and the world from language: it is the major aim of poetry.

In sum, there rehearsals demonstrate a twofold reality. First, there is complete identification with a political system (democracy) that lacks of any surrounding space where the impossible (utopian) ideas can be developed. This very lack of distance between the subjectivities and the system erases any possibility to any antagonistic position (anybody against democracy is against us), and therefore to any dialectical gesture where to find a more satisfactory situations for the actual political conditions. This is what the darkest version of the theatrical world aims, namely, the happy existence within a general amusement of the population that consummate the *us*. We have proved how the failure to do this enables any power structure to vanish any truth process and critical thinking within the realm of *us*.

Nonetheless, what really becomes interesting too is the capability of people to gather together at a global level and, even though there is still a lack of a proper language (poetry) in the revolts starting from the 1991 in Seattle, there is as well an attempt to become actors of this language that is not yet there, that is not yet available to conduct the revolts to a major range. It is this step that takes from being the symptom to become the subjectivity that will provoke more and new symptoms of a change, the one that must be articulated in these rehearsals that are now spread all over the world. In sum, for
first time in a long time, a rehearsal must be conducted to overcome the coming play and become a universal play on a universal stage.
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