The Loss of the Philosphic Tradition and the Rise of the Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Diana Jonmarie

Dr. John Marini / Dissertation Advisor

May, 2015
We recommend that the dissertation prepared under our supervision by

DIANA JONMARIE

entitled

The Loss of the Philosophic Tradition and
The Rise of the Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte

be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

John Marini, Ph.D., Advisor

Eric Herzik, Ph.D., Committee Member

Robert Dickens, Ph.D., Committee Member

Neal Ferguson, Ph.D., Committee Member

Barbara Walker, Ph.D., Graduate School Representative

David W. Zeh, Ph.D., Dean, Graduate School

May, 2015
ABSTRACT

This study examines the loss of original principles that distinguish ancient Western philosophy as a valid conceptual framework for political theory and practice. I explore how the Philosophic Tradition as a centuries-old foundation of inquiry and discourse loses its significance and finally its authority in the postmodern world. With the exclusion of metaphysical reflection and reason as a basis for understanding human existential and political phenomena, the transition to Historicism and Philosophic Positivism effectively redefined the nature and application of politics. Critical to this research and serving as a focal point of this study are the works of theorist and originator of the Positive Philosophy, Auguste Comte. I analyze the author’s several volumes, these dedicated to establishing a new foundation of political thought, one in which scientific inquiry would serve as the ground for seeking truth and knowledge and as a basis for methodologically directing social and political reorganization. Essentially, Positive politics would as the theorist proposed, be free of abstract speculation (metaphysics) and work to reframe human nature by achieving a universal social state defined by ‘Order and Progress’ and a futuristic system of advancement alike to no other period in human history. As this study examines this prophesy, it takes into view the rise and popularity of the Positive Philosophy from ancient perspectives to modern and postmodern Western thought. It further illustrates the resistance to and eventual replacement of traditional theoretical foundations leaving an indelible imprint on political philosophy which had experienced a profound transformation from its pre-scientific origins. Once as truth-seeking, self-critical and reflective as to moral values and ethical considerations of justice, prudence, and the public good, the Positive Philosophy would serve instead as the ground and authority for, as Comte envisaged, a modification of human existence. Thus politics reformulated was set to task in ordering the social world into its mission of productivity and progress and reconciling its vision of human perfectibility with a proposed end to political conflict.
DEDICATION

This achievement is dedicated to

Joanne Clare Guarnieri Doyle

whose loving encouragement and support made it all possible.

E alla famiglia,
altri cento anni
CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................. i

DEDICATION .............................................................................................................................................. ii

CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................................ iii

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 1
“Does something exist . . which has not even a name? ................................................................. 1
Laying the Groundwork for the Philosophy of History .................................................................. 5
From Historicism to the Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte .............................................. 17
Selected Words of Auguste Comte ................................................................................................. 22
Post-modern Voices – Political Positivism and Its Controversy ............................................ 23
Significance to Contemporary Political Science: Raising Important Questions ............. 35
A Critique of Positivism as Prophesy for the Twenty-first Century .................................... 38
References ................................................................................................................................................. 40
Appendix A .................................................................................................................................................. 43

CHAPTER I. THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHIC TRADITION .......................................................... 44
Origin of Political Philosophy in the Greek Dialectic ................................................................. 44
The Value of Philosophical Foundations in Political Theory and Practice ..................... 54
Philosophy as a Way of Life .............................................................................................................. 58
References ................................................................................................................................................. 67

CHAPTER II. A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE MODERNS AND THE TRANSFORMATION TO POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY .................................................. 68
The Machiavellian Approach to Positivism ................................................................................ 68
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and the Dispute With Tradition ..................................................... 72
The Political Realism of Thomas Hobbes ..................................................................................... 76
René Descartes and the “First Philosophy” .................................................................................... 89
Baruch Spinoza’s (1632-1677) Political Rationalism ................................................................. 94
Jeremy Bentham’s Reformation of Political and Legal Theory (1748-1832) ...................... 99
The New Positivism .......................................................................................................................... 105
References ................................................................................................................................................. 108

CHAPTER III. INTRODUCTION – THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE – EARLY ESSAYS (1818-1822) ........................................................................ 109
Table of Literature .............................................................................................................................. 112
Early Writings (1818-1828) ............................................................................................................... 113
References ................................................................................................................................................. 129
CHAPTER IV. THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE
THE FIRST SYSTEM (1830-1842) .................................................................................................130
  The Positive Philosophy and the “Sixth Science” – Social Physics ..................................138
  Social Physics and a View of Logistics ..............................................................................146
  Theory of Social Statics and Social Dynamics ..................................................................157
References ............................................................................................................................162

CHAPTER V. THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN RACE IN THREE PHASES ..............................................163
  Social and Political Progress Under Monotheistic Catholicism ......................................175
  The Second of the Three Phases – Metaphysical State and Critical Period of
    Modern Society ...............................................................................................................186
  The Reorganizing Movement of the Positive Phase ..........................................................199
  The Third Phase – “Philosophical Renovation” and the New Positive System ..............209
  A “Religion of Humanity” – Developing the Faith in Order and Progress .....................214
References ............................................................................................................................224

CHAPTER VI. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF COMTE’S POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY
AND THE RISE OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM ...........................................................................225
  A View of Early Twentieth Century NeoPositivism ........................................................261
References ............................................................................................................................272

CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION - OBSERVATIONS OF POSTMODERNISM .........................273
  A Brief Look at Postmodern Systems Theory .................................................................290
  Bureaucracies and Their Motives .....................................................................................301
  A Final Observation ..........................................................................................................313
References ............................................................................................................................316
INTRODUCTION

“Does something exist, not in outer space 
but in the world and the affairs of men on earth, 
which has not even a name?”

Political Theorist, Hannah Arendt
Between Past and Future (1954)

In the context of political thought, how might we answer this question? If we respond affirmatively that there is something nameless that exists on earth and further if we agree that it is significant and valuable to our lives and worldly concerns, likely we would cherish and preserve it. It might even be given a noteworthy name or special title, a designation important enough to remain in our understanding as virtually timeless, enduring and memorable. Despite however, the probability that this ‘something’ exists, this “age-old treasure” (5) as Arendt described, it still eludes our understanding perhaps as an inevitability of the modern age and political reality. We suffer from a “failure of memory” (6) and likewise our perception of the real or imagined, of truth or fallacy has dulled. As much as we have forgotten and likely lost this treasure, conceivably a knowing that is irretrievable, now unknown, we have lost a true sense of ourselves. “. . . . there [is] no mind to inherit and to question, to think about and to remember (6).”

More specifically, Arendt alerted us to the disappearance of philosophic reason as once an essential attribute of political inquiry and practice. She lamented that the activity of the mind and the intellect, “had ceased” (9); metaphysical reflection and objective thought, as if these had been an aberration evaporated from the modern world into a
distant time and unfamiliar past. Arendt further recognized an even greater loss. The centuries-old Philosophic Tradition as the original source and historical foundation of political thought and rational discourse had altogether retreated from modern age politics.

Original concepts including moral considerations, ethical values and principles, and an objective understanding of theoretical abstracts such as freedom and justice, truth, virtue, prudence, the public good, power and authority—once inseparable from the dialogue of politics were subjects now oddly nondescript and in effect, rendered meaningless in the contemporary world.

In Arendt’s observation these had fallen short as practical utility in the political realm. Perhaps having unavoidably surrendered to the realities of the age alike to other mid-century theorists e.g., Strauss and Voegelin¹ she admitted having “joined the ranks of those who for some time now have been attempting to dismantle metaphysics and philosophy with all its categories as we have known them from their beginning in Greece until today.”²ii Agreeably, dismantling metaphysics and finding its proper place suggested the need to actualize objective knowledge along with observing philosophical moral principles, i.e., to make them known and incorporate theoretical foundations, truth

¹ See David Luban’s “Explaining Dark Times: Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Theory” (79-110) in Hannah Arendt Critical Essays, L. Hinchman and S. Hinchman (1994) State University of New York. The author explains both Strauss and Voegelin were critics of positivist political science arguing the “Weberian separation of fact and value is self-contradictory” (100). They were “interested in a revival of classical virtue” (99). Notably, Arendt contradicted in her own terms, this “Hellenic nostalgia” of which she was associated with Strauss and Voegelin arguing that “No turning about of the tradition can . . . ever land us in the original Homeric position (99).”

² Arendt, reflecting on the value of philosophical thought explains, “. . . the life of the philosopher [is] devoted to inquiry into, and contemplation of, things eternal, whose everlasting beauty can neither be brought about through the producing interference of man nor be changed through his consumption of them” (The Human Condition, 1958, 13).
and reason into the practical world—hardly easy if not altogether impossible, as Plato demonstrates in the Socratic dialogues.  

Thus in this perspective we might consider and respond to Arendt’s realization—that a nameless treasure had once likely existed but its value had become unrecognizable “in the world and affairs of men.” We might duly question whether if rediscovered, philosophic reason would experience a similar fate; that because of the “adversity of reality [ ] because no tradition had foreseen its appearance or its reality [and] because no testament had willed it for the future” (5-6) it would remain both nameless and essentially non-existent in the modern world.

The Western Philosophic Tradition derived from the classical Greek understanding of nature and reason “was unable to perform the task assigned to it,” (6) as it no longer served as a guiding authority for realizing a just regime. From man’s quest for perfectibility and progress arose, “the modern age with its growing world-alienation . . . a situation where man, wherever he goes, encounters only himself.” Arendt refers to a state in which human understanding is limited to the obscure lens of relative self-perception, this as a form of deception—a subjective reality, “. . . that has become opaque for the light of thought (6).” With the loss of philosophic inquiry and its foundations of reason, the meaning of existence and objective truth had become unintelligible and political thinking impotent of greater reflection and ideas—and as other theorists

---

3In Plato’s *Georgias*, Callicles’ discussion with Socrates about the futility of philosophic deliberation and its unimportance in the political world: “This is the truth of the matter, and you will realize it if from now on you abandon philosophy and turn to more important pursuits. Philosophy, Socrates, is a pleasant pastime, if one engages in it with moderation, at the right time of life; but if one pursues it further than one should it will bring ruin. However naturally gifted a person may be, if he studies philosophy beyond a suitable age he will not have the necessary experience to be thought a gentleman and a person worthy of respect” (Hamilton and Emlyn-Jones. 1960. Penguin. (pp 68-69).
observed, disillusionment would be the outcome. “. . . the past has ceased to throw its light upon the future, the mind of man wanders in obscurity” (Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 1835).  

These illuminations serve their purpose here—to revive our memory of the Philosphic Tradition and to reexamine original foundations of political thought. It is to question if metaphysics and the practice of political philosophy had surely dissolved from “the world and the affairs of men on earth” or rather that it had been overshadowed enough that its abandonment became inevitable. If the Tradition was cast aside, renounced for a replacement, e.g., as Marx had reconstructed philosophy essentially as political ideology relative to economic principles, labor, class division, etc.—would this explain its disappearance such that in the modern world it had become a complete unknown?

As a starting point, this study examines the theoretical principles that distinguish ancient Western philosophy as a conceptual framework for political theory and practice. I explore the Philosophic Tradition and how as a centuries-old foundation for political discourse, it loses significance and finally its authority in the contemporary and postmodern world. What theoretical elements had undermined and essentially replaced original thought? Why would the practice of understanding political phenomena on

---

4 As Arendt describes, “. . . the critical interpretation of the past, an interpretation whose chief aim is to discover the real origins of traditional concepts in order to distill from them anew their original spirit which has so sadly evaporated form the very key words of political language—such as freedom and justice, authority and reason, responsibility and virtue, power and glory . . .” *Between Past and Future* (1954).
grounds such as nature and reason, these as requisite to early American constitutionalism become a source of distrust and even disdain to modern theorists as one described the Tradition, “. . . the old philosophy is in a state of imbecility; . . .” (Martineau, Vol. II, 140). How had this determination that classical theory reduced to worthlessness and as such discarded as something moronic become acceptable to later thinkers? Had political philosophy itself changed? And on what theoretical grounds would a replacement develop and later emerge as the new authority for political thought and practice?

### Laying the Groundwork for the Philosophy of History

Modern eighteenth- and nineteenth-century theorists, J. J. Rousseau and later, G. W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx were instrumental in formulating theories that were grounded in a unique brand of historicism. The Philosophy of History conceived of the nature of man and human existence as one of order and progress, and of forward motion as such, a chronology relative to a progressive state of being in which human perfectibility would be its ultimate aim. Its fundamental assumptions stood in contrast to original principles and distanced Greek concepts of nature from the dialogue of politics. The meaning and purpose of political life was determined as relative to time and place and had not developed from the attribute of human reason, epistemological investigation, and

---

5Nature and reason, as understood in the classical period had earlier established that man’s knowledge of himself exists through the practice and cultivation of thought, and via trust of the natural senses for examining truth on objective grounds; the philosophy of man and the nature of being as practiced existed through a willingness to doubt and question, contemplate and analyze as a metaphysical exercise and as a source of epistemological study.
objective thought (a hallmark of the ancient conceptualization of politics). Existence itself, absent the abstract theoretical foundations of values and the examination of truth—these as essential to philosophic political inquiry, had been reduced to simple definition as it could be explained in subjective terms as the result of human ‘opinion’ history and action, of man’s collective productivity, of force and political will.

Rousseau’s discourses underscored this approach, one emphasizing that history was fundamental to understanding human existence. In the state of nature, Rousseau argued that the original condition of human life was one of innocence and purity. Before acquiring the burdens and restraints of developing civilization, man had lived by his most basic instincts and natural will, existing with others as a morally good, equal and free human being. But human life, claimed Rousseau, had become distorted and inauthentic as a result of an artificial and corrupt social world. The problem of immorality, injustice, inequality, and largely the evils in the world were self-created; civil society had been the breeding ground for all of man’s ills. Rousseau further rejected the

---

6 “... nothing is more gentle than man in his primitive state, as he is placed by nature at an equal distance from the stupidity of brutes, and the fatal ingenuity of civilized man” *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men aka The Second Discourse*, 1755 (Cahn 401).

7 “... he is restrained by natural compassion from doing any injury to others, and is not led to do such a thing even in return for injuries received” (Cahn 401).

8 “Man is born free but is everywhere in chains” *(The Social Contract, 1762)*
idea that human innovation and scientific discovery had improved life, that people were morally and socially liberated as a result of intellectual development and progress. Man’s life in contrast of his true nature and natural goodness had been damaged by modern advancement and he had suffered by his drive toward selfish achievement and the corrosive effects of civilization.

Rousseau believed that although “wicked” and corrupt by way of his history and a ruinous civil society, man could rise above the falsely inflated sense of individual self-worth that he required of himself to suit his social station in seeking advantage over others. He could be rehabilitated and reclaim a natural social unity with his fellow citizens by way of mutual trust, obligation, and cooperation. A kind of communal self-love and total freedom were central tenants that would motivate all citizens to secure and regulate life in a moral and legal sense, acting responsibly without sacrificing one’s natural identity and free will for the protection and rights one deserved. Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762) presented a solution that would include the acceptance of political authority in unison with the general free will based upon a self-imposed moral obligation toward achieving the common good. Ideally, citizens would respect the law of all for the sake of free expression, liberty, and equality and for an equal concern for the welfare of others. Social ties and cooperation created a popular sovereign authority and an agreed allegiance to the collective conception of perfectibility. In effect, the general will

nearly all by adhering to that simple, uniform, and solitary manner of life which nature prescribes” (Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 1755) (Cahn, 383).

9 See: A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences (1750).
culminated into a virtuous citizen body that would impose the moral qualities necessary for a freely functioning, responsibly just society. As a rational standard further advancing the idea of the State and its capability of constructing a revised version of human nature, existence, and political life via the progressive theory of History, it succeeded in eliminating the traditional ground of reason\textsuperscript{10} as a foundation of political thought.

Confidence in the Philosophic Tradition virtually dissolved from view in the modernizing century as rational Historicism had discovered its theoretical base. This new foundation of political theory and practice produced a nearly complete departure from the classical Greek dialectic that had emphasized the metaphysical and epistemological approach to understanding political phenomena.\textsuperscript{11} Philosophers of History legitimized the theory of perfectibility and progress, a new standard largely reflected in the works of nineteenth century German thinkers. Among them and considered one of the most revered, influential, and later controversial\textsuperscript{12} was G. W. F.

\textsuperscript{10} Contrary to the ancients and the philosophic tradition, Rousseau believed that reason (e.g., the dialectic on the virtues) was not the basis from which man could make life intelligible. He argued: “the human understanding is greatly indebted to the passions, which, it is universally allowed, are also much indebted to the understanding. It is by the activity of the passions that our reason is improved; for we desire knowledge only because we wish to enjoy; and it is impossible to conceive any reason why a person who has neither fears nor desires should give himself the trouble of reasoning” (Cahn 386).

\textsuperscript{11} As in the Socratic dialogues, the dialectic focused on argument/debate, and refutation as a way of seeking truth. The philosophic discussion served to clarify misconceptions and advance knowledge of certain truths that all could agree upon, i.e., the meaning of existence, the virtues, the best regime, etc.

\textsuperscript{12} Hegel’s philosophical idealism was marginalized by the end of the nineteenth century as British theorists, e.g., Bertrand Russell criticized it as outdated historicism and of “little genuine philosophical interest” (Redding, Paul. 2012).
Hegel (1770-1831). Known for his consciousness theory\textsuperscript{13} and author of numerous theoretical treatises,\textsuperscript{14} Hegel expanded his systematic analysis of the sociopolitical world as a method to include a teleological view of human history. As a foundation for developing the philosophy of human perfectibility and progress similar to his predecessor, he further advanced the ideological vision of Rousseau’s \textit{general will}, advocating a type of collective patriotism as a means of achieving the social good and a just civil society. Hegel theorized that the ideas of man were essentially shared concepts and thus should be shaped and organized by an ordered social world.\textsuperscript{15} Language, cultural norms and social traditions constituted \textit{Geist} or \textit{Spirit} as a state of communal consciousness and the common good will of all citizens. Theoretically, this \textit{Spirit} materialized as a result of reconciliation or merging of the individual objective will and the subjective or collective general will which would ultimately produce a unified and thoroughly industrious whole (the State). “The question at issue is therefore the ultimate end of mankind, the end which the spirit sets itself in the world” (\textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}, 1807). Through an evolutionary process (History) the rational administrative state would emerge as the highest form of development for modern man. This ‘end’ as Hegel

\textsuperscript{13} The “life and death” struggle for recognition forms the dialectic between the consciousness of oneself and the otherness that one recognizes. There is an internal tension that exists between these two conflicting and interactive forces that in the end, find a “level of truth” that brings together “their certainty of themselves, the certainty of being” (\textit{Phenomenology of Spirit} 1807).

\textsuperscript{14} e.g., \textit{The Science of Logic} (1812-16), \textit{The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences} (1817), and \textit{The Philosophy of Right} (1821).

\textsuperscript{15} “Mind is the nature of human beings \textit{en masse} and their nature is therefore twofold: (i) at one extreme, explicit individuality of consciousness and will, and (ii) at the other extreme, universality which knows and wills what is substantive” (\textit{Philosophy of Right}, 1821. (Cahn 791).
envisioned a state of perfected humanity would mean that politics itself, i.e., the philosophic ground from which political inquiry and practice had originated and sustained its conceptual basis of knowledge and ideas would in the modern world, no longer need exist.

Hegel, as an ardent critic of social contract doctrine believed it neither produced nor justified the legitimate authority of the citizen or of the state. The sphere of civil society provided freedom for individuals but social institutions ideally should be appropriately structured and representative of a unified, ordered, and self-authoritative political culture. The modern administrative state should be one of total participation in the communitarian scheme and strictly organized to provide for social freedom and justice which in Hegel’s ideal included the managed enforcement of moral and ethical values. “[T]he free will must will in order to be free” (*Philosophy of Right*) legitimized this authority as necessary for achieving political power. As Hegel’s was a “system of needs”\(^\text{16}\) met through civic organization, regulation, associations, and legal units, e.g., the courts, the police, and the corporation, the regime could operate according to rigid, self-imposed regulation. A public administrative authority (the bureaucracy) would complete the system of universal political right. In the communitarian and nationalist sense, individuals would be able to reconcile their rights of independent freedom with the

\(^{16}\) “As a private particularity of knowing and willing, the principle of this system of needs contains absolute universality, the universality of freedom . . .” (*Philosophy of Right*, 1821).
institutionally structured and organized administrative state. From this perspective as with subsequent historicists, philosophic reason, its principles along with its theoretical considerations, (e.g., good government, natural law, prudence, and justice) neither served as a foundation for political inquiry and practice nor as an authority for understanding political phenomena. The politics of the political will, of History, progress, and perfection had rooted itself firmly among nineteenth and twentieth century theorists such that political philosophy itself had changed as virtually unrecognizable. Ideology had replaced the old tradition and with it, classical thought retreated as something no more than a forgotten art.

Following this line of thought, Karl Marx (1818-1883) who had been influenced by Hegel and materialist philosopher, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), further developed the view of Historical progressivism by way of advancing his own dialectic focused particularly on the process of alienation, self-estrangement, and the dehumanizing effect of economic exploitation under capitalism that had essentially reinvented man as a mere commodity. The definition of human life was characterized as having been created and recreated throughout history as simply an object of labor and productivity. Everything to man including himself was what he produced and Marx’s explanation of the modern sociopolitical world was centered on the concept of overt materialism and the exploitation of labor in which man had been reduced ultimately to enslavement (alike to Rousseau’s theory that development and civilization had robbed man of his natural

---

17 “The Idea of the state is the universal idea as a genus and as an absolute power over individual states—the mind which gives itself its actuality in the process of World History” (Philosophy of Right, 1821 (Cahn 789)).
goodness, authenticity, and freedom). Further in relation to Rousseau, Marx asserted that civil society is essentially a degradation of humanity as it generates an egoistic side of man that manipulates him apart from his natural tendency toward “species-life” (Feuerbach 1841) and his “better” nature. “Man, in his _most intimate_ reality, in civil society, is a profane being. Here, where he appears both to himself and to others as a real individual he is an _illusory_ phenomenon” (“On the Jewish Question”, 1843). As such, private life including religious observance and private property interfered with the individual’s proper melding into the foundation of an otherwise perfected political state, the universal whole from which man would will his emancipation and freedom, as Hegel prescribed. “[I]t follows that man frees himself from a constraint in a _political_ way”. . . The state is the intermediary between man and human liberty (32).”

As a result of estranged labor and alienation, economic inequality had materialized between two hostile camps, theoretically the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the former as laborers dehumanized and bankrupt of any life value and the latter as profiteers insensitive to everything except monetary gain. Marx’s remedy for alleviating human inequality was his advocacy for mobilizing the mass of working class proletariat by promoting its resistance to bourgeoisie abuse. Severing the unequal economic

---

18 “All the presuppositions of this egoistic life continue to exist in _civil society outside_ the political sphere, as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained to its full development, man leads, not only in thought, in consciousness, but _in reality_, in life, a double existence celestial and terrestrial. He lives in the _political community_, where he regards himself as a _communal being_, and in _civil society_, where he acts simply as a _private individual_, treats other men as men, degrades himself to the role of a mere means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers” (“On the Jewish Question”, 1843 (Tucker, 34).
interdependent bonds between them would mean revolution, a necessary strategy enabling the “overthrow of all existing social conditions” (*The Communist Manifesto*, 1948) including forcibly abolishing private property\(^{19}\) and commerce along with the whole of capitalist bourgeois society.\(^{20}\) Communism was the final resolve for disoriented and dissociated man, according to Marx. He could as Rousseau and Hegel prescribed, will himself back to freedom and equality by virtue of his Historical progression toward a higher stage of development via the advancement of the all-powerful State.\(^{21}\) “[C]ommunism therefore as a complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being – a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development” (*Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*: 3rd 1844).

As is apparent in these, the most indelible sociopolitical treatises of the age, the Philosophy of History as an authoritative ground for political thought and practice emerged triumphant in “[r]eturning man to himself”; perfectibility could be achieved

\(^{19}\) Rousseau was much an enemy of private property proclaiming that it was, as Marx would agree, a debauchery barring man’s natural freedom: “The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying ‘this is mine’, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars, and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows: ‘Beware of listening to this impostor: you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody.’” (*Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, 1755).

\(^{20}\) “In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all” (Tucker 491).

\(^{21}\) “This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism, equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man – the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution” (“*Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*”: 3rd 1844).
through the progressive will via an institutionally ordered, communally centered civil society. As this swiftly became the ambition of successive political theorists\textsuperscript{22} in the following century, the banner of Historicism subsequently gained momentum in shaping the nationalist regimes of Western Europe whose ideological focus on state power further prepared the ground for ensuing political hegemony, collective violence, and ultimately world war. Largely in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, political theorists denied the foundations of prudential politics from which the theoretical principles of liberty and justice had been essential to establishing good government. Natural rights principles drawn from the Philosophic Tradition and early liberalism were considered impracticable and obsolete in the modernizing world.

American thinkers alike to their European counterparts rejected social contract theory and its constitutional constructs, e.g., the division of powers that was designed to protect individual freedom via limited government. The consciousness of freedom from a conceptual point of view had moved beyond the authoritative ground of nature and reason as post-Civil War theorists were greatly influenced by the German philosophers and Historicism. American scholars like John Burgess, a disciple of this scholarship

\footnote{John Dewey (1859-1952) and other optimistic 20\textsuperscript{th} century theorists believed the new historical consciousness would better solve the problems of modern man and again substantiate the values of Western democracies. The old liberalism no longer served any practical utility for achieving the values of citizens by limiting the powers of government. Dewey further asserted that intelligence and freedom (as in the old understanding of man’s nature through reason) was not inherently individual. Rather, reason is a social construct—functional, active, and progressive in nature. Dewey believed in social organization through which man could achieve knowledge and realize his values of freedom and social equity. Man is motivated not through contemplation of ideas, explained Dewey, but through the rational will and contrary to abstract reasoning, he understands himself through his History. The methodology of empirical science (via observation and experimentation) was the true liberating factor for defining socialized man according to Dewey and many other Historicists to follow. The end of history would justify the Rousseauian ideal—the perfectibility of man—through the certainty of science. This new idealism would solve man’s sociopolitical problems and ideally be able to answer the great questions of human existence.}
taught in the Hegelian tradition and supported the burgeoning movement of Progressivism: “We value [History] not by its brilliance but by its productiveness.”23 The Philosophy of History promoting ideological tenants of the modern rational state became the bedrock of university teaching in political theory and the anthem of the modern Positivist school. Charles Merriam24 vii (University of Chicago, 1903) denounced social compact theory stating bluntly that “men are created unequal” and this should be recognized as a fundamental condition of human nature.25 Essentially, the Progressives established the principles of inequality and based their arguments on the ‘natural’ divisions of race and class. During and after the Civil War a great many writers defended the idea that certain races of people were naturally inferior to others and set about experimenting on various theories supporting this view. Slavery and racial segregation were found as legitimate social phenomena and legal doctrine (Plessy v Fergusson, 1896) emerged in defense of separation theory as it aligned with the Philosophy of History and Progressivism.26 viii

23 Burgess developed the discipline of Political Science at Columbia University (1876) and founded Political Science Quarterly (1886).

24 Founder of the Behavioralist approach to Political Science

25 “Not only are men created unequal, such was the line of reasoning, but this very inequality must be regarded as one of the essential conditions of human progress.” Calhoun did not hesitate to assert that the advance of human civilization depends upon the inequality that exists among men. “There have always been and there must always be, he argued, a front and a rear rank in the onward march of humanity; to reverse or confound this order, would check the advance of the race. This fundamental fact that individuals or races are unequal, is not an argument against, but rather in favor of social and political advancement.”

26 John C. Calhoun wrote in 1848, A Disquisition on Government —“. . . “I assume as an incontestable fact that man is so constituted as to be a social being. His inclinations and want, physical and moral, irresistibly impel him to associate with his kind; and he has, accordingly, never been found, in any age or country, in any state other than the social.”’ (Dolbeare and Cummings, 243).
With the development of modern science the framework of historical progress assumed a substantially greater authoritative role in the modernizing century. The disciplines of economics and the social sciences were especially instrumental in laying the groundwork for, as Marx had earlier envisioned, “returning man to himself.” As natural law theory was replaced by the law of science, ideas, values, and knowledge itself were now transformed into measurable dynamics (statistics) that could be utilized for modeling the progressively ordered social state; this later became the grounding philosophy for developing theories in social engineering and studies in Eugenics (c.1904). Just as Hegelian philosophy reasoned, individuals would be absorbed into the larger whole as intellectual and moral advancement would evolve through history via the will of the ‘perfected’ human being. The modern rational state (the bureaucracy) as a conceptual framework from which social progress could be realized would provide and reconstruct the fundamental properties of liberty and justice and act to control the problems of social and political inequality.

The Philosophy of History neither can claim an end to human imperfection, politics, and social conflict as its many theorists expected of its outcome than it can be credited for wholly replacing the authority of the Philosophic Tradition. Understanding Historicism’s theoretical origins and development offers only the proverbial ‘tip of the iceberg,’ particularly as a resolve to the questions earlier posed.27 As this dissertation

---

27 What theoretical elements had undermined and essentially replaced original thought? Why would the practice of understanding political phenomena on grounds such as nature and reason become a source of distrust and even disdain to modern theorists, as one described the Tradition: “. . . the old philosophy is in a state of imbecility . . .” How had classical theory become reduced to worthlessness, discarded from the discourse as acceptable to later thinkers? Had political philosophy itself changed? And on what theoretical
seeks to reveal that the rest of the saga is yet untold, its focus narrows significantly for
this and the primary goal of this research, that is to trace and further examine the sources
leading to the end, not of History, but to traditional philosophic reason and its theoretical
foundations. The study turns to a considerably influential and powerful theorist and to
the works that speak directly to the philosophical transformation defining the age.

From Historicism to the Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte

Less celebrated for his significant contributions to political thought, Auguste
Comte, identified as the “father of sociology” along with his important treatises: the
Course on Positive Philosophy (1830-1842, originally in six volumes) and the System of
Positive Polity (1851-1854, four volumes) are deserving of close analysis. The Positive
Philosophy was for its time considered an intellectual masterpiece of nineteenth century
sociological theory, elaborating on a vision of scientific advancement for the purposes of
reorganizing society, abolishing political conflict, and securing as Comte confidently
asserted, the future of mankind. As the theorist described, “the discovery arises of a great
fundamental law,” The Law of Human Progress from which three methods or systems of
philosophy are formulated: the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive. These
are distinct from each other as separate branches of human knowledge and all achieve a

grounds would a replacement develop and later emerge as the new authority for political thought and
practice? (pp 4-5)
point of absolute perfection, the Positive being the ultimate in this theoretical trajectory. The law of the three stages along with the entirety of the *Course* emphasizes the Philosophy of History as providing the backdrop for understanding human development in chronological as well as sociological terms. Here, the individual human mind is but a portion of the whole as it moves through the phases of understanding not independently evolving but rather corresponding to the “epochs of the mind of the race (3).” Essentially, knowledge itself is collective as an occurrence derived from the orderly succession of former and future discovery and is relative to the stages upon which it advances all human thought from one to the next historical era.

Comte’s presumptions allude to the necessity of the factual and the subjective as evidence of knowledge from which theory then arises, “there can be no real knowledge but that which is based on observation of facts (3).” As the theoretical had originally provided this guidance in the earlier two stages of development the Positive relies on the empirical or the strictly observable as Comte explained, answering the “most inaccessible questions—those of the nature of beings and the origin and purpose of phenomena (3).” From this perspective, Positive science adopts the task formerly the work of traditional or Metaphysical (second stage) philosophy. Abstract objective thought and conceptualization are rendered useful only as transitional from the very “primitive” first stage of development, the Theological to the advanced Positive stage (4). There is no other utility for it, as Comte assured. Both the Theological and Metaphysical stages as

28 The Theological arrives at the “Single Being”, monotheistic conceptualization; the Metaphysical requires the source of human understanding as “(Nature) . . the cause of all phenomena” (2), and the Actual or relative presupposes the Positive state.
they decline give way to purely Positive subjective reasoning, “for only what the mind perceives from within its understanding or predisposition through empirical observation, fact or opinion is what can be known.” Comte imagined, “—every branch of knowledge, sooner or later, [is] brought within [the] Positive Philosophy (6).” He was most adamant in this regard for linking all knowledge and means of discovery with the Positive Method; scientific application would render itself as “the only means of knowledge of intellectual phenomena (9).” Positivism would succeed in excluding “the illusory psychology” (metaphysical thought) which Comte believed could only imagine and comprehend remote, unrealistic conceptions of the organic world. Lacking empirical analysis and procedural methods particularly for understanding human behavior and sociopolitical phenomena could not in Comte’s mind, be more outmoded and irrelevant.

“The Positive Philosophy offers the only solid basis for that Social Reorganization which must succeed . . .” It was particularly necessary for addressing “the great moral and political crisis” as the author claimed had overtaken societies’ general stability and social order, a state having succumbed to “intellectual anarchy.” A foundation of first principles and universal social doctrine was needed to eradicate disorder and political conflict and return citizens to a “natural and regular, normal state of society (12).”

Comte claimed that sociopolitical conflict and instability had originated from the coexistence of all three philosophies, the Theological, Metaphysical, and Positive. There

---

29 This principle conflicts with metaphysical philosophy, which is not limited to sensory perception, the experiential or experimental alone; rather, knowledge is drawn from logic and rational thought and in practice as a system of deductive / inductive reasoning.
was no doubt in the theorist’s mind that the Positive Philosophy was destined to prevail. The human mind as confidently expressed would experience a revolution in thinking; the dynamics of the system of Positivism would bring, “Social phenomena within its comprehension, and afterwards consolidate the whole into one body of homogenous doctrine (13).” In Comte’s view Positive knowledge was a triumph over “mystical” thought and its utility both multi-dimensional in scientific application and far-reaching as to solving national political crises. Cautioning that his system was thoughtfully not overrated taking into account the complexity of the universe, Comte assured that “the doctrine need not be one; it is enough that it should be homogenous (14).” Thinking homogenously then was the aim of the Positive Philosophy. As an intellectual and operational authority it would reign supreme as the taskmaster for reorganizing society, a work “too mighty” (13) for either of the other two philosophies (the Theological and Metaphysical). It was time Comte declared, to end the confusion and conflict these had caused and to eliminate their influence and authority from the developing intellectual world. Complete adaptation to the system of Positive Philosophy, the “general ideas which must prevail among the human race” would render the “civilized nations of the world” (13) freedom from political instability, social disorder, and revolutionary crisis.

The writings of Auguste Comte are extensive as to their depth and range of intellectual thought and analysis. From the collection of work spanning nearly twenty-five years emerged a finely detailed classification and philosophical catalog of the sciences (mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology) and the seminal design and operational plan for a “New Science” (Social Physics) along with its counterpart system,
the Positive Philosophy through which a complete process for “organizing human life” (334) was devised. Comte’s *System of Positive Polity* would offer a newly perfected social order. Human progress was the ultimate goal of Positivism which would secure the future of mankind, this expectation described in much of the theorist’s work. Comte’s political philosophy throughout these several volumes illuminated the goal of unifying science with politics and most importantly, “to free it from the entanglement with ancient philosophy . . .” (*Social Physics, Book VI*, 195). To this end the theorist was successful as his treatises advocating the science of social organization received wide attention and acceptance around the world, notably in the period before the First World War. Particularly in Latin America, enthusiasm for Positivism reached its political zenith as countries adopted the principle of order and progress including Brazil, its flag displaying the motto, “Ordem e Progresso” as a representation of the new political authority that would largely influence much of the developing world.

Comte’s earliest formulations of the Positive Philosophy reflected in the *Course* and introduced in his public lectures of 1826 attracted a number of Parisian intellectuals and later of note, the intense interests of English reformists and thinkers including John Stuart Mill. A long correspondence between the two theorists followed for several years from which an engaging philosophical conversation developed on the subjects of political and epistemological considerations. Mill to a great extent supported Positivist principles although with reservations concerning particular areas of Comte’s thesis such as the exclusion of metaphysical thought from his classifications, as well as disagreeing with certain conceptual foundations—these disputes ending the discussion that had earlier
brought them together and eventually dissolving the relationship altogether. Comte’s Positive Philosophy nonetheless triumphed in its introductory years as the *Course* attracted a number of followers to its promising vision for reorganizing society via the implementation and practice of social scientism—a task, as Comte envisaged being singularly reserved for scientific experts, as this passage from “Considerations philosophieques sur les sciences et les savants” (1825) describes:

> Out of the academies themselves the greater number of the *savants* will melt in among the pure engineers, to form a body practically offering to direct the action of Man upon nature, on the principles specially required; while the most eminent of them will doubtless become the nucleus of a really philosophical class directly reserved to conduct the intellectual and moral regeneration of modern society, under the impulsion of a common positive doctrine. They will institute a general scientific education, which will rationally superintend all ulterior distribution of contemplative labours by determining the variable importance which, at each period, must be assigned to each abstract category, and therefore first granting the highest place to social studies, till the final reorganization shall be sufficiently advanced.

### Selected Works of Auguste Comte

The present study’s primary hypothesis underscores the idea that the Positive Philosophy bears some if not much the responsibility of surrendering to the past the ancient Philosophic Tradition and largely its wisdom to earlier forebears. In simple terms, the quest for universal human perfectibility, the theory and practice of evolutionary progress, and systematic sociopolitical development and reorganization
likely and quite effectively replaced conventional political philosophy and authority along with its principle foundations of original thought (the fundamental conceptualization of nature and reason). Theoretical knowledge and objective inquiry had been redefined through science and its application would as Comte encouraged assume the task of providing answers to countless “inaccessible” questions arising in the modern world. The role of History in conjunction with the Positive methodology “should reveal the future in politics as it has done in astronomy, physics, chemistry, and physiology” and “be regarded as the direct object of political science (57).” No longer would theological or metaphysical principles lead to “interminable discussions” (48) from which no certainty could be discerned from this discourse. Scientific politics as the theorist declared had finally come of age to fulfill its mission of restoring the social order and reorganizing civilized society to its maxim of productivity and progress, its complete development allowing as well for the final abandonment of the ancient tradition.

A close analysis of Comte’s scholarship is central to this observation and to the prevailing theme of this work. For purposes here, the primary literature on Comte’s subject of Positivism includes primary selected texts (See Appendix A)\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{Post-Modern Voices – Political Positivism and Its Controversy}

The literary focus of this investigation centers on the works of Auguste Comte and the embrace of Comteian Positivism among its early devotees as illustrated in their

\textsuperscript{30} Harriet Martineau’s editions are considered the most favored among Comteian scholars; the author himself approved of her translations during the time the original works were written (c. 1853)
works (c. 1860-1939). While the voices of the past reveal the source of Positivism’s rise to significance by the twentieth century at the expense of traditional philosophic approaches to political inquiry and practice, it is duly interesting to examine its legacy of controversy. Particularly among the academic and professional community the debate was contentious and ongoing between Positivists (postmodern empiricists) and their adversaries opposing the rejection of traditional theory and its canonical texts (the works of Plato and Aristotle). These were condemned as “operationally meaningless” in the perspective of modern political scientists and lacking “real world” utility (Dahl 1956, 57)xi —this critique echoing Comte’s debasement of metaphysics more than one hundred years earlier.

Political analyses relying upon a range of historical classics were evaluated within the academic discipline as an “unprofitable form of historicism” (Easton 234)xii because the intellectual study and teaching of abstract ideas and original principles (e.g., Aristotelian conceptions of the good society) provided no real functional prescription for transforming political thought into more productive use. The new ‘hard’ science of politics and its practitioners agreed that the philosophic or ‘soft’ approach lacked a reliable foundation for proving its conceptualizations and insisted upon factual-based methods of analysis for producing reliable and further, serviceable results.

The avocation of scientific investigative techniques and empirical methodology had evolved from what was coined “Popperism” (Ricci 115).xiii Karl Popper had introduced a “philosophy of science” (Popper 1945) from which the criteria for social scientific investigation emerged and separated by its basic tenets the scientific from the
nonscientific. According to Popper, that which is only testable, falsifiable, and only those uncertainties that could be methodologically investigated and verified qualified as truly scientific. The larger questions and beliefs stemming from moral or religious value-laden assertions about human nature and the complexities of society had originally been verifiable only from within the traditional framework of experience and history. Thus theories were held together by intellectual assumption and generalization only and further, ethical considerations as neither provable nor disprovable in any realistic sense were therefore inadmissible to the realm of empirical inquiry. Popper’s perspective on science also included the idea that scientific truth or knowledge acquired was tentative (distinct from how a moralist would envision certain truths as unalterable), never completely conclusive, and therefore able to be revised. Thus trial and error methods of testing hypothetical invention and design techniques as reliable yet flexible in the analytical schema of research were emphasized and adopted as much for their Positive practicality as for their logical proficiency in advancing the social scientific revolution.

Scholars both pre- and post-World War II embraced the new methodological treatment of politics that would presumably remedy society’s immediate and most pressing problems. In vogue was finding practical solutions to social problems and in the new manner of thinking, human behavior would through tactical engineering via non-ideological means produce positive results. This approach was decidedly distant from the fading conventions of classical moralism and the teaching of philosophic principles as established truths that would solve human problems. The catchphrase of pre-World War II theorists (Beard 1937xiv, Herring 1940xv) had already been resonant more commonly
from a professional as well as academic standpoint: “The conception of experimental method in science demands a control by comprehensive ideas, projected in possibilities to be realized by action” (Dewey 50).xvi Ideas were to be framed not by transmutable and porous generalities but instead by structured experimentation and active exchange ideally standardized so that the best possible ends could be achieved. Intelligence naturally factored importantly and by Deweyian logic could be understood as a mechanism, an active generator of thought (as opposed to the passive, contemplative) and operate constructively and strategically in providing a more viable means of seeking and utilizing knowledge as an output. Science, especially in the realm of political inquiry that at the time began to focus strongly on democratic institutions was more logically the tool needed for purposeful gains. Dewey explained his theory of organized intelligence as a remaking of, “the old through the union of the new (56).” In this way, past experience and history as knowledge merged with ideas of rational intention, i.e., putting ideas to work rather than allowing them to idle in the archives of philosophic idealism.

Political theorists from the 1950s were availed of the same opportunity that Popperism produced decades earlier. The study of politics could be partitioned into two parts fairly equally and analysis from within each separate format would presumably rectify the debate between hard and soft approaches to knowledge. The dichotomy that had earlier been created between distinctions of the scientific and the nonscientific came to fruition again in the discussion in the political realm of what is and what ought to be. Moral imperatives and ethical theory existed more solidly in the latter as real world issues and events and their respective observations found province in scientific empiricism. The
discipline of political inquiry would theoretically regard both scientific and nonscientific modes of study as valid although in the interest of avoiding controversy the problem would again materialize over the motive and particularly the language used in the best way to synthesize knowledge. Values were again at issue in the context of inclusion into scientific investigation, the conceptual considerations of how human behavior, the state and society *ought to be* interfered with the practical factorization of definite, orderable and objective inputs of what *is*. Many practitioners thus preferred the use of methodological techniques in which to gain perspective on the fundamental and later more complex dynamics of human behavior. The Positivists succeeded in operationalizing political inquiry and moving in this trend, theory itself was recognized as a scientific activity rather than a field devoted to ideological precepts.

McDonald and Rosenau (1968)xvii explain the transition of theory from a field to an activity encompassing a variety of political studies applicable to government and politics from voting behavior to constitutional law to party activity, etc. Behavioralists (Easton 1962; Eulau 1963; Somit and Tanenhaus 1967)xviii in particular focused on specific subjects, e.g., democratic theory, systems theory, international relations theory, etc., and all commonly applied empirical methods excluding the use of philosophic inquiry. Again, the *‘ought to be’* was overwhelmingly rejected by a majority of political scientists (Truman 1951; Lasswell and Kaplan 1952; Cobban, 1953; Easton 1953)xix advocating a new understanding of what theory should and potentially would do. Truman insistently claimed that classical formulations of theory had been hopelessly inadequate and there was no choice but to frame it as a more dynamic enterprise, one
distinctly teleological in orientation. The practice of political theory, one that would be factually explicit, logical in its findings, and gainfully efficient in purpose could not be over-emphasized as the new order among mid-century Positivists.

“Everything that is worth saying on political theory has already been said ad nauseam” (321) affirmed Alfred Cobban in critique of classical political theory in 1953. He went on to explain why traditional political inquiry had reached a point of decay as it had been accustomed to depending on over-worn meta-theoretical foundations for sustaining its worth and usefulness. Cobban premised that theory’s fitting demise (or death, with which others agreed, Laslett 1956; Dahl 1958)xx was the result of the lack a progressive adaptation to realistic goals necessary for further development of research in the field as expected by Positivists within the profession of Political Science. Dahl in finality, commemorated theory in his 1961, “. . . Epitaph for a Monument . . .” observing the success of the behavioral approach as inevitable, as it had wholly captured the discipline of Political Science.

However enough per se had been said ad nauseum, the ritual of debate soldiered on over the fact-versus-value dichotomy and unsurprisingly a decade later, Cobban was heatedly denounced for perpetuating an assumption among professional colleagues that traditional inquiry had become extinct in the advancing universe of modernized political studies. Dante Germino retorted in 1963 that Cobban had completely misstated the importance of philosophic theory that in his view was actually an “experiential science” (437)xxi and on the contrary, one that was constructively undergoing a revival on its own merit. Germino declared that long-established theory and its renewal could be adopted
and legitimized with the elimination of former subjective value assumptions that posited that philosophic thought had essentially become impotent and ineffective in failing to contribute to the burgeoning demand for political knowledge—these evaluations had been exhaustive and ultimately incorrect. Time-honored, conventional political wisdom especially in realizing its true worth only need acquire a sufficient epistemology to realize acceptance by professionals and academicians alike that would avidly support its revitalization. Those a part of the existing vitality in the philosophic tradition from which Germino provided at the time a comprehensive catalog of names included Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, and Michael Oakeshott. He drew particular distinction of Oakeshott’s work distinguishing levels of human experience within a phenomenological framework of understanding the multi-dimensional conditions affecting human life.\(^\text{31}\) Germino described philosophic theory as a “potent refutation” (458) to the unimaginative thinking and linearity of Positivist scientific trends declaring that far from being in decline or dead, traditional political inquiry looked forward to a long-awaited renaissance in the discipline and of taking its place among the highly-revered and valued empirical analyses that had overwhelming dominated the study and science of political inquiry. Commenting in the affirmative that, “I never did believe with Bob Dahl that the behavioral movement would sweep everything else under the rug” (“Quo Vadimus?”, 1969), Heinz Eulau’s brief study found traditional works to be alive and well among colleagues with sixty-seven percent specializing in Normative and fifty-three percent in Historical political theory (12-13). “ . . . I always felt that the normative, legal, and

\(^{31}\) Oakeshott — Experience and Its Modes (Germino 1963, 458)
historical approaches would continue to exist side by side with the most scientific ones
(13).”

This evaluation did not escape the criticism of revered political theorist, Leo Strauss (1899-1973) whose view of mid-century political scholarship was far from favorable as reviewers recognized:

. . . . he ceaselessly challenged those among his social science colleagues who focused on what they called “behavior,” and who thus treated the written opinions of judges, the deliberations of representatives, and the formation of public opinion as purely quantifiable and largely predictable “elite-group” or “mass” phenomena. He argued that these scholarly and teaching fashions not only undermined the already precarious respect for political debate and public-spirited leadership, but also falsified the empirical data, the reality of man as the political animal.

Strauss’s own critique of modern political inquiry and the scientific study of politics suggested that it had lost its pre-scientific foundations, i.e., its political common sense having become obsessed with making predictions via abstract modeling techniques and analyses. It had become blind to both its meaning and true purpose—“one may say of it that it fiddles while Rome burns. It is excused by two facts: It does not know that it fiddles, and it does not know that Rome burns” (Strauss 1962, 327- *Essays*).

Political scientists in the following decades continued their over-zealous debate focused on the fundamental values and rationale of soft versus hard approaches, e.g., the problem of methodology and the nature of political theory (Ashcraft 1975), the displacement of substantive theory and theorizing (Gunnell 1981, 1988), the re-entering
of politics into the discipline of political science (Scaff 1980), and the fundamental identity of political theory/philosophy (Warren 1989). Herbert Werlin in 2002, described political scientists as annoyed and confused if asked what they understood about politics and related conceptual theories, e.g., democracy, decentralization, etc. (660). His summation of the discipline was simply that it remained “primitive” and that a solution to clarify concepts could be found in his “political elasticity theory.” Werlin took issue with APSR criticisms that his work in comparative case studies was “anecdotal” and not “methodologically rigorous” enough for its publishing and further lamented that his theory would “not find a large readership” because of its lack of hard science now expected in the discipline. Werlin summed that this rejection served as a good example as to why political scientists would remain confused and that he would retreat to publishing within the specialization of the field of comparative politics.

Werlin’s experience seems to have paved the way for political scientists in the following years to commonly interact more comfortably and productively with other scholars within their designated field specializations. Rather than being commonly connected by the discussion, study, interpretation, and understanding of politics and theoretical concepts, they were most exclusively drawn together each by their particular subject of inquiry and related research topics in, e.g., American Political Science, Comparative studies, Political Economy, International Relations, and Public Policy Administration. Grant’s 2005 study explained that although the hard versus soft debate had continually factored as important among political scientists in terms of methodological preference and epistemological approach, scholarship was now organized
within the discipline most exclusively around questions of the same type of politics and political phenomenon studied. Additionally, scholarly activity was further centered upon similar professional goals and this trend was illustrated by examining the American Political Science Association (APSA) and its organized sections that branched off from the larger membership into groups associated with specific subject matter or scholarly research. A majority of regular members of APSA joined at least one of these organized sections (380) as representative of their field specialization.

Grant’s assessment using a topographic mapping technique and multi-dimensional scaling that applied a graphic representation as geographic metaphor to the discipline and its organizational patterns was particularly revealing. The map (383) shows the continent of political science and its various sub-fields, a landscape both connected and separated by a diverse and idiosyncratic population of interests, these divided into regions concentrated within distinctly separate borders and further overlapping into neighboring locales. Almond’s idea that the field of Political Theory (Philosophy) represents the core of the discipline and serves as the basis of developmental inquiry is contrary to the model’s findings. Rather, the most concentrated and dominant areas of study in respective order of size and regional emphasis are positioned in Comparative politics and Interdisciplinary Studies (these including, e.g., History and Politics, Women and Politics, etc.). Several of the other sub-fields find a distinctive place on the panoramic continent with the exception of one inhabiting an island all of its own that is geographically distant and completely disconnected from the homeland; it is the field of Political Philosophy.
This finding reaffirmed Monroe’s et al. (1990) allegorical observation of the recurring problem of “separate tables” (Almond 1988) within the discipline of political science:

With the emigration of political theory to its own intellectual and professional archipelago, from which it makes only occasional visits to its now alien homeland, and largely only as a location for discussion its own internal affairs, political science lost a large measure of its critical self-awareness. And political theory lost its connection to the principal piece of institutional reality that tied it, however indirectly, to politics (37).

By 1988, Gregory Almond characterized the field of Political Theory and its contribution to the discipline of Political Science as representing the subject’s core foundation, that it should codify the discipline’s history and serve as the basis of developmental inquiry in understanding central concepts, theories, and ideas. He further expressed an opinion shared by others that Theory had been, “traumatized and seduced by scientific methodology and simplistic 1960s and 1970s thinking” (35). David Ricci (1984) would have agreed in his discussion on the idea that political science had detached itself from its philosophical foundations. He explained the tragedy existing within the discipline that while practitioners had fervently endeavored to produce valid and reliable knowledge from modern scientific and technical analysis of political behavior, their work created a marked distance from considering the intangible factors that science had repeatedly failed to deal with effectively. The most difficult to analyze, i.e., the elusive, indefinable value-laden elements existing in the realm of social science, the intangibles that form the basis from which philosophic theory found its most powerful utility were contrarily written off by the practical rationality of factual, methodological analysis.
Ricci and Almond both claimed that the discipline therefore was self-defeating in its purpose and goals and had become divided and dissonant by the lack of a more comprehensive conversation inclusive of all possibilities of political inquiry, especially those factors appearing unapproachable to many researchers. Ricci (299) described scholars that had essentially disclaimed uncertain and ambiguous terms from the discourse and reworked the traditional vocabulary of theory in order to reduce and/or avoid provocative discussion and “fruitless controversy” (Easton 44).

Strauss in contrast would have seen uncertainty as especially fruitful in the discourse of politics and ambiguity necessary as “the sacrifices which we must make so that our minds may be free” (1952, xvii). While Positivism had offered a structured, value-neutral political science it had resolutely ignored a critical resource for understanding the uncertainties it attempted to resolve. Strauss explained that philosophy itself was purposely ambiguous; the very reason why it could be wholly embraced when “listening to the conversations between the great philosophers . . . the greatest minds, and therefore in studying the great books (1968, 7).” This advice seemed to have echoed Arendt’s observation, i.e., a need to recall something that once existed “in the world and affairs of men on earth.” It was an ancient foundation too difficult perhaps to unearth, a treasure too irrelevant to be considered a valid approach to modern political thought having lost its value and finally its authority to the advancement of science and the Positive Philosophy. Looking further back to Comte’s Social Physics (c. XII) in its early formulation would begin to explain this distinct “philosophical renovation.”
“... [E]verything is essentially ready for the process” as its creator ensured, “science is the only basis of a true philosophy” (310).

Significance to Contemporary Political Science: Raising Important Questions

As an important topic for contemporary political study, this work hopes to inform as well as raise further important questions:

- Is it possible that Comte’s vision of Social Reorganization is all or in part, true? If so, how did this transformation occur and what effect has this had on society and the individual as to the new authority of Positivism?
- Is metaphysical inquiry including speculative thought and its narrative form mostly dead in various contemporary spheres, e.g., in the academy and the social sciences, in civil society, in the realm of active politics (leadership and bureaucracies), in postmodern discussion focusing on domestic and global issues?
- Have we reached a finite end to politics, as scientism declares itself more able to answer questions of truth?

While Comte’s project is most exclusively illustrated, this study further draws comparable focus on ancient philosophy in view of its timeless principles from which the discipline of politics itself endures. The foundations of thought and critical analysis as essential to human knowledge and wisdom derive from our unique ability to reason, to objectively contemplate truth, and freely cultivate ideas that build an understanding of
our existence in the world. To this the ancient practitioners were well-attuned as they applied their observations of nature to ethical questions of how best to achieve the good life and in determining what attributes constitute a just regime. Enduring for several centuries from its Greek origins to the Enlightenment, to the framing of the American Constitution, the Western Philosophic Tradition served as the grounding authority for political thought and practice. Its fundamental approach from the perspective of nature and reason laid the foundation for early liberalism as it established a framework for the development of natural law and the principles of individual freedom, justice, and equality. Important to Enlightenment thinkers, natural rights were understood as universal moral truths, inalienable, absolute and self-evident, as well as necessary for pursuing social, religious, and economic freedom. Protections from despotic rule and tyranny were embedded in natural law as it acted as a barrier against abuses of government. The founding of the American Constitution firmly rested on the philosophic grounds and principles arising from Greek political theory. Good government arose from the practice of prudence, a virtue essential to the public interest in achieving a just society. As Aristotle described, “...prudence must be a true state, reasoned and capable of action in the sphere of human goods” (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk VI: Intellectual Virtues). As the words illustrate, the insight and wisdom of philosophic reflection guided pre-modern thinkers on the practice of politics. To eighteenth-century

---

32 “...the best city is happy and acts nobly. It is impossible to act nobly without acting [to achieve] noble things; but there is no noble deed either of a man or of a city that is separate from virtue and prudence. The courage, justice, and prudence of city have the same power and form as those things human beings share in individually who are called just, prudent, and sound” (The Politics, Book 7, I, 1323bl30, Lord 197-8).
statesmen, its theoretical principles were critical in constructing the framework of republican government.

As modern life gave way to Positivism and the advancement of the practical sciences so had political philosophy from the standpoint of nature and reason retreated as something of a lost art—one that had earlier been an inseparable part of political thought and practice. In its place, ideology would replace ideas in the twentieth century. Under its own criteria of defining man’s nature to creating his definitive truths, ideological politics could no longer reconcile itself with reason as to whether its practice provided an understanding of justice as a foundation for the good life and the best regime. Its concerns were only relative to time and place into what it would claim as the steady flow of human progress and achievement via the Philosophy of History essentially with the goal of overcoming nature, this would be its end in the modern world at the expense of the Philosophic Tradition. As such, men have succeeded in shaping and managing their very existence in accordance with the Positive will as opposed to reason as a basis for government through which particularly powerful ideological trends in recent history have claimed their authority. To a great extent, this is evidenced by countries in Western Europe in the early part of the twentieth century that had succumbed to fascist rule.

---

33 Hoffe (1987) writes eloquently on the subject of political justice as it is critiqued in “a complex structure of essentially positive rules, authorities, and powers. In such a complexly balanced yet unrestricted positive structure, the call for a supra-positive critique has lost some of its sense. The perspective of political justice apparently resides, politically speaking, in no man’s land” (7).

34 As in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1821), human nature arises from a consciousness of will both individually and universally thus knowing and willing serves as a principle guiding the eventuality of the rational state. See further: German Ideology, b. Hegel.
A Critique of Positivism as Prophesy for the Twenty-first Century

Disillusionment and its outcome of violent political turmoil are hardly disputable in the wake of two world wars in the twentieth century. As well, the problem has failed any resolution in the postmodern era. It was thought that Positivism as the new science of politics would be able to provide answers and contribute to resolving issues of conflict and instability. But as it seeks answers, these are only as substantive as the questions it asks. Given these are primarily concerned with human progress and scientific achievement and not to any great degree with theoretical foundations as they relate to abstract knowledge (truth, justice, and prudence), it would be to predict the likelihood that violent political conflict will fail to find its resolve in the postmodern world, especially as concerns state power versus the rights of the individual. This work will further illustrate Positivism’s shortcomings—how in the event that science has replaced the metaphysical knowledge for the experimental in its quest for human perfectibility, it has succeeded in eliminating an understanding of the natural world and its earlier foundations, replacing it for a self-created one. As the post-modern experiment speaks its own language and poses its own questions relative to concepts of justice and freedom, it is likewise left to its own devices for answering them. It is further to recognize that it does so without the benefit or the enrichment of philosophic reason. Absent its

35 “. . . positive freedom is not a state but an act which involves methods and instrumentalities for control of conditions” (from The Public and Its Problems” (1927); a view by progressive theorist John Dewey (1859-1952).
fundamental principles conducive to values and objective thought is to understand the nature of disillusionment particularly as it has and continues to preside over the political landscape.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A – Selected Works

**Early Writings** (1818-1828)

“Separation general entre les opinions et les desirs (1819)
***“Separation of Opinions from Aspirations” (trans. H. D. Hutton)

“Sommaire appreciation sur L’ensemble du passé moderne” (1820)
***“A Brief Estimate of Modern History”

“Prospectus des travaux scientifiques necessaries pour reorganizer la societe”
(1822); Revised: (1824)
**Plan of the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society”

“Considerations philosophiques sur les sciences et es savants” (1825)
**Philosophical Considerations on the Sciences and Savants”

**Major Works** (post-1829)

Cours de philosophie positive. Six volumes.  Paris (1830-1842)
**The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte – Freely translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau. Two volumes. London (1853)

Discours sur l’esprit positif. Paris (1844)
**Introduction to the earlier work

System de politique positive, ou Traite de sociologie instituant la religion d l’Humanite. Four volumes. Paris (1851-1854)

**Works by John Stuart Mill**

Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865)

**Works by Moritz Schlick**

Positivism and Realism (1932); The Vienna Circle

**Works by F. Stuart Chapin**

Cultural Change (1928)

**Works by Charles E. Merriam**

Prologue to Politics (1939) **English Translation**
CHAPTER I.  The Western Philosophic Tradition

Origin of Political Philosophy in the Greek Dialectic

Both Plato (427-347) and his pupil, Aristotle (384-322) illustrate in their important works, The Republic, The Laws, The Politics, and Nicomachean Ethics i the development and authority of the Philosophic Tradition, established as the foundational ground from which the theory and practice of politics originated during the classical Greek period (fifth and fourth centuries, B.C.E.). The Greeks examined human existence through the lens of the natural world via metaphysical inquiry and epistemology (the nature and study of being and knowledge). i Both theorists focused on similar important themes as subjective and objective means of discovering truth, the nature of justice, ethics and moral principles, i the concept of the good, effective governance, and the laws. Aside from its practical purposes as a deliberative and legislative science described in Aristotle’s Book VI, Nicomachean Ethics, an essential attribute of politics existed in the Philosophic Tradition as a “species of prudence”—an intellectual virtue or the “calculative part of the soul” (166) that was acquired through experience and the exercise of abstract thought dealing with knowledge of the self and individual character in relation to the political world. The attribute was interchangeable with moral virtue, both necessary for achieving the highest form of human goodness, eudaimonia (happiness). i As a means to this end, the nature and study of politics had developed from its
philosophical underpinnings as “the most authoritative and directive” a tradition Aristotle first described as “a kind of political science” (4-5).

The foundational theory of nature and reason was authoritative for both philosophers in determining the composition, character, and form of a just polis. One of the most fundamental questions in achieving the ideal rested on defining the nature of justice and distinguishing its value as the best outcome for man, i.e., a virtue leading to the common good. From a metaphysical approach Plato described justice on an individual level as the harmony of one’s soul. As individuals have souls these must be harmonious in satisfying three fundamental desires: appetite (food and shelter) including the quest for wealth and power; developing reason (contemplation, knowledge, and the intellectual search for truth), and spirit (honor, recognition, and courage). “Psychic harmony” (Dahl 818) of the soul was thus experienced when the desire for each was satisfied and free of conflict between them. However, the desire to satisfy appetite can interfere with reason and the quest for truth; harmony then is subject to the internal struggle of the desires of the soul to be satiated and at peace. As a conceptual ideal, individuals whose souls were in accord with harmony were superior beings, i.e., intellectually developed, honorable, courageous, and in self-control. As a measure of human good arising from the individual soul, Platonic justice applied not only to private but also public life. Thus the idea of civic/political justice is raised in terms of one’s moral duty as the virtuous good citizen in pursuit of the highest form of human happiness and good for self and society. vii
As illustrated in The Republic, a central problem of politics is man’s inability to fully understand justice, essentially how to know truth or arrive at the good. Through the Socratic dialogues, Plato makes clear that ordinary humans know only subjective forms of truth as they arrive at knowledge and understanding from the visual world via the realm of opinion and convention, i.e., from one another. Conversely, objective truth, constant, unchanging and universal as understanding drawn from the intellect, the realm of the mind’s capability to reason and contemplate the world outside of the empirical and sensual is rarely the way man attempts to make life intelligible, asserted Plato. With the exception of the philosophers, most humans will never enter the world of abstraction where the beauty of knowledge reveals eternal truth, the supreme good and ultimate wisdom.

Best illuminated in the legendary Book VII, Allegory of the Cave, philosophers are exceptional as the most learned and thus most able members of society fit for the task of leadership. They alone can understand anything of important value to the polis and its members because their knowledge is most complete for understanding both the dialectic and the “Forms” —the basis of goodness and the virtues that must be acquired. Plato draws a distinction between the enlightened philosopher and the average person. The common person is bound in chains together with others to the wall of the cave. The prisoners’ sight is restricted and nothing is seen but reflections of light and shadow from a fire burning within. These reflections are essentially imitations of reality of which the chained observers are not aware are false and ultimately meaningless. Essentially, they
are condemned to knowing only subjective images of truth and are forever lost in the darkness of ignorance and self-deception. In contrast, the philosopher is a freed human being, one who transcends the world of the cave and moves toward the light of reality (the sun) which represents the form of the supreme good and the intelligible world of eternal truth. As Plato argues, only those that ascribe to the abstractions of the mind and the intellect as a means of acquiring the highest form of knowledge and recognition of absolute goodness as fully enlightened souls are fit to rule society.

As a basis for social organization, justice in terms of the harmonious soul corresponded with the regulated structure, proper functioning, duties of citizens, and leadership of Plato’s ideal regime. The best state (the citizen body) was analogous to the harmonious soul of man in that it must be temperate (of appetite), mature of knowledge (intellectual reason), possess courage, spirit, and strength of character, and further be integrated into a unified and stable whole. Plato’s just society was ordered similarly reflecting three categories or classes of people, each functioning in their proper role as laborer, the dominant characteristic being physical/appetite, warrior, in respect of having courage and spirit, and ruler, possessing the highest form of intellectual wisdom/knowledge. The classes were arranged hierarchically and ranked in quality as gold (rulers), silver (warriors), and brass (laborers). Communal organization was particularly encouraged as necessary to ensure unity and common purpose toward achieving the good of society. Family structure would be regulated, i.e., wives should be held in common and children raised in public nurseries. Marriages were unions of “the
best of both sexes, as few inferior as possible, and only the offspring of the better unions should be kept” (*The Republic*, 461 a). No private possession of property would exist in order to ensure the sharing and reciprocal exchange of all things to include each individual’s personal experiences, i.e., pain or pleasure, sufferings and joy. Plato envisioned that “all will aim at the same ends, because they [citizens] are convinced that all their interests are identical” (462 e). Toward this end, the system of education functioned to ensure complete conformity to the political structure; individuals would be properly prepared for their given role and assigned function. Essentially, Plato’s *Republic* was a system of eugenics, the state rigidly structured, socially and politically mechanistic, and characteristic of what critics have described as something resembling a Communist utopia. Plato later became his own critic in another major work, *The Laws*, seemingly having abandoned his ideal of governing power held in reserve for an elite group (instead, a code of law was the same as the reason of the ruler) and removing restrictions to private property.

From the backdrop of Plato’s *Republic*, Aristotle’s *Politics* emerged with a similar focus on the process of attaining human excellence as a means toward achieving the ultimate good for self and society. Alike to Plato, his inquiry centered on the question of how man via living a virtuous life could form the best regime. Aristotle explained that humans are by nature, political creatures having a commonality that brings them together via the ability to reason and communicate. The polis or city is also natural, existing as a functional partnership among individuals whose ultimate aim *happiness* is best achieved
in the form of the cooperative good. Aristotle argued that man is capable of practical wisdom (prudence) as a way of determining what way of acting is most appropriate or best for a given situation. That man and city were linked by nature, the best realization of himself would be as a civilized, virtuous participating citizen; the best end for the state was self-sufficiency achieved by moderate, reasonable and prudent actions in respect of its size, constitution, and governance for attaining the good life.

Aristotle notably criticized Plato’s *Republic* charging that the regime was not natural in the way it was structured and the city would not function effectively as a unified whole for realizing its ultimate aim of the good life. The problem apparent to Aristotle was that Plato simply failed to recognize that people are by nature different as are their abilities, experiences, and interests. As individuals endeavor toward being their best as citizens, their various contributions would ensure the best functioning, the greatest good for the city as a whole. Eliminating this diversity, as Plato had proposed making all identical would destroy rather than promote the city’s unity as Aristotle explained, “it is therefore clear from this that the city is not naturally one in this way as some say, and that which was said to be the greatest good to the city destroys cities. And yet the good of each thing preserves it” (*The Politics* 1261bl 5). The regime was better served by encouraging individuality and independence including governing one’s own private life as well as allowing equal participation in public affairs and decision-making authority.

Following in his assessment of Plato’s *Republic*, Aristotle took issue with the role of philosophers as rulers observing that they were likely to fail in their leadership
capacity. Experience, explained Aristotle, as well as having practical knowledge of politics was essential and most necessary for possessing proficient decision-making authority. Problematically, philosophers-kings as rulers over the lives of all citizens would rely on their knowledge of the Forms and abstract theoretical reasoning, i.e., their understanding of objective reality (as earlier described in Plato’s Allegory). They could not adequately run the city without knowledge of its practical affairs, the workings of its economy and civic life. Having little connection to its political and social conventions and the opinions and reasoning of others they would not be promoting city unity and self-sufficiency—the goal of leadership that characterizes the best regime, as Aristotle envisioned. The contributions of many independent voices, those that could offer practical and productive knowledge as best could be derived from the whole society would be overshadowed by the command of one or an elite group of philosophers immersed in the realm of the theoretical knowledge acquired from outside of the cave.¹

An important point of contention that Aristotle confronts at length in his rebuttal to Plato’s Republic is the issue of city unification—how this would be achieved in terms of communal relationships, friendships, families, and property held in common. Plato devised a system in which each individual acts as a family member to all others, e.g., a father to one son is a father to all in the community; sons will hold all men in common as fathers;¹ wives and the responsibilities of children are equally shared. Each will express the same forms of endearment (concern, charity) equally toward one another.¹ The city as family household would develop a “natural” bond in which the reciprocation of all
“pleasures and pains of any member” would draw all together. Theoretically, private friendships and family relationships would eventually dissolve and subsequently affections along with living arrangements would merge into one tightly-knit commune. For Plato this type of unity was, “the greatest good that a state can enjoy” (The Republic 464 b).

Aristotle questioned the practical utility of this theory; how could this reconcile with observed human nature and the way in which people actually behave? He condemned the idea as impossible and inconsistent with both nature and reason. Neither would the plan unify people nor would it subsequently achieve the greatest good. Assuredly in fact, much harm would likely occur as a result of making all things common, as Aristotle observed, “What is common to the most people gets the least care since they are concerned most of all with their own things, but less with the common things, or as much as falls to each” (The Politics, 1261b35-38). In other words, neglect of the commons would be the consequence as individuals quite naturally are self-interested, they would assume others are attending to duty thus they would be devoted primarily to personal concerns. Further as an observation of nature, Aristotle explained that people are likely to recognize their relatives, e.g., parents of their children, siblings as to family resemblance and thus by nature would feel a greater affection toward their own. If citizens could not know their relatives nor cultivate private relationships they would feel less rather than more affection toward one another and be more inclined to
commit impious acts, i.e., violence and/or sexual perversion and actions clearly negating the greater good.\textsuperscript{i}

While commonly shared affections counteract the goal of achieving a just and happy polis, Aristotle also criticized the lack of freedom of citizens to privately own or control property. He objected to the restrictions placed on individual independence and autonomy generally as he believed that citizens should be treated as separate and distinct components to the polis contributing to its good cooperatively, as in the partnership model “for the sake of living well” as educated\textsuperscript{i} and virtuous self-governing individuals. This was the best way to achieve unity and the ultimate good (happiness), a course clearly distant from Platonic totalitarianism.\textsuperscript{i} As Aristotle emphasized, the political good for man is justice but a system of rigid control and forced conformity to structure and rules would only produce the opposite, i.e., injustice would be the end result. Everything held in common would not ensure that factional conflict would not arise; in fact it would likely increase because of disputes over justice. Divisive and destructive to the city’s harmony, the problem of faction was counteractive to the goal of achieving the collective good. Thus the political system rather must be flexible, distribute and balance governing authority equitably, and craft prudent measures that act to diffuse the tensions that naturally occur among a diverse populace.

Aristotle elaborated on the framework of the ideal constitution and polity notably in Books III-VI) in the \textit{Politics}. His ideas on types of regimes, e.g., monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy (six altogether)\textsuperscript{i} greatly influenced later political theorists. He
distinguished between regime types in his discussion concerning who should rule, i.e., the few, the many, what social category and to what advantage; it was conceived that a mixed governmental structure would especially satisfy the requirement of justice to include a fair and balanced distribution of power. “[T]hose regimes which look to the common advantage are correct regimes according to what is unqualifiedly just, while those which look only to the advantage of the rulers are errant, and are all deviations from the correct regimes; for they involve mastery, but the city is a partnership of free persons” (1279al 20). Particularly because there were problems inherent even in the best regime forms as to equity and freedom which could lead to their degenerative opposites, a combination of both seemed the most attainable as practical and efficient. “For one should study not only the best regime but also the regime that is possible, and similarly also the regime that is easier and more attainable for all” (1288bl 37). It was important that the polity represent the whole political community and further that it be governed by the rule of law protecting both the wealthy and the poor in which neither could take advantage of the other. The attributes of both democracy (distributed rule) and oligarchy (rule by privilege and wealth) essentially as two extremes produced a middle ground as Aristotle described in the *Ethics*, the mean from which the most stable government was drawn. The middle class as a majority arising from each category and representing a pluralistic whole could best be depended on for respecting the auspices of reason along with nature as the most authoritative ground for human existence; this foundation would keep the political community unified and just by virtue of the laws. It was more likely
that this class would be equitable and less consumed with envy (as the poor) or contempt (the wealthy). They would moderate these excesses and further solidify the political ground of authority, that being consensual self-rule as framed in a more balanced, equitable, and distributive power structure. Aristotle recommended, “Those who are going to rule in the authoritative offices ought to have three things: first, affection for the established regime; next, a very great capacity for the work involved in rule; [and] their virtue and justice – in each regime the sort that is relative to the regime . . .” (1309a 33).

He further outlined the most authoritative directive for a constitutional democracy. The sharing and preservation of freedom was the defining principle of a just regime (1317b 43); the second being equality as best it could be realized by an equitable distribution of power.

The Value of Philosophical Foundations in Political Theory and Practice

The Greek dialectic dating in this instance from the Platonic dialogues and forward to Aristotelian foundations exhibits an important attribute particularly inherent in the tradition of political philosophy. Theoretical reasoning including metaphysical thought contributing prominently as a method for the investigation of truth and the nature of being served dually as a practical means of analysis for observing and interpreting political phenomena. The study and practice of ethics (moral and intellectual virtues) in a broad sense played an equally substantive role in understanding the nature of the individual, political man, and community. Justice, for example was fundamental in this analysis as a “complete” virtue, enjoined with the laws of the polis in securing just,
lawful actions. As justice is applied “aiming at the common advantage,” it would “produce or conserve the happiness and the constituents of the happiness of a political association” (Ethics, 1129a 15). Most prolifically explained in Book V of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (1129a), the conceptualization of political justice is distinguished by two classifications, i.e., by what is perceived as just via convention (nomos) and law (the rules of justice) and that which is just in accordance with nature (phusis) or natural law. The latter is characterized by its virtual immutability as to human affairs such that its validity is universally recognized and in this sense described, “as fire burns both here and in Persia.” In other words, “justice is a human concern” (1129a30) of which all are familiar. However, it is not easily accomplished in a practical sense as it must be presupposed by a virtuous moral state and a shared understanding that justice is essentially that which exists as “the good of others” (1134b5). One of Aristotle’s most prolific passages reflects on the nature of justice and in the case of leadership draws eloquently upon the distinction between the rule of men and the principle of natural law; the latter being conducive to the abstract conceptualization as a virtue or moral good. “. . . justice is only found among those whose mutual relations are controlled by law . . . .” (30). “That is why we do not allow a man to rule, but the principle [of law]; because a man does so for his own advantage, and becomes a despot, whereas the ruler is the upholder of justice, and if of justice, of equality” (1134b1). As Aristotle emphasizes, justice exists as a mutual good and as a foundation of the virtuous political state. Most importantly, Aristotle calls upon the recognition of the philosophical principle that
grounds this definition and thus its understanding of value to both political discourse and practice.

As the most “authoritative and directive” both moral and intellectual virtues as elaborated in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Books III-VI) are not limited to abstract conceptualizations as the work itself is acknowledged as one the author adapted to the practical study and science of politics. In the instance of Aristotle’s discussion on the understanding of (*phronesis*) practical common sense, (wisdom) or in its literal translation, “prudence” the meaning derives from the theoretical principle as a “true state” (1140b5) and pertains to “action with regard to things that are good or bad for man.” Prudence as well as (*sophrosune*), temperance are qualities of particular necessity in the management of states as Aristotle explains importantly on the grounds that these preserve judgment about “what is to be done” (15). And while prudence is expected of good and temperate leadership, intellectual capability as intelligence and intuition are especially consistent with prudent judgment. All are conducive to the science of politics as these and particularly prudence exists as “the same state of mind . . . .” (1141b25). Aristotle distinguishes further that knowledge and practical wisdom as to the development of learning the factual (e.g., mathematics) is set apart from the acquisition of prudence. Both time and experience are required as with the philosopher or the metaphysical, thus “the young” as Aristotle remarks, are not likely to grasp this virtue and tend to “repeat the doctrines of these abstractions without actually believing them . . . .” (1142a20). In order that correct political judgment and consideration coincide with the
intellectual virtues it is recommended that the experienced and aged citizens be given the greatest attention and their “unproved assertions and opinions” be particularly embraced. The factual or empirical “demonstrations” (10) do not produce such insight and understanding.

An important critique as to the value of the *Ethics* is to question whether the virtues as states of character and mind or study of the virtuous make any difference in the realm of the political or, if simply knowing of what is just and good amounts to acting as such. Is prudence authoritative to practice in view of the exercise of deliberation, judgment or in relation to one’s contribution to the social good? Does wisdom described in Aristotelian terms as “excellence in the art” (1141a10) and essential to knowledge find its place in the actuality of politics or give rise to its value in the public sphere? As Aristotle makes clear, knowing how to perform prudently and acting morally just or honorably does not make one just per se. Rather, it is the virtuous state of mind that drives the action and the choice one makes via “virtue that makes the choice correct” (20). Right action or fair judgment in this way are products of the many virtuous forms, as Socrates defined these together in relation to one another as the principle of prudence (16). Following in this vein, the principle itself exists as the essential foundation from which all just political practice arises i.e., one cannot exercise action on behalf of the good with the exclusion of the moral and intellectual virtues, in other words, without prudence. In sum, “even if prudence were not practical, it would still be necessary” as Aristotle concludes, allowing for one caveat. It does not preside over nor has complete
authority over wisdom or “the higher part of the soul” (1145a5). Alike to medical science if it were to claim authority over health, it does not use wisdom in supporting its realization; the logic is akin to proclaiming that “political science controls the gods because it gives instructions about everything in the state” (10). Referring to the subjective here, the “calculative part of the soul” (prudence) from which action derives can better claim the realistic implementation of knowledge (reason) as to understanding political phenomena; the other in complement, i.e., the metaphysical or purely objective, and abstract philosophical wisdom retains an equally significant position.

Philosophy as a Way of Life

As convincing and immeasurably beneficial to the study and science of politics, the Aristotelian treatises in the decades following (from 322 BCE forward) nevertheless receded from serious scholarship with the exception of various traditional loyalists editing the works including the Ethics’ namesake, Nicomachus, son of Aristotle, Lyceum successor, Theophrastus (322 BCE) and later, Ariston of Ceos, as successor, c 225 BCE (Thomson 306). As Roman influence prevailed over the political and intellectual environment in the following century, so had a growing skepticism of classical Greek philosophy developed in its place. This distrust of the original foundations materialized in view of the fundamental principles and metaphysical underpinnings considering the profound questions of being and truth, the elements of nature and reason in relation to living the virtuous life, and the theoretical understanding of justice as essential to the
political order. From the conquest of Greece forward Roman regard for the theoretically abstract approach to politics could not have been more distant to the preference for the practical in terms of inquiry into a more relative and realistic methodology for achieving good government.

Despite the suspicion of and aversion to classical philosophy as to Roman sensibilities, the task of enlightening the population of its Greek foundations was considered a necessity to philosophical scholar and political statesman, Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE). A self-professed member of the Skeptic school as well as admirer of Plato’s works, Cicero believed that the doctrines of traditional philosophical thought must be adapted to Roman foundations, i.e., be realistic in terms of political deliberation of what is possible and necessary as well as what is sought-after in the theoretical sense. [Alike in the discourse of politics as to what *is* versus what *ought to be*]. Achieving the common good must include a discussion of the virtues but these should not be held to exist in isolation of their practical utility as Cicero asserts: “. . . . the existence of virtue depends entirely upon its use; and its noblest use is the government of the state, and the realization in fact, not in words, of those very things that the philosophers, in their corners, are continually dinning in our ears” (*Republic*) (159).iv Thus the directive to statesman was such that they must consider the contemplative philosophical principles not strictly as far-flung assumptions that pose too difficult an understanding of politics or seem of little importance to everyday political life. Rather abstract conceptualizations of justice must be recognized as conducive to constructing in material form the institutional
and legal framework of the best possible regime. Importantly and reflective of Aristotle, the dual approach of the contemplative and the practical worked well in conjunction with one another. And further settling the argument between what is best in choosing between private and civic responsibility and whether to pursue the life of the philosopher or that of the active politician, Cicero’s elucidations in his work, the *Republic* offered via the tribulations of Scipio the wise alternative: “a union of experience in the management of great affairs with the study and mastery of those other arts,” (160) i.e., philosophical expertise incorporating the virtues and prudence applied resourcefully to the administration of good government. What was then theoretically possible and consistent with what was necessary in respect of the welfare of the regime agreed with the desirable and sought-after goal or as Aristotle expressed of the nature of politics, the attainment of the supreme good for man (*eudaimonia*) happiness and prosperity corresponded with the practical application toward that end.

Cicero’s political works bear close resemblance to the philosophical teachings of both Plato and Aristotle particularly as these illustrate a comprehensive treatment of nature as the natural or universal state of being and justice as the foundation of political life. Scipio’s understanding of the commonwealth for example, represents the necessary blending of both the “certain social spirit which nature has implanted in man [and] the wealth and common interest of the people (163).” As necessitated by government, justice is fundamental to the natural development and prosperity of the political community for “without the most perfect justice, no government can prosper,” (Book II, *The Republic of*
As the best regime is then one in which justice underlies its success, it should serve well in further sustaining its utility toward that end. But while Cicero’s assertion ensures that this ‘complete virtue’ as Aristotle described provides the strongest and most stable bond necessary for a thriving republic, it is challenged in large part by the counter-argument of Philus, a fellow academic Skeptic raising the premise that justice in itself is not natural nor universal to all persons everywhere. Justice contends Philus, is no more that a product of convention and further that it disagrees with both nature and wisdom as to the behaviors and intellectual sensibilities of individuals and human society. It is folly to believe, explains Philus that justice in the sense that it recognizes the good of and for others comports with natural self-interest which more commonly rules over human behavior. Moreover, convention dictates that injustice may be necessary to ensure the safety and security of the state; Rome in this instance would not be an empire if it had not defended against the injustices pressed upon it by its enemies. Convention, as the common agreement among the polis that the interest of another state must first be investigated and considered beneficial to its own good negates the sensible or wisest procedure toward the most favorable end. As Philus emphasizes, wisdom in agreement with experience and self-interest override the virtuous and moral foundations and these should not interfere with what nature in practice demands:

Wisdom urges us to increase our resources, to multiply our wealth, to extend our boundaries; . . . to rule over as many subjects as possible, to enjoy pleasures, to become rich, to be rulers and masters; justice, on the other hand, instructs us to spare all men, to consider the interests of the
whole human race, to give everyone his due, and not to touch sacred or public property, or that which belongs to others (169).

While Philus’ claim seemed undoubtedly reasonable in this dispute over justice, elder statesman and Stoic philosopher Laelius stood opposed to the assertion that self-interest and its motivations led to the most rewarding and wisest of political action. Rather justice as “right reason” was best in agreement with nature and as it was conceived in full accordance with the universal as the immutable and eternal natural law. It served well and completely as the central foundation of all rational thought and human action. As Laelius reasoned,

. . . .We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times . . . (169)

As earlier observed, the fires of justice “burn[ing] both here and in Persia” denied the claim that it was merely fundamental to convention and circumstance as simply a product of human society which in effect varied among cities or nations. Nature, not utility defined both its substance and purpose and in contradistinction to Philus’ expectations of self-interest, justice could be depended on with respect to “the nature of man” and reason as Cicero elucidated and validated further via the establishment of just laws.
Cicero’s teachings in his corresponding work, the Laws emphasize that the theoretical principles upon which good government thrives are those that are universally valid and as such devised to “promote the firm foundation of States, the strengthening of cities, and the curing of the ills of peoples (171).” Natural law particularly with respect to nature and reason as the foundation of acquiring the highest form of human goodness (eudaimonia) and excellence attained from ethical virtue and wisdom was basic to political life. However to Cicero and equally to those of the Skeptic school, the conceptual premise must be made practicable as observably in nature the virtues and application of natural law in its purest sense was incompatible with human society and its inevitable foibles. Thus it could only be defined and applicable in understanding its dual disposition, i.e., law not only as human political thought had conceived for example as enactments of societal command and authority, but law as eternal and universally binding through virtue and wisdom drawn from the highest form of human reason. As Cicero emphasized, the philosophical natural law was essential as guide to the best ends (excellence) and the best state but must be tempered by its reconciliation with law in its ‘lower’ form as necessary to political life. “The essential nature of the commonwealth often defeats reason” (Republic Bk II 57), asserted Cicero, thus the “reason and mind of a wise lawgiver applied to command and prohibition” would best serve its practical function. Justice too, as a complete virtue as in Scipio’s view must not run counter to human nature such that it is unobtainable or inapplicable in the practical sense.
Cicero’s concern for the commonwealth’s ultimate survival was his own restoration of the Philosophic Tradition particularly at a time when the metaphysical approach to politics and discourse over the political order was often regarded as nothing short of blasphemous to the Roman mind and sensibilities. The speculative life of Greek origin had given way to an emerging system of Positive politics in the Roman schema based far less upon the foundations of nature and reason with exception given to asserting the philosophical as a practical means for achieving positive ends. Nonetheless, the Tradition remained foundational to political thought providing the substantive arguments upon which later theorists, e.g., St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) developed unique theoretical works particularly framed within the constructs of the ancient philosophers.

Most distinctive of Aquinas’ contributions was an effort to reform and to enhance Christian theology particularly in observing Aristotelian theory as a basis for integrating further, both Greek philosophic traditions with ecclesiastical foundations. Aquinas owed much to Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as the *Politics* and established its authority firmly alongside that of defined theological principles of faith. Revelation and reason according to Aquinas were distinct as complete sciences and both shared the fundamentals of epistemological knowledge that would neither place them at odds with one another nor diminish their substantive foundations. Both intellectual and divine truth of which they could reconcile in harmonious accord revealed a congruent and relatively perfected form of enlightenment. Aquinas’ theory thus developed upon this basic ideal and the essential merging of Christianity with both the philosophical and the political
approach arising from Aristotelian conceptions, one of particular importance i.e., the notion that man existed in nature as a political being. Further, civil society was a natural state to which the welfare and moral development of the individual was best enhanced and most likely ensured via the unity of its members and its object of the common good. As well, the political authority on philosophical grounds was the most defining factor in determining the regime’s substance and survival, its stability especially resting on the efficacy of the rule of law. As Aquinas observed, “Laws are the privileged instrument of politics and stand in relation to the works of man as universals to particulars. It is through them more than through any other agency that the ruler promotes justice and moral goodness among the citizens” (Commentary on the Ethics, X, 257).vi

There is a distinct departure from Aristotelian political philosophy in Aquinas’ assessment of the social good with respect to Christian doctrine. As members of a universal human society existing together in nature and with the common attribute of reason, the ultimate authority by which all beings are subordinated is the law and justice of divine providence. Aquinas makes clear that human interpretation of natural law and the practical and philosophical intellect do not altogether make the just regime nor are they alone responsible for achieving human excellence. Rather this is a result of God’s grace through the practice of moral virtue and by which humans are judged. Thus there is a difference between the goodness of man relative to the regime and its ethical foundations (as Aristotle prescribed) and absolute goodness that arises to the principles of Christian devotion and reverence to the divine. From whichever approach both lead to
the distinction of universal morality which in Aquinas’ definitions of the cardinal virtues, justice and prudence are explicitly connected to the understanding of the soul alike to Platonic interpretation. Similarly, Aquinas’ characterizations of moral law take on a more rigid sense of order and expected obedience in comparison to Aristotle’s *Ethics*, these in terms of actions which may be judged accordingly as commensurate with the social good or conversely, disobedient to it and of which may be praised or punishable in respect of divine law.

In however closely Aquinas adopted Aristotelian philosophy and the Tradition while also disputing various of its more secular claims, it is notable that Christian theology via Aquinas’ comparable interpretations of its principles of nature and reason, natural law including the moral and intellectual virtues, and the best conditions of sociopolitical regimes, adopted the foundations of ancient thought formulated well over a thousand years before. The Philosophic Tradition neither had dissolved along with its metaphysical meditations nor had it become obsolete as soon after the Greek period Roman interpretations retained much of the principal elucidations that both enhanced political thought and shaped it in practice and purpose. The theological establishment during which Aquinas formulated his *Summa Theologica* also created a sense of balance between the ancient foundations of reason and the powers of revelation instilling much of Aristotelian wisdom into Christian philosophy and tradition. This fragile relationship was not to last however as the classical era gave way to modern illuminations rejecting both the Church and the early revelations of the Philosophic Tradition.
REFERENCES


CHAPTER II. A Brief Sketch of the Moderns and the Transformation to Positive Philosophy

The Machiavellian Approach to Positivism

Niccolo Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) is easily among the more celebrated thinkers of merit in the history of political philosophy. Renowned most exclusively for his particular brand of politics, he devised an approach largely formulated on the basis of achieving consistent and unfailing political ends—essentially, an objective meant to enhance the nationalist state, its power and its discipline even via the harshest of means. He is discussed for purposes here to draw attention to early modern representations and conceptions of Positive political philosophy and to further contrast the ancients’ view particularly of natural law and original principles, these in Machiavelli’s perspective perceived as resistant to the Positive or practical law considered most compatible with civil society.

The natural or moral law derived from the metaphysical constructions of virtue or on theoretical grounds such as reason as a foundation of the good and just society could not reconcile with real tendencies in human nature for example, the instinct for self-preservation. This inclination as a force most dominant in driving political life reflected away from any prescribed moral duty or as the ancients’ teaching would have affirmed, the conception of men as they ought to be as good citizens of the state. Rather given men as they are as rationally self-interested correspondingly determined the moral foundations upon which the political society should aspire and these should neither be conditional to,
nor were they necessarily compatible with virtue as Machiavelli’s well-known reflection on the subject reveals:

There is so great a distance between how one lives and how one ought to live that he who rejects what people do in favor of what one ought to do, brings about his ruin rather than his preservation; for a man who wishes to do in every matter what is good, will be ruined among so many who are not good. *The Prince* (1513)

Machiavelli was more than convincing as a political pragmatist. His thoughts on classical philosophy and its idealistic treatises on best regime principles and formulations in the wake of Plato’s *Republic* and Aristotle’s *The Politics* were generally resistant to early conceptualizations of universal principles envisioned through Hellenistic Stoicism. While the ancient tradition underscored that political excellence remain concurrent with ethical foundations, this being the regime’s worthwhile end and a theoretical ideal all might likely support, the singular way of achieving such a goal according to Machiavellian principle would be possible only by reducing such standards to the common and much lower political order; this theory recognizing the issue of the immoral and the unethical, essentially the opposition to the virtuous good which would better actualize the ideal. Justice for instance, can only be known by acknowledging that injustice invariantly exists—through evil does good emerge, and from terror and tyranny is freedom thus obtained. That which is illegitimate, explained Machiavelli can only bring about legitimacy.
The foundations of virtue thus are reconceived in the consequence and authority of their failing (vice) as men no longer learn from philosophic antiquity and their histories how great republics arise. As Machiavelli and his modern contemporaries would come to believe, there could never be another Athens. Only perhaps via Rome and the ruminations of Livy of which the thinker devoted his *Discourses* can reverence be given to the ancients and only as such to reestablish virtue according to its reciprocal value or in effect, alike to a regression of morality in favor of immorality. As a foundation derived from a state of nature comparably similar to Hobbes’ dangerous and inharmonious world, virtue in this new language of Positive philosophy is transformed and in most respects disappears from its earlier Platonic underpinnings as a new political order emerged—this with its own definitions and directives brought about especially by an explicit rejection of the deemed ineffectual Philosophic Tradition, its original doctrines and adherents. Machiavelli underscored in his criticism of the ancients: “Our religion has tended to glorify humble and contemplative men rather than men of action” (116); surely then, the contemplative must surrender to force adamantly deemed proper for restructuring political society. In the case of an ambitious prince the plan for political action and iron-fisted rule takes precedence over prudence—the latter in this instance being the least favorable for realizing effective governance. Prudence, as earlier described as an intellectual virtue, “the calculative part of the soul” was acquired through experience and the exercise of abstract thought and considered most importantly to the ancients as “an essential attribute of politics.” Not unpredictably however is prudence
devalued here as the language and means of achieving *eudaimonia* (happiness) arising from Aristotelian theory endorsed neither the purpose nor the goal of Positive politics. In its place, power and its complement authority of domination became its active end.

As is known of Machiavelli’s prescriptions cited in *The Prince* and the *Discourses*, the establishment of absolute power entails a revival of a new authority beholding to the ruler by virtue of the utmost loyalty and reverence. This veneration expected of all is not overshadowed by Christian doctrine and worship of the divine; rather it is combined with the latter such that the ruler is God-like and of the highest authority. The language and communal foundations of the polis are also modified in order to reframe the political will to power as Machiavelli believed necessary, “That the change of sects and languages together with floods and plagues destroys the memory of things” (313).¹ This effectively extinguishes the old for the new by dissolving any mention of the eternal truths spoken in the dialogue of the ancients and the philosophic practice respecting the rule of law, these no longer purposeful and as such can be easily forgotten. Christian authority would also retreat and finally meet its end as Machiavelli predicted that futile theological foundations would fall to conquest by the new political order. Finally, the transition had established the rudimentary grounds by which the Positive Philosophy had begun to develop its pre-scientific roots. The advancement of scientific theory and practice would nurture this change and further influence the political landscape as theorists resolved to distance themselves from the ancient past.
Francis Bacon shared in common with Machiavelli’s political pragmatism an approach also considerably distant from traditional philosophical thought. Particularly deemphasizing the central theoretical foundations of antiquity, Bacon’s focus on practical applications and stressing the importance of empirical methodology were explicitly rendered in several of his works, e.g., *The Advancement of Learning* (1605), *Norum Organum* (New Method) (1620), and *Phenomena Universi or a Natural and Experimental History for the Construction of Philosophy* (1620). During his early scholarship Bacon made clear his distaste of the ancients including Aristotle of whom he described as a “dictator” and as such “reign[ed] amongst the schoolmen” with “a kind of degenerate learning” he considered lacking of both utility and innovation—the “cobwebs of learning” could only serve to waste otherwise inquisitive, fruitful and inventive minds (Skemp 1912, 63).ii Although respectful nonetheless of Greek thought and sentient to its important abstract formulations reflective of the period, Bacon did not rest easily with its approach as he remarked in his 1605 treatise, “the question between me and the ancients is not of the virtue of the race, but of the rightness of the way” (*The Advancement of Learning*, Book I, iv 5, 1605).

‘The way’ of ancient thinkers according to Bacon was deficient such that it unwisely entrusted to the discovery and advancement of knowledge the purely speculative contemplations of man. Intellectual reasoning along with man’s reflections upon natural phenomena relative to sense perception and analysis were imperfect and
inherently faulty human capacities, vulnerable to error in the acquisition and utilization of knowledge. With the absence of a more reliable means of learning and thinking, i.e., without a consistent methodological treatment applied to inquiry and observation as well as to ideas and imagination, falsity and erroneous interpretations and conceptualizations would come between the “mind of man and the nature of things” (Novum Organum).iii Aristotle’s logic and the philosopher’s use of deductive reasoning via syllogism served as a worthy example on this point.iii As Bacon argued, the mind is originally deceptive and thus its propositions and resulting conclusions can be specious and misleading. So too are literary works untrustworthy in their inaccuracies as are words vague and imprecise; language itself is inherently erroneous and serves otherwise to misinform. “Here is the distemper of learning,” declared Bacon “when men study words and not matter” (Novum Organum, 1620).

Bacon is most revered for his firm belief and foremost advocacy of scientific empiricism and innovation. Particularly promoting the practice of inductive reasoning, experimentation and invention, Bacon’s philosophy rested primarily on the ground of reforming the processes of knowledge by encouraging both technical learning and advancing its greater utility in a theory of Positive human progress. Science was the keystone for developing human potential and for creating a forward-moving, ordered, prosperous, and ultimately, peaceful civilization. As providing the antidote for curing the ills and miseries of mankind, practical reason utilized at its efficiency maxim would clear the enlightened pathway to the social and political good.
As Bacon’s fictional utopia, *Nova Atlantis* (1627) represents this approach in its rather fantastical account of human survival, the practice of science and technical innovation would prove essential in addressing the destructive forces both natural and political that had historically brought about the demise of even the most enlightened civilizations. The *New Atlantis* in Bacon’s tale transcends the common fate of all political regimes in that it does not perish as do Athens and Rome. Owing to the establishment of “Solomon’s House,” an academic fraternity of expert minds devoted to scientific research and modern advancement, the future betterment of the species including civic life and the social and political well-being of the state would be secure. As described of the organization, “The end of the foundation is the knowledge of causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible (New Atlantis 1627).” As Bacon’s lengthy passage reveals of Solomon’s House, its many endeavors and disciplines largely replicate a modern university system and its operations. Among its many achievements, the erecting of “high towers” in which various experimental laboratories and chambers house expert scientists, their projects and specimens engage in all manner of empirical research. The protection and preservation of the regime would rest in the capable hands of Solomon’s founders and fellows. The “Merchants of Light,” the knowledgeable and wise men of the fictional society of “Bensalem” claimed on behalf of human inquiry their certain mastery over nature through science and with this a qualified governing authority as Bacon emphasized:
Human knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known the effect cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule” (*Novum Organum, Part I, Aphorism III.*, 67-68). iii

Bacon in his many volumes on the subject insisted on a new epistemology, a restored and more efficient philosophy which must be born of a system of science and methodology, an approach grounded in the empirical objective analysis of natural phenomena. The discovery of truth including understanding the political life of man must importantly be free of philosophic fallacy, i.e., conceptualizations traditionally imposed by the “idols” (the ancients) as presumably being the best means for attaining knowledge. In the theorist’s judgment, misrepresentations and distortions were rather the case as propounded in the Greek tradition and only “certain empty dogmas” were their result. Idols were guilty of mistruths according to Bacon as their doctrines were conceived primarily of the natural albeit deceptive intellect. The mind was inherently untrustworthy as were speculative reasoning and the process of learning via sense perception. Man must implement a practical and reliable approach to investigation and all manner of inquiry if at least to correct this innate disability. Further, students of the world should be wary of outdated philosophic principles that essentially fog the mind of new reflection and inhibit new methods of discovery and innovation:

On waxen tablets you cannot write anything new until you rub out the old. With the mind it is not so; there you cannot rub out the old till you have written in the new” (*Temporus Partus Masculus (The Masculine Birth of Time)*, 1603)).
In this ‘rubbing out’ of the old mind, one antiquated and unreliable as the Philosophic Tradition had come to be known, the ‘writing of the new’ as Bacon advocated would press forward the principles of Positivism via the advancement of science and empirical inquiry. The new Philosophy of practical politics followed on the horizon as theorists argued further that the past was useless to the present.

**The Political Realism of Thomas Hobbes**

As Bacon was most concerned with curing “the distemper of learning” via science and removing the problem of traditional philosophy’s flawed epistemology from which he believed human progress had little chance of materializing, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in similar fashion opposed the reasoning and theoretical doctrines of classical philosophy. The ancients had erred in the way they believed human advancement and perfection could be achieved. The “virtue of the race” as Bacon had described and idyllic utopias were still perhaps the philosopher’s mission, nonetheless the quest for perfection must be separated from the actual political goals of man and society. If the good life and a thriving society were to be realized and sustained, believed Hobbes, then it demanded rationality and in agreement with Baconian science it must apply a similarly analytic and essentially practical approach to political theory.

Hobbes’ opposition to Aristotelian thought asserted that the most powerful attribute and thus motivational force largely responsible for human behavior was not by
nature reason such that it was derived from the intellectual virtues, e.g., prudence. Rather in the state of nature men are ruled by their passions and thus are vulnerable to a variety of ills, threats, and natural tendencies toward the irrational including violent conflict. Moreover, in contradistinction to Aristotle’s view of man’s natural existence being both social and political, Hobbes denied this assertion. The true condition of mankind is essentially one of a pre-political state in which self-preservation is the most important concern such that civil society is replaced by a state of war and in which fierce competition, distrust, and all manner of hostility and conflict reside. As Hobbes affirmed in one of his most acclaimed passages:

. . . men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such a condition there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; not letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (Leviathan, 1651) (Cahn)

The prescription for man must then be nothing less than a retreat from or rule over this barbaric state of nature and further to induce him to obtain security where none exists, comfort where he may invent it, and peace in cooperation of this end with others. Reason must override the passions that are inclined to destroy albeit the rules of reason or as Hobbes describes, the moral or natural law must be understood in terms of the
common and most powerful instinct of self-preservation—this forming the basis of all social and political arrangements and institutions. The philosophic ground of modern liberalism as it derives from Hobbesian theory of individualism and the rights of man as these apply to the state of nature come to fruition here and with this development, the withdrawal of traditional philosophic theory would follow.

Particularly, the understanding of equality and justice were at issue and essentially classical theory was at odds with Hobbes’ perspective. Aristotelian political thought explained that men are naturally political and as such are predisposed to their differences where some are inclined to serve while others more capable of rule. In the state of nature according to antiquity inequality is fundamental; thus both the fair and reasonable distribution of justice and resulting peace among men can best follow with the appropriate formulation of civil laws that adjust to the various virtues and vices of individuals in civil society. Allowing for natural inequality does not condemn men to live lives of perpetual conflict ultimately resulting in human self-destruction as Hobbes would believe. Further, the recognition of difference concurs with the desire for individual liberty such that while all strive for independence all may seek the benefit of cooperation and agreement toward this common goal which in turn reduces the hostility and distrust of which Hobbes speaks. Aristotle asserted, “Being a multitude . . . it is necessary to make [the city] common and one . . .” (The Politics 1263b 35)iv and as well, the political system must balance authority and power among a diverse populace.
Despite this logic it is unlikely that individuals will surrender to a universal sovereign in hopes of avoiding conflict with others as Hobbes proposed.

The validity of the theorist’s argument nonetheless was consistent with both the rational pursuit of self-preservation and security that men seek and the desire for peace such that individuals become willing to negotiate for both. Hobbes was well-known for introducing the familiar social contract theory from which civil society develops as a ground for the attainment of each individual’s personal liberty via a mutual acceptance of all others’ desire for the same. This covenant as the principle foundation of justice and likewise injustice also establishes the basis of the civil law, one that derives exclusively from a form of self-legislated right to exercise one’s obligations and duties first to oneself and subsequently toward protecting the social good. The presumption of and dependence on mutual trust inevitably applies however; Hobbes’ theory that trust is something nonexistent in the state of nature contradicts the contract’s otherwise better purposes. Justice is in a sense vulnerable here or in effect unenforceable when covenants have no firm guarantee that individuals will perform in fairness to one another. The state of nature as earlier described is perilous and uncertain as to men’s fundamental survival, thus there is no possibility that a just civil society under the unavoidable circumstances of fear (of death) as Hobbes emphasized, along with mutual distrust and categorical selfishness (self-preservation) would prevail. Nonetheless, self-interest remained the common element that can make men just so that each can assume a perfect equality among one another. Disputing Aristotle’s claim that the state of nature affirmed men’s
inequality again referring to the ancient doctrine of distributive justice in which some are more worthy than others to command and others to serve, the requisite foundation of equality is instead fundamental. Civil society must recognize equality and afford equal status to all whether or not it exists, claimed Hobbes such that justice is by design proportioned to serve each in the same way. Under this covenant all benefit by virtue of a reciprocated rather than distributed form of justice.

The premise is one contradicting the original terms upon which the state of nature is defined. In accord with the ancients’ perspective, differences between individuals remain fundamental and in turn the recognition of such diversity, this “multitude” as Aristotle described, would better establish the authoritative ground of both political life and the civil law in accordance with justice. Further, virtue and vice as a basis for realizing the truth of man’s nature that the good and its converse are reconciled in the instance of reason as opposed to passion was argued as both conceivably and actually possible. But Hobbes asserted that virtue is nothing more than power exercised in the pursuit of self-preservation. The actuation of governmental power in effect to check and/or restrict men’s otherwise hostile nature toward their natural rivals in society then becomes essential. Men, said Hobbes are thus destined to consent to one omnipotent sovereign power constituted of the many wills and desires of individuals bound together as a unified whole. This governmental entity in turn acts to protect the commonwealth’s interest in concurrence with each individual’s rights within its bounds and by means of the application of equal justice.
Hobbes devised a political arrangement (the social contract) as one would similarly construct a numerical equation. The formulation, a commutative exchange between citizens and the government, the former consenting to obedience in exchange for the sovereign power’s protection should sum to its expected outcome, resolving political turmoil in civil society and achieving peace. Importantly, all political powers exist exclusively within a system of centralized control, these including the police power of the state with the right to punish and execute, the legislative power creating laws particularly prescribing for citizens the goods they may be allowed and/or denied, and the judiciary, one committed to sovereign legal doctrine. One of the most important edicts concurring with this agreement includes citizen renunciation of any right of resistance such that the sovereign’s absolute authority is not subject to any claim of injustice or subjugation that the governing power might otherwise commit. The social contract is an agreement limited to citizen subjects involving only one another whereby all agree to relinquish their rights otherwise retained in the state of nature to a supreme and in this instance an impervious sovereign. To reject the judgment and actions of this singular power is not possible given that it stands apart from the covenant inclusive only of the subjects under its control. And as this governing authority represents the sum total of each individual’s will, resisting its power to compel and command all to obey is alike to declaring war, not upon government but rather against oneself and one’s fellow citizens. Thus, prosecution and punishment of the resistant and disobedient allows the sovereign the exclusive right to exercise both its police and judicial powers in keeping the peace.
The strict limitations to individual political rights are evident; Hobbes’ social contract was devised to ensure the right to self-preservation and to protect each citizen against injury, injustice, and the loss of liberty imposed by others. However, there are few if any provisions for addressing the potential wrongs of the sovereign. Any opportunity for civil disobedience is thwarted by the impenetrable barriers of a unilateral governing power. Hobbes’ *Leviathan* rules both over the minds and over the actions of its subjects albeit with the aim and the obligation of asserting its dominion and authority unconditionally while inflicting no harm upon obedient individuals. This arrangement included its “inconveniences” of which absolute power was capable as Hobbes’ acknowledges:

“... in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth, which I confesse is a great and inevitable convenience” (*Leviathan*).\(^v\)

While those ‘inconvenienced’ by the fault of monarchical misjudgment and abuse would expect to appeal to justice for equal treatment, there is no such avenue for cause against the sovereign as the judicial power as one solely committed to the latter’s legal doctrine. Essentially citizens cannot apply the rule of law to leadership in this instance and as such it can be said in contrast to Paine’s famous declaration of 1775, “the law is king.” Rather in Hobbes’ conception of justice and political order in a monarchical arrangement, “the king is law.”
The strength and power of the monarchy is drawn from its parts consistent with the political will of all, this assembly banded together in unison to support and uphold the self-regulating leadership of one sovereign. This is inconsistent with a traditional monarchy, argued Hobbes as the governing power does not arise from hereditary succession but rather via the electing body which approves of and legitimizes the sovereign’s complete autonomy. And while the will of all defines the law of one by which all must abide it does not present itself such that it is reasonable, i.e., subject to evenhanded and discretionary counsel; for reason claimed Hobbes is not the foundation by which man exists in nature as the Greeks theorized. The law via the will is the absolute command of the superior authority, one in which obedience is expected. The civil laws follow in this vein where the authoritative body (the commonwealth) rules each subject under its dictates by majority. Granted, the common will toward achieving the social good is the goal and the civil authorities enforce the laws accordingly protective of and for this purpose.

One may notice in Hobbes’ political formulation the absence of any legal or moral appeal to justice. When unjust actions by the civil authorities are unchecked by any other power or counsel, how does the commonwealth otherwise thwart abusive treatment that arises from the collective will? Deliberative reason is not applicable here and nor would the application of prudence as these appeal to the abstract theoretical definitions of which Hobbes dismisses in his political discourse. For example, justice in accord with the Philosphic Tradition arises from the ethical standard of fairness by
which all agree or the common or natural law that commands the highest authority and
provides the most reliable ground by which political life is instituted. But the standard of
intellectual virtue and thus the ground of political authority, e.g., prudence can claim no
power or control over vice, claimed Hobbes. Further, appealing to man’s better nature in
turn foils his aim for a safe, prosperous, and more peaceful existence. Within civil
society destructive forces are otherwise inevitably present, explained Hobbes and these
cannot be diffused by demand for or obligation to moral imperatives that are essentially
impotent in this regard. In short, the laws based on the standard recognizing the virtues
as well as vice have “no teeth” for establishing and preserving an orderly and just polis.

Hobbes’ schema for achieving an indestructible social and political order and
subsequently arriving at a lasting peace was devised with the objective of establishing a
system of government suitable for all peoples arising at any one time or place. Contrary
to Aristotle’s teachings on the differences and suitability of various regimes in
accordance with the individual and social climate of which each is best fitted, Hobbes
believed no such approach was necessary or proper. One may observe of Hobbesian
political organization that it reflected [in the contemporary and simplified vernacular] a
“one size fits all” plan. The corporeal standard by which men build their institutions of
government rested on the lowest level foundation of human motivation (the passions and
self-preservation) thus citizens in perfect concert with one another and each alike to a
piece of the jigsaw fitting together to form the whole construct the permanent and
imperishable stanchions of concentrated power. Further, no individual or faction would
be capable of threatening or deconstructing the edifice of the state, its institutions and administrative offices. Simply when citizens obey this self-erected sovereign, they are simultaneously committed to dutifully protecting and policing its all-encompassing authority and again, relinquishing their individual right to personal liberty.

Hobbes insisted on rooting out what he believed were the causes of political instability resulting in the consequent ruin of many regimes. The challenge to the sovereign authority and attempts at sedition were squarely addressed in the theorist’s work, *The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, Part I, Human Nature, Part II De Corpore Politico* vi and as well in *Leviathan* (XLVI) in which he discussed the folly of the wise and prudent or those deliberations of the Greek schools of thought that could not have been more misguided and erroneous as he described them. vi Hobbes framed his argument for defending against threats to the sovereign power in his work from *Leviathan* entitled, “Of Those Things That Weaken or Tend to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth” (XXIX) in which he explained that “internal diseases” and “intestine disorder” stem from “the poison of seditious doctrines.” These overt subversions included the deliberations and disputations against the commands of the commonwealth essentially from where the weakening of its power originates. Loyalty to the civil law respecting the “public conscience” or moral doctrine by which each citizen consents is corrupted by individual private opinion. In effect, “private conscience” in this case attempts to supersede the collective will that otherwise by right commands the behaviors
and actions of all. Hobbes insisted that insurrection of this kind must not be present or available in social or political contexts as he affirmed:

> From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves and dispute the commands of the Commonwealth, and afterwards to obey or disobey them as in their private judgments they shall think fit; whereby the Commonwealth is distracted and weakened” (*Leviathan*, XXIX).

On this point, Hobbes argued that the sovereign power must be the ultimate guide and final judge of right and wrong / good and evil in accord with the citizen body’s consent and its absolute obedience to this doctrine. Individual governance cannot factor in this schema as it posed a “distraction” or worse, instigated dissent as a dangerous challenge to the ruling authority.

Among the several ‘seditious doctrines’ Hobbes cited as repugnant to the commonwealth’s health and stability is one illustrated in the fifth doctrine, the edict that would disallow the sovereign’s right to control in part or whole a citizen’s private holdings. Relinquishing control of property otherwise independently owned by citizens freely and separately places the ruling power in a position of weakness such that “protection from foreign enemies and from the injuries of one another” is either diluted or nonexistent. For reasons of the defense of every subject inclined to act in self-interest and similarly to gain more power over another, the sovereign solely upholds justice among them as it enforces punishment on those exercising their personal and unlawful will. Moreover, the commonwealth is less likely to be compromised when this power
remains undivided as a division of power most definitely contributes to its dissolution, as Hobbes affirmed: “... for powers divided mutually destroy each other.”

Hobbes is keen to point out that both Greek and Latin thought are largely responsible for instigating political upheaval particularly as the discourses of the ancients speak adamantly of the monarchal arrangement as one prone to reckless abuses of power and of its governing over its subjects amounting to the rule of slaves at the hands of a tyrant. Rebellion and destruction of the monarchy are then encouraged and thus become the foremost occupation of those wholly resistant to its absolute authority. The dye of revolution as Hobbes observes is cast among the populace by those that would otherwise rule themselves and whose advocacy of political uprising eventually achieves the goal of deposing the sovereign and permanently dissolving monarchal power. The irony is such that a strong monarchy is what is most desired, explained Hobbes and particularly among the dissenters claiming abuses, of whom are otherwise blinded by their own resentment and fear: “... those democratical writers that continually snarl at that estate, it wanteth nothing more than a strong monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain tyrannophobia, or fear of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhor.”

Mixed government as introduced in Aristotelian political theory in which various regime characteristics existed together as a combination of democracy, oligarchy, and/or aristocracy such that power is distributed for purposes of guarding against tyrannical rule is much disdained by Hobbes. This amounts fully to rule by independent factions and one “subject to a diversity of opinions” that renders its dominion vulnerable to sectional
conflict over the right and administration of governing power. As well, popular governance, Hobbes warned where the authority of the sovereign is reduced or worse dismantled by “the flattery and by the reputation of an ambitious man . . . whose virtues and designs they [subjects] have no knowledge” and by which they are misled, does great harm to the commonwealth and its fidelity to sovereign leadership. Compared to a cancerous and diseased organism, Hobbes describes the “immoderate greatness of a town” making ill the otherwise healthy and thriving body politic of an absolute monarchy. This “infirmity” disputes its power by “pretenders of political prudence; which though bred for the most part in the lees of the people, yet animated by false doctrines are perpetually meddling with the fundamental laws, to the molestation of the Commonwealth, like the little worms which physicians call ascarides.”

Aside from his formulations of what would constitute the most successful political regime, Hobbes insisted first on reckoning with and disposing of philosophic fallacy. In devising his masterwork, *Leviathan*, his aim to eradicate ancient foundations and principles from modern discourse much of what he believed were erroneous and deluded misconceptions was in large part successful. Plainly, traditional definitions on the state of nature, natural law, and justice conflicted with his views and others’ during the period. Rational self-preservation governed by men’s passions and fear of violent death existed as the most powerful motivation and this should be understood as the foundation from which all social and political life arises. Reason as proposed by the ancients was argued as most fundamental in contrast and the best possible political
system could be achieved in accord with seeking the virtuous life. This was an aim far too high and indisputably unrealistic for Hobbes. The ideals and prescriptions were surely honorable but these ponderings should best be left to antiquity. Modern theorists in agreement dismissed the classical approach concentrating instead on the developing themes and doctrines of political realism.

René Descartes and the “First” Philosophy

A discussion on the development and evolution of modern philosophical thought would not be complete without observing the important contributions of French philosopher, René Descartes (1596-1650). Notable for coining the phrase, “Cogito Ergo Sum” (“I think therefore, I am”) the theorist alike to his modern predecessors encouraged the departure from ancient foundations and principles of virtue and natural law while subsequently altering the direction of thought toward methodological and scientific epistemology. Particularly devoted to and much revered for his skill as a highly respected and creative mathematician he was moreover, the author of various original works during his lifetime and several treatises relative to the study of matter, natural phenomena, and the advancement of physics included among these: Discourse on Method (1637) and essays, Dioptrics, Meteorology, and Geometry; Meditations on First Philosophy (1641); and Principles of Philosophy (1644). In the Principles, Descartes explained that the “highest and most perfect moral science” referring to the total sum of philosophy derives from the acquisition and utility of scientific knowledge, the fruits of
which bestow upon the learned the highest form of understanding. Descartes’ tree of knowledge made up of its parts (roots, branches, and fruits) resembles various states of learning, i.e., from the roots the metaphysical knowledge of the soul and the spiritual has planted the seed and from which the trunk, the study of natural physics grows. The branches representing all of the other sciences likewise abundantly bear fruit these having produced complete and pure wisdom with the emphasis that their harvest can only be possible if the various branches of science are adequately developed: “Just as it is not from the roots nor from the trunk of trees that one gathers the fruits, but only from the extremities of their branches, so the principle utility of philosophy depends on those of its parts that one can only learn last.”

To Descartes, “seeking truth in the sciences” (Discourse, Part I) paved a more enlightened path to knowledge and philosophic certainty far more adequately than “the disquisitions of the ancient Moralists,” their speculations resting upon no better foundation “than sand and mud.” While Descartes was well-versed in the classical works of Aristotelian political philosophy and recognizing their value in stressing the important principles of virtue, he believed these were given “no adequate criterion” from which to assess and utilize them effectively. Undoubtedly, learned men from the ancient world could be credited with their imaginative intellectual advancement and recognized for their cultivation of philosophic theory; nevertheless, their reasoning over the ages had not rendered knowledge particularly constructive nor had there been progress made in arriving at theoretical truth; “there is not a single matter within its [philosophy’s] sphere
which is not still in dispute, and nothing, therefore, which is above doubt.” A claim of falsity and theoretical fabrication among the distinguished elders of thought and letters had revealed much that the tradition lacked, their “... speculative matters that are of no practical moment” and opinions that had fostered only their authors’ vanity and further deceit. Descartes moreover discussed a personal intellectual journey and one especially leading away from ancient teachings and their defective epistemology. “... I gradually extricated myself from any errors powerful enough to darken our Natural Intelligence, and incapacitate us in great measure from listening to Reason.”

On the perspective of reason Descartes was adamant on the point of independent, balanced, and objective thinking; thus the individual mind as it instructs the will in carrying out that which it judges best must be purged of the “appetites and preceptors,” meaning the distractions of the passions of which all men are subject. These passions either as the bases of good or bad, honorable or ignoble actions must be kept ordered and essentially mastered within one’s own power and further assisted by reason which must be free of prejudice, comprehensive, and representative of the highest intellectual degree. Only by methodological means and via Descartes’ insistence on the use of mathematical principles could reason serve most effectively in overcoming the imperfections pertaining to man’s intellect and improving his otherwise fallible human nature.

Descartes’ perspective on the improvement of human nature in terms of the political and social realities was such that these would best be left to experience and custom rather than subject to the empirical applications of science. The thinker deferred
to a conservative view and agreed with the fundamentals of established authority as concerned the politics of his time. Discussed in his letters with his student, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1643-1664)\textsuperscript{viii} the question of public morals and conduct should be assigned only to the sovereign authoritative power particularly in agreement with monarchal governance and policy. From Descartes’ standpoint the study of politics and its functions in particular did not align in any measurable or significant way with pure reason and inquiry (science) and as such the question of political truths upon which classical philosophy had established its foundations on ethical principles was comparatively a far less meaningful as well as fruitless enterprise. It would be otherwise necessary to redefine and distinguish philosophy anew and retreat from traditional inquiry. Modern and improved investigation according to Descartes would “separate fact from fiction” and truth from unsubstantiated speculation.

 Cartesian philosophy in a broad sense contained certain foundational principles from which the theorist was confident would be beneficial in arriving at the “general good of all men” (Discourse, Part VI). The resolution to doubt in absolute terms and/or reject every opinion confronted, even as to one’s own was necessary for clarity of mind and reasoning as a purely practical exercise. It was best, explained Descartes “never to place our complete trust in those who have deceived us even once” (Meditation One). Thus to doubt meant also to distrust intuitive thought derived from the physical senses as these were deceptive and essentially impeded interpretive cognition. In addition, the natural superiority of the mind Descartes described as “generosity” particularly inherent
in the strong and noble is presupposed as a fully comprehensive virtue. Contradicting Aristotle’s theoretical ground in which the cultivation of the various abstract virtues is essential, e.g., justice as a foundation for achieving the social good, Descartes’ generosity (pure reasoning) was better capable as a holistic political virtue, its object in particular to acquire complete mastery over nature. This perfect moral science as materialized in Descartes’ philosophical approach to knowledge would render complete the acquisition of wisdom. Truth then was relative to this form of practical virtue and this could be fully realized through scientific inquiry, and specifically on empirical terms.

Descartes’ recommendation was certainly to promote the advancement of empirical methods for acquiring knowledge and clearly as its object the development of a positive political science would follow. Importantly, scientists as most competent in society would best be positioned to act as judges of social and legal doctrine and as well in devising its authoritative mandates, similarly to Bacon’s treatment of the “Merchants of Light” in his work, *Nova Atlantis*. The technological mastering of nature including humanity would otherwise enlighten society such that the ethical and moral foundations of traditional philosophy could merge to some extent with its practical utility. Descartes believed firmly however in eradicating any more “humanistic” approaches and guidance finding it essential to divert “weak minds” that would otherwise corrupt the progress of scientific study and practice (referring here to ecclesiastical leaders, prophets, and reformers). “[E]ven the weakest minds could acquire a most absolute empire over all their passions if one employed enough industry to train them, and to conduct them”
Further, confirming his conviction that the ancients and the Philosophic Tradition had led men astray from humankind’s greatest industry and alike to Bacon’s thesis, Descartes’ project effectively re-identified and re-purposed philosophy, facilitating both the theoretical and practical foundations from which scientific inquiry would flourish and in all respects reconstruct the future. From this basis the Positive philosophy owed little to the hermeneutical study of the good, the classical interpretations of the ethics, and the fundamental virtues as these related to social and political development. As Descartes emphasized, this methodological enlightenment would assuredly envision for man his highest mastery over nature, as “done as if by machinery” the “endeavor to establish and extend the power and dominion of the human race itself over the universe” (Discourse).

Baruch Spinoza’s (1632 – 1677) Political Rationalism

Spinoza’s political philosophy followed closely the course already forged by the modernists before him. Notably drawn from Hobbesian theory and his masterwork Leviathan as well as Machiavelli’s discourses on statesmanship, Spinoza’s central premise adopted a similar view of rational politics made real via eliminating classical theorizing and utopianism from political thought. Critically assessing the ancients’ contributions, Spinoza faulted their interminable focus on various conceptions and conditions of human nature e.g., the critical distinctions between vice and virtue and ethics as applied to the political framework. Of them he wrote, “And so they think they
are doing something wonderful, and reaching the pinnacle of learning . . . For they conceive of men, not as they are, but as they themselves would like them to be.” The philosophers of antiquity composed “satire” rather than ethics claimed Spinoza, “and that they never conceived a theory of politics” that would not be taken as “chimera, or might have formed in Utopia . . .” ix. Clearly, the theorist was confident that the abandonment of classical thought and its application would wholly benefit the ‘proper’ advancement of political analysis and alike to his predecessors the embrace of science would sever the ties of tradition that had overshadowed theoretical innovation. Distinguishing the natural passions and human emotions such as love and hate, anger and happiness, pity, envy, etc., as vices to be examined within the purview of ethical reflection was particularly unsound for “applying mind to politics” explained Spinoza (Part IV). The passions particularly should be redefined as “properties” such that they could be observed in the same manner as natural atmospheric phenomena, e.g., “heat, cold, storm, thunder, and the like . . .” Their causes as fixed or predetermined as assumed of all human behaviors could be deduced in measurable terms and thus better understood by calculative reasoning.

Spinoza considered empirical methodology much alike to Cartesian science as a necessary means of advancing the work of political philosophy, that its direction and purpose should follow both in theoretical analysis and practice a similar course of study that all of the natural sciences had engaged. He explained in his discussion of Substance (Ethics) that the foundational principles of knowledge materialize ultimately in existent form, i.e., all relate to actual matter as reality; human behaviors in similar fashion occur
in a categorical sense as “modes” or as properties of substance. Thus the study of political behavior for example should rest upon the relative ‘what is’ in contrast to the understanding of the actual that the ancients conjoined with ethical principles in explaining the actions of men and of what ‘should be’ as the political end or social good. As the theorist remarked in his *Ethics*, “I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a question of lines, planes, and solids” (*Book III*), meaning particularly that empirical analysis of political phenomena would yield best the ends to which the philosophy of politics required of itself. By means of calculative deduction the practical vision of its intents would emerge and thereby provide specific answers to centuries-old questions; for example, “What is the best form of government? What is the best end that politics achieves? As these queries were pertinent to Spinoza’s argument on the importance of practical application over a purely theoretic approach so was the examination of State institutions and Positive laws, these providing the most instructive understanding of government and civil society. And while Spinoza may have emphasized the value and utility of an emerging and innovative approach, its development was simply such that the philosophy of politics should as intended be made to work; speculative theory and discourse should arrive at practical ends and motivate human behavior toward the best possible outcomes.

Alike to Thomas Hobbes’ theory of a pre-political state, passion is presumed to be the basis upon which men act; by nature men are driven by their pains and pleasures and only self-preservation exists as the prime motivation for achieving social unity and
political cooperation. The collective arrangement (the State) serves as the rational aim for securing individual survival, protects each of their interests and provides entitlements of freedom in an otherwise untrustworthy, unforgiving social climate. The State’s unity must be preserved particularly by obedience to the laws binding of each and via deference to the sovereign authority (analogous to Hobbes’ treatise) that it represents the responsible will of one as the will of the collective. Disobedience would disadvantage only the individual wrongdoer in acting against one’s own self-interests. And while passion may inevitability drive the will of men, practical reason will temper it by virtue of its legitimacy via the commonwealth’s power and influence. This is to say that the conception of the State and its leadership necessitate the accord between sovereign and citizens and on the basis of applied reason secure its harmony and well-being. As Spinoza reflects:

> When, then, we call that dominion best, where men pass their lives in unity, I understand a human life, defined not by circulation of the blood, and other qualities common to all animals, but above all by reason, the true excellence and life of the mind (CHAPTER V. Of the Best State of a Dominion).

Reason creates the political and legal institutional framework by which individuals consent to exercise their will in concurrence with State authority. And as trustees of citizen will, governmental institutions prevail over individual power and to which citizen freedom is then subordinate.
Spinoza transitioned from Hobbesian belief in the necessity of absolute rule and prevailing political doctrine. As such, his viewpoint differed in concern of what would constitute a free and just civil society. Philosophy essentially as the exercise of principled thought and reason remained fundamental to a flourishing and sustainable polis and from which the theorist instructed expressly in his *Theologico-Political Treatise* (1675-1676) the importance of its retreat from conventional religious and classical foundations. Scripture, for example interprets the moral and natural law by which individuals demonstrate both faith and obedience. Virtue as the outward expression of “God’s law” consists of the latter (piety or goodness) and in respecting the individual rights of one another. Obedience of the Positive law of the State initiated by reason and supported by virtue materializes as an exercise of devotion to both the moral and the political order. In effect, reason and revelation concur in directing society in principle and action. The best regime constitutes a harmonious relationship between them.

Spinoza emphasized the advantage of a democracy as a benefit to the self-interested citizen. The best regime is one in which individual self-rule responds and respects both State power and the political will of the majority. Moreover, the practice of religion is firmly protected, its doctrine existing freely within civil society. The balance between Revelation’s commanding authority and the sovereign power importantly achieves political stability; separation between Church and State further circumvents conflict over power. The former particularly does not preside over the Law or the legislative process—this being the job of government officiated by and for the
public will and custom. Spinoza especially defended State sovereignty and its paramount authority of protecting democratic freedoms.

The theorist further aimed to revitalize the meaning and intent of political philosophy; the principles of reason and application of logic must supplant the misdirected speculation, inaccuracies, and ultimate corruption of religious thought and superstition. Further, classical philosophy must develop methods of analysis that better illuminated the truth in terms of the state of man’s nature, human experience, and the dynamics of political reality; these must be studied as they appear and as they exist. Rational thought should not otherwise escape the relevance of mathematical calculation, this revealing a clarity resistant to distraction and inaccuracy. Spinoza and earlier modernists like Descartes found the Tradition inefficient and flawed, not without merit but simply lacking in scientific rigor and its revelations. And along with new discoveries philosophy itself had been altered in function and purpose. Ancient reflections were considered obsolete to the study of politics as theorists embarked on new paths of enlightenment; the scientific approach being its driving and unstoppable force in the following centuries.

Jeremy Bentham’s Reformation of Political and Legal Theory (1748-1832)

One may assess Bentham’s well-known Utilitarianism as a radical response to classical philosophy considering his resolute detachment from Socratic teaching as an approach to inquiry and understanding political life. The traditional dialectic, its method
of theoretical discourse and objective argument over the conditions of right and wrong and good versus evil offered little in the way of practical solutions on pressing questions of both politics and law. Bentham insisted on developing a more tangible method for solving moral dilemmas and especially encouraged the embrace of a science attentive to existing political reality. Rather than deliberating on ethical imperatives distinguished in the works of Plato, Aristotle, and later in the eminent treatises of Immanuel Kant, a simple calculus and the fundamental “Principle of Utility” would create the framework for a rational and stable social order. Essentially, the utilitarian science of politics and particularly of legislation materialized as Bentham’s important brainchild and would complete the transformation from ancient and outdated foundations of thought to well-designed practical applications. Particularly as a deep criticism of English law during the period, Bentham elucidated in his work, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) its grave faults arising from tradition and outdated custom as:

that fictitious composition which has no known person for its author, no known assemblage of words for its substance, forms every where the main body of the legal fabric: like that fancied ether, which, in default of sensible matter, fills up the measure of the universe . . .” (685)^5

Similarly to Hobbes’ theory of passion as the prevailing power over intellectual reason, Bentham’s account of human nature distinguished the relative characteristics governing man’s existence and actions as “two sovereign masters,” their authority occurring in simple terms as both the avoidance of pain (or Evil) and the pursuit of
pleasure (or *Good*). These natural attributes of self-interested action and their consequences, “augment the total sum of [individual] happiness” and further extend similarly to the common interests of the community. It was necessary, explained Bentham to create a method of calculating and comparing these pains and pleasures applying the “axiom of mathematics” from which to base first principles within a “system of reasonings” (686). The *logic of utility* provided the terms by which to measure and judge individual and society’s virtues and vices while eliminating applications of speculative theory. “We want no refinement, no metaphysics” insisted Bentham, nor would any consultation with the ancients be needed or in fact, welcomed.

An interesting and notable attack on traditional and particularly theological philosophy is outlined in Bentham’s work examining *The Ascetic Principle* (686) in which he described a class of philosophers that abhor the act of gratification and of seeking pleasure. Morality in this perspective is defined as deprivation and virtue emerges in denying one’s natural tendency to act in self-interest. Enjoyment observed Bentham, is either diminished or blamed, despised and/or disparaged in the ascetics’ view and those largely devotees of religious faith, “have flattered themselves with the idea of seeming to rise above humanity, by despising vulgar pleasures (687).” And while this principle and its criticism is not representative of, nor points to Greek foundations as it insists on the total censuring of pleasure and prescribing pain as a duty, Bentham nonetheless reproached the ancients for their definition of pleasure and its manifestations, these reframed as, “honour, glory, reputation, decorum, or self-esteem (687).” In any
case, the Ascetic Principle in Bentham’s view rested upon falsity and erroneous reasoning. Especially in its perceptions of human nature it denied the logic of utility in relying upon arbitrary sentiment and specious assumptions.

Bentham’s theory of rational utility was accompanied by his commentary and steadfast criticism of the English legal system including the doctrines of common law during the period (1770s). As a legal positivist, Bentham expressed his utter disdain for sentiment and its appeal to the fundamental principle of Sympathy and Antipathy (687) for determining judgment on acts of good and evil, and the consequences of pleasure and pain. Arbitrary and prejudicial in nature, sentiment could only act in harmony with subjective opinion and result in misguided and imprudent rulings. A jurist’s sentiments should remain his own and these should never influence practical reasoning, insisted Bentham. The Principle of Sympathy and Antipathy essentially negate all principles and “A true anarchy of ideas results from it; since every man having an equal right to give his sentiments as a universal rule, there will no longer be any common measure, no ultimate tribunal to which we can appeal (688).”

Bentham explained further the irrationality of sentiment in his several examples of how judgment of good and evil is variously determined in accord with one man’s conscience or moral sense, in another’s common sense, and in another’s understanding as the latter suggests that moral sense and common sense “are but dreams.” A last man explains that he has an eternal and immutable rule of right and insists on its command in
reasoning and judgment. And from all these exhortations nothing more than opinion, absent reason reigns, observed Bentham:

You hear a multitude of professors, of jurists, of magistrates, of philosophers, who make the law of nature echo in your ears. They all dispute, it is true, upon every point of their system; but no matter—each one proceeds with the same confident intrepidity, and utters his opinions as so many chapters of the law of nature. The phrase is sometimes modified, and we find in its place, natural right, natural equity, the rights of man, etc. (688)

The tautological argument and theoretical conviction was neither rational nor productive as it prevailed over governments and the legal system. The ideal pursuit of happiness especially subordinated the otherwise better objects of governmental responsibility in providing the means for achieving the public good, these in terms of securing moral standards and the independent aims of equality, liberty, justice, commerce, and religious freedom.

How best could the legislator accomplish this, queried Bentham in effect by especially eliminating the moribund approach of the Ascetic Principle and with it the “unreasonable” affront of sentiment to utility? In his Principles of Legislation, a simple calculus could instead provide the means to value and measure the “two sovereign masters” governing man’s existence and behaviors. As pleasures and pains are simply “instruments” within each individual’s exercise of will and both powerful in connection with the rules of conduct, each act should be valued according to four circumstances,
(intensity, duration, certainty, and proximity) (691) and calculated in terms of tendency. Also added were the circumstances of productiveness and purity. Together these variables would determine the likelihood of occurrence and as such achieve a measure of predictability. Bentham’s theory of tendency assumed an algorithmic methodology very similar to modern quantitative modeling. A unit of measurement, e.g., a productive pleasure would be evaluated according to circumstance and depending on the level of intensity or duration, the possibility of its occurrence could be estimated. Thus a pleasure would follow from another of the same value. Further, a pure pleasure would assume little significance in producing a pure pain. As such, “These are the elements of moral calculation; and legislation thus becomes a matter of arithmetic (692).” Further as Bentham assured, the process of evaluating good and evil would become second nature as one would hardly be conscious of the steps necessary for arriving at judgment; the “justice of estimate” would become essential particularly to complex matters of decision-making and to “demonstrate a truth” (692) that would not otherwise be known.

Bentham’s legal Positivism via his radical criticism and reform of what he described as a “veiled despotism” that had prevailed in “the greater part of philosophical systems” (688) were reason enough to dismiss their principles almost entirely from the practice of law, politics, and from within governmental institutions by the late eighteenth century. Especially moral considerations based upon universal laws, “the eternal and immutable rule of right” had neither any real foundation for proof of its claim of truth nor any realistic application. In view of a standardized system of justice the Tradition was
vastly outmoded and the doctrine of natural law obsolete in respect to ethical relevance and judicial function. The utilitarian approach was enthusiastically embraced by theorists particularly as it finalized the rejection of ancient treatises along with their exhausted and dysfunctional theories.

The New Positivism

Political philosophy’s departure from the ancient classical perspective originating from early sixteenth century forward corresponded with the emergence of modern scientific approaches to understanding both the universe and human nature. The Philosophic Tradition having dominated the study and discourse of politics in the early centuries of Western though gave way to the rapid development of scientific theory and methodology as theorists adopted its principles and various applications that revolutionized conceptions of law, civil society, governmental power, and legislative authority. Most evident in this transformation and what would become the most commonly held conviction among thinkers beginning with Machiavelli would be the firm rejection of original foundations and their moral prescriptions that were of little value to Positivist thought. Directed toward practical reasoning and further distant from the speculative contemplations of the ancients, modernists confidently claimed that realism and utility would succeed where conventional philosophy had failed. Theorists like Bacon, Descartes, and later Bentham grounded intellectually in the mathematical sciences expressed their common disdain for Aristotelian reflection and method and insisted on
eliminating the age-old process of deductive reasoning via syllogism that they believed proved deceptive and inaccurate in comparison to empirical, systematic analysis. As Bacon insisted, the mind must be free of abstraction and vague conceptualizations of truth and further must resist the temptation to rely upon intuitive language and its assumptions of reality. As well, meta-ethical visions of enlightened, ordered and just societies arising from moral generalizations and inferences of the virtuous and the good could not be trusted as a reliable ground for accurately interpreting the meaning of justice in applicable terms. As Bentham argued, arbitrary and imprecise determinations arising from traditional moral principles, e.g., Aesthetics, Sentiment, Sympathy and Antipathy had forever plagued the judiciary and legislative authority. Without a methodological system of analysis for calculating the results of pleasure and pain and behaviors of good and evil neither the discovery of truth nor the reasonable application of justice could be realized.

As the early modern Positivists would all have agreed, a theory of politics in accord with traditional philosophy could only be taken as imaginative “chimera” as Spinoza emphasized and no longer served as a valid means of understanding political phenomena. Further, its prescriptions relying on theoretical conceptions of what ought to be interfered with actual observations of human behaviors that could better be scientifically analyzed as “substance” alike to matter and categorized as “modes” or properties and as patterned tendencies. Arising from empirical application, rational and efficient systems of government and legislation would emerge by design of “practical philosophy” via the general principles of mathematics and physics, as Descartes
professed. A defined and powerful methodological political science that modernists enthusiastically embraced would influence the work of future theorists. The *Novum Organum Scientiarum* as Bacon predicted, the “new instrument of science” had arrived and following in the early nineteenth century a fully crafted Positive Philosophy would emerge as the foundation for constructing a complete and well-ordered Social System. All of humanity through scientific development would be organized according to its ‘modes’ and ‘tendencies’ or as may be observed, act as working parts in the mechanism of the greater progressive whole. Comte’s System of Positive Polity as the theorist declared, would lead the way to man’s greatest triumph, a fully productive system committed to the principles of Order and Progress—this premonition oddly familiar and perhaps disturbingly accurate as a reflection of the postmodern world.
REFERENCES


CHAPTER III. Introduction: The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte - Early Essays (1818–1822)

Examining the evolution of modern political thought and the manifestation of what Descartes had defined as “the highest and most perfect moral science” or “First Philosophy” puts into perspective the later work of theorist, Auguste Comte (1798–1857) and his seminal formulations, the *Course on Positive Philosophy* (1830–1842) and *System of Positive Polity* (1851–1854). Comte followed his predecessors in developing a practical and scientific philosophy especially engaging study in various disciplinary subjects such as physics, astronomy, chemistry, and biology. Beyond the natural sciences, Comte attended notably to the examination of human society, its social foundations and political forces and firmly asserted that his System of Positivism would set in motion an intellectual, political and economic renaissance and eventual restructuring of the old world into the new. To accomplish this one might think as Comte did in terms of the approach to knowledge, essentially to confirm in his words that “there can be no real knowledge but that which is based on observation of facts (71-86).”¹ The direction and purpose of the Positive method conforming to scientific foundations, empirical application, and utility much in the same way earlier theorists like Bacon and Bentham had prescribed was foremost to Positivism’s success. Comte’s project included the expectation of the final termination of abstract thought residing in the “primitive” first and second stages of human development (the Theological and Metaphysical) and its dissolution would clear the way toward achieving Comte’s purposeful goal of addressing
the universal moral and political crises he described as “intellectual anarchy.” As he asserted, “The Positive Philosophy offers the only solid basis for that Social Reorganization which must succeed . . .”; and as its most sincere and determined architect, Comte believed his doctrine would fully return societies from degradation, political disorder, instability, and conflict and revive their natural state of harmony and productive utility via controlled social organization.

Comte’s system was intended to be in his words “homogenous,” the Positive Philosophy overcoming all previous “mystical” thought and culminating into a universal intellectual and utilitarian authority expected to relieve the world of its confusion and turmoil that had earlier developed as a result of traditional theory’s unsound foundations. Especially adaptable were all the “civilized nations of the world” that could easily embrace the New Science (Social Physics) and apply the Positive Philosophy and method to constructing the Positive Polity—a perfected social order that would achieve the ultimate objective of organized and universal human progress. The concept indeed became popular and alike to other revered political thinkers, Comte’s theory of Positivism attracted enthusiasts and followers from various countries particularly nations that had experienced significant political conflict. And certainly the idea of human perfectibility, restructured social development, and modernized intellectual progress along with creating a world free of political turbulence convinced many that Comte’s systematic formulations would succeed. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the authority of Positivism assumed the task of both redefining philosophy and its original
purpose of seeking truth from the objective and inaccessible realm of knowledge. As
Comte envisioned, the “interminable discussions” would finally cease as Positivism
would become “the direct object of political science (57).” It would “reveal the future in
politics” via its methodology and scientific applications alike to studies in physics and
chemistry, and presumably answer with certainty any and all questions in regard to
human nature. Finally, a reconstructed social order would emerge, one more proficient,
productive, and innovative that would in due course determine and direct the world’s
history through its unbounded progress. Comte believed fully that his new society would
never succumb to political weakness and eventual collapse, this phenomenon attributed to
the outdated and failed ancient principles that had outlived their usefulness. History
would again restore its mission of civilizing society through Positivism’s system of Order
and Progress.

A view of this history then begins with the close analysis of the theorist’s earliest
writings and following to the major works (Chapters III.-VI.). Included are subsequent
texts (Critique by J .S. Mill and excerpts from twentieth century Logical Positivists) as
outlined:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Early Writings (1819-1828)</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Separation general entre les opinions et les desirs.” (1819)</td>
<td>“Separation of Opinions from Aspirations.” (Translated by H. D. Hutton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Prospectus des travaux scientifiques necessaries pour reorganizer la societe.” (1822); Revised (1824)</td>
<td>“Plan of the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Considerations philosophiques sur les sciences et les savants.” (1825)</td>
<td>“Philosophical Considerations on the Sciences and Savants.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Works (post-1829)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Cours de philosophie positive.</em> 6 vols. Paris, (1830-1842)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Discours sur l’esprit positif.</em> Paris (1844)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>System de politique positive, ou Traite de sociologie instituant la religion de l’Humanite.</em> 4 vols. Paris (1851-1854)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works by John Stuart Mill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Auguste Comte and Positivism</em> (1865)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works by Moritz Schlick</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Positivism and Realism</em> (1932)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works by F. Stuart Chapin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Cultural Change</em> (1928)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works by Charles E. Merriam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Prologue to Politics</em> (1939)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subsequent to the major works’ completion, Comte reproduced and included in his later Volume IV *System of Positive Polity* (General Appendix) earlier essays such as the, “Separation of Opinions from Aspirations” (1819) and “A Brief Estimate of Modern History” (1820). He remarked of their intention of providing a meaningful theoretical connection and “continuity of thought” explaining that their themes had first originated from youthful formulations that had later developed into conceptual maturity. These discussions he declared were “disguised by the exceptional magnitude of my task” (3) and thus were necessarily reiterated in demonstrating the original endeavor and its ultimate purpose of instituting a “universal religion,” the basis of which was conceived from the theorist’s masterwork, *The Positive Philosophy*. From one less crucial paper of 1817 Comte stressed the essential premise: *Everything is relative; this is the only absolute principle*” (4); this fundamental rule he would apply considerably to his sociological and political theory and as a scientific grounding for “that systematization” (5) of the *Positive Polity* that had been fully completed by mid-century.

The young Comte in writing his *First Essay* in 1819, *Separation of Opinions from Aspirations*, made clear his rejection of fostering the formation of an egalitarian or democratic political system and further explained his disdain for a self-governing polis whereby all citizens contributed their views of politics and in which all could appoint themselves legislators—this allowing for the incompetent as well as the most able to lead.
It was absurd to believe “that anyone can understand political science” (6) without extensive study and specialized knowledge particularly of abstract principles and conceptual theory. The problem of this far too liberal approach existed as a result of “politics not having yet become a positive science” (6) and its most significant methods of comprehension, e.g., the observational and deductive processes of analysis had not yet been developed nor fully utilized. Further, this specialization could not be afforded to all given the dominant force of public opinion, especially that of the unenlightened and/or misinformed that would confound the otherwise good intentions or aspirations of the Positive political regime. In this argument, Comte made note of the French upper classes that “profess retrograde opinions” and whose convictions to return to ancient political systems of feudal leadership defeated their aims of securing a prosperous and peaceful modern society. As this sociopolitical goal was no less significant to the laboring classes, certainly as peace, liberty, and economic prosperity desired by an industrious citizenry, a similar problem existed, i.e., that the “notions as to the means of securing these blessings [were] so erroneous that, if put in practice, they must lead to disorder and arbitrary power (7).” Nevertheless, aspirations should not be denied a nation’s progress toward the best political end insisted Comte nor should rulers be restricted in administering to the citizenry’s desired ambitions for liberty and justice. However, the distinction between political functions and responsibilities in governing must be realized in practical form as well as the implementation of method for achieving the regime’s ultimate success. The Positive science would fully satisfy this objective and additionally apply to politics a new
meaning and purpose. As such, the task of this transformation would appropriately be
assigned to those “scientific politicians” that ranked in the public confidence equally as
authoritative as “astronomers to astronomy, [and] physicians in medicine, etc. (7).” In
the first lines of his 1820 essay, A Brief Estimate of Modern History, Comte asserted
that the advance of civilization would necessitate the replacement of former political
systems, these based upon both spiritual powers or the “papal and theological” and the
temporal described as “feudal and military.” The tendencies of war attributed
particularly to theology and nationalist (feudal) rule would dissolve under the influence
and industry of science as both powers arising from pre-Enlightenment centuries were no
longer conducive to modern evolutionary progress, the development of which depended
on the dissolution of their principle foundations. Together they “must disappear
simultaneously” (500); the temporal power reinstated by the industrial complex which by
its advancement would subordinate military force to the point where it would eventually
become useless as Comte envisioned. As a prelude to the complete Positive system, this
“Emancipation of the Commons” facilitated the change to come and the reorganization of
the social order would be one centered on the “Industrial Capacity” (500) and its
independence from pervasive and restrictive military power.

The outcome of Positivism defined a liberated society engaged in the work of
progress and one equally free of its obsolete spiritual foundations that were deemed
detrimental to both social and political advancement. Science would create the much
needed pathway to realizing political autonomy replacing archaic metaphysical principles
with new analytical discovery and setting in place the “superiority of the positive over the conjectural” as Comte confidently described, “of physics over metaphysics” (501). Submission to the latter would no longer exist as society’s spiritual affairs would be directed by and defer to the “positive scientific capacity” (502), a power Comte affirmed would replace “Revelation by Demonstration” and provide a fully modern and complete course to spiritual enlightenment. Concluding his optimism for Positivism’s promise of overthrowing the impotent powers of the older structures and their inherent failures, Comte embraced his theory declaring, “In a word; one system culminated; another was born (502).” And further from its ultimate success the Positive Philosophy would in Comte’s visualization take its place among the most influential and revered treatises ever created.

Comte’s Third Essay (1822) was equally optimistic in introducing the model for the new social system described in painstaking detail as the *Plan of the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society*. Imperative as well was the Plan’s timely and most necessary instruction such that it must avert the impending social disaster Comte asserted had culminated into “a profound moral and political anarchy.” The ancient system had led to a menacing social disorganization existing as a “negative tendency constituting the greatest obstacle to the progress of civilization (9).” Both the feudal and theological systems had failed especially as these had not alleviated political upheaval, nor had they produced long-standing secure regimes that could survive the threat of revolution. Moreover, the doctrines devised in consequence, the “anti-feudal,
and antitheological‖ (14) proposed no less dogma and resulted equally in as much disorder. The principles defining individual sovereignty and the foundations of government ‘by the people’ were likewise ruinous. It was absurd, explained Comte that political power placed in the hands of the incompetent and unenlightened rather than with those of “superior intellects” could ever succeed in guiding the citizenry toward efficient and scientific social progress. Surely, the answer to solving the “great crisis that characterize[d] the present epoch” (15), the technical and judicious reorganization of society must be undertaken. To Comte, the opportunity for initiating operations and serving as its master could not have been timelier as he declared, “Such a doctrine can alone terminate the crisis by forcing society into the track of the new system, which the growth of civilization has prepared and now offers as a substitute for the feudo-theological system (15).”

The first order of operation must materialize with the mental conditioning of the public to conceive of and be convinced that the total reorganization of society was the imperative new aim and aspiration which included the abandonment of the ancient systems. The adoption of the Positive Philosophy and engaging in its greater purpose meant separating theory from practice much alike to the early establishment of Christianity which had created a spiritual power that was eventually all-inclusive in its authority, both of the theoretical and practical. This “great and beautiful conception” (22) was admirable for its consistency in distinguishing the feudo-Catholic system for its longevity throughout centuries and the same was forecast for Positivism, that it “should
occupy the first rank and govern the spiritual and temporal powers” (22) in the present and in congruence with modern objectives. The material task of engaging the Positive sciences as the theory’s operational tools would be strictly entrusted to the intellectually capable and skilled savants, “to men who pursue a method of which the superiority is universally recognized (25).” Comte insisted that only those knowledgeable in the empirical practical sciences were worthy of the important task of instituting Positivism’s theoretical work. Further, the assignment must wholly belong to the particular class of intellectuals Comte described as the “scientific corps,” men “familiar with the principal laws that regulate natural phenomena (25).” The social doctrine rested in the gifted hands of scientists and those specialists who could actively pursue the establishment of the new political philosophy. The power of Positivism would not only become known it would establish the aim of universal human progress. Along with this pursuit the ancient foundations would as intended finally crumble, their philosophical value dissolved and replaced by a modern counterpart, a political science conceptually distant and equally abstract from its early origins.

Comte reiterated that both spiritual and temporal powers be engaged by savants in reordering their direction toward the scientific. This task was especially conducive to the organizing of the new administrative system that would guide the industrial capacity and utilize its laboring forces effectively. Savants would exclusively hold both “capacity and authority in matters of theory” (27) with the power of science leveraged against any social prejudice or resistance to their command of organizational restructuring. The
competency of scientific men was beyond any argument otherwise questioning their mission or authority as Comte provided his four “proofs” that distinguished them particularly as: intellectually superior; spiritually devoted to the office strictly reserved for them; possessing the requisite moral authority; and, exclusively of European origin (their class definitively representing Western social and political advancement). The conceptual underpinning of Comte’s reorganization theory simply stated that, “scientific men ought in our day to elevate politics to the rank of a science of observation (29).”

Comte’s Third Essay outlining his operational plans for the future Positive society included a brief introduction to his well-recognized theory on the three-stage development of the human intellect. The thesis observed that all branches of knowledge must pass through three “theoretical states: the theological or fictitious state; the metaphysical or abstract state; and lastly, the scientific or positive state (29).” Science is essentially primitive in the first state as isolated observations and ideas of the supernatural combine to constitute the invention of facts—knowledge developed “in its infancy” (29) as Comte described. Intellectual progress is made in the second state albeit that it serves only as a transitional phase from the first to the final third point of development. Interestingly, Comte described the metaphysical second state as having a “mongrel nature” as it presupposed that facts and the observation of phenomena naturally connect with ideas, these forming “personified abstractions” (29) that are simple approximations to either the theological or scientific. This lack of empirical precision defined the metaphysical state in Comte’s view as something of a theoretical pariah.
Arriving at the definitive third state, facts would be linked to the general Positive laws of nature, alike to calculations in the physical sciences, e.g., astronomy and chemistry and ranked as principles that “reduce to the smallest possible number” (30) the essence of knowledge essentially quantitative and virtually simplified.

“Men familiar with the progress of the sciences can easily verify the truth of this general historical résumé . . . .” (30), declared its most reverent advocate. Elaborating on his thesis, Comte scrupulously applied the theory of Positive science to politics asserting that its study and discourse had journeyed through both first and second states and had arrived at the third as a fully developed and efficient political science. The “doctrine of kings” (30) otherwise representing the theological foundations of primitive man had given way to the abstract principles constructed in the metaphysical phase; the people’s doctrine generating what Comte referred to as “the antecedent to all development of the human faculties by civilization” (30) identified more concisely as the social contract. The concept of universal natural rights pledged in the doctrine was undeniably negative and certainly a cause of warfare, explained Comte. Rousseau, as its chief architect perpetuated the idea that it should serve as a foundation for social organization—this Conte adamantly disputed in his lengthy discussion. As proof, one could easily attribute the primitive and destructive forces observed throughout human history to the underdeveloped early stages of sociopolitical thought. Thus it was clear that human progress had long awaited its liberation from a state of confusion and political impotency. The “scientific doctrine of politics” (31) was destined to rise above the archaic past,
affecting a serious revolution leading to reform of the highest order, as Comte passionately elucidated:

—no moral revolution ever existed at once more inevitable, more ripe, and more urgent than that required to elevate politics to the rank of the natural sciences, through the combined efforts of European savants. This revolution can alone introduce into the great crisis of our day a really preponderating force, capable of preserving society from the terrible explosions of anarchy that threaten it, by putting it on the track of that improved social system that the state of our knowledge demands (32).

To further convince his listeners, particularly the commissioned savants of the grand scheme of constructing operations necessary for the reorganization of society, Comte provided in this prospectus a “series of works” in three parts. The first examined in general the historical evolution of the human intellect essentially with the intention of liberating it from its negative character, certainly from both the theological and metaphysical states of mind. This could be accomplished via comparison to the “general spirit of positive politics” (33) and from which each could be analyzed of their fundamental condition. To clarify Comte combined the two early states together in view of the characteristic they both held in common, namely that imagination had predominated over observation (34), the theological deferring to the supernatural and the metaphysical conceding to contemplation and/or the speculative or “mongrel” ideas described as “personified abstractions.” This approach could only harm the intelligent mind and its potential for knowledge in that it had persuaded that humans resided in the
center of all natural systems. In other words, the imagination was capable of convincing man of his superiority the exaggeration of which served to overstate his power and importance. What could define more the “infancy of human reason” (34) observed Comte, than this profound distraction from natural authenticity. As somewhat of a temporary remedy the natural processes of learning and education centered mainly among the physical sciences, e.g., astronomy had succeeded in modifying perceptions of human advantage in the universe and the understanding in due course that, “Man has been dethroned from his central position and reduced to the rank he really occupies (34).” The Positive education of science and its material demonstrations of observation and experiment would set right the true position of man as subordinate to the imperceptible within the grand universal design. His grasp upon this fundamental fact would only necessitate the demand for the Positive science particularly as it applied to political life. The condition of politics, explained Comte presented a “perfect analogy” (35) much alike to astrology evolving further to astronomy and of alchemy to chemistry. These had not been left to the notions or whims of imagination and nor should the theological or metaphysical remain any part of the nurture and future practice of political science.

Comte further criticized the ancient systems particularly for their political institutions acting as “a sort of universal panacea” (35) for solving societal ills and a cure-all approach having consistently failed at achieving a perfected state of civilization. The military state, for example as a system of human industry had earlier predominated and fulfilled the active aim of adopting war for sustaining primitive theological societies.
It could be easily recognized that these prevailing and powerful social forces had directed the political order which in turn defined the condition of civilization then consistently unstable, chaotic, and retrograde. Metaphysical constructs had not fared better as their theoretical reflections and remedies akin to Rousseau’s social contract could not capture the “ever-growing expansion of the scientific and industrial elements” (38) that could assure the proper and systematic social organization required for universal human advancement. This assurance entailed that rejection of these archaic and misguided philosophies was necessary and the most fundamental law of Positivism must in turn be fully embraced. This edict proclaimed that History had plainly determined the natural and steady course of human progress and particularly that advanced civilizations had largely been the result of scientific discovery and the various contributions of Positivists. In due course savants were convinced of the ancients’ fallible and pretentious political theories that had proven incorrect in regard to social organization and human industry. While continual progress had been made, there was no doubt that various approaches in the instance of the metaphysical philosophy and its institutional designs (democratic regimes) had been both “blind and unjust” (40) obstructing the inevitable forward direction of human civilization. Simply, these theories must finally be relieved of the task of social organization—and the work be given to the Positive Science of Politics.

We must not “mistake the actors for the drama” (43) expressed Comte in quotation of Madame de Staël\(^1\) referring to false appearances disguised as reality. Specifically, Comte cautioned that individuals in civil society tended to view and judge
the obvious and/or the superficial as representing truth without deeper reflection of its natural causes and effects. This was recognized of political action generally aimed at producing significant change and tangible results subsequently influencing the force and direction of civilization by virtue of its appearance being perceived of as sound and effective. In contradistinction, the work of the Positive political science existed as its own reality and it would not seek to control or manipulate as an influential or governing authority. Its aim as utilitarian only as observational and computational should define its purpose to enlighten, advise, and equally endorse its power to facilitate the greater mission of supporting the universal ‘drama’ of human progress. It must not be obeyed as much as it should be highly respected for its exacting knowledge of politics, this further relieving the polity of its constant and injurious social turbulence. As Comte affirmed, all political conduct would exist in harmony with Positivism as it would ultimately direct with certainty the forward course of civilization.

Further emphasizing the benefits of Positive Politics, Comte noted that the misdirection of statesmen was due to the absence of scientific “demonstrations” that could guide them away from “serious political aberrations” (45) they were otherwise prone to trust. Only the law of progress proved a trustworthy directive for political action. The governing power especially profited from this fundamental tenet and could fully rely on the new order of Positive Politics, the developed Political Science for overcoming any opposition to the general plan. It would prevent, for example the common “oscillations” (46) prevalent during the changing course of civilization, these
movements comparative to the ebb and flow of motion or instabilities slowed the advancing passage through time indicative of all societies. These antecedents of progress would occur less frequently with the “permanent practical utility of this kind of knowledge (46).” As Comte affirmed:

The fundamental datum and positive starting point of general practical politics consists therefore in a determination of the real tendency of civilization. By ascertaining this we can harmonize political action with it and render as mild, and as short as possible, the crisis that the human race inevitably undergoes during its successive passages through the different stages of civilization . . . (46).

What was formerly thought to be useful for establishing the foundations of good government, for example the principle of liberty arising from the metaphysical state had been “very mischievous” (48) and clearly inharmonious to societies not yet educated in the Positive Politics—these ancient abstract theoretical forms, their decrees and institutions continually proved antithetical to the political order and its progress. The most important principle failing to be recognized by legislators either elected or officiated by inheritance and the general ignorance of which led directly to subjective and arbitrary power in government was due to a profound lack of knowledge of the theory of human movement through time. This Philosophy of History Comte described as the “natural law of development” (49) had not taken its place as the practical foundation and positive aim of politics. In the third phase of human advancement however, it would materialize and eventually overcome the negative results of ineffectual theory leading to arbitrary power.
The new and decisively able foundation devising a “Government by measures replac[ing] government by men” (49) would arise as the supreme law superior to any other in guiding the forward course of human organization into resourceful and congruous social systems.

Operations of a motivational nature would necessarily be employed in order that man could “shake off the powerful yoke of ancient habits” (50) and fully and optimistically engage in modern processes of the scientific polity. While savants and the scientific corps occupied with Positive demonstrations of observational science and factual discovery advised and planned political action according to their findings, society then would execute the operations necessary for developing a fixed and durable social structure. Comte suggested that the fine arts would also play an instrumental role in its persuasive powers such that artisans would advocate the adoption of the industrial order promoting the benefits of devising practical and reliable political institutions and ensuring their continual application and maintenance. This endeavor required the essential energy of the imagination refraining from “obsolete ideas and monotonous pictures” (51) and instead focusing fully in support of the Positive state. Distinctively, imagination would never again subordinate observation but alternatively be its advocate, the former also being modified to adjust to the empirical work and aim of the Positive Philosophy. “. . . observation conquers the right of examining in every direction. . . . by force of exercise, as to the general theoretic ideas which constitutes the natural termination of the transition (52).” In other words, science and industry dominate in this
third epoch and all conceptions of politics becoming Positive, have “dethroned the imagination” (53) and consequently delimited its powers of original thought. Over time the value and purpose of critical thinking in the manner of objective contemplation and the speculative investigation of politics would cease along with its definitive claim of natural law as an absolute truth. Positivism would triumph over this “theologico-metaphysical dogma,” as Comte described which over the ages had guided thought into a “permanent conspiracy against mankind—such a spirit equally absurd in its principles and revolting in its consequences . . . (55).” These creations of the imagination must be tempered and considerably readjusted to serve empirical investigation, the aim being to overpower vague abstract reflection and finally purge traditional theoretical concepts from the discipline and practice of politics.

Comte explained that the Positive sciences are largely utilized for predicting outcomes; observation of various phenomena and resulting knowledge acquired is employed to forecast future occurrences. Such is the case of the astronomer accurately predicting the solar events experienced in the planetary systems via observing various relationships of the stars, moon, etc. The object of political science is directly analogous to this practice, asserted Comte as in much the same way the social system renders meaning to its progressive future particularly by observing the past. This a priori knowledge essentially the study of earlier civilizations is certainly useful to the Science of Politics. However, as the subject is a “special kind of physics” this as it unites human natural history and evolution with man’s organizational development through time, a
posteriori knowledge (empirical evidence) most evidently applies, as Comte explained.
The direct observation of sociopolitical tendencies reveals the significant determinants and probabilities for predicting the future of civilization. Comparison of different locations and cultures from around the globe, for instance, “from that of the New Zealand savages to that of the French and English” (65) would establish the state of progression from current to future periods of advancement. The science of Social Physics elaborated in detail from the Positive Philosophy would take into its fold, “all degrees of civilization” from which it could evaluate the condition of the human race (65). Comte was confident of the value and resourceful purpose of this new Political Science. He devised a plan of collecting data for composing “annals of the human race” examining nations and constructing records of their civic and provincial attributes, e.g., from population demographics including simple biographical information to greater systems of organization. As this practice of comparison and evaluation was adopted, it would in turn become indispensable as a complete course for realizing the Positive Polity furthering the aim of reordering the future social landscape and as Comte confidently predicted, directing anew the forward progression of human civilization.
REFERENCES


As is clear from his early writings, Comte’s boundless energy and enthusiasm for developing a complete and fully productive Positive Philosophy was later illustrated in the several volumes of work composed between 1830 and 1842. Specifically notable for its meticulous detail, Comte’s first grand treatise, the *Cours de Philosophie Positive* included six volumes and an extensive number of chapters—the subjects chronologically arranged and beginning with a full introductory account of the purpose and importance of the Positive Philosophy and following with its substantive theoretical concepts and methodologies. Certainly his early essays described thoroughly and adamantly the reasons why the essential transition to Positivism was necessary even urgent as its creator insisted that the state of intellectual anarchy, political instability and turmoil had already fully assaulted the character and social progress of humankind. As earlier discussed, the Theological-Metaphysical foundations, their sociopolitical institutions and directives had been ruinous and in Comte’s mind must be eradicated if the new Science of Politics and its plan of complete social reorganization was to successfully materialize. Thus one must begin at the beginning as did the first chapter, *Account of the Aim of This Work; View of the Nature and Importance of the Positive Philosophy* initializing a full discussion of the human intellect and its historical experience:

In order to understand the true value and character of the positive philosophy, we must take a brief general view of the progressive course of
the human mind, regarded as a whole, for no conception can be understood otherwise than through its history (71). \(^1\)

In the study of human intelligence Comte stressed the importance of recognizing its most fundamental law, this being applicable throughout historical experience and of which firm evidence had proven its accuracy as fact. This law as Comte described, decreed that all conceptual theory and that of every branch of knowledge successively passes through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological, or fictitious, the Metaphysical or abstract; and the scientific, or Positive (71); this well-known theory historians have described as the “law of the three stages.” \(^1\) In relation to the human mind and in its processes of understanding phenomena it naturally progresses via three methodologies and their respective philosophies all of these being exclusive of one another. The first Theological state of the mind seeking to understand the origin and purpose of all things presupposes the supernatural and the actions of mystical beings in acquiring knowledge of the universe. The second Metaphysical state is only slightly modified as it replaces the conceptual basis of the supernatural with abstract formulations Comte described as personified and inherent in all individuals; these neither being fixed nor reliable and simply existing as a transitional state of the mind’s development. The third and final Positive state reflects the definitive human intellect, one no longer searching for absolute truths or veritable causes related to phenomena. In place of both early phases of the mind, empirical study and reasoning come to fruition in determining factual knowledge congruent with scientific discovery and its progress. As the final third
state advances, it renders the former philosophies and the methodologies of the past as ineffective and as such these are fully replaced by the Positive system.

Interestingly, some of the significant elements of differentiation between the phases are explained briefly in relation to their progression from the earliest point of origin to a unique conclusion, for example the Theological state having first adopted a variety of divinities distinctive of a polytheistic system and finally ending in its “highest perfection of which it is capable” (72), i.e., monotheism. Likewise of the Metaphysical second state, nature as a comprehensive entity provides explanation of all causes of phenomena in this transitional phase; the mind’s ability to acquire knowledge reaches its capacity up to the point of finite abstraction and finally having no fixed ground from which it reasons adequately as it wanders and essentially goes nowhere, surrenders to the Positive state, the perfected intellect employing its scientific methodology as the preeminent means of understanding. Equally significant to this theory of intellectual progression is the concept that the individual mind and its developing phases corresponds or characterizes in the same way that of the entire body of humankind, as Comte explained, these ultimately being one and the same. Thus the most fundamental law of the three stages importantly recognizes the “epochs of the mind of the race” (73) and that the entirety of human intellect through its historical experience and its vast acquired knowledge had advanced enough such that it may employ the most sophisticated technologies of which it is capable. As Comte continually emphasized in his treatise, empirical science would not only press forward the acquisition of factual knowledge, it
would equally raise the level of all intellectual capability from its primitive state to its highest and most productive aptitude. In its final and perfected formulation, the whole of philosophical theory would be grounded on the universal practice of observed phenomena and the factual representations in nature. Finding no place in the new system of empirical science the theological, abstract and speculative methodologies would no longer distract the mind from its proper utility and progress as it would be guided exclusively by the Positive Philosophy, its true course of reason and knowledge.

The nature and purpose of the Positive Philosophy was to employ means of accurately analyzing phenomena under various circumstances and to correlate observations with the invariable laws of nature. The acquisition of knowledge at the Positive stage is sophisticated and Comte cautioned that the rate of advancement among different scientific disciplines and their operations may not have arrived at their highest intellectual level at the same time. Thus the work of astronomy, for example and its facts being general and largely basic had arrived as one of the first Positive sciences followed by the study of terrestrial physics and later chemistry. Increasing in scope and in length the study of physiology (biology) would next join the revolution of scientific progress. It was acknowledged that the natural sciences had begun their gradual progression through time as far back as Aristotle and further evolved through centuries of original thought. However, the fundamental spirit of Positivism from the ancient periods up to approximately the seventeenth century had experienced profound opposition to the character and contributions of empirical science particularly yielding to the superstitions
of powerful religious bodies and their conjoined academic systems. Thus the true point of departure of the Positive Philosophy had only occurred in recent eighteenth and nineteenth century history, as Comte determined this period being around the time of Bacon’s conceptual foundations and via the illuminations of Cartesian theory. This marked the final and most important phase of the new Philosophy of Science in which all branches of knowledge could be brought together under its general operations. However, not all disciplines had linked together with their principal counterparts, e.g., chemistry and physics. Given as the most complex and the most dependent on the other branches for fundamental understanding yet not fully developed, the study of social phenomena required a distinctive classification as well as a different theoretical treatment. This new Social Science, Comte described as “Social Physics” was paramount to the work of the Positive Philosophy serving too as Comte’s quintessential model for reorganizational theory and later becoming the central focus for founding the System of Positive Polity. It was a “philosophical system of the moderns” (77) proclaimed its creator, one that would incorporate all conceptions melded together into a singularly homogenous doctrine. Its character would be sustained over time and its course developed continually by the addition of new and more sophisticated knowledge. The Positive Philosophy was by nature superior to the former two methodologies and its universal acceptance and practice would eventually supersede their authority, leaving them finally to the historical record.

The important attribute of the Positive Philosophy existed via the aggregation of all intellectual resources and their respective conceptual theories combined into one
uniform system of methodology; the sciences in their consolidation being the model
eexample. Of this expectation, Comte directed his explanation of the system to the
discussion of its “universal, or encyclopedic, order” (86) introduced as the View of the
Hierarchy of the Positive Sciences. Before offering a chronological classification of the
sciences Comte put forward the essential ground rules requisite of the process of ordering
the sciences in terms of their nature, interdependency, and progress. Importantly, it must
be recognized that scientific knowledge was two-fold, both practical in its application and
speculative as to theoretical interpretation; the latter also existing as a duality of both
abstract and material or concrete knowledge. As this condition had created a variety of
secondary sciences, e.g., chemistry leading to mineralogy or physiology to zoology,
likewise their methodologies had adopted different procedures and theoretical forms.
Thus it was imperative for final consolidation of the Positive method to remain focused
on the primary sciences such that the homogenous doctrine materialized naturally as the
one “true philosophy” defined as the result of the system of Positivism. Further in this
pursuit, Comte identified the dogmatic study of knowledge as opposed to the historical
approach as best avoided—the former interpreted as the procedure of examining the past
labors of men less advanced but nonetheless useful to the progress of science in a way far
too laborious and essentially fruitless in its practice; referring consistently to inert
original doctrines that tended to fog the visions of new discovery. The dogmatic method
deterred the progressive education of scientists from the higher level of knowledge
already achieved and its propensity often superseded the efforts of modern advancement.
The far preferable directive was to pursue science historically and to utilize this course of inquiry for determining the principal condition of a particular classification of study and from that point develop knowledge naturally and without distraction to a higher level. Comte’s extensive system of classification was confirmed to agree perfectly with this method, the foundations of which were condensed in this initial narrative and described as a simple mathematical illustration addressing the core project.

The fundamental sciences amounted to six in total, this number representing the smallest reduction arising out of a possible “720 different dispositions” (93) or what were considered, “changes”. For scientific classification one rational order among a variety of possibilities must be found by comparing the different orders of observable phenomena and arriving at the defining principle or general law. The law discovered served to ground the study of the various categories as arranged and provided the basis for succeeding observations. The result of this interdependency among scientific operations would increase in both efficiency and the propagation of new knowledge, particularly from the examination and ordering of simple phenomena to understanding their greater complexities. In this summary of the scientific process, Comte differentiated between the study of inorganic matter in this analysis referring to the nonliving classifications and the organic or living bodies relative to all natural phenomena. He elaborated on the latter as having two orders, one related to the individual and the other to the species. Applying the general law of scientific succession would classify the species as dependent on the individual as to observable phenomena and also that it existed as more complex in
comparison to the simple or general distinction. In terms of scientific systems and their methodologies the organic was also divided into two specific disciplines of study, so-called organic physics or physiology and its counterpart, Social Physics. The physiological laws according to the life of the individual could be applied to all social phenomena this being the more complex classification. Significantly however, Social Physics is characterized as fundamentally discrete and essentially separated from physiological phenomena as it is comprised of its own category of observations.

Excluding the “first of the six great sciences, “the study of Abstract and Concrete Mathematics,” the principle five (astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, and Social Physics) existed in “successive dependence” (96) of one another within the Positive system. From the first considering the most abstract and remote phenomena ascending to the last observing the particular and the most intricate, this amalgam of scientific study represented a sort of filial connection, as Comte described. This family of sciences albeit hierarchical would perfect each of its own character adding to its specific mastery of knowledge. Students of social philosophy and later as political scientists would benefit most from the system of Positive science as they will have learned from the general laws earlier established and competently apply them to relative observations and new formulations of theory, essentially experiencing in Comte’s words, “the power of the method (99).”
The Positive Philosophy and the “Sixth Science”: Social Physics

Prior to the unveiling of his central opus of the Positive Philosophy introducing the new Science of Politics (Social Physics), Comte completed several preliminary and particularly comprehensive books reflecting on the nature and function of the primary sciences. Positioned within the six-stage hierarchy of the Positive sciences and the first was Mathematics followed by the associate and gradually more complex methodologies of Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, and Biology. These chapters discussed in detail each discipline’s attributes from the ‘General View’ of the science to its analytical functions and mechanics and following to its subsidiary divisions, e.g., Geometry as an outcome of mathematical practice. The object of these initial writings were essential in solidifying the theory of “gradation” (96), referring to the successive interconnection among the sciences leading to ever higher degrees of precision in methodology and knowledge. As these reach their full course of intellectual competence and expertise they form the general scientific foundation from which others arise and flourish. The arrival of Social Physics as the sixth major science was such the case in this upward linear order. Extensively illustrated in Comte’s treatise on the Positive Philosophy, Social Physics was grandly introduced both in terms of its importance to human development and its potential for solving its greatest difficulties as the title exemplified: Necessity and Opportuneness of This New Science. However, the task of illustrating the procedure for its acceptance and progress would be difficult, particularly in terms of freeing social
theorists from their continued dependence on the ancient philosophy and the antiquated principles of the Theologico-Metaphysical authority.

Firstly, Comte insisted that the Positive system must be recognized as a fitting and viable approach to the study of the sociopolitical world. Investigation and analysis were fundamentally similar functions and observing social phenomena from a scientific basis was no different than the practice and general procedures of the other natural sciences. Secondly, it was imperative that theorists understand the urgency and importance of practicing Social Physics in short, to rescue society from its “deplorable state of anarchy” (196). Statesmen in particular should embrace its utility and purpose in hope of resolving the alarming threat of revolutionary anarchy which had continuously plagued all political systems from the ancient to the modern periods. Both intellectual and social anarchy existed, the former being a result of the decline of the Theologico-Metaphysical philosophy that presently was in a “state of imbecility” (196), described Comte and which had left in its wake a profoundly unstable and confused theoretical system. The Positive Philosophy while steadily progressing through time had still yet to acquire the task of developing the “mental government of the human race (196).” Thus it must be timely employed and with all of its spirit and energies hold back the widespread destructive forces that the ancient systems had brought to bear upon societies over many centuries. The philosophy and practice of Positivism would re-empower political thought making it valuable and productive again. This highest degree of Social Physics, i.e.,
Political Science would reformulate theory and exercise its purpose of reorganizing society and finally curing it of its endless struggles.

Its initiation would begin with an essential premise contradicting ancient theory, i.e., the conception that order and progress were irreconcilable and their combination had been wholly problematic to societies. On the contrary, Comte argued that both were indispensable to modern civilizations and together served as the central resource of all legitimate political systems. To separate them or to favor one over the other was to be blinded of both identifying and solving political problems. Additionally, this condition of disconnecting order from progress, the former moving backward as it adhered to the doctrines of ancient tradition and the latter in forward motion yet in a constant mode of disorganization existed as a perpetual state of conflict. Clearly this divergence had been a vicious cycle of generating endless sociopolitical chaos and in evidence of this theory Comte affirmed that the condition was common among all European societies albeit on different levels and with certain variations. The different social classes opposed each other on either side of the spectrum; the conservative inclined toward restoring traditional theological doctrines, the other proclaiming its destructive evils arising from its oppressive dogma and seeking always to destroy its principles foundations. These disparate theological and metaphysical (also military) loyalties could neither reconcile their differences nor exist to work together in developing a Positive and progressive polity. As resolute combatants both perpetuated retrograde philosophies and methods inducing further political instability and its violent outcomes. In response, Comte’s
vision of intellectual Order and social Progress constructed from the embrace of the Positive Philosophy provided the anchor for regenerating an efficient and stable political system. On this promise, he elaborated that, “We shall hereafter find how great is the superiority of the positive philosophy in this view, because, once extended to social phenomena, it must connect the different orders of human ideas more completely than could be done in any other way . . . (200).”

In retrospect considering the second stage, the Metaphysical polity observably as a negative influence and subsisting in a state of revolutionary anarchy had nonetheless prevailed to direct the early growth period of the human intellect from the earliest eras toward the contemporary. It must remain in place even as “dangerously active” (201) as a provisional state until the newly reorganized political system succeeding it could end its destructive antagonisms. As a necessary part of the transitional process persisting under the state of anarchy would not be brief but rather continue over generations depending on the changes needed to replace it. The new system in the interim would actively create new political institutions, their Positive rise associated with the work of extinguishing the old foundations while developing completely new innovations. Again, the transitional period would inevitably last for some time as the breakdown of the old structures had become deeply rooted in the original foundations which must also be deconstructed. Slavery for example, was analogous to this project as it had existed for many centuries as a basis of society particularly during the Roman period from the second century BCE to the fourth century CE and its permanent abolition would not occur until centuries later.
In like terms, the provisional period existing also as a preparatory state was both perilous and persistent in its negative activity and tendency. Nonetheless, its dogmatic principles and obstructions were necessary for the Positive innovations and systems to follow and critical for future reorganization.

Comte’s criticism of the Metaphysical state as the provisional bridge toward this end was deeply analytical of its exigencies and the resulting failure of the revolutionary polity. He condemned its theoretical doctrine not merely for its adverse antagonism of the ancient order but as well for professing to restrict important governmental activity and its duty and power to rule. As a result government had become an enemy of society functioning mainly in police actions rather than in social development. Moreover, the principle of freedom including the right of free inquiry and unrestricted expression of opinion and communication were no less destructive to the political system. Calling this doctrine irresistible to the public and its canon of liberality a “revolutionary contagion” (203) it had also become universal both as the mindset of contemporary society and declared its supreme authority. Unbounded liberty as Comte explained could only be a temporary state arising simply from abstraction and representing nothing more than the unregulated human intellect. Neither was it absolute nor authoritative in properly ordering political systems and institutions. “To be always examining and never deciding would be regarded as something like madness . . . and no dogmatic consecration of such conduct in all individuals could constitute any perfection of the social order (204).” However to its credit remarked Comte, the metaphysical polity did enable philosophers to
investigate various organizational principles and inspire a discourse of free inquiry and the communication necessary for the flourishing of both abstract and concrete ideas, without which future doctrines like the theorist’s own Positive Philosophy could not have been written.

While freedom of inquiry was an established principle of the metaphysical doctrine albeit negatively affecting the political order, the dogma of equality was similarly significant in consequence, i.e., being only a relative or temporary condition used to exploit the foundation of the old polities. With their demise, the principle acted in retrograde purpose becoming an obstacle to reorganizational theory (if one existed); its idealistic demand of perfect equality especially in terms of providing identical rights to all men was a fallacious and misleading canon. Differences among humans are easily distinguished by both physical and intellectual characteristics, explained Comte and as civilizations have progressed, these become more profound in degree and range, i.e., the superior and inferior particularly separate and various. Moreover, this dogma of equality extended to the deceptive ideal of popular sovereignty or in terms of the people’s government, again acting to destroy the ancient regimes while forming the basis for the temporary institutions established to accommodate its supremacy. Although deemed as such it could not materialize as absolute or politically stable as a genuine governmental system as it could be continuously altered by the popular will. This situation easily illustrated the Metaphysical state’s arbitrary character and its revolutionary tendency asserted Comte, and certainly was inferior if not hostile to reorganizational theory and its
progress. Again to its credit however, the theoretical bases entailing the spirit of inquiry and liberty of conscience, as Comte described, had been enormously useful in providing the analytical tools for both expressing the substance of political theory and the testing of its reasoning and expectations. While this exercise would reach its ultimate philosophical conclusion in the provisional stage, it had nonetheless established the difference between the epistemological pursuit of knowledge and the emergent empirical application of inquiry. Undoubtedly, it had assisted in developing the foundation of the Positive Philosophy and contributed to the rise of the new political system.

At the time of writing Social Physics Comte recognized that the Positive Philosophy was still distant from its objective of eradicating intellectual and social anarchy from the political landscape, as well as the implementation of its methodology for achieving social reorganization. He was intensely optimistic nonetheless as he discussed its future success, cautioning political theorists that had surrendered to the “gloomy despotism” (210) of the anarchic state to distance themselves from philosophical despair. He explained that the most advanced human intellects were on the brink of realizing a social order most worthy of their ability and character. The disheartening dogmatism experienced for so many generations would soon give way to the modern and scientific efforts of the best and the brightest; thus the savants would again find their place in developing the new politics and constructing a substantial and stable social system. The Positive Polity as the quintessential outcome would utilize the rational methodology for purposes specific to the homogenous doctrine of Positivism,
meaning that it would coordinate the entirety of all social ideas and condense them into one uniform foundation applying the aggregate energy of all of these in developing the perfected state. The acquisition of knowledge would enter the hierarchy of scientific operations along with its empirical applications; and in concurrence with this change transform the whole of political philosophy by increase and progression of its principles and method. Subsequently, the spirited embrace of the Positive Philosophy as the only means of reconciling order and progress would arrive as the final and complete third stage ultimately solving the backward motion of historical experience and dissolving revolutionary anarchy under the power of its authority. Moreover, a social and moral renovation of ideas would also come to pass as science would prove the futility of investing ineffectual efforts in resolving all human suffering, i.e., the insurmountable personal problems that afflict the individual and the infirmities impossible to cure. Science assured Comte, would at least illustrate the incurable so that the labors of human intellect and energy would not be wasted or inauspiciously abused. Positivism’s focus instead would center on the study of political conditions and their definitive questions related to the social order and its development. It would consistently establish its principles as a political foundation and as a purposeful moral authority specifically attending to the “mental reorganization” (215) of society. This would effectively reconcile the social classes and leadership as they would find equitable ground between them. Importantly, all modes of anarchic discourse must be extinguished and no trace of the revolutionary doctrine or retrograde system be preserved. The Positive Polity would
soon absorb only the provisional and progressive ideas of liberty and permanently liberate the concept from its illusory and arbitrary position under the old system. In concluding this introductory chapter Comte most optimistically assured that the Positive Philosophy would succeed in its command of the social order and its administration as the new and unquestionably superior political authority:

The high practical utility of the theory I am about to offer cannot be questioned by the haughtiest politician when it has once been demonstrated that the deepest want of modern society is, in its nature, eminently theoretical, and that, consequently, an intellectual, and then a moral, reorganization must precede and direct the political (216).

**Social Physics and A View of Logistics**

An important point made by Comte in his discussion of *Social Physics* was that it was best to examine first and before approaching its particular methodology the present state and condition of political science.iii As earlier observed the discipline was analogous to the other advancing sciences and their evolution to higher degrees of knowledge, e.g., astrology to astronomy and alchemy to chemistry. Similarly in view of the Theological-Metaphysical systems and in examining them in terms relative to political method the speculative and/or imagination had consistently presided over the observational as to understanding social phenomena. This method had always led to the endless recycling of theoretical concepts of politics rather than progressing forward both in reasoning and in creating rational and sustainable political foundations. Thus it was clear that the transitional stage must proceed to the task of reversing the methodology of
the old system particularly in subordinating imagination to observation. When this was accomplished both the method and the advancement of *Social Physics* and modern Political Science would be fully elevated to the level of efficiency and productive purpose. In its position as the sixth and most complex of the primary sciences it was imperative that it adopt in its entirety the scientific method of empirical observation and analysis. In addition it must never retreat to the antiscientific, vague and ultimately capricious generalizations concerning the subject of politics—here the passionate imagination ever playing its detrimental role in distracting the intellectual and rational visions of “real thinkers (220).” In this transformation from the absolute theories of the traditional philosophies to the relative Positive methodology was the key to utilizing *Social Physics* in its most productive capacity. Precision and accuracy in evaluating social phenomena was its most rewarding outcome in advancing the knowledge and practice of Political Science to the highest level of authority. The implementation and practice of *Social Physics* would require placing limits on political action, this in eliminating any arbitrary modifications to the general system and to guard against the prescriptions of legislators acting to change its directives by their own authority or by influence of public opinion. This “ill-regulated” (222) governing at will as it yields to human caprice and uninformed social impulse cannot ensure political stability, explained Comte. Thus laws must be determinate in setting incontrovertible restrictions to political action especially as this would apply to the outmoded metaphysical conceptions of politics having in any case no further relevance or power to persuade or injure. As the
practice of Social Physics becomes more clearly defined in eliminating the old from the new politics it can proceed with its essential scientific operations, i.e., in first distinguishing both Static and Dynamic conditions as these correspond with the Positive conception of Order and Progress. The Static forming the foundation of sociology involves the direct observation of social phenomena and its laws consisting of action and their reaction within the various parts of the social system. This can determine the general social movement by examining its interconnections and its tendency of organizational order, for example how political institutions and society interact together whether in harmony or otherwise. Additionally, Static investigation could entail social patterns and ideas as these combine or separate within the whole of the system; this study indicating the relationship between various intellectual formulations and the activity of their corresponding associations.

As to the Dynamic aspect of Social Physics Comte remarked that it was “the more interesting of the two” (229) as its focus was relative to the study of human development and its major progressive forces (the physical, moral, intellectual, and political). Its main objective was to utilize science particularly for this discovery and to establish the general laws governing the entire course of human progress. Determining the “laws of succession” (230) distinguishes social Dynamics from the Static, the latter providing the general theoretical basis of political practice. The former operates similarly albeit its specific purpose centers on the longitudinal existence of Order, this in terms of examining the conditions that further determine as a whole, the movement of human
progression. The observation of a Dynamic phenomenon, for example, would focus on successive generations and the various social changes having occurred over time that would indicate the order of their moral, intellectual, and political character, this also in view of their relation to one another. Comte explained that one of the central influences of this movement and a determinant indicator of social progress was unquestionably the course of scientific enlightenment and the cultivation of human intellect and reason as it had adapted to study applicable to the general laws of nature. The Positive laws of science and their discoverers had evolved from the earliest origins, e.g., Pythagorean theory to their modern conceptions, these from which the Dynamic order of the universe could be verified and understood far more sufficiently than other methods of inquiry. Similarly, the application of Social Dynamics in its advanced scientific form had readily prepared it for investigating the condition of large-scale civilizations and their social and political evolution. The method would clarify through the lens of science the greater movement of societies and the political order at various stages of human development. Finally as a result of both Static and Dynamic operations the theoretical and practical would work together coordinately in determining the greater condition of social order and progress based on the Positive laws that Comte envisioned would further establish the foundations of modern restructuring and social reorganization.

To reiterate the law of succession in terms of the relative view of observing one society politically improved from a former state and in its relation to the Positive development and advancement of subsequent societies is also to recognize the coexisting
human condition in the longitudinal sense or in terms of its greater correlative patterns. Comte argued that without this approach, i.e., the process of *Social Statics*, the whole of human history would be unintelligible and its entire system of forces would be incomprehensible as they relate to social order and improvement. Moreover, it must be substantiated further as the new political philosophy, actors particularly relying on its general principles and influence that would better guide the systematic reformation naturally occurring. This would equally avoid any disruptive alterations to its foundations. In a very complex explanation of this process, Comte summarized:

In the political system this principle of positive philosophy shows that, in a static view, any possible variations can affect only the intensity of the different tendencies belonging to each social situation, without in any way hindering or producing or, in a word, changing the nature of those tendencies; and in the same way, in a dynamic view, the progress of the race must be considered susceptible of modification only with regard to its speed, and without any reversal in the order of development or any interval of any importance being overleaped (236).

One of the remarkable aspects of Social Statics and Social Dynamics as to the systematic improvements to knowledge made via empirical investigation was that nothing was left in doubt. For example, the variations of social phenomena having their limitations, explained Comte, including various changes occurring as a result of political action are determined by a fixed scientific principle from which can describe the general course or pattern of the order and condition investigated. Assuming the accuracy and
exact method of evaluation and applying the “principle of rational limits to political action,” one can identify the contact point “between social theory and practice” (238) and as such embrace its particular reliability illustrative of the new Political Science. As it was yet limited in the manner most useful, i.e., in its capacity to educate and there from alleviate to some extent the persistence of social crises and political disorder, it could in practice modify social phenomena by the laws of science, this being the principal function of Social Physics.

In simple terms science does not judge nor does it govern political phenomena so much as it considers its facts as observational subjects. It determines the state of harmony or conflict existent in the social system and examines relationships together as these connect to the greater whole of the past, present, and future of human development. In this perspective, “political science enlightens political art” (239) as Comte described the special attributes of Social Physics. And while it assumes its proper place in the hierarchy of primary sciences, its methodology is both singular to its means of inquiry described as “direct” (240) as well as the “indirect” in relation to the other sciences. The former includes three procedural approaches these being by observation, experimentation, and utilizing the comparative method. Observation applies a rational methodology in which Positive laws (Static and Dynamic) and theories are connected directly with observed facts, e.g., past and present phenomena in order to determine estimations of future conditions. Absent the procedure of correlating facts with other facts, scientific principles render the observational process meaningless and at best offer
anecdotal assumptions, these without reliable verification of the phenomena studied. Comte mentions the necessity here of employing the most highly skilled and trained rational technicians meaning those scientists able to effectively handle the complexity of the undertaking described as the “exercise to convert almost all impressions from the events of life into sociological indications (243).” In short, the analytical process must not be compromised by dilettante efforts of the under-qualified and none other than the savants are capable of understanding its intricacies and utility. Following as a direct as well as indirect means of inquiry, the process of experimentation coexists with its counterpart methodology (observation) albeit its value is considered somewhat less fruitful to the latter in the case of its unique scientific application. Comte described both the “natural” and “facticious” procedures of experimentation that are similar in terms of examining various interferences or “disturbances” to the natural laws, either of social “harmony or of succession (243-244).” Social pathologies, for example are explored alike to the biological study of disease within the body, the social organism in this case being the unit of analysis and the examination centered on the disruptions to the natural course of order and sociological process. Comte suggested this as a valid research methodology given the greater objective of investigating all political, moral, and intellectual functions and their relationships to the Positive laws. However, its theoretical conclusions must be drawn with caution as this analysis had not been fully developed particularly in its scientific applications. The Positive natural order and laws could not be assumed in exploring the social sphere and their foundations must be tangible before the
process of experimentation is deemed fully reliable. Nonetheless, the method would eventually evolve and its procedures becoming more adaptable to the work of the Positive Philosophy and the development of social science.

The third methodology of comparison is notably controversial to customary practices of inquiry as Comte explained how it greatly differs from the Theologico-Metaphysical philosophy particularly in its rejection of comparing human society with the lower mammals and their primary social functions. The Positive Philosophy would correct this error of investigation by exercising the scientific examination of the most basic natural laws of social interconnection found initially in the lowest order and comparing them to human phenomena. This procedure clearly disagreed with traditional philosophic epistemology that regarded these connections as simply arbitrary and generally baseless observations. Similar characteristics exhibited between human and animal were inconsequential if not misdirected as to the study of human society and development. On the contrary, Comte argued that the Positive method of comparison in this unique scope of exploration was enormously advantageous to sociological investigation. Human and animal societies were alike and to ignore their common similarities and associations would be to disregard important factual results culled from the scientific comparison of both to each other. Moreover, instituting this procedure would once and for all dissolve the “insolent pride” (246) of disparaging theorists holding to their contempt of such a method.
Asserting his full endorsement of scientific comparison, Comte described the primary operation of the method, comparing independent human societies existing in different geographic locations and observing their evolutionary stages of development. Exhibiting general and consistent progression, populations were nonetheless each unique in their degrees of civilization. Both Static and Dynamic forms of inquiry would apply to comparing them in establishing the laws specific to each, e.g., social interconnections and generational succession and from which could be drawn the most accurate analytical interpretation including the measure of social evolution each had achieved. An important principle applicable to this method specified that the human intellect’s development is uniform in regard to its advancement overall and despite the various range of conditions, e.g., race, climate, economic or political environment these diversities do not affect its general progression. Further, the mistake in comparison has often been such that the variations are descriptive attributes thought to evidence the movement of human evolution. In reality they may confuse or contradict the interpretation of comparative phenomena particularly when they are multiplied in the analysis, for example examining both the effects and variations of race on the social period and factoring in geologic climate as a third variable. While the comparative method in its empirical application yields much in the way of possibilities for analysis, it raises the chances of error which may render it virtually impracticable in this regard. Thus the Positive philosophical conception of greater progress must be kept in mind, as Comte asserted in referring to the whole of human development being dynamic and often proving unrelated in various
respects to certain modes of speculation and reasoning arising from studies too narrowly framed or utilizing specialized methodologies.

As the final segment of the comparative method, this being the historical counterpart to the general process, it was described as the “only basis on which the system of political logic can rest”; its function analyzing the chronology of human generational development constituted the “substratum of the science” (247-8) and from there it could contemplate and verify both the whole and the various parts of the entire history of human effort and its labors. Without this particular scientific specialty all knowledge would amount to a collection of unrelated and perplexing interpretations having little value in contributing to or guiding the direction of social evolution. Further, the Positive historical approach although not appearing to, does appeal to human sentiment on a deeper and more reflective level, as Comte suggested, i.e., the application of science engaging not in popular or superficial events but rather examining the successive generational serious of human experiences that manifest gradually through time. The viewpoint presents a reverence for ancestral heritage that is most significant to the practice of Social Physics and its estimation of varying states and dispositions of human society. As it investigates the successive political, intellectual, and moral phases of the past it examines in turn the decline of the Metaphysical and the ascendancy of the Positive stage of development and all of the attributes consistent with the former’s eventual dissolution and its replacement.
The historical method of observation and its comprehensive analysis of the full trajectory of human social phenomena enables it the ability to predict the future, explained Comte. As it looks beyond the present and recent past to the greater range of history it avoids the misleading observations of tendency that relate to the transient doctrines and institutions associated with the Metaphysical state and its revolutionary period. Clarity and precision is the goal of this higher level of study and Comte cautioned that errors relative to mathematical interpretation could possibly occur. For instance, examining a pattern of successive decrease in human physical labor over generations in a relatively civilized society while observing an increase in other forms of work activity e.g., related to technological advancement would indicate or predict the outcome that all physical labor would be replaced and then cease over time. As most unlikely and as an implausible assumption this neither could apply as a whole to the general state of social development. Thus as false results may occur with the historical method the technique requires that the Positive theory be directly or indirectly associated to every observation of human development relative only to the general law of social succession—an immutable span of far-reaching dimensions. All analytical inferences must connect to this reasoning if outcomes are to be methodologically accurate and coherent particularly in systematically observing the historical progression of social states and the greater complexity of this movement. In short, scientific observers must not allow the minutiae of social study and its fine-tuning to detract from the larger scope of investigating or understanding the full range of human social development. The utility
and proper work of the Positive Philosophy would both “sanction” the scientific endeavor, as Comte reassured and in its routine practice become the “wise social speculation” (252) and enlightened knowledge that had been lost to the metaphysical wanderings and false guidance of the ancients.

Theory of Social Statics and Social Dynamics

Comte’s scientific procedure for examining human social conditions consisted of utilizing both Static and Dynamic approaches developed directly from the Positive Philosophy. The Static analysis investigates social phenomena at the least complex level beginning with the individual and proceeding to the family unit and further to greater society. The plan of Social Statics or Theory of the Spontaneous Order of Human Society iv would lead to the complete scientific understanding of “whole of the human species” and as Comte specified in this introduction [and significantly narrow in scope] the “whole of the white race (263).” Investigating the most fundamental attribute of human development, Comte explained the duo nature of man’s individual existence as influenced by both the affective and intellectual faculties; the former characterized the primitive state governing the physical or material activities and its counterpart recognized as the condition of cognitive reasoning. Reason had not been cultivated sufficiently in Comte’s assessment, as the intellect “was the least energetic . . . and so far from adequate” that “almost all men are naturally unfit for intellectual labor (264).” Thus at the individual level, “men must be classed, in a scientific sense” essentially by their
mental capabilities; further, their intellect and reason must be directed away from its “natural lethargy” and toward the material improvement of the “social organism” (265).

As this endeavor materialized as it does naturally to human civilization, Comte instructed that the individual intellect assist as the guide and measure of the social condition at the rudimentary level.

From there, the true social entity of the human family presented generally the origins and outgrowth of the larger whole of the social system. As it follows from its basic biological functions from marriage and the raising of children, the family unit “occasions harmony” (268) and the less of discord from which the Positive Philosophy can assess the general condition and character of the social state. Comte determined additionally in this procedure that the intellectual inferiority of women be certain and indisputable in recognizing her inherent weakness and ill-fitted condition for the intense mental labor of scientific abstraction. While women are considered inferior in the area of knowledge and reason they are superior to men in expressions of moral sympathy and social character which in their complementary and interconnected natures stabilizes the social order. Thus the importance of analyzing the domestic organization of the family establishes the general condition both of the greater social foundation and in the long-term sense interprets the correlation between past and future, i.e., distinguishing ancestral lineage and the passing on of cultural custom which by these variables indicates advanced (or otherwise) familial and social interconnections and intergenerational progress.
As all human interactions, relationships and coordinated energies converge and grow more complex the scientific investigation of social life becomes more proficient and yielding in essential knowledge of natural phenomena. From the union of family and domestic association arises the “principle of cooperation” (272) as a basis for the last division of Static analysis, i.e., of greater society. All human operations are included within its scope from individuals to various classes and nations, as Comte viewed the “race being bound up together” (272) in one intricately connected social organism. From this point of complexity the social and political relationship merges to form an abstract theory of government by investigation of its material purpose as well as its intellectual and moral foundations. As Comte described, it exists from the “habitual predominance of the spirit of the whole that constitutes government” (275) and from this perspective, its general tendencies and direction are observed in view of all human and social contributions. Military societies, for example establish government on the basis of the active cooperation (referring to the principle law of Static analysis) of an army or as to industrial societies the coordination and distribution of labor. As such, individuals and various human cooperative occupations and functions subordinate naturally to governmental supervision and organization. This subordination establishes its own law as an ever-enlarging social and political authority. Moreover, the state of development reveals the ascendancy of society’s intellectual and moral superiority from the smallest to the largest contributions of human effort. The divisions and offices within the political structure also accord with this expansion and from which the best fitted individuals
emerge to rule and direct its course. As the general principle of cooperation affirms from Static analysis, political subordination is assured in modernizing societies and in Comte’s perspective is central to human civilization and progress.

As the work of *Social Statics* determines from its method both the condition and natural order of human society in its initial and spontaneous stages of development, the practice of *Social Dynamics* examines the gradual succession of continuously more advanced social systems and civilizations arising from the primitive to the highest order of human existence. It is to consider particularly the rate at which human evolution progresses from which it analyzes specifically only those universal and permanent influences that affect development. “Ennui is the first that presents itself” (281) explained Comte, as man by nature is restless (or exhibits “boredom”, as the term defines). As such, his disposition is always to exercise every instinctual and intellectual faculty such that human expansion is inevitably unrestrained and continuous. A second consideration affecting the rate of progress is the undeniable fact of human mortality or simply that the human lifespan is limited and certainly insufficient of time needed to devise and implement scientific advancements and also prepare for their succession to subsequent generations. A third attribute observes population increase as the most significant in affecting rate of progress particularly referring to large concentrations distributed upon a limited amount of space. For example, from cities arise the expansion of intellectual knowledge and material innovation from which the rate of progress is accelerated.
Intellectual evolution is the determinant principle in the Dynamic analysis, as Comte described; the primary law being in accord with “the general history of the human mind as the natural guide to all historical study of humanity (284).” As part of the inquiry of intellectual progress, all abstract conceptions must be considered from their fundamental origins to their advanced theories. In sum, examining the entire history of philosophy including the Theological, Metaphysical, and Positive phases is the object of Social Dynamics and as the most interpretive of human development yields a complete estimation of social advancement. Comte determined that social science had moved past the first of the three stages (the Theological) and nearly had been fully acquired in the Metaphysical state. The Positive science would be the next logical step in the process of intellectual evolution as it would naturally foster the work of Social Statics and Social Dynamics and “lead forth the human mind” (286) toward its destination of advanced reasoning through scientific enlightenment. Moreover, a worldly intellectual community would arise to establish the future ground of political organization, attaining the power to modify and decisively influence public reason and subsequently alter the direction and actions of the political authority. In Comte’s vision, the Positive Science of Politics would eventually come of age to meet the challenges of the future and in its continuous development achieve the complete and permanent restructuring of modern society.
REFERENCES


CHAPTER V. The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte
Development of the Human Race in Three Phases

Understanding Comte’s logic and the theorist’s enormous task of devising the universal restructuring of human society into a logically organized political system is best approached by closely examining the three-phase theory of *Social Physics* earlier described as the Theological (or military system), the Metaphysical state (or the modernizing period), and the “final tendency” of modern society, the Positive phase. Comte begins the historical analysis of the “social series” with note to its restrictions which include limiting the study to only those nations representing the human race in its most advanced state. He asserted that the white race descended from the nations of Western Europe and the examination of their ancestral heritage would best explain the historical influence and evolution of social phenomena over many ages and further provide a view of the connection of the phases reflective of all human development. This classification was imperative as well to the understanding of greater political relationships essentially between nations of inferior and superior standing; the assumption being that the *elite* of humanity imposing their progressive ideas, cultural values, and institutions on the less advanced would reveal how progress may materialize over time. Comte was confident that the law of the three stages would especially elucidate the facts relative to generational development, each period revealing a rational character particular to its own stage and its dynamic association with both preceding and following phases.
The state of man beginning at the “Starting-point of the human race” reveals the purely primitive form of human existence described as “Fetichism” and man in his lowest condition subsisting as a fetich-worshipper and cannibal. There exists only a rudimentary level of intellect in these civilizations and from a primal level these develop a collective behavior described as “star-worship” (8) or paganism from which the higher order of polytheism follows. Fetichism as it deifies the imaginary or unknown phenomena is the original foundation of theology in its most basic simplicity as the theological philosophy is similarly grounded in the adoration of the mysterious or supernatural. Moreover, it is the most powerful influence on the mental state, explained Comte as evidenced by numerous pagan gods and deities that have formed the basis of all theological conceptions in the ancient world. In this view, it serves as an obstruction to the advancement of genuine knowledge as the primitive spirit is directly opposed to that of the scientific. Legitimate facts observed of natural phenomena are overpowered by the imagination or vague perceptions of reality. At the Fetich stage the mental state conjures a “kind of permanent hallucination” (16) or fantasy and as Comte implied, exists in the absurdity of its own illusions. Fetichism nonetheless has been rewarding particularly in its social influence as it civilizes in the sense of collective organization toward common and productive ends with, for example the introduction to agricultural life. In this first instance it is regarded as a “human institution, for the regulation of the most general political relations of all . . . (23).”
Polytheism is directly derived from Fetichism as the intellect draws further away from the primitive to abstract thought or reason. This philosophical transition preserves the theological foundations of the ancient form while reducing its central conceptions of multiple imaginary apparitions (fetiches) to a lesser number of divinities or gods, as Comte described as only “a troop of fetiches (27).” These are equally powerful in the transition from the concrete to the abstract, i.e., from fetich, considered absolute to the gods or metaphysical representations as personified abstractions often having humanlike characteristics. In this phase the metaphysical offers the only intelligible view to human understanding and while drawing on the intellectual faculties the theological ground originally derived from Fetichism is preserved and simply modified and evolving in the course of human development. Polytheism was most adaptable to the social environment and as Comte observed the most durable of any in this theological phase. Essentially in the earliest state of human reason, several gods and their special powers and distinctive qualities corresponded to an infinite number and variation of natural phenomena. All events could be attributed to the actions and will of these supernatural forces and to which the religious spirit subsequently flourished. The rise of theological ideas within the vast scope of human imagination and explanation of the natural world under Polytheism fully occupied the human mind and confirmed its devotion to a multitude of deities.

Comte described three approaches to examining Polytheism. One was to recognize that through spiritual and philosophical contemplation, it had aroused the
scientific intellect; reason as well as methodological application of observing phenomena being the natural and progressive next stage of acquiring knowledge. The imaginary superstitions, the mythological and metaphysical speculations as these would apply divine meaning to observations such as the position and movement of planetary bodies gave way to more concrete methods of analysis from astrological generalities to the scientific laws of physics. The basic development of scientific reasoning could be attributed to Polytheism; however it was of less favorable influence compared to the other two aspects more compatible with this theological phase.

The rise of artistic expression, poetry and the arts originated under Polytheistic authority and equally to a level of social power, “not equaled since” (37) in a more favorable period. Its general encouragement of the soul of man as Comte describes the imagination and sentiment arising from the spiritual faculties drawn from Polytheistic influence surpassed all others in view of the aesthetic creations of divinity. Comparable but in contrast to Fetichism’s limited representations of the supernatural, Polytheistic expression released the religiously dogmatic and finite visions of the natural world by expanding the scope of artistic creation to imaginative explanations of both moral and social phenomena. This form of aestheticism, “acting at once on the mind and the heart” in Comte’s view existed as a principal element of human evolution serving as the median between moral and intellectual progression. It was essentially indispensable for mental progress generally and more importantly was recognized as a lower but advancing stage of human education, imperfect given that reason had not ascended yet over the
imagination. Nonetheless in terms of significant innovation the “aesthetic excitements” (42) are easily evidenced by the exceptional creations of artistic genius as Comte noted of the poetic works of Dante and Milton, the dramatics of Shakespeare, Racine, and Moliere. Particularly in painting, technical methods combined with the most reverent form of moral expression. And most obviously in architecture, industry had united with the moral power of the aesthetic as illustrated in the magnificent cathedrals of the Middle Ages. All of this, affirmed Comte arising from human effort, organization, and progress, “unites the perception of the beautiful with the relish for truth, on the one hand, and the love of goodness on the other (43).”

Polytheism is accredited with initiating the first “social corporation” (45); one devoted to the development of the sciences and industry and to aesthetic creation. The priesthood in authority of this enterprise served as political power over all practical, theoretical, and spiritual matter. Essentially, the theological philosophy born of the institution of religion slowly incorporated the social establishment via various activities of the ancients, e.g., festivals, the games, and theatrical events. As these were considered passive engagements of social organization, the active was centered in military life and its propensities for warfare. It must be recognized that war and the destructive instincts became the natural means of civilization, explained Comte and by conflict and conquest human society expanded and further developed in industrial activity to accommodate the production of military arms and weaponry. “Such is the process by which human societies were disciplined, extended, reconstituted, and led on to their subsequent mode
of existence (47).” As to discipline, the military structure as a principle social foundation included the enterprise of slavery as an indispensable means of support and in this perspective was particularly beneficial to human progress. As Comte asserted, this institution considerably advanced both moral and industrial growth; the defeated through conquest in war existing invaluably as slave labor--their servitude exchanged as ransom for the sparing of life. This arrangement in consideration of this era of human development existed in harmony with the greater social community, “the ancient conqueror and his captive worked in virtual concert, the activity of each promoting that of the other” (51).” And in relation to polytheism, the institution served as a moral foundation corresponding in agreement with the theological and social good. The subjugator and those in servitude both commonly preserved the religion of their respective gods and in this each subordinated to their superiority. Interestingly, this common bond between them further substantiated the natural progression from Fetichism which in its primitive state of tribal conquest had not gained by instituting slavery but rather sanctioned the extermination of captives.

One of the main characteristics reflective of the ancient political world was the incorporation of both the spiritual and temporal powers. Generally under a Polytheistic regime moral and philosophical thought rested within the priesthood or as Comte described the sacerdotal authority and the active or temporal power was military in nature. The powers coexisted and functioned interactively, for example under military domination the sacerdotal authority played an active role in command of the polity. Both
the laws and the moral foundations of society were essentially symbiotic relative to the political authority. This concentration of power also tended to degrade and/or abandon the moral and spiritual foundations in favor of military command supporting its preoccupation with war and conquest and reinforcing the institution of slavery. This system earlier considered beneficial to the advancement of civilization in terms of its contribution to industrial development would nonetheless eventually obstruct moral and social progression. Essentially, as the first principle of moral advancement being self-governance, this could not be obtained by greater portions of the population in servitude. And certainly arbitrary cruelty and human degradation could be attributed to its tradition. Thus there existed under the incorporation of spiritual and temporal powers in the Polytheistic polity an inherent moral corruption and inferiority which contributed generally to its social and political instability. It could be said further that the ancient regimes in terms of morality were entirely militaristic as the aim of these societies were apt to wholly command by obedience. Moral education among the greater populace materialized only in popular events (festivals and theatre) this being too, the only resource for philosophic instruction and social action. The result then of Polytheistic social morality rose to the level of a nationalized loyalty to country and commander(s) via the spiritual and temporal powers combined.

Characteristic of the Polytheistic system are its three categories, historically defined as the Egyptian, the Greek, and the Roman regime (61). Comte associated with the first, “the great system of castes” (62) and along with its flourishing in Egypt vast
areas of the East (China and Tibet) subsisted under this early and moderately civilized social organization. Generally found throughout various parts of the world, the system was foundational to ancient civilization. From its origins arose a basic philosophical class; its institution responsible for the cultivation and regulation of knowledge and artistic development. The caste regime could be fully credited with the most significant periods of industrial growth and creation as evidenced by the Great Pyramids, the division of labor fully adaptable and efficiently organized in constructing its great many projects. The important attribute of the system was its political stability as all castes commonly subordinated to the supreme authority were integrated and cohesive in purpose and in deference to the highest command. Of this superior rank the theistic leadership existed as high priests, magistrates as well as philosophers, physicians, and architects. Castes having developed initially from domestic and family origin also contributed to social and moral stability; this spirit of good will and cooperation was evidenced by an improved system of justice. The status of women, for example evolved from subjugation, rudimentary labor and seclusion under polygamy to positions of some individual control within the home. The custom of respect for elders and ancestry also flourished in both small and greater social units. The sentiment extended throughout the entire caste system and functioned as part of the primary political organization, its principles establishing a fundamentally stable and well-disciplined regime. Upon this solid theologically-based foundation came also the tendency of inflexibility and stagnation within the social structure such that it would become obstinate to change and
reject efforts to improve and advance its political efficacy. For example, the ruling caste committing all resources to securing a concentrated absolute power over all descending ranks commanded obedience through the instilling of fear and superstition. This doctrine would avert any potential for intellectual advancement and further inhibit scientific learning and efforts toward advancing practical knowledge. In the last analysis, the caste-oriented theocratic regime contributed substantively to human progress only to impede its further expansion as a result of its rigidity and dogma.

The secondary category in the Polytheistic system and distinguished as military in nature associates the rise of the intellectual regime or that of Greek civilization, Comte assigning its position as intermediate or between the Egyptian and Roman periods. Greek militarism unlike the Roman period of conquest existed in waging small-scale battles between states and the pursuits of war were incomparable to the latter’s particular goal of territorial expansion which included the subjugation of various populations. The Greeks desired far less of military domination and essentially concentrated their resources and faculties substantially on the cultivation of the intellect, epistemological study, moral development, and the fine arts. This progression in human civilization arose from the great advantage of neither being engaged exclusively in warfare nor relying on sacerdotal (or priesthood) authority. The speculative life of “abstraction” flourished during the age of Greek Polytheism as philosophers, scientists, and artists were absorbed into the hierarchy of the governing class; as is known, these individuals often served as instructors to military families, e.g., Aristotle’s teaching of Alexander the Great. As
Comte describes, “a contemplative class composed of free men, intelligent and at leisure with no determinate social function” (68).” established dominion over the province of knowledge and intellectual development. And at this juncture between the Theological and Metaphysical foundations, scientific enlightenment entered in turn and in complement to epistemological scholarship. The Positive sciences in their rudimentary form, e.g., mathematics and geometry propelled the fields of rational logic forward; abstract deduction and calculative reasoning fueled the spirit of scientific discovery and theory along with the utility for constructing monumental projects, e.g., the Greek temples. This was the epoch of “progressive Polytheism” as Comte coined the term; moreover, the period in which the Positive philosophy had begun to influence the foundations of Greek metaphysics. Aristotelian theory rested on the comprehension of the natural laws and combined with the power of human reason transcended the otherwise purely speculative and moral fixation of earlier thinkers (Socrates and Plato). This transition influenced the active social realm and the political authority in turn began its conversion to a general and more systematic reorganization. Interestingly as Comte points out, the Metaphysical in the end sought to distance itself as independent from both the powers of theology and science and in its pure form separated from the means of constructing a practical and sustainable political regime.

The greater influence on modern society and the most impressive was the Roman regime. Destined to achieve the universal supremacy of empire it had released its bonds with theocracy by discharging the authority of the priesthood and subordinating it to the
power of the military force and the senatorial leadership of high-ranking officials. All institutional entities responsible for educating and directing the polis were incorporated into one homogeneous commanding unit. The republic established its power in progressive degrees and well over centuries successfully conquered nations while securing its political authority and respective government. A fully functional and stable unity developed between the people and leadership ensuring the nationalist spirit and its progression forward. Moral advancement was harmonious with the same goal of encouraging a military discipline and obedience to the objective of nation-building and dedicated to Roman law and custom. Social morals were progressive although still harsh considering the cruelty inflicted upon slaves and the barbaric and inhumane amusements, e.g., Roman gladiator sports. As to intellectual advancement Rome followed its Greek predecessors in this sphere but rather than developing further upon its foundations of knowledge and aestheticism it imitated its creations (Greek sculpture) and as is known, executed works with far less artistic skill and talent. As to Roman decline it could be said that moral corruption contributed largely to the empire’s final dissolution. Its imperial government had not succeeded in devising or implementing a regenerative political foundation necessary for both governing vitality and social stability. Emperors were obeyed but their grand system of leadership was deficient in the fundamental principles that would sustain order and retain loyalty to the regime. Political alliances soon were broken or fragmented, their strength diminished and unable to defend against threats to destroy imperial command. The demise of Caesar and this age of empire were
sanctioned by “metaphysical fanaticism with aristocratic rage” (75) described Comte, this indelible imprint on historical progressivism reaching its final destination in this third phase of ancient Polytheism.

It was in preparation of the Monotheistic system that the Metaphysical state Comte described as a “chronic malady” could be valued essentially for its rudimentary scientific scholarship and “nascent positive spirit” (76) that would propel forward this theological stage of human progression. The new Monotheistic order had adopted the abstract Polytheistic spiritualism and its deist conceptions from which its one-god innovation emerged, closely resembling the idea of the supernatural being but centralizing an absolute spiritual and intellectual authority. The advantage of one deity was receptive to the age, one of transition and instability serving as a basis for universal communication and interconnection arising from one homogenous religious center. A social and political revolution materialized from Greek and Roman influence and the Metaphysical philosophy would obtain its dominion over both the universal moral doctrine of society and guide the direction of all practical associations and political affairs. The division between the theological and governmental powers had not occurred at this stage as this relationship served to unify and stabilize the polity and in the larger arena connect nations having similarly adopted a monotheistic authority.
Social and Political Progress Under Monotheistic Catholicism

Social and political life under Monotheism would flourish particularly under Roman Catholicism as Comte examined in his chapter (IX) titled, *Age of Monotheism*. – *Modification of the Theological and Military System*. Several attributes contributed to this progress. The priesthood, for example was put to task as this particular caste functioned in a practical capacity disbursing its labors among a variety of disciplines, e.g., medicine, the industrial arts, and administrative offices. The benefit made possible the gradual separation between the Theological and the Temporal or military authority. As Catholicism fundamentally solidified the foundations of social progress it constituted the moral power as its primary director of which had earlier been subordinated to the political authority. Subsequent to this separation of powers it had become fully independent and thus was able to indoctrinate the government with its directives of revelation and devotion to the Theological order. This was a new power described Comte, “prescribing submission to established governments, while subjecting these governments to a universal morality of growing strictness (89).” The division between the temporal and spiritual powers was fundamental to each in function as the former related most essentially to social education and the latter to practical action. Both were sovereign and generally only advisory to one another. Under Catholicism the speculative class arose to fulfill its greater purpose, i.e., to enlighten on the observation of nature and practical human life and impose its moral influence and instruction on the masses of whom accepted it as a natural advisory body. The abstract ideal of the common good
could be attributed to monotheistic revelation and its legitimate development advanced the social and political improvement of the system affording the governing power the benefit of theoretical wisdom and practical rationality. Moreover among the polity this new organizational modification extended a universal morality and enculturation to the Theological philosophy; and even beyond the political sphere and its dominion, the religious order commanded via its common doctrine obedience and respect for a more noble authority. To Comte, this power “as the ordained guide of the general progress” would serve as example and guide for reconstructing the Positive system on an even “better foundation” (91).

One of the most noteworthy attributes of the Catholic ecclesiastical order and relative to the way in which it established a sound and effective political foundation of leadership was the elective principle. It was a “masterpiece of political wisdom,” (93) described Comte in which inferiors in the theological hierarchy elected their superior officiates from the lower ranks to the higher, even producing cardinals and popes from obscure positions and status. This contributed abundant stability to an otherwise unreliable hereditary system which may not provide adequate and wise governing expertise and ensure the proper functioning of its powers and privileges. The early monastic institutions before their eventual decay conversely disengaged from corrupt political practices leading to abuses of power. Disciplined in the intellectual and speculative arts the Catholic order established a permanent class of educated and powerful clergyman existing independently from within the greater sociopolitical sphere.
Education was the most effective avenue for developing a powerful political influence; the ecclesiastical superiority in this instance was unsurpassed in importance to the temporal authorities and more respected than any other theocracy historically. Given its uninterrupted intervention in most social endeavors when it had obtained its complete maturity, Church history and its advanced theological system had mirrored the fundamental progress of human history, engaging in its most significant conceptions and aspirations throughout time.

Aspects of Catholicism relative to gains in its political philosophy existed in the enforcement of disciplinary and restrictive measures expressly imposed to limit the religious spirit and supernatural inspiration that could otherwise detract from absolute devotion to its principles. Essentially, the polytheistic tendency to create a multitude of deities specific to one or another inspirational revelation and the recognition of myriad prophets, seers, and token spiritualists subscribing to each could not continue under this “final jurisdiction” (96) of divine faith and obedience. Catholicism’s restrictive doctrine also extended to its sacred language of Latin preserved long after it was popularly spoken as a means of concentrating communications within the institution and likely as a way of limiting criticism to scriptural texts that would inevitably agree with its canons. Moreover, there were two eminently vital imperatives to the Catholic ascendancy of political authority. Ecclesiastical celibacy was one affirming the basis of religious discipline of the clergy and functioning as well in maintaining independence separate and essentially removed from material society. It could be seen as sacred in the higher caste
system of the monastic order in which it could command reverence from the less devotional. Politically, this principle of the priesthood nearly replaced that of the hereditary doctrine in the secular and feudal system and stood equal to it in influence and primacy in the regime. Asserting the temporal authority of the Church via of the popes’ sovereignty served as the secondary imperative, one in which the reign of territory containing small to larger populations was sufficient to secure the institutional hierarchy’s moral command operating as a provincial government in these. As in Italy both moral and intellectual development flourished during papal supremacy albeit at the expense of a political nationalism which had instead materialized under its dominion (a power equal to the temporal authority). As Comte observed, the political sacrifice was evident in the ten-century struggle to establish a system of national unity independent of Catholic reign as it had become deeply engrained in the entire trajectory of human progress since the early Roman period.

Catholicism’s credit to social and political progress was most evident in the contributions to intellectual development; the system had for its long period of spiritual and philosophical advancement favored both the acquisition of knowledge and under its authority its educational administration. Although repressive of popular and secular influences it had by its restrictions on intellectual discovery other than the religious, increased the attraction to it. And as scriptural authority could not hold for long a monopoly on knowledge the Church could best retain its power by creating a Catholic educational system. As Comte described, the priesthood adapted and applied itself to the
vast exploration of human nature, observed tendencies of individual and social behavior, and interpreted conceptual theory in view of its theological or metaphysical foundations. This movement was eminently beneficial to the Church in terms of political efficacy as it existed as one and the same of the spiritual and moral authority. And relative to morality, the Catholic institution of confession served as a function of this education as it was empowered to judge the moral actions of men and purify them by repentance under its doctrine of salvation. This disciplinary system could not be better applied as a condition of the theological government, a most stabilizing and powerful force in meeting both spiritual and practical needs of individuals and society.

Catholic dogma certainly does not go unrecognized in Comte’s discussion of the social function of the Church and its contribution to human progress or its divergence from it. Particularly in understanding its political character, ecclesiastical authority must create absolute faith as obligatory and by doing so it could provide a practical utility to governance by duty, discipline, and unconditional reverence to its central principles. An example in kind was the Catholic dogma of salvation belonging exclusively to the institution such that theological divergence was fatal in the sense of damnation to all those heretics deviating from the faith. And is well known, the dogma of mankind’s condemnation via Adam’s fall from grace is one other necessary aspect of Catholic philosophy that more particularly confirmed the fundamental principle of human suffering from sin. Only from absolution by the clergy could one be redeemed and saved from eternal punishment via purgatory or hell. Comte explains this as a case of political
necessity, i.e., that Catholic dogma defined its place as the ruling moral authority, its complement being in turn, the assignment of a divine theological character to complete the ideal of intervention into human affairs by the great spiritual power. This apotheosis, as Comte described would raise the Church to monarchal status and complete its unity with the temporal authority to ensure its presence in the political sphere.

An interesting element defining priestly authority was named in Comte’s evaluation as "Real Presence" (104) which extended Catholic dogma further into political efficacy via the perpetual powers of consecration (the administration of the sacraments); this viewed as indispensible to temporal rulers in assuring worship and devotion to both the divine and the political powers. The noblest of religious men, e.g., Augustine, Jerome, and Gregory were strongly supported by sovereigns of great authority and political influence such as Charlemagne and from this the commanding spirit and unity was most effective in shaping the moral and obedient character of the Monotheistic regime. From the ancient system still considered military by definition and reinforced by the increasingly authoritative administration of Catholic doctrine, the transformation to a “less offensive character” (108) eventually arose to change the continuous conquest of lands into a more independent territorial defense in which military leaders governed allocated areas of the empire under the monarch and thereby pledged to preserve the hereditary succession of the ruler. This ensured the feudal reign of kings and the efficient system of serfdom while the Catholic authority emerged equally in absolute spiritual influence and leadership. It was an “admirable combination,” described Comte and
further established by the Middle Ages the “social superiority” of civilization and “a new spectacle of the dignity of human nature” (111) became apparent during this period of progress.

The development of the feudal system distinguished the essential elements significant to the advancement of modern European societies. From a military regime emerged an industrial province that further reflected the means of social progress, for example by the transition from nomadic life to a stationary agricultural state and in restricting military action to a singular caste for protective defense. Catholicism’s role in the Monotheistic regime in large part materialized as the agent and absolute authority of universal morality and in this it arose to a position from which the polity was eventually subordinated. The “social glory of Catholicism” (115) inspired the moral objectives of the military forces as pious soldiers defended the realm against the irreligious and the heretical along with all elements that threatened its moral foundations. Religious terror was utilized in kind, authorizing punishment and damnation for resisting or violating Catholic precepts and the clergy’s sacred ordinances. Morals were regarded as the supreme social directives necessary in guiding an otherwise aberrant polity; the great mission of the spiritual order thus expressed its universal doctrine as prescription for both social purity and perfection. The love of God and the inevitable evils could be rectified via Catholic doctrine which by commanding obedience and deference to ecclesiastical authority was believed to ensure the future development of human life.
Comte pointed to one of the Positive features of the Monotheistic regime being that while its existence had conditioned individual and social activity to religious dominion it had also generated the advancement of the human spirit in various capacities “worthy of its nature (118).” For example, philosophy would engage productively in perfecting society via its theoretical inclinations while science would explore the potentialities of the universe and human nature. Aesthetics would enhance the imaginative faculties and produce works of inspiration while the industrial would create the material innovations enhancing human ingenuity and resourcefulness in productive enterprise and progressive development. Interestingly, Comte explained that the individual and society most benefited by moral direction encouraging the expression of love and virtue best fitting to private and public happiness and the general welfare. Proposed by the Catholic Church universal love would make the better of even the most modest of societies in terms of those most limited in resources and capabilities. It was the greatest of all wisdom produced under Catholicism and both the most motivating and controlling of human action. The moral doctrine fixed the ideal and guided all outcomes toward a universal design of faith and charity. And from the abstract concepts to the concrete state all could discover a model for living and for conducting affairs most humble to the mystical deity while being of the highest order of civilization. The virtuous life including the element of humility was eminently important to enforce in order to repress the otherwise dishonorable traits characteristic of human nature, e.g., pride, vanity, and want. Moreover, Catholic influence supported domestic life, the
propagation of families, and sanctioned paternal authority. This arrangement as discussed by Comte and those of his age, considered this most beneficial to women as they were rendered completely secure in the care of the husband and household. Reflective of this condition however, were the serious restrictions and limitations to the mandates of domesticity and under Catholic doctrine the severing of marriage (divorce) posed the worst consequences if emancipation from its constraints was attempted. Further as Comte believed in agreement with the most enlightened men of any historical period, the “law of social progression” (121) depended upon the general subjugation of women and their essential containment to domestic functionality as wives and mothers. Women must be disengaged from any outside occupation, education, and civil or political affairs considered suitable only to men.

An attribute of the general social morality that the Catholic Church had popularized as doctrine was a sort of universal human sentiment and religious affection linking in brotherhood all Christian peoples and extending to nations of similarly common faith and principle. The Monotheistic belief existed in uniform subordination to one spiritual authority under which all “citizens of Christendom” (122) associated. This influence was instrumental particularly to European advancement as human conditions were mandated in coordination with legal doctrine under the theological system. This was especially commendable for curing the ills of human misery while producing a general sentiment of unity in social and political terms. Certainly too it was further distant from the problematic abuses caused by the combination of temporal and spiritual
powers, for example, defining the Greco-Roman systems especially as these regimes deteriorated in later periods. According to Comte, they had declined from the “imperfections of the philosophy” (123) during the social phase and conditions of the period. Catholicism then recovered the better attributes of intellectualism and progressive thought further developing the connection to the spiritual via the foundations of an improved philosophical reasoning. A revival of scholasticism and as Comte described, “the acceleration of the mental movement” (124) appeared at its highest ascendency during the Middle Ages and became the center of Church authority supporting its singular dominion over society and political life as evidenced by the Italian monarchy during the period. While manifesting in the higher stratum of the Catholic hierarchy the theological philosophy exercised a control of the masses incomparable to any other ruling authority as it advocated the principles of a purified social morality to the general public. To individuals it empowered each to judge both personal and collective actions by its doctrine of faith and goodness and encouraged a spirit of communication within its disciplinary codes of ecclesiastical ethicism.

Catholic progressive thought and intellectual development included the regeneration of the Greek theoretical foundations, Aristotelian theory particularly experiencing a revival of the Metaphysical philosophy and doctrine of natural law and reason. And with the Monotheistic influence the spirit of intellectual culture extended to the growth of the natural sciences, again via Aristotle’s original conceptions of the earthly elements from which mathematical and astronomical calculation, methods of
observation and experimentation would follow. And as this “mental movement” (127) continued, aestheticism flourished in the form of artistic creation including architectural design, the great cathedrals as testament to this improvement in intellectual development and in accompaniment, the monastic musical creations that filled the Church monuments with intricate harmonies of religious song and verse.

The progressive mental movement and its important component, industry extended this universal development; the most significant improvement during the period being attributed to the dissolution of feudal serfdom. Under Catholicism’s guardianship communities were granted the freedoms necessary for the enhancement of political legitimacy of the Church which could ultimately sustain its theological authority particularly over the numerous emancipated laborers elemental to the social progress of the regime. As Comte clarifies, the ecclesiastical polity was neither indifferent to intellectual growth but rather enlarged its scope of reasoning, methodological processes as well as its moral philosophy from which the Positive Philosophy would eventually ascend. This sustained its powerful dominion over centuries. Nonetheless, it would decay in time, as Comte explained, as it continued to reject the Positive Metaphysical foundations in favor of its Theological / moral underpinnings; the former being intellectually advanced in scientific investigation and epistemology that would separate to a great extent and become equally authoritative and actively influential in the emergent polity. “The more Catholicism aided the intellectual movement, the faster did the destruction proceed, because scientific and other intellectual advance added honour to the
metaphysical spirit which appeared to direct it (131).” And by the time of the dissolution of the Theological order, Catholicism had no longer coordinated its moral and social authority with progressive scholarship and in fact could only move in retrograde direction of the intellectual movement forward; the decline was thus inexorable to both social and political progress. The Theological philosophy by the end of Catholic supremacy could be best regarded as a “precious legacy” (132) of great historical merit and had gained much to its credit comparably to earlier Polytheistic regimes. Moreover, strict theology may not have survived past the following centuries especially as to its political dominion beyond papal supremacy; nonetheless the organization would exist as a primary spiritual organization leading into the future of modernizing society.

The Second of the Three Phases – Metaphysical State and Critical Period of Modern Society

Comte firmly asserted that the Metaphysical phase and associative social state during this transitional period was philosophically deficient in theory and purpose as it had created the political disorders that delayed human developmental progress toward its otherwise Positive end. Nevertheless, this intermediate stage was necessary if at least for the experience of the process needed for eventually replacing “the new for the old” system of organization despite as Comte described, its “negative character” (137) in view of political progress. The important element of revolutionary change defined this period serving to reveal the inadequacies of the ancient system and propel the movement
forward from the stagnant dogma of the past to preparing the new ground and fundamental structure necessary for social reorganization. The commencement of the revolutionary process originated in the early fourteenth century as the Catholic Church exceeded its boundaries in the establishment of absolute dominion over civil society creating an equally commanding opposition to its politically oppressive governing power. The eventual decline of the spiritual foundations defined by Catholic authority and evidenced by resistance to its religious doctrine forced the inevitable downfall of the Church and a system no longer competent in maintaining both social and temporal order formerly under its control.

Comte explained that the most efficient analysis of the five centuries since this period to the present during which he wrote the Positive Philosophy was best understood in two categories; the first concentrated on the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in which social progress had occurred spontaneously and essentially unstructured. The second part examined the following three centuries under which the “negative doctrine” emerged to influence completely the social climate and the developing secular tendencies of a modernizing world. Notably in the earlier centuries the decline could be attributed to the separation between the military or temporal power and the religious authority as their originally combined dominions particularly common to European sovereignties dissolved under the burgeoning disruptions arising from a repressed and increasingly disenchanted public and disputation over the regime’s largely autocratic rule. The internal breakdown of the Catholic authority had also contributed to this rapidly weakening political system
as factional divide over ecclesiastical privilege expected by a nationalized clergy was
denounced as incompatible with the centralized dictates of the papacy. The result of this
inner conflict materialized in the formation of independent organizations that further
altered Catholic doctrine and dismantled the original foundations of the Church.

Similarly, the dissolution of temporal powers caused by the resistance to centralized
monarchical control by localized powers inherent in the feudal hierarchy could not
reconcile differences. Thus both temporal and theological authorities collapsed under the
forces of which Comte confirmed were necessary spontaneous inducements for decay
and eventual re-growth of the social and political orders. Here was provided “fresh
evidence of the fitness of the regime to carry on the great human evolution” (141) made
possible by the demise of the first phase and the emergence of the Metaphysical stage
negative in its enterprise but importantly transitional and exclusively preparatory in
laying the foundation for the ideal Positive state.

One of the aspects arising from the break between both failed temporal and
theological powers during this phase was the ascendancy of philosophical inquiry and
speculation which expressly characterized this revolutionary period. Protestantism
particularly identified with the philosophy in simple terms described as “nothing more,
historically speaking, than a growing and increasingly methodical protest against the
intellectual bases of the old social order . . . (143).” The movement was inherently
negative and antagonistic toward all traditional authority over the social domain and its
discourse was generally adverse to original Christian doctrine (Catholicism). The period
reflected variations of Monotheism however, with the founding of eighteenth century Deism which based its fundamental principles within the schema of metaphysical inquiry and reason. Comte suggested that the greatest intellectual minds had finally withdrawn from these arbitrary foundations as the Positive spirit being initially and most generally restricted conformed more naturally to an anti-theological basis of analysis of the physical world.

Among the social forces prevalent over three centuries in the transitional stage from the twelfth century forward were the ‘metaphysicians’ described as the alternate representation of the former spiritual influence, and the ‘legists’ deemed equivalent to the temporal power. Arising from the great schools of thought (universities) and the complement senatorial assemblies, the men of letters and the various lawmakers, e.g., members of parliament, judges, and lawyers established apart from the primary ruling power a secondary and auxiliary class of advisors of significantly influential character and authority. The former attributed to revitalizing Aristotelian philosophy endorsed a more rational scholasticism and speculation of both moral and social phenomena having coordinated theological foundations with the fundamental ground of natural law and reason. Thomas Aquinas as an example of the emerging class of metaphysicians extended traditional learning to intellectual theory on subjects of social and political controversy. From this historical turning point, according to Comte’s observations of the metaphysical phase arose the destructive elements that further dissolved the spiritual power and stimulated efforts to encroach simultaneously upon its already diminished
temporal authority. Alike to the metaphysicians the legists as Comte described were the progeny of ecclesiastical canon yet were increasingly immersed in a deeper hostility and conflict with traditional Catholic authority. As such the rising divergence between the Church and the political jurisdiction and its administrative responsibility over the civil affairs of state particularly illustrative of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries produced a new and revitalized temporal power. Monarchal control returned with greater supremacy over the popes and as the revolutionary system materialized triumphant over the old order the metaphysicians and legists fully realized their advisory functions, as Comte claimed of this negative phase, to continuously “discredit and destroy” (149) traditional foundations. This natural disruption predictable in his theory of social evolution would accomplish its purpose of ultimately redirecting the movement of human progress forward. As an integral part of this progression, this work of social and political reorganization would launch the future development and final achievement of the Positive state.

As the temporal (military) power began to dominate especially the European polities of the late fifteenth century, e.g., England and France via the unrestrained usurpation of the intellectual, moral, and spiritual foundations of the papacy which by its separation from temporal authority had otherwise flourished before the period of rapid decline, the tendency of conflict and war returned to occupy a system now inherently volatile to its inevitable manifestation. And following the rebellion of Luther as it had evolved to Calvinism, the entire clergy had succumbed to political subjugation under the
ruling caste. As an auxiliary institution to the superior power of royalty, Catholicism offered its religious support simply as a means of surviving the sovereign order of kings. Having little left of its own organization, the repression of spiritual liberty and its retrograde motion continued while the rise of the aristocratic power developed its dominion over all sociopolitical order. Comte described this event as “a sort of permanent dictatorship” and the inevitable “consequence” as well as the “corrective of spiritual disorganization” (159).” Yet, without this revolutionary alteration consistent with this phase of human evolution the revitalization would not have assumed its new direction. This Comte explained as the “ministerial function” (162) of political power and from which soon followed a decline of the military regime. A new order of men inexperienced in war and conquest arose to counter the command of warrior kings, their standing armies replaced by temporary militias. This anti-military character, a precursor to the modern state continued into the seventeenth century with its increasing encouragement of open political discourse and inquiry which had been generally contrary to earlier military restraint.

Observing the transformation from the militarism of past centuries initiated the rise of the “diplomatists” (165) as Comte described, serving as a new order of international politicians that had formerly been under papal authority or were originally members of the Catholic clergy. Their work was to exercise negotiation in constructing alliances and forging peaceful relations among powers while generally dismantling military tactics of aggression and war. Having to some extent settled the temporal
command that had reigned over each of the European states, the diplomatists set to task their mission of equalizing at best the balance between the Catholic and Protestant systems. The international system of treaty materialized as a political solution to former conflict over territory, for example the Westphalia agreement establishing nation-state sovereignty and the rudimentary political organization on the continent developed continually up to the French revolutionary period. Comte described this transitory period as preparation for the old system’s eventual intellectual and social dissolution necessary for laying the new foundations for the Positive doctrine as universal principle. The most significant attribute accommodating the change had been the spontaneous rise of the power of free inquiry which emancipated individuals and liberated expression, communication, and discovery of new perspectives formerly restricted by theological or temporal dogma. This new revolutionary doctrine was essential to tempering if not enlightening the old systems of power that would otherwise have returned to tyrannical despotism. Loosening the bonds of absolute authority engaged both the ruling and social elements in the progression especially developing the individual spirit and “personal energy” of all contributors “whether industrial, aesthetic or scientific (169).”

It may have been considered that this phase was more than sufficiently beneficial in terms of sustaining and further advancing the whole of the sociopolitical state. Interestingly however, Comte explained of the Metaphysical state’s “corrective function” that both the temporal authority and the revolutionary doctrine when merged were by nature, antagonistic and necessarily counteracted one another; the former revering the
past traditional dogmas and preserving material order; the latter requiring a liberality from any restriction on its innovation. When put together the “general movement of social decomposition” (169) would begin the process from which the Positive phase eventually emerged. Modern governments in which political actions had generally abandoned the social elements for more concentrated efforts to maintain the material order which had continuously been threatened by liberal movements evidenced this instability and the phase’s impermanent foundations. Contributing equally to the dismantling of traditional authority were dogmas of all variety as Comte described (172): the dogma of “liberty of conscience” charged with the moral obligations held originally by the Church; the “sovereignty of the people”—a dogma of importance to civil society in general; the “dogma of equality” that had abandoned the caste system in the moral sense, and the “national independence” dogma which established the rudiments of security—all of these generally keeping vibrant the obligations and conditions of human life while nonetheless imposing an irregular and imperfect tendency or general system of insurrection necessary simply to avert the danger of total moral and political disintegration.

The Metaphysical state was “deplorable” in its negative retreat from human advancement by way of these disruptive dogmas according to Comte. Although seemingly just the opposite in terms of revolutions establishing new and progressive constitutional governments never before obtainable under the rule of absolute autocracies, for example Cromwell’s overthrow of the English monarchy that particularly
restrained the House of Lords, the revolutionary condition failed to extend any part of the Positive progression or “critical doctrine” as it is described. The American Revolution was evidence to its failure from Comte’s viewpoint as it had more than any other sanctioned the political power of legists and coordinate metaphysicians of whom subjugated the population into believing in universal theories with no substantial social purpose. The political superiority of which was claimed by American revolutionaries were illusory visions at best and in Comte’s view far from adequately developed or utilized. Further, an inherent and more deeply problematic flaw occurring within the revolutionary doctrine was the condemnation of “the political existence of any spiritual power (176).” Through this important legacy of Catholicism and indispensable to the social order, eternal principles could be distinguished from transient facts. Their illumination could guide all social classes to a rational appreciation and respect of moral values. The loss of the spiritual power especially in view of its deterioration over three centuries was a “serious misfortune” (177) and destructive to modern societies. Owing particularly to the rise of Protestantism, the decline corresponded with the continuous secession from social progress and could be framed more as a “movement of decomposition” (181) that had preceded the regenerative period.

Attributed to this metaphysical negativism, as Comte described was its anti-theological character arising from the prescriptions of the Greek schools that tended toward the atheistic via the deification of nature and turning generally toward a speculative pantheism, considered a radical if not heretical and all-consuming rejection of
religious tradition. The philosophy of negativity as evidenced by the seventeenth century had engrained itself in the intellectual movement obscuring the foundations of faith for the insistence of reason. This transition had not been altogether detrimental in view of the greatest minds of the period, for example of Bacon and Descartes which required an “entire theological emancipation” (183) that could allow for intellectual innovation. However, this new liberality was not so easily embraced otherwise, observed Comte explaining that the multitude had been deeply disturbed by the inevitable conflict between theological conviction and the increasing allure of scientific discovery. Even Catholicism’s best efforts to revive the spiritual order provided no reconciliation and thus developed its desperate hostility toward intellectual aspiration and advancement as Galileo’s persecution illustrated. The ongoing antagonism between the theological and new freedoms endowed to human reason and enlightenment confirmed their incompatibility and eventual separation. In Comte’s assessment, the former could only be resistant to legitimate knowledge and thus must be inconsequential to the development of social regeneration during this phase. This favored progress given that it assisted men and their passions for innovation. However, the passions engendered both the good and bad aspirations such that conflict was inevitable between them. While the Positive doctrine expectedly extended its reach further into a less restricted social environment, the speculative influences could too, destroy these better ambitions. By the individual sovereignty and rights of man arose vanity, pride, and envy and of which were often supported by the proclamation of political fraternity which easily materialized into
insurrection and a powerful resistance to authority, order and social law. As Comte envisioned, this condition completely characterized the negative revolutionary phase making evident its total opposition to the critical doctrine distinguishing the Positive Philosophy and confirming the latter’s necessity for expanding human development through principles of Order and Progress.

In summary of this stage in the evolutionary process Comte described the Metaphysical phase as represented by three distinctive periods, each revealing an important and necessary contribution to the development of Positivism. The initial segment had produced many of the great minds of the seventeenth century; Thomas Hobbes particularly being favored for his grasp of Cartesian principles and for his laborious efforts in revolutionizing philosophical and political thought. Recognized as the theoretical precursor to the formulation of the Positive polity, Hobbes’ critical analyses greatly influenced modern metaphysicians and doctrine consistent with its advancement in the following century. Following in this vein of intellectual character the second period distinguished its resistance to the ancient and essentially backward motion and condition of primitive Fetichism. This point of theological dogma ceased to develop further in this transformative age, for example via the conversion to Deism advocating the veneration of nature and imposing an embrace of more general theological ideas in lieu of strict and inflexible doctrines of faith. This perspective created its own consequence, however with the theoretical ideal of self-love and the insistence of individual salvation of the soul and conceptions of morality infusing its metaphysical
followers with personal anxieties and irreconcilable doubt. As Comte explained, these imaginary self-indulgent interests stood in opposition to realistic objective thought further reinforcing the blinded negativity of the Metaphysical phase at the expense of Positivism’s encouragement and direction toward the genuine and concrete illuminations of the mind. The intellectual character of this period could not otherwise move forward productively and had only sanctioned the dogmas consistently strengthening the negative doctrine. As evidenced by the political character as the third feature dynamically affected by the misguided foundations of this period, the temporal power deferred to the otherwise popular spiritual order by allowing restrictions on its authority including its ability to facilitate the social progression of which it could otherwise promote.

As Comte observed, the embrace of Protestantism had come at great cost to followers and owed much to the decline of the social and political state. The emancipation of the human mind had suffered significantly from its radical dogma and its failure to provide sufficient spiritual reform that included the support of intellectual liberty and a final retreat from “mental despotism (189).” The only direction it had provided was the movement forward into the negative or retrograde metaphysical philosophy, its scholars and men of letters of whom now held firmly to their authority as masters over the minds of many residing in the universities and parliaments. The education provided was almost purely literary, described Comte and was far distant from Positive science and its “pure thinkers” of the modern age; disappointingly, the “art of expression was more important than the power of thinking” (192), the result of which
encouraged dangerous hypocrisy and theoretical confusion. The most serious of metaphysical hindrances was the failure to encourage any valid philosophical ground or conviction among its many opinions, speculations, and intellectual differences. The resultant social rivalries and conflicting ideas could only produce an irrational and weak system of logic having no reliable methodology or expectation other than to reinforce disagreement and doubt among an array of sophistical and purposeless contributors. Referred to as the “destructive school” (193) Comte explained that prominent metaphysicians and disciples of the negative philosophy had greatly influenced the political order while concealing their true revolutionary spirit. Appealing to men’s passions the movement flourished as the new school of politics, founding institutions developing its core principles, and establishing a class of minds consistent with the even more commonplace and inferior from every constituency. Rousseau had been the notorious advocate of this new political school and in Comte’s view the theorist had applied more aesthetic finesse to political doctrine and far less to its intellectual relevance and utility. The political philosophy was useful however as it accompanied in this evolutionary process the ideals and theory as well of various economists, for example Adam Smith who had influenced rulers and directed governments as to their industrial and military expansion. Political economists were especially beneficial in promoting scientific study and their motivations further advanced new discovery and innovation.

Comte concluded of this progressive yet revolutionary negative phase that it had nonetheless failed to guide men to any deeper conviction or reverence for rational
knowledge and intellectual progress. Its philosophical inaccuracies and inconsistencies rendered it useless for establishing a practical and stable political order; its social system, equally detrimental had surrendered to sophists and ill-equipped orators focusing on the passions for curing the ills of a morally conflicted society. Traditional foundations of Catholicism had dissolved into a hatred for its dogma and the Protestant theological doctrine could not restore or sustain its earlier stabilizing ground of ethical conduct. Social conflict reverted to the temporal power for solving differences while arbitrary laws and regulations further impinged upon the public domain and its private moral convictions. And as such with its moral deterioration and political and social dissolution responsible for the near demise of man, described Comte, it was clear that the phase would perish. [For] “in such a result we see the proof of the temporary character of this pretended philosophy, formed as it was to destroy, while it was utterly unable to organize even the simplest human relations; and the more it triumphed in its political direction, the more conspicuous was its organic imbecility (198).”

The Reorganizing Movement of the Positive Phase

The transition to the Positive stage had evolved gradually from the fourteenth century forward as modern innovation and new sociological processes and industry further retreated from old feudal systems, its destructive warfare and Catholic dogma. In Comte’s observation, four classifications of human society existed and moved forward along an evolutionary trajectory leading to modern advancement. These social elements,
“the industrial, the aesthetic, the scientific and the philosophical” (203) developed in varying degrees and at different intervals while coexisting together, each contributing to the other in the process of human progression. Within them were levels of succession particularly moving from the general to the specific and from abstract knowledge to the concrete and practical. Of the most advanced societies the rise of industry was most noticeable as the mainspring of social, practical, and intellectual activity. Its positive ascendancy to developing modern foundations included a spirit of goodwill and communitarian solidarity supporting the means of production among and for the benefit of its working classes. This favored both domestic stability and enriched the moral and aesthetic spirit. Integrative social relationships within the industrial environment from agricultural to emerging commercial and manufacturing centers replaced old systems of caste and hierarchal power. Public and private interests improved as their activities became interchangeable in providing social goods and services to growing populations. As Comte described of the benefits of industrial societies, “the love of gain is surely preferable to the love of pillage” (214) referring to the previous centuries marked by war and conquest.

Certainly industrial systems were naturally imperfect given various human deficiencies and often lacking progressive social organization. Generally however, the development of industry advanced particularly the order and discipline of the masses, Comte explained. The denial or acceptance into the labor force was the means of coercion, subtle and effective in driving the cooperative and positive working spirit. It
was a far less oppressive method than force as in earlier times of command by servitude or slavery and served to strengthen and unify laboring communities. New polities materialized along with their legists constructing laws and affirming their political powers. And as industrial development thrived, so had the period encouraged Deistic expression from which the emancipated social forces proclaimed their independence from theological and feudal oppression. In the largest French and English cities of Paris and London this spirit of industry reigned steady via its liberal influence with far less dependence on traditional political foundations. The military system withdrew from its stronghold of force giving way to decline and diminishing power as industrial leaders gained and accordingly refashioned its authority to include paid armies retained importantly for national defense. Forming political alliances with the aristocracy the new industrial elite encouraged control of organized labor and its operations under a mutual jurisdiction of influence. Political institutions reflected these changes particularly in regulating production and management of industrial invention and innovation. The manufacture and distribution of firearms, for example coexisted with a well-equipped and compensated modern army.

One of the most significant industrial innovations during the modern reorganization period and largely contributing to rapid social and intellectual progress emerged with the development of printing. The art and manufacture of books and reading material became the great instrument of scholarship for mass consumption only limited to those not having yet developed the skill of reading. The access to educational
resources and communications encouraged the increase of knowledge in various disciplines of study along with contributing further to political realignment given the increasing criticisms of the religious order and oppressive governmental regimes. While feudal systems and monarchical leadership remained foundational albeit existing in uneasy congruence with rudimentary industrial development, changes in literacy, aestheticism and its movement toward new and freely expressive artistic pursuits encouraged individual independence and emancipation from original foundations. Catholicism’s earlier commission of the arts including the masterful works of skilled painters, sculptors, and architects designing the great cathedrals and their elaborate furnishings encouraged aesthetic advancement in greater European society. And with this artistic flourishing the expansion of modern language corresponded with the burgeoning creative energies circulating among the Western European nations. A retreat from dead languages (Greek and Latin) was most noticeable among common social communication and popular expression in turn would alter meaning not limited to words but also in conceptual theories and approaches to new knowledge and discovery.

As Comte observed, Western advancement was especially characterized by its impressive originality and the spirit of spontaneous creativity brought about by the surrender of an earlier restrictive social state which included the very old and gradually impotent revelations of antiquity. The enjoyment of aesthetic ingenuity became to even the most humble a true social movement of cultural enlightenment attending to human moral, spiritual, and intellectual understanding. Following closely with industrial
progress the embrace of aestheticism encouraged further scientific discovery and technical innovation. Envisioning the design of scale, line, and shape of a work of sculpture was for example, comparable to the mental exercise of mathematical calculation utilized for producing instruments for research such as a sextant or telescope. As aestheticism in relation to the political order was commonly present in monarchical systems, the fine arts particularly the development of poetry increased in popularity among the aristocracy and later in its propagation among the general polity. The works of Shakespeare, Cervantes, and Moliere were universally successful becoming among the growing repertoire of the dramatic and literary arts an established part of social progression and in Comte’s vision represented civilization’s ongoing advancement toward the Positive state.

The cultivation of science and the advanced study of natural phenomena as a significant social classification in the reorganizing movement paradoxically owed much to the monotheistic state, observed Comte, given the ongoing replacement of its religious prophesy and revelation with rational thought and its investigative activity. Particularly the intellectuals of the period ventured far beyond the speculative theories and literature produced in the metaphysical schools, focusing on mathematical concepts in conjunction with astronomical exploration and analysis. Historically interesting were the various phases each great civilization had journeyed in terms of their advancement as illustrated by the Arab world’s progression in scientific discovery during the same time of the Christian wars and Western military domination. The latter would follow the Arabians
just after the centuries of discovery of the celestial world and the advancement of disciplines such as geometry, trigonometry, and importantly chemistry. Paving the way for the modern Positive state, the embrace of science both contributed to the decline of traditional (speculative) philosophy and subsequently created philosophy anew. Its rational course as it persistently educated the human mind and further stimulated its curiosity established the theoretical grounds by which universal principles were substantiated. Through alchemy had evolved chemistry—astronomy via astrology; the philosophy of science had gained the nascent powers and wisdom of the ancients and extended its reach further to create modern and more sophisticated methodologies. It easily cast the Positive spirit upon the social realm gaining the popular confidence for its new doctrines via a slow but continual induction into the scholastic systems. The encouragement of science equally gained footing in view of governmental authority to which the processes of industry and military development relied. Training academies were founded in order to create a working class that put to practical application new theories and discoveries, these introduced by the men of science (e.g., Bacon and Descartes) who had become an independent exclusive class often favored and protected by the monarchy.

“. . . the transitory philosophy which, for the three last centuries, science has been destroying” (262) retreated simultaneously with the emergence of Positivism. While the metaphysical spirit had continuously engaged in conflict involving both the temporal and spiritual orders, by contrast the Positive philosophy gained substantial ground in
scientific innovation and progress. Comte affirmed that Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo had been its true founders and should be credited for successfully abandoning the ancient traditions and scholasticism in favor of rational thought and its firm grasp of science. As time also contributed to the dissolution of the Philosophic Tradition, the positive spirit claimed complete possession of it such that it would later reclaim anew its scholars and students in the engagement of social regeneration and modern progress that would follow in the third phase.

Conclusively, the need for a systematic homogenous state could not have been more fully necessitated or justified, explained Comte, and more imminent in genuine purpose. Industrial society as it continued to flourish had neither been able to regulate nor organize its common social and political interactions adequately between consumers and myriad producers, laborers and the kingpins of industry. Unchecked self-interest and absent a civic consciousness, the public domain had degraded into “blind empiricism” (273) having little direction nor ability to manage itself or guard against a constant threat of economic and political ruin. The “collisions and complaints” were numerous and destructive particularly among the abused and suffering laboring poor. Comte laying the foundation for the embrace of the Positive Philosophy described of his own historical period:

We find ourselves living at a period of confusion, without any general view of the past, or sound appreciation of the future, to enlighten us for the crisis prepared by the whole progress yet achieved. We find ourselves after half a century of tentative confusion, oscillating between an
invincible aversion to the old system and a vague impulsion towards some kind of reorganization (276).

The moment had come for the final ascent of Positivism. Certain of the complete failure of the Metaphysical phase affirmed the conclusion in Comte’s view that nothing could have been more negatively disabling and ultimately destructive for advancing civilization particularly as it included the Philosophic Tradition especially celebrated during the turbulent revolutionary stage. The decline had begun just before its initiation with the dissolution of the Jesuit school considered the only possible redemption for a continuously decaying Catholicism and its resolute moral order. The liberal Protestant ethic contributed equally to failure as the so-described retrograde movements like the American Revolution which had provoked simultaneously the French response carried further the ill-destined philosophical emancipation, i.e., the metaphysical foundation of universal principles having no real course for its doctrine; constitutionalism being “fully exposed to their organic helplessness (278).” The victory of the legists along with their colleagues in kind, the metaphysicians and “degenerate successors”, i.e., “doctors, judges, and inadequate managers of society” (279) as Comte described, all as active agents mentored the moral and political confusion and languished in the consequent revolutionary crisis. To its credit, this retrograde transformation witnessed an enlightenment of some merit in the social world but at the expense of adequate rule to temper its unconstrained movement. The “incapable multitude” (284) was called upon to self-govern which could do nothing short of destroy its own necessary political
institutions and endanger the social order by enhancing civil power over military. Thus the response eventually would come to further restrain modern progression materializing in the form of tyrannical dictatorship [Comte referring to the earlier era of Napoleon Bonaparte] and a repression worse than any former period had produced. Particularly repugnant was the degradation of social character attributed to a system perpetuating certainly violence but as well, a voracious tendency toward vice and vanity, absent of restraint and regulation from its immoral and self-destructive propensities. Government too could provide nothing of intelligent guidance or support for the rule of law as it thrived on corruption and illegitimate power. Comte described this evolution as the “complete fulfillment of the negative philosophy” (290) in which all authority had fallen into the hands of charlatan leaders and anarchist organizations, “literary men” that had penetrated every corner of society with the negative doctrine. The theological system filled its ranks of offices with disingenuous laymen and the morally innocuous representatives of a virtually inconsequential religious spirit absent of virtuous inclination. Likewise, the respected military caste had gradually dissolved during the revolutionary crisis stage and its provision of order and security was substituted with the conscripted or voluntary armies made up of the non-military public who would otherwise regard the obligation as burdensome and impermanent.

Science too and its earlier rigorous pursuit of specialized knowledge in the Cartesian fashion had not progressed to any degree of enlightenment especially as Comte predicted of its completion of the intellectual phase integral to the Positive Philosophy.
Rather, science had regressed into mediocrity in which its savants had only limited vision of natural phenomena having succumbed to the mental enslavement of metaphysical retrospection, a “disgraceful triteness” and with it “the rise of ordinary minds,” (304) as Comte described. Of the most engaged scientists, the mathematical empiricists and their studies were devoid of any vision for future discovery as their methodologies could only be repetitive of their former analyses. Further, the purity of science had been tainted during this phase as the inaccuracy of research subsisted along with a degraded affiliation with industrial profit, creating a class of intermediate savants stagnant between traditional speculative philosophy and a modern Positive renovation of the scientific fields.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century the state of philosophy had reached a similar low point Comte observed, as it had infiltrated areas of knowledge from which it should have otherwise been restrained. These were involving both social and moral foundations that were better left to empirical doctrine absent the speculative and abstract. It was expected that a complete theoretic generality of human progress should ideally arise by virtue of an advancing intellectualism over time; but contrary to the prediction, philosophy in the prevailing second phase had been impotent of anything of the Positive inclination. Dogma and stagnation of theoretical inquiry had been its only attributes and it had produced nothing of value to modernizing humanity. Further, this primitive state of philosophy originating from Greek theory and scholasticism had attempted to be equal to science in its earliest progression of grounded principles (e.g., logic) which within its purview had only created more absurd and grandiose pretentions. In Comte’s critique the
work of philosophy in its already exhausted and decayed condition had been “one of the most memorable examples on record of a disastrous metaphysical infatuation (309).” And on this idea it would become clear that philosophical science must eventually be replaced by a scientifically grounded Positive philosophy. The “renovation” would finally dissolve the old and useless contemplations of human existence as science would become the only basis for truth and with this transformation Comte’s design for Order and Progress together would reconcile to create a perfected human world.

The Third Phase – “Philosophical Renovation” and the New Positive System

“Science is the only basis of the true philosophy,” (310) declared Comte as he concluded his detailed analysis of the Metaphysical Second Phase and his commentary on its disastrous outcomes that he believed had thoroughly burdened and impeded human social and political progress over time. As his treatise turned enthusiastically toward promoting the great benefits that the Positive Philosophy would provide, it had as well scrupulously removed the old and formerly resilient Philosphic Tradition and its general theories from the dialogue. The future must proceed from the human evolutionary stage to present modern reality and the “fully positive life,” (311) described Comte via an advanced sociological system no longer vulnerable or unstable as in the past. The revolution would proceed in stages centering first on the intellectual, then moral, and finally political spheres (311), the ultimate concurrence of all establishing in complete harmony a perfected and Positive living system. The regeneration of the Positive
doctrine would arise as the new moral authority as the general laws of nature would be reconstructed in conformance of its enforced discipline both in habit and mind. Human society would rely on the Positive principles to direct its actions and inform its philosophical contemplations. Importantly, there must be a lasting and complete separation between theory and practice, advised Comte as these were juxtaposed alike to the differences in the arts and sciences, their powers apart being best perfected and systemized. This applied to governmental authority as well given that the concentration of powers had failed in its creation of constitutions and corresponding institutions which too little provided for the social need and a direct supervision necessary to avert conflict, disillusionment and apathy. As Comte explained of the new system’s capabilities, modern societies would be restored of harmonious relationships via a rational and durable Positivism described as a “true solution” that would require the submission of “all classes” to a moral authority and “under the instigation of a spiritual authority strong enough to enforce discipline.” Moreover, “rights would be replaced by the calm and precise determinations of duties” (318), the former a principle of the old Metaphysical doctrine and particularly referring to individualism replaced by the collective social state’s obligations. In the Positive governmental framework the ideal of universal rights would not be permitted as it adhered to the desire for selfish and also passive causes, explained Comte; rather, the state’s approach would actively generate cooperative compliance toward generosity and compassion for the whole.
Comte insisted that a universal system of both intellectual and moral education of the Positive Philosophy be implemented in modern societies beginning with the entire population of Western Europe. Further, the various branches of knowledge must be coordinated and directed toward developing the Positive doctrine; the renovation of philosophy arriving at its completion after eliminating all extraneous abstract and speculative conceptions. This application would dissolve the dissensions among differing interests and finally cure social conflict. As an important part of the process, children would be trained appropriately in attitude and moral habit in necessary preparation for adulthood duties in maintaining a civilized, orderly state one deferring to the spiritual and political authority dually governing the Positive polity. Certainly religious activity contributing to the shaping of moral systematizing would be necessary as its influence was capable of eliminating spiritual controversy.

The Metaphysical philosophy had failed to construct a political regime asserting itself beyond national borders in Comte’s view, thus in considering the congruence of all advanced modern states [numbering five in the category at the time of his writing] and in association with the Positive progression, a universal moral authority should be established in which all would be commonly engaged. Populations would be connected via this Positive education which could only arise among Western European nations seen as the only fit civilizations prepared for the social regeneration. No primitive theologically based or metaphysical societies could adapt to the new Positive Philosophy and no attempt should be made to include them as it was necessary to extend the
regeneration within an exclusive and homogenous society of Western Europeans. Writing this passage in the early 1840s, Comte presumed that great wars would not occur again as adaptation to Positivism moved forward; nonetheless he believed a safeguard of one diplomatic “higher” power was needed to moderate and/or extinguish inevitable conflict between nations, classes, and individuals. The latter would subordinate to its authority representing “the power of a regular discipline of minds (324).”

Within this framework of Positive states and their internal networks the separation between private and public occupation should be dissolved and reformulated into a complete public system of operations and utility of which should be considered wholly social and necessarily suitable to the general need. Private vocations under the system of Positive regeneration would embrace the obligation to the public sphere and fully contribute to the modern universal order. Further, hierarchies would develop naturally in Comte’s reorganizational schema as the superior ranks particularly constituting first the active powers (industrial production and capital management) then the speculative classes (the Positive sciences), and finally the aesthetic arts (lower order) would emerge as a fully functional social system. The industrial power included its own hierarchal order ranked by vocation, e.g., bankers and financiers occupied the highest level, followed by the merchant class, then manufacturers, and finally agriculturists and laborers (329). Comte assured that social inequalities and abuses in the system would be minimal as each occupational entity would agree with and support the Positive education instilled in the population as a guarantee of harmony among all devoted to the general welfare. With
this promise all would enjoy a freedom dependent upon their contribution, the means of which would be available to those worthy and capable. While this assured the Positive social development, it would as well require the exclusion of the unworthy (the ignorant and/or unmotivated) which must at first be guided both in moral and practical instruction. With their reconditioning, “. . . quacks and dreamers would lose their vocation” and there would no longer be “questions of right [but more certainly] questions of duty (334).” Once educated and assigned to employment their Positive energies would reinforce the burgeoning working classes loyal to the system’s functions and goals.

Defined as the “new spiritual authority” (336) the development and definitive doctrine of Positivism would pass through stages. The first, described Comte would generate the reorganization of opinions (the speculative and theoretical ideas) and evolve further into accepted moral ideals, principles, and practices that would ultimately emerge as Positive political institutions. Positive methodologies would convert original epistemology and its philosophical foundations into a broad scientific approach, replacing the abstract and/or exploratory theoretical questions with the relative means for answering them; the former’s principles would ultimately yield to practical application. Now would both the conception and the utility of Social Science assume its natural position that is, to fully direct and implement the means of achieving Comte’s greatest vision of Order and Progress. The ancient and impotent Metaphysical phase would be demolished, its scholars and legists deemed contemptible in their retrograde schools and corrupt political offices would be removed and the destructive revolutionary elements
would no longer threaten the political structure and temporal authority. Human destiny would reach its pinnacle success in Comte’s Positive Philosophy and from its creator’s most assured and confident standpoint the future of mankind would be saved from ultimate ruin.

**A “Religion of Humanity”- Developing the Faith in Order and Progress**

During the period from 1851 to 1854, Comte composed his second significant work, *Systemé de Politique Positive or Traité de sociologie instituant la religion de l’Humanité* comprising four volumes and translated into English as, *System of Positive Polity, or Treatise on Sociology Instituting the Religion of Humanity.* In prefacing the work he explained the title appropriately represented the Positive science as a firm foundation for establishing a sound universal “religion” for the ages under which a powerful new social structure and its correlative moral directives of Order and Progress would eventually flourish. The opening chapters reiterated the substance and goals set forth in the Positive Philosophy essentially emphasizing both the embrace of scientific development and the general principles of Positivism that would reorganize and systematize humanity in its final evolutionary phase, guiding it forward into a productive and prosperous future.

One of the most interesting passages in this final treatise conceptualized the notion and understanding of truth of which Comte proclaimed was essentially “rendered homogenous” as it would converge under one principal moral doctrine (329). As to moral application this meant that the Positive study of humanity and its progress should
be objective allowing for the freedom of the intellect to explore and synthesize knowledge of phenomena while remaining distant from various subjective digressions; thus control of intellectual activity must be exercised in every instance via scientific methodology. This would require establishing a rational inductive process of reasoning based upon empirical evidence for synthesizing all of the characteristics and complexities of human life. The general laws resulting from applications of both Social Statics and Social Dynamics would produce the required knowledge (basic informational data) and for complete systematization and functionality this knowledge would merge under the Positive sciences from which one, the “science of humanity” (332) materialized as an absolute source of truth. In Comte’s vision and expression of its intellectual character, Positivism was synonymous with words describing its capability, e.g., “certain”, “precise”, “real”, “useful”, and “relative”, all of which were considered the “highest attributes of human wisdom (333).” Thus truth while formerly not appearing in material form and essentially an abstract conception in the traditional metaphysical sense would instead be revealed in concrete terms through the Positive science; humanity could only benefit from this new definition, as Comte envisioned.

Positivism also included a motivating force that Comte believed necessary for achieving the Philosophy’s central imperative of Order and Progress. Love, as the principle foundation of its labors would render complete the Positive system’s harmonious merging of human reason, moral activity, and of feeling including the sympathetic and altruistic expressions, each fulfilled suitably within the social
organization. The domestic role and familial duties of women were especially fundamental in this regard, promoting the indispensable social bond and deepening the spiritual power within the private sphere by tempering the material and political forces that arose from the rational will and self-interest. Women as naturally compassionate beings must be protected and supported by men so that their sympathetic affections would expectedly flourish and guide the moral development of Positivist society. Similarly within the framework of moral perfection, philosophers as general theorists should only provide intellectual and speculative influence relative to the Positive school and must refrain from governmental affairs. The creation and maintenance of wealth and industry should be regulated by capitalist administrators and both political and economic responsibilities would better rest in the hands of the upper classes and be concentrated in the positions of power ensuring the general welfare of the state. The “priests of humanity” (388) all compatriots of the system, including the working classes and women would devote their services and energies to developing, perfecting, and sustaining the Positive doctrine and mission of Order and Progress.

In view of Comte’s fastidious outline of human history featuring the theory of the three phases, there included two important periods each representing past development; the first initiated the foundational Order derived from the early stages of primitive Fetichism and followed by basic theocracy; the second and successive period corresponding to Progress was described as “sociocracy” (448). The latter attributed particularly to Western doctrine and associated with the forward movement of humanity
over several centuries had considerably distinguished itself from static Eastern theocratic foundations. As Comte perceived, Order and Progress had in this context opposed one another and along with this conflict disrupted the collective movement and historical continuity of human society. The future of humanity thus depended on the Positive ‘priesthood’ that would unite the governing principles of both theocracy and sociocracy [this conducive to moral and intellectual development respectively]. The previous static theocratic Order would cease to exist and instead transform into an absolute ground for Positive reorganization. And no longer would retrograde anarchy that had arisen between the developmental periods threaten the sociological foundation as Progress would result as the synthesis of a disciplinary system from which all mankind’s energies derived from both the theological and sociological would coexist harmoniously, evolve naturally, and need no modification.

The idea of the perfection of mankind culminated in the final fusion of each ‘priesthood,’ both the theological and sociological states completing the formula for the ultimate system dedicated to its service and progression. Alike to the Roman social order, definitive action would replace speculative epistemology with the regenerative Positive movement centered significantly on improving and fortifying public life. Collective purpose would subordinate the private as its intellectual power developed by means of scientific innovation would direct individual accomplishment toward the coordination and advancement of the rational state. The process would guarantee the whole as to securing its future existence which included the stabilization of its political
power and temporal forces. Likewise, the future of humanity would rest on this structural foundation as the Positive ‘Religion’ melded both the moral and the intellectual into active service relative to sustaining its generational continuity.

Comte had confirmed that both past and future were definitively linked by successive phases from which the universally recognized Religion of Humanity would eventually materialize as the final realization of the Positive Philosophy. Examined in “The Worship” of Part IV of the System of Positive Polity, the successful restructuring of the West depended upon an understanding and appreciation of the significant periods of human history, these it must necessarily pass through to complete the final transitional phase. Illustrated in detail, Comte devised the Positivist Calendar (472-73) demonstrating the theory’s close alignment with the Philosophy of History especially consistent with the perspective of modern thinkers e.g., Hegel and Marx. In this structural configuration consisting of a thirteen-month yearly period and a monthly trajectory ranging from the First Month - The Initial Theocracy (the age of Moses) to the Thirteenth Month - Modern Science, all of the stages of human history are categorized according to their epical periods existing over several centuries. The third month, for example identifies the age of ancient philosophy and under the heading ARISTOTLE the significant figures of this era, each associated with one day of each of the four weeks in the month are cataloged. For instance, week number three and days fifteen through twenty-one feature the names, “Aristippus, Antisthenes, Zeno, Cicero, Epictetus, Tacitus, and [in upper case], SOCRATES.” Moving forward to the fifth month of the calendar,
CAESAR heads the classification of Military Civilization and following in the sixth month, the category of ST. PAUL and the period of CATHOLICISM lists the Holy See and its beatified saints, each individual assigned to a day of the week including ST. AUGUSTINE positioned on day seven of week one.

A principle goal of the Positivist Calendar was intended as something of a moral imperative in which to illustrate the continuous span of human evolution and to honor various “servants” (468) of the priesthood that contributed to the preparatory stages leading to complete Positivism. Comte described the condition of true moral understanding as the “Great Being” and to which all “worship” was directed. Otherwise titled, Conspectus of Sociolatry or Social Worship two divisions marked a systematic synthesis between both the subjective creation of man under the title, “Love as the Principle, Order as the Basis; Progress as the End” and the objective appreciation of humanity, i.e., “Live for Others (the Family, Country, Humanity).” As described, the Worship of Humanity was arranged in a triumvirate of evolutionary social stages comprising in total eighty-one annual Festivals, these in a series grouped by month alike to the Calendar’s first through thirteenth and further sub-divided into categories organized under the two general divisions. Within the first of the three stages of Sociolatry reside Months One through Six and each titled according to fundamental social associations. For example, the first month represents general Humanity, its first systematic (Order and Progress) subdivision being New Year’s Day and under the second subdivision titled, Synthetic Festival of the Great Being, various Festivals of the
Social Union exist; four are featured in particular, religious, historical, rational, municipal. Likewise in the second of the three major evolutionary Preparatory States, the Seventh Month is characterized as Fetichism, followed by the Eighth and Ninth Months, Polytheism and Monotheism, respectively. Man’s existence is described initially as nomadic, sedentary, sacerdotal, and military and advances to intellectual development during which scientific and philosophic thought arises (the period of Pythagoras and Aristotle). Interestingly, the third and final social stage reflects the state Comte describes as Normal Functions (Months Ten through Thirteen) from which human evolution completes its destination into the realm and workings of Positivism. Each of the months here expresses a functional expectation, i.e., a significant level of Providence described in succession as Moral, Intellectual, Material, and General and correlating each by virtue of class categorizations. Women identified as mother, wife, daughter, and sister are included only in the Moral Providence grouping (Month Ten) while the “Patriciate” (Month Twelve) and their attributes corresponding to banking, commerce, manufactures, and agriculture define the Material Providence.

Festivals in Comte’s Conspectus of Sociolatry are imaginatively portrayed under the main subdivision of Social Worship entitled, Live for Others (the Family, Country, and Humanity), these as general idolizations of man’s state of being beginning with the first of the three Preparatory States (Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism). Essentially as artifacts of Fetichism for example, four Festivals illustrate mankind’s evolutionary development corresponding with the nomad, sedentary, sacerdotal, and
military stages, i.e., Festival of the Animals, of Fire, of the Sun, and of Iron. The Festivals arise in accord with human intellectual advancement and finally into the fully dynamic state (Normal Functions) of Positivism.iii The Festival of Castes through that of Trajan (within the Polytheistic State) is associated with conservative, intellectual, and social progressions. Similarly, in the Monotheistic State, fundamental Theocracy to Catholicism and Mohammedan correspond to Festivals of Abraham through Mohammed. The Metaphysical following within the same grouping celebrates the Cartesian phase of development. Comte’s Conspectus included a COMPLEMENTARY DAY and for this period the Festival of ALL OF THE DEAD takes place. Finally, an additional day for satisfying leap years includes the General Festival of HOLY WOMEN.

As a significant complement to the Positivist Calendar and in finalizing his ‘spiritual’ reorganizational theory ‘The Worship’, Comte created the Positivist Library in the Nineteenth Century, a compilation of one-hundred and fifty classic works grouped by subjects: I. POETRY (thirty volumes), II. SCIENCE (thirty volumes), III. HISTORY (sixty volumes), and IV. SYNTHESIS (thirty volumes). Aided by this extensive compilation of titles,iii Comte proclaimed that the priesthood as Worship of moral principle and the doctrine of Order and Progress would ascend to the summit of a Positivist religion in which Comte appointed himself the high priest over its clergy. Following from both Calendar and Library and guided by its creator, the Religion of Humanity would begin the social reorganization process. The initial task required constructing the Positive sociocracy and soliciting a cooperative government, explained
Comte, one that would fully dismantle its former foundations along with suppressing the “spiritual budget” (475) i.e., the theological, metaphysical, and scientific powers that had falsely been sanctioned by a retrograde and self-destructive society. The Worship would represent the Positive law and reframe the intellectual order as necessary for the “mental government of the human race,” (196) this by means of reformulating political theory and practice naturally via the doctrine of Social Physics. Devotion to the Positive religion especially concerned the eradication of that “revolutionary contagion” (203) earlier described which had arisen in its most detrimental form during the Metaphysical phase.

The result of unrestricted political expression and opinion must be recognized as adverse to the power of the state and its institutions, the popular will simply a display of arbitrary and dangerous hostility to the Positive order. The state of social anarchy had far reached its bounds in destabilizing governmental authority and too often afflicted the social organization always vulnerable to its constant antagonism. “True believers” were already practicing the “social sacraments” (476) observed Comte, as he finalized discussion of The Worship. Convinced that the priesthood was imminent in awakening humanity to its greatest triumph the chapter closed with the high priest’s absolution of the “fallen” as he described those blinded by the light of their own dogma and the many of whom had not yet converted to the faith of Positivism. The Philosophic Tradition could no longer save lost souls searching for redemption and peace that the Religion of Humanity could guarantee and that they, “would come asking from the worship of humanity the consolations and the protection that the decrepit beliefs can no longer give them (476).”
Comte, as he confidently believed of his own powers would fully sanction this total
rebirth of Order and Progress, the Positive system’s grand design, and in his grandiose
vision it would become the great Renaissance and he, the savior of humanity in the
modern age.
REFERENCES


2 Comte, Auguste. *Age of Monotheism. –Modification of the Theological and Military System*. Chapter IX. (82-133).

CHAPTER VI. Critical Analysis of Comte’s Positive Philosophy and the Rise of Logical Positivism

John Stuart Mill – Perspectives

No discussion of Auguste Comte’s Positivism and his reorganization theory would be fully illustrative of his vision for dissolving traditional philosophic foundations without examining the exemplary critique of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). As is known, both were thinkers during an age of profound social, political, and economic change in early nineteenth century Europe and the events that notably altered their intellectual perspectives, e.g., the French Revolution and the development of industrialization marked a rebirth of theoretical discourse and in retrospect, a reevaluation of philosophic thought for the modern era. Certainly the period summoned new ideas to confront the accelerating pace of human progress, posing questions of both direction and purpose if at least to quell the fear of uncertainty of an unknown future. Various conceptualizations emerged in hope of providing the modern blueprint for heading off the mounting and inevitable social disorder and avoiding a return to past propensities leading to conflict and war. Questions concerning property, wealth, status, and importantly power arose to challenge theorists and their inquiry for finding potential solutions to political antagonisms and social injustice. All to a large extent looked into the future, some seeing an abyss that human life must circumvent with its own invention for bridging the widening gap between that unknown existence and the past; others conversely, sought to
achieve the future contemporaneously as both past and present had only been antecedents of a greater and much grander human scheme.

Mill’s focused critique appeared in print under the title, *Auguste Comte and Positivism* (1866), a summary volume of over two-hundred pages in which he begins his analysis by introducing Positivism’s origins and underscoring its particular timeliness:

“Positivism” and “the Positive Philosophy” . . . Those phrases, which during the life of the eminent thinker who introduced them had made their way into no writings or discussions but those of his very few direct disciples, have emerged from the depths and manifested themselves on the surface of the philosophy of the age. They are symbols of a recognized mode of thought, and one of sufficient importance to induce almost all who now discuss the great problems of philosophy, or survey from any elevated point of view the opinions of the age, to take what is termed the Positivist view of things into serious consideration, and define their own position, more or less friendly or hostile, in regard to it (1).

Those most “friendly” to Comte’s magnum opus included English and various European thinkers and some scientists that began to consider the potentialities of the Positive Philosophy and its systemization theory. Mill noted that Comte’s treatise had attracted a following of admiring Positivist disciples and its creator had achieved a certain power and popularity both of reputation and as to the success of the *Cours* and the *Systemé*. Many ‘believers’ touted Comte’s extraordinary thought and doctrine and drew much attention to its philosophic innovation while as Mill observed, failed to attend to its most grievous errors and misleading falsehoods. These were positioned to be “injurious” (4)
explained Mill and thus an objective evaluation must ascertain truth from an otherwise idealistic and possibly erroneous vision of human progress.

Mill’s initial criticism of Comte’s conception of understanding phenomena and its relationship to human knowledge explained the Positive method of “foreknowledge” (6) i.e., a distinction made of the original Positivists Comte named early in his treatise, e.g., Bacon and Descartes. In seeking phenomenological cause, scientists develop a control and/or power over their subjects as perceived in their relative state of being via experiential or experimental investigation. Observations were evaluated according to their general sequences or patterns; these explaining the object studied particularly relative to its antecedents and from which facts were derived from an ordered empirical perspective. Facts build upon each other in succession from which general laws are then deduced. While this process secured a greater confidence in acquiring knowledge of phenomena by means of its methodological approach (assuming the “foreknowledge” is accurate in its control of the study), it was certainly as Mill observed, narrow in its vision. The Positive science did not question the original source of existence or being of subjects as they are; nor did it investigate the nature of phenomena in any way other than how it was relatively perceived. To Mill and his especially direct criticism of Comte, this method was nothing new yet the Positive Philosophy suggested this as solely the author’s own invention. Further, Comte’s particular nomenclature was criticized as distinctly partial if not beneficial to his theory in referring to the Theological and Metaphysical
stages and their adamant denunciations throughout the treatise, these obviously fitted to promote the final successful phase of his Positive creation.

Contrary to Comte’s definitions, Mill insisted that the Theological must instead be understood on objective grounds and its meaning should consider the significant source of its nature derived from and defined by the “Personal or Volitional” (10) state of human thought. Equally of the Metaphysical the term better defining the perspective of abstraction and reason via the study of nature should simply be referred to as the Ontological, commonly accepted among philosophers and theoretically greater in scope and practice. Moreover in its defense, Mill reflected on the Philosophic Tradition arising from this stage of human development. Following from the initial evolutionary phase of the theological spirit of volition in which the monotheistic God explains the universe and its phenomena to man, comes a new period of revelation as Mill eloquently described:

. . . . it is a power, or a force, or an occult quality, considered as real existences inherent in but distinct from the concrete bodies in which they reside, and which they in a manner animate. Instead of Dryads presiding over trees, producing and regulating their phenomena, every plant or animal now has a Vegetative Soul, the [Greek: Threptîkê phygê] of Aristotle. At a later period the Vegetative Soul has become a Plastic Force, and still later, a Vital Principle. Objects now do all that they do because it is their Essence to do so, or by reason of an inherent Virtue. Phenomena are accounted for by supposed tendencies and propensities of the abstraction Nature; which, though regarded as impersonal, is figured as acting on a sort of motives, and in a manner more or less analogous to that of conscious beings. Aristotle affirms a tendency of nature towards the best, which helps him to a theory of many natural phenomena. Many important consequences are deduced from the doctrine that Nature has no breaks (non habet saltum). Nature furnishes the explanation for the reparative processes which modern physiologists refer each to its own particular agencies and laws (10-11).
An important conclusion that Mill asserts here is that earlier modes of thought, both in terms of divine revelation and ontological interpretation and their respective explanations of various phenomena through centuries had never been considered limited or finite, nor that important theoretical foundations would be replaced by Positive epistemology. Comte’s generalization upon which is clarified the law of succession albeit of human history by virtue of its various phases (the Theological in three parts: Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism) and the Metaphysical as the indispensable transitional phase, confirms merely a survey of historical data upon which the Positive Philosophy finds its place. Mill added to this observation that unless Comte’s grand theory was true, “he has accomplished little” and thus a meticulous analysis must be rendered if at least to clear away its misconceptions that would otherwise “prevent many competent persons from assenting to it (13).”

Mill does not deny Comte’s various claims concerning the faults of both Theological and Metaphysical philosophical foundations, citing their inherent predisposition for confusing abstract speculations with reality. This observation was again nothing new to any scholar or student of history, reminded Mill and the most well-known of this form of thought was found in the great treatises of both Plato and Aristotle. Phenomena had always been explained in concurrence with the laws of nature and also by way of understanding the essence and/or substance of all things material. And while these laws were generally accepted there remained as much rebellion against the general doctrines of speculative thought which continued to develop abstract theories delving into
the occult and the supernatural. “Quiddities” (16) or pure essences of character and the
soul were meticulously investigated and the qualities of worth and virtue factored
significantly in philosophic interpretations of human phenomena. From antiquity
forward and periods far beyond the Middle Ages up to the seventeenth century,
Metaphysical thought (as Comte described the “preparatory” stage of man’s
development) had long survived its many battles with Realism’s challenges. By the time
of the Cartesian sciences, the differences in approach were marked and clearly defined.
Science seemed then to triumph over its adversary as Mill described; the creation of
forces and principles (17) affirmed new explanations of phenomena and rendered the
abstract merely simple and spurious names for things yet unexplained. It had, as Comte
envisioned cleared away the dogma of the past and its words of original inquiry and
discourse. As Mill observed of the result, “. . . . we have ceased to believe in what else
they once designated . . . (18).”

The human intellectual journey contrary to Comte’s law of three phases, had not
materialized in successive stages, Mill added. Rather the conjoined modes from the early
Theological to the Metaphysical foundations represented man’s progressive state as more
a systematic coexistence; the development of knowledge, discovery of natural laws and
disciplinary experience of observation and study combined and moved forward
cooperatively into new realms of understanding. Particularly citing spiritual evolution,
Monotheism for example had advanced from smaller Polytheistic cultism retaining the
notion and worship of various deities until adapting these gradually to the power and
authority of one God. This graduation was exemplified in the transitional period of Greek to Roman society, the subservient Olympic gods under the auspices of supreme ruler Zeus later by conquest fell under the control of Roman domination. The state religion of Rome initially included a number of individual deities particularly representing worship to its military leaders. For purposes of stabilizing the social order and harmonizing a diverse and fragmented society, Roman law drew into its religious dominion various cults and pagan deities all while Monotheistic doctrine gradually gained a foothold among leaders [e.g., Constantine in the early fourth century] adapting to its highest order of Christianity. As Mill asserts of this observation, Monotheism coincided best with the laws of nature, the adaptation to the will of one god reigning over the universe better revealed phenomena by the influence of a singular entity which included all variability always consistent and absolute. This was the point of human advancement where the invariabilities (the general laws of science) were discovered by virtue of the learned intellect applying the utility of calculation and measurement via geometry and rudimentary physics. Philosophers like Aristotle had explained the physical phenomena through empirical observation thoroughly enough to find themselves being violently persecuted by religious dogmatists yet nonetheless their theories developed from disciplined inquiry had stood the test of time. “. . . accepting a notion of divine government” (27) and that “the whole [referring to all of nature including human intelligence] was the work, not of many, but of the same hand” was an exceptional achievement. Importantly, this initiated the process of discovery of universal
laws and further endorsed the idea of an inclusive unity among all things both perceivably actual as well as the intangible abstractions.

Mill explained in his review of this period of human history that the Positive science had by virtue of its rapid advancement over some centuries during which Polytheistic and Monotheistic revelation existed was indisputably actualized at this time. It had not been the result of graduation to intellectual superiority by the succession of phases developing from the Theological and beyond. Human enterprise in its myriad forms which included its traditional foundations and principles had intertwined not harmoniously per se but nonetheless coordinately and consistently. The evolutionary process of human thought included the “volitional” approach arising from the primitive developmental state and further to the natural adaptation to gods and later the unity of one which then afforded a greater freedom for its disciples from Theologians to Metaphysicians, and Positivists. Neither was the successive process oppressive as Comte suggested of the former to Positivism as the advances made by each stage contributed to the various applications and formulas created by the energies of the greatest thinkers of each period. Mill observed the Metaphysicians particularly were derided by Comte for their “inconsistencies and absurdities” and a barrage of “negative criticism” (29) exaggerated his premise of their destructive interference with the mechanism of human progress. Charging the lack of Positive science and allied with the instinctive and arbitrary tendencies of abstraction that better conciliated observed phenomena and that which nature provided in fact had been to Comte, the worst episode of man’s historical
intellectual journey. This phase was distinguished in the Positive Philosophy as especially retrograde and troublesome, predominantly in destabilizing the political foundations of the social order and disrupting its vital progress. Contrary to this argument, Mill clarified the reality that the Metaphysical period had beneficially supported the framework of the Monotheistic state, the governing power which was essential to sustaining both the political order and social progress. Moreover, given its unifying effect by virtue of its disengagement from a variety of deities and powers in support of a universal authority consistent with its epistemology evidenced its fundamental contribution to intellectual thought and human advancement over centuries.

Mill further criticized Comte’s ordering of the sciences initially classified as either concrete or abstract and in which these were discrete, horizontally arranged, and scaled as one in subordination to the other. The abstract centered on phenomena existing in nature, for example the chemical elements and planetary forces had established by observation and study the general laws specific to the domain of Chemistry and Physics. The concrete sciences in Mill’s examples of Zoology and Botany were those disciplines that Comte would describe as developed in and of themselves and independently arising from their own evidentiary observations of phenomena. Each would thus draw exclusively from deductive reasoning supporting its own hypotheses. In adamant contradiction, Mill explained on the contrary that from the natural laws associated with the abstract sciences the concrete draws the important knowledge from which it develops theoretical specialization. Essentially, the sciences do not ascend upon a scale of ordered
truths nor advance according to their complexities by leaving behind original principles. Even in the concrete mechanical sciences the general laws of abstract mathematics (Algebra and Geometry) permanently apply and continue to form new laws related for example to the understanding of motion, gravitation, and the general phenomena of astronomical physics. Both the organic and inorganic are directly and indirectly associated with one another; human creations related to concrete matter derive from knowledge of natural phenomena and abstract principles. A weathervane for example is created to observe the directional forces of weather and climatic change where both the abstract and concrete converge to form meteorological science. Additionally cited in Mill’s critique here is the object of human society of which Comte relates similarly in this theory and his marked objection to the idea that it depends solely on the laws strictly of its own making. In reality, man’s existence is fully interconnected with the totality of all organic matter, e.g., animal life, the terrestrial forces and the indisputable universal laws of nature; the abstract principles are undeniably present and in absolute terms never temporary or disassociated from human experience.

Comte’s ideal on the eventual control that mankind establishes over his existence in the Positive phase in terms of predicting the relative behavior of phenomena through science is also a claim Mill disputes. Having presumably passed through the Theological and Metaphysical stages which held the abstract philosophy and aforesought leading finally to the Positive experience, the fact remains that man still conjures the so-called
irrational conceptions that continue uninterrupted throughout each phase and in which he expresses the eternal visions of perceived truth as Mill describes:

men still pray for rain, or for success in war, or to avert a shipwreck or a pestilence, but not to put back the stars in their courses, to abridge the time necessary for a journey, or to arrest the tides. Such vestiges of the primitive mode of thought linger in the more intricate departments of sciences which have attained a high degree of positive development. The metaphysical mode of explanation being less antagonistic than the theological to the idea of invariable laws, is still slower in being entirely discarded (48).

To Comte’s credit, the Positive Philosophy had journeyed farthest in adopting a scientific methodology to the study of human social evolution; the thesis of antecedent sciences led instrumentally to its highest formulation of Social Physics and Comte’s systemization theory. As confidently constructed and resourceful as the theory appeared, Mill debated further its grounding premise particularly on the definition of a Philosophy of Science. As such, this must be “distinguished from the science itself” (53). Contemporary philosophers have customarily conformed with the ancient understanding of science which includes all moral, social, and intellectual knowledge known via man’s faculties and modes of thought relevant to the world in which he lives. This “science of Man” (53) importantly comprises an acquired philosophy that attributes to man, i.e., the whole doctrine of human experience arising from within itself and is developed through processes of the mind and its logic continually assessing knowledge from which its produces the most lucid conceptualizations. Specifically, truths that are discovered as
results of scientific study do not define science; as in philosophy it is the process of speculation and discovery rather than its end. Further clarifying this concept, Mill explained that the Philosophy of Science involved two principle parts, these being the “methods of investigation” and the “requisites of proof” (54). The former essentially describes the various paths of the intellectual journey that demonstrate how and to where it progresses toward its destination; the latter tests its discoveries and the evidence acquired. By Comte’s design this would mean arrival at a relative and finite truth, the science itself complete and ended by its own process of perfection and a result of which is believed as indisputably true. Yet as Mill questions, does this finite conclusion represent truth? The second principle of testing is absent in Comte’s formulation of social science. In comparison and as example of attempting deductive proof, Aristotle’s syllogisms (albeit in some sense are insufficiently generalized) reflect the theoretical and systematic testing of evidence. Comte’s inductive process similarly is nonexistent for testing inferences presumed correct (alike here associated with “luminiferous ether” (56) that cannot be directly proven yet nonetheless is accepted for its scientific utility in explanation of phenomena). As no hypothetical inference can be legitimized unless concrete methodology is provided as Comte’s pure science requires, then none of its resulting evidence can be known as truth. What is explained here is simply that Comte rejects any speculative logic and its application that would bridge the path to truth. Further he determined that its methodizing, from a metaphysical standpoint was faulty if not irrelevant to accepted and advanced scientific modes of study. But as Mill disputes,
this means that science must learn solely from the practice of science itself at its highest level which is the ultimate if not illegitimate claim of Comte’s Positive Philosophy. Moreover, without inductive reasoning which includes the ‘ether’ from which imaginative thought arises to form hypothetical inquiry, the pathways of the intellect are essentially limited to narrow interpretations of fact and do not as Comte believed move progressively forward especially as to his grand theory of human perfection.

Mill’s critique is often accusatory of Comte’s approach and proposed practice of philosophy citing his rejection of and particular contempt for other methods of inquiry, e.g., the Science of Psychology and its observations of intellectual consciousness. To Comte, self-observation of the mind and its reasoning powers would not go beyond the knowledge of simple biological processes. Given the principles of Positivism for example, observation of fact is limited to relative perception (concrete phenomena) thus this method would not include the intangible mediums such as memory, instinct or intuition. Yet as Mill argues, this exemplifies possibly the better part of human knowledge that is, man’s reflections upon his being and awareness of self is an essential part of inquiry and understanding. This approach was fundamental to the ancients in which the mind and soul of man were distinguished from animal life; that examining reasoning in terms of function and ability, e.g., the power to wonder and imagine could not be disengaged from science. Epistemological interpretation largely defined the dynamic basis from which man progressed in all other states of reasoning including relative perception. Unequivocally, the dismissal of this process of intellectual
examination for knowledge acquired merely by evaluation of what the mind has produced and the results taken from empirical study alone make clear as Mill affirmed the complete fallacy of Comte’s argument. Continuing in this vein, Mill further denounced the idea of studying the intellect via the archaic practice of Phrenology (the examination of bumps on the skull in determining individual character) which Comte suggested for observing mental function. Again, his analysis then would extend only as to biological processes, the brain being observed strictly as organic matter producing certain results of its activity, e.g., the appetites and emotions, the active capacities, and the intellectual faculties (65). And more fantastical in Mill’s observation of Comte’s approach was the idea that portions of the brain when adaptation to Positive thinking was fully evolved would eliminate the metaphysical tendencies that the theorist believed were barriers to human social progress. Critically speaking, it was obvious to Mill that the general theory of intellectual evolution that Comte created in accord with the Positivist thesis spoke little if not quite primitively on the character and relative contributions of advanced psychological study as the theorist had easily and unfortunately dismissed the important works of early scientists.¹ Comte positioned the Science of Psychology within the system of the Positive Philosophy simply as a derivative of the practice of Physiology and attributed little to its value and purpose. In doing so and fervently in regard to sponsoring the success of his project he was gravely in error as to making known its mistakes and disturbing oversights.
In response to Comte’s Theological and Metaphysical applications included in the general theory of *Social Physics*, Mill stated, “No one ever regarded himself or his fellow-man as a mere piece of machinery worked by a god . . . . (67).” While the Theological assumption indeed demonstrates that humans assert that a powerful god, divine will and its authority exist, human consciousness associates existence with belief in its spiritual and moral foundations such that man via the soul is connected to the deity rather than being its product. Further, abstract conceptions arising from Metaphysical thought guide human intellect and function as speculative pathways of progressive action in the political sense that equally determine the applications of moral law and distributions of power. Both experiences, as Mill explained should not be discounted as mere means by which an end is produced as an object fashioned from the mechanism, and neither do these most fundamental of human experiences rest upon a thinning foundation ready to break way for the emergence of a new Positivist Order. Political philosophy as an example of an evolutionary process of metaphysical thought rather than a product of itself, continuously engages the social world in its deeper convictions relative to ethics and the doctrines of “Intuitive Morality” as Mill described; this being the “oldest domain of observation and experiment (71).” Yet in deep criticism of the Philosophic Tradition, Comte belittles it as a revolutionary vehicle for attacking an imperfect society not yet advanced in the Positivist system. He does not credit it with any understanding of sociological truth or theoretical doctrine from what he otherwise defined as a provisional state. The Metaphysical phase must dissolve in order that man
establishes a disciplined and indestructible system of moral control that can overrule his
deep passions and intellectual convictions.

This approach revealed Comte’s disdain for the liberal and free-thinking discourse
on subjects of philosophic ethics and politics and the notion that opinion and doctrine be
formed only by more competent men, certainly of the Positivist school. Only those aptly
trained in the discipline of Positive thinking were better charged with these intellectual
challenges. As Mill contradicted this approach, he described in metaphor that this was
alike to “the man in the story, who being asked whether he admitted that six and five
make eleven, refused to give an answer until he knew what use was to be made of it
(76).” This is understood as simply denying the liberal approach to thought for the
adoption and practice of its rigid and more structured counterpart that requires relative,
precise, and calculated answers. While the methodology may be sound and the objective
pertinent to a utilitarian goal, i.e., solving questions with answers that result in some
productive practice or enterprise, it forbids the intellect of a more vital purpose of
allowing the mind to speculate outside of a prefabricated model and its formulaic design
for discovering truths. This does not deny established truth that man agrees exists in
various forms, for example that two added to two equal four. Rather, it simply professes
that one should be able to believe that the answer of ten is nonetheless conceivable
despite knowing the correct result of the equation. It is doubt that Comte objects to,
explained Mill and the necessary element of self-criticism important to all modes of
thought. This practice was retrograde according to the Positive Philosophy and clearly distinguished as dangerously revolutionary.

In defense of the Metaphysical modes of thought and its philosophic maxims believed counterproductive to the goal of social progress, Mill points out the contrary to the negative viewpoint. The Philosophic Tradition is no less ‘Positive’ than Comte’s formulations and has similar effect and significance especially in the political domain. The doctrines of justice, equality, and democratic freedom align with the desire for social order through which individuals and societies advance in their attainment of self-government. The principle of the self-governed arises from universal natural law but also entails the means by which its significant end is obtained. The process and its result are not retrograde or largely dogmatic as Comte asserts, nor impracticable as to the objective of reorganizing society in view of a positive ideal. For example, it does not reject a system of organization and political framework for legislating positive laws nor does it disavow authoritative leadership. Government assumes responsibility of keeping order while maximizing the regime’s theoretical axioms of justice. In effect, these political foundations arising from the practice of Metaphysics relative to social organization are fundamentally positive as Mill explains, and further account for progressive speculative and scientific thinking as Adam Smith demonstrated via his theories on Political Economy.

It is Comte’s superficiality in his critique and dismissal of this important work that is most irksome to his critic; Mill further asserting that Comte’s unfounded derision
of social scientists otherwise having added much to the discipline since Smith’s seminal contributions was especially puerile and misguided. In his evaluation Comte resisted the very discussions and meanings found in speculative sociology that are in fact indispensable to cognitive and concrete theoretical development. Mill further called to attention Comte’s arrogance in believing that scientific thought up to his own Positive invention and design had been virtually infantile and petty in comparison—those theorists before him were incapable of developing greater methodologies and advanced scholarship outside of their respective disciplines. Essentially Comte had identified himself as the ultimate sociologist and his method superior to all and any other dealing with sociological phenomena. Thus already having assessed Comte in his capacity as self-designated social scientist explained Mill, his Positive system must next be closely scrutinized in much the same fashion its author had applied to his fellows in the field.

The Positive method would first be evaluated for its validity as a “Science of Society” (83) and if it was to be representative of this designation it should hold to the same principles and modes of investigation, i.e., of deductive and inductive reasoning. In comparison, earlier formulations of society and Social Science drew from observations of phenomena of man’s existing nature and from which it arrived at by deduction the universal laws relative to the individual as a social being including the comprehension of his actions and accounting for human passions and feelings. Faulting this method as imperfect Comte insisted that the deductive process concern itself only with human history and social analysis be limited to the cumulative influence of antecedent
generations upon those that follow. As society progresses accordingly the facts of existence are clearly identified certainly not from abstract deductions, as Comte believed these to be imprecise and inconclusive but from empirical evidence provided by the historical record. From this perspective it is presumed that human beings are already molded by the experience of others preceding them. Individuals are neither universal in orientation but historical and existing behaviors are explained as the result of the whole of human social progress arriving at a particular period. Undoubtedly the phenomena of man’s being can be examined in relation to this designation as a species as Mill agreed, but the deductive process as one similar to the physical sciences is questionable particularly in verifying general laws. In sociological study it is experience that identifies these via the principles of human nature and in view of the general theory experience is never exactly the same nor is it necessarily patterned in a predictable chronological order consisting of causes and effects. Neither then is human civilization static at any one point. Moreover, this method of observing sociological phenomena as it corresponds with the common ordering in scientific analysis, i.e., the examination of the details or separate parts leading to evaluation of the whole is inappropriately applied. This approach should not be the case for Sociology, explained Mill. The social state alike to a complex organism is composed of various elements that consistently interact together in forming the greater human collective. These elements include continuously developing human accomplishment that relate to any present state of social existence and are especially connected with contemporary civilization. Citing “religious belief, philosophy, science,
the fine arts, the industrial arts, commerce, navigation, government” (87), Mill explained that all of these cannot be observed as apart from the whole or essentially compartmentalized, as Comte’s methodology requires.

Several of the arguments in Comte’s Positive treatise are considered weak if not unconvincing in Mill’s estimation. Concerning the various antagonisms that are described in his detailed analysis of the social condition or Social Statics, Comte reveals that man’s nature consists of being both self-interested and benevolent and these are never easily reconciled in the social state. This is a considerably trite observation as Mill explains. Similarly, labor (both mental and physical) is generally problematic such that it does not necessarily satisfy man’s perpetual needs or desires. This duality, the struggle between personal incentive to improve and the tendency toward apathy is an antagonism existing as a natural condition, again, nothing new to sociological study. Mill explained what is already conceived of this subject: “human nature is capable of great amelioration” via the “social instinct” (90) in congruence with the personal labors both physical and intellectual and indeed this exists as inspiring human development and progress. The question remains how the Positive Philosophy and Comte’s plan of social reorganization would enhance what is already Positive improvement.

Comte elaborates further on the elements of family life as part of the foundations of Social Statics clearly with a subjective opinion as to its functions and expectations, which Mill characterized as “of the most orthodox and conservative sort (91).” In view of the institution of marriage, Comte firmly insisted on the strict and invariable
Catholicized version while deriding the Protestant variations for including the authorization of divorce. His belief extended to the absolute subordination of women to men being under their control and protection. Wives in particular should be restricted to family responsibility and there was no other identification afforded women, as Mill observed of Comte’s view; they are either treated as “grown children [or] exalted into goddesses: honors, privileges, and immunities, were lavished on them, only not simple justice (92).” Strict obedience to marital roles and duties would ensure harmonious relations between men and women; the presumption further asserted that domestic accord is especially beneficial to the social stability of modern industrial societies. As the institution of marriage had demonstrated, the comfort and regularity of home and hearth is not disputed, as Mill reminded adding that its permanency in this regard is always the desired outcome upon its enactment. However, to mandate it as indissoluble given the nature of human vulnerability and its capricious misjudgments was an inflexible if not an ignorant charge of the social condition and all of its variable circumstances. Comte’s ideal could not have been more rigidly dogmatic on the subject, observed Mill. And in defense of divorce it could be argued that it had a legitimate and positive purpose; “—for enabling those who, by a blameless or excusable mistake, have lost their first throw for domestic happiness, to free themselves (with due regard for all interests concerned) from the burthensome yoke, and try, under more favourable auspices, another chance (94).”

A significant criticism of Comte’s Positive Philosophy is the theorist’s expectation that a higher intellectual and moral authority assumes the responsibility of
educating and shaping the ideas and opinions of men and through which it guides their consciences toward the right order of the Positive system. The notion first presupposes the complete agreement among all political and moral theorists after having adopted the general laws of the Positive science. Upon their unanimous accord the Positive Philosophers would assume their undisputed leadership positions as social and spiritual governors of the state. On this particular construct Mill remarked, “A function of this sort, no doubt, may often be very usefully discharged by individual members of the speculative class; but if entrusted to any organized body, would involve nothing less than a spiritual despotism (98).” This centralized ‘Spiritual’ authority of Comte’s creation could only propagate “evils” if the ideal became reality. Of the most basic of these is the dangerous assumption that “the social state determine what ideas shall be current; instead of the current ideas determining the social state and its character” (102). The Positive system would accomplish this through a process of moral modification of men’s natures, this in conjunction with the expectation of the individual’s disciplined obedience to the progressive character of the social state. The concept is grounded on the assumption that men’s intellect is overruled by the passions and these must be strictly tempered so that moral anarchy does not interfere with mental development and ultimately social advancement. As Comte insists throughout the treatise, history attests to the moral failure of man and his sentiments which are too random and anarchistic to be of use to his intellectual development. On the contrary, replied Mill “The passions are, in the individual man, a more energetic power than a mere intellectual conviction” to satisfy his
primitive desires (101). They are attributes of the speculative mind that further generate imaginative and useful ideas and opinions arising from abstract reasoning that in the social state are necessary for its improvement. Remodeling these natural tendencies to better conform to the Positive mode of conduct and thought with the expectation of greater intellectual progress is adverse to this objective.

Most noticeably deficient in Mill’s point of view of the Positive polity is that it only exists as an ideal and cannot be realistically practicable despite Comte’s careful formulations. Of its actual governmental structure only two significant powers exist; the Positivist thinkers (savants) are responsible for directing and managing the ‘spiritual’ and moral conduct of society; the other authority—the industrial class “an aristocracy of capitalists” (122) controls the temporal or police power presiding over the active energies and production of the state. The masses falling in between these have no claim to self-rule including intellectual development as they need only act in deference to the two and demonstrate obedience to them. Via the general application of the Positive science the two great powers will lead by the laws of Social Physics and through the force of Social Dynamics. In Comte’s vision social regeneration and its outcome, the universal social ascendency of humankind will ensure its highest ambition and that level of perfection achieved by the Positive general will. Any abuse of this dual system of governing would answer to the Spiritual Power; the inferior classes which are presumed fully in agreement with the Positive law would comply with their learned opinion on all matters public and private. The lower classes would not be obligated to pass judgment; this authority being
left to the state offices. As Mill points out, “Liberty and spontaneity on the part of individuals form no part of the scheme (123).”

In the introduction to Part II of Mill’s review of Comte’s Positivism he begins by mentioning various disciples in passionate support of his main treatise and the general concepts written in several volumes by the theorist over his lifetime. Of the many publications, one most influential to his English adherent and loyal devotee, Richard Congreve was the *Catechism of the Positive Religion*, which was translated from the French in 1858. The first edition was published in London with two later editions following in 1883 and 1891. Fully adopting the Positive Philosophy, Congreve founded the London Positivist Society in 1867 and in observance of Comte’s ideal creation, the *Religion of Humanity* and its *Catechism* established the English Church of Humanity in 1878. This led to the opening of an American version based on the ‘Positive faith’ and devotion to its principles of altruism, order, and progress and religious practice including sacraments and rites similar to Catholic ritual. Comte’s *Religion* also developed in Brazil with the opening of the Positivist Church of Brazil in 1881 and Positivism gained popularity nationally as demonstrated by the country’s flag which bears the Comteian motto, “Ordem e Progresso” (Order and Progress). As recognized by both his devotees and critics, Comte had acquired exceptional celebrity among many Positivists and generalists alike and his extraordinary intellectual focus and dedication to his work were noteworthy.
One peculiarity Mill observed of Comte was his rule of strict abstinence from all reading including popular and scientific publications, newspapers, journals, and books with few exceptions e.g., the ancient and modern poets. Comte believed this important for his “hygiène cérébrale” (mental health) (128). Mill to some extent made sense of this practice considering that concentration of the intellect and the absence of any distraction was necessary for the intense and laborious mental work that Comte demonstrated. However, it must be recognized that one loses the value of literary thought in all of its varieties and perspectives, including the critical view of the contemporary world which can only add to a greater understanding of truth. By analysis of other views one learns of one’s own erroneous assumptions or otherwise may validate theoretical propositions by comparison. In Mill’s chastisement of Comte’s hygienic practice he alleged that he had deluded himself in imaging that his great theoretical formulations were entirely faultless. Moreover, this was the most grievous of errors in view of the philosopher’s work of mind and speculative habit. Reflecting on the personal as the sole source of knowledge exclusive to any other modes of thought or others’ ideas prohibited its essential self-appraisal and objective critique. Comte had concluded of the theory and system of Positivism in this way that it was perfect, superior to any other, and needed no modification. And in this narrow vision the result produced a “gigantic self-confidence, not to say self-conceit. That of M. Comte is colossal” (130), observed Mill. Easily the self-taught having no standard of comparison grew more in his self-assured extravagance, as Comte had demonstrated and finally to an “outrageous” height of arrogance. As Mill
commented, one must read his writings to believe it but certainly this intense egoism was obvious.

As to Comte’s *Religion of Humanity* in which he was self-appointed as its High Priest, the “Worship” essentially had no belief in the traditional God, explained Mill albeit this was not a disqualification for making it a valid religion. In general, religion requires a strong conviction or belief that is given ultimate authority over one’s actions to which duty and devotional sentiment are attached. To the believer this creed or God is real although ideal in its conception as conventional Theism affirms. To Comte, both the real and ideal converge, the earthly deity, the “Grand Etre” created from this union arises as “the Human Race, conceived as a continuous whole including the past, the present and the future (134).” This was not to deny or otherwise replace the Christian doctrine of a Supreme Being. Comte’s God is essentially subordinate to it; however, the *Religion of Humanity* is claimed as an exceptional faith qualified to serve in its greater purpose, this being the cause of duty and veneration to the Grand Etre. Under Comte’s constructions of the faith the ultimate creed from which the spiritual and moral inspirations of man arise commands that individual self-interest and personal satisfaction be denied for the better inducement of living for others. In Mill’s translation of this theory of “vivre pour autrui” Comte mandates that, “We should endeavor not to love ourselves at all” (138) and in this one and only object (altruism) should man devote himself to man. Constant habit and discipline will incline individuals to restrain their natural egoisms and passions which will otherwise dissolve with their devotions to the *Religion*. Mill noted that personal
indulgences of any kind were to Comte immoral and should be suppressed. Moreover, the subject of morality completely “intoxicated” him to the point where every question rested on its necessity and purpose.

Comte’s Catechism insisted further on total unity between the personal and social, their complete harmony culminating in the absolute perfection of human existence. Further, the fully amassed human collective was the only way possible to achieve a lasting good to which it would surrender to the Positive system all its natural propensities considered negative to its progress. It is fair to ask the question: “Why this universal systematizing, systematizing, systematizing?, as Mill does of Comte’s theory. Why is it necessary that all human life should point but to one object and be cultivated into a system of means to a single end” (141)? The premise is ridiculous on its face as Mill explained, in that individuals are the sum of mankind and each given a fair share of freedom to pursue personal desires in view of others’ freedoms under the same rule achieve a happier state of cooperative existence and progress as a whole. Men are not automatons to be organized as well-oiled working parts of a greater human mechanism. Neither should individuals be absorbed into the mass human collective with only one purely moral purpose and goal. While man indeed exists as a social being or “political animal” striving for the common good as Aristotle reflected, it is not by selfless altruism that he survives. Nor is the social good possible without the individual human spirit and its incentive of “self-love” and gratification earned by personal life efforts and beliefs. Yet to Comte, no other way other than the Positive system could solve the great human
dilemma; religious devotion to the Grand Etre was the only hope for man’s future survival. Much like Calvinism, observed Mill, all other activity other than unselfish obedience and altruistic duty to this Positive Religion was considered sinful and deserving of moral blame and chastisement. But what is obviously missing in Comte’s argument is the true human condition of spontaneity (143) in which moral obligation is fulfilled without direct coercion and instead occurs by nature in individuals so inclined to contribute by their own means to society’s welfare. Through this they receive the gratitude from their fellows and are honored for their altruism as a personal exercise of faith in community. Sacrifice and charitable giving are self-motivated and are better offered through the personal desire of the benefactor that receives no pressure to perform good works. Conversely, altruism by means of a systematic obligation as Positivism requires is a contradiction if not a complete negation of its meaning and purpose.

The only necessity of social morality and right conduct that should be enforced, observed Mill, is the law that prevents individuals from harming others. Any other sanction insisting on absolute moral obligation and obedience is oppressive even given its best intentions. As to the practice of ethical behavior and its principles, these are best learned through education and experience. Granted the teaching of children the appropriate social customs and rules via a system of discipline and training is effective and this develops in adulthood by habit and circumstance their place as virtuous citizens in civil society. And in agreement with Comte, personal labors for the sake of benefitting others beyond satisfying individual wants should be strongly encouraged as a genuine
moral preference exercised for its own sake. However in the case of industry and production this force can never work in terms of moral perspective. Laborers in positions of subordination to employers do not perform in the spirit of good intentions per se more than they do for self-sustenance, their cooperation given in exchange first for satisfying personal need. Thus in contradiction to Comte’s ideal of mutual collaboration and through which an altruistic unity is achieved in relation to industry, cannot in truth be realized. The energies on both ends result as a condition of practical necessity and by which a certain equity and benefit is thereby agreed upon and obtained for each. Anything more expected of the arrangement would be alike to the commitment of soldiers to an army to which they have given their complete allegiance for its profit alone. This is not the case in civil society where free negotiation is better the rule for satisfying both moral and practical obligation.

Mill described several, as he called them, “really ridiculous” (149) elements of Comte’s theory. One in particular deals with religious devotion and prayer respecting those of honorable position and representing absolute moral perfection. These in Comte’s view are women being the best form of human existence and their positions in life as “the mother, the wife, and the daughter” associating all past, present, and future with three social sentiments: “veneration, attachment, and kindness (150).” As part of the Positivist system all believers must practice adoration and pay homage to them via regular prayer, this exercise performed over the course of each day in three timely sessions (morning, noon, and night) and totaling no less than two hours. Physical rules in
relation to time apply; kneeling in the morning session is required and must be given the longest time, the least in the middle hours, and as much prayer again in the evening period preceding sleep in order that dreams may be influenced by the mind’s observances. One may notice the similarity of Christian ritual and the worship of saints; likewise to Comte was the glorification of the whole of humanity, including the entirety of all social and political connections in congruence with its progressive phases including the class divisions Comte assigned to human life and its evolution. More than eighty festivals [as noted earlier in Comte’s Sociolatry] celebrate each week the ‘Social Worship’ and the principles of “Love, Order and Progress” in harmony with “Living for Others” representing the full doctrine of faith. The priesthood of the Religion of Humanity performs the sacraments totaling nine in reverence to the major transitions experienced in life, for example the filial relationships and proceeding to the occupational endeavors and finally death, considered a passage to immortality whereby the living celebrate the dead of whom symbolize the full experience of the Grand Etre.

To Mill in evaluation of Comte and his “public cultus” it could be summed in brief as the theorist’s complete “mania for regulation” and to its definitive end which “throws an irresistible air of ridicule over the whole subject (153).” As an example of the ridiculous was the extreme conviction to prayer and devotion to the Religion that Comte expected of all who would be enlightened to the Système de Politique Positive and its moral motive. Certainly, his absolute fidelity to his own creation was profound having the effect of raising his spirit both for himself and Positivism to heights far above the
realistic and sensible. But simply not everyone could be so enthused or easily adaptive which was among the many human reactions that Comte had failed to consider. An interesting comment by Mill was one observing the thinker’s personal character that reflected upon a man who had found no humor in life, laughter also eluding him over the years as he worked tirelessly on his masterpiece. A sense of deep seriousness predominated over his temperament and all other sentiment or emotion as Comte himself observed, flowed directly into his “moral regeneration,” this being a result of “une incomparable passion privée” (130) meaning the influence of his brief interlude with Madame Clotilde de Vaux of whom he developed a passionate romantic attachment. After her death and serving as his spiritual muse, Comte judiciously constructed the framework of the “Social Worship” which included Love as its principle devotion and within the Sociolatry the Festival of Holy Women was devised. The sentiments too were reflected in systematic arrangement as part of the Religion of Humanity. To Mill and other critics it was a ludicrous assumption of Comte to believe his followers amendable to this distinction of love and human affairs of the heart, these being personal to the individual, which Comte often overlooked in his grand design of humanity.

The political schema was no less dogmatic as Comte expected the Spiritual Power to dominate as the supreme governmental authority of which the clergy of his Religion commanded all moral activity. Specifically, he provided no place for a representative congress or a general assembly of any kind and absolutely no franchise granted for electing public officials. Simply, the process of nomination and appointment of leaders
by their predecessors was the only reasonable option assured Comte, the nominees subject to scrutiny by their superiors and political peers. The general offices and those empowered as public functionaries constituted a small wealthy class serving as the heads of industry (capitalists), managers and administrators of the subordinate laboring proletariat. They would be entrusted with the social welfare in respect of its economy and production only so far as they acted in service to the Grand Etre. No personal profit would be gained over and above a fair compensation earned for themselves and this was subsequently reserved for their heirs of whom would succeed them in occupation and responsibility. The system required all compliances related to capital be left in the hands of the qualified few in Comte’s ideal polity. This mandate also eliminated small proprietorships and enterprise of which should be absorbed into the larger capitalist system and their operations directed by and for the benefit of the Positive State. As Mill observed, Comte’s society consisted of two classes, “only of rich and poor” (163), the former entirely in charge of the means of production while also powerfully in command of the moral cooperation and obedience of its laborers presumed to thrive in agreement with the Spiritual Power. In kind, social and political progress would follow naturally from the Positive Order and in Comte’s view achieve all of the glories of a perfected state of humanity.

In Mill’s analysis it was clear that combining both powers of industry and the political government “amount[ed] to a dictatorship” (168) and as easily as could be observed, no check or guarantee against its possible abuse was provided in Comte’s
design. As he put it bluntly, “When we consider that the complete dominion of every nation of mankind is thus handed over to only four men—for the Spiritual Power is to be under the absolute and undivided control of a single Pontiff for the whole human race—one is appalled at the picture of entire subjugation and slavery, which is recommended to us as the last and highest result of the evolution of Humanity (168).” Comte’s entire ideal which was finally and in all respects quite fantastic from the thinker’s exaggerated point of view rested on a certain few but wholly misguided points of argument. One in particular presumed that human feeling supersedes the intellect in that the former commands the latter in its sole purpose without exception of achieving the social good and human perfection. No other duty is extended to it which would otherwise be morally suspicious in intent. All thinkers and their hypotheses in this sense are subject to evaluation of their efforts under the sacerdotal power or Priesthood through which the High Priest reigns supreme over the mind’s inventions, including its questions and opinion. Totalitarian in its foundation and principles, the Positive system was best described by Mill as “the moral and religious government of the human intellect (170).” Further it demanded that intellectual power be tempered and disciplined to conform to the great design lest it become anarchistic and in Comte’s terminology, “revolutionary” and hostile to its social responsibility. Particularly in the scientific arena all discovery and new methodologies must be of utilitarian value to society or else its work cannot be truly beneficial if not practically applied. In Mill’s words, “it must bring forth fruits to Humanity, otherwise it is not only contemptible, but criminal (172).” Contrary to this
ideal the question becomes: How can it be decisively evaluated that any knowledge that arises be distinguished (prima facie) as useful or not? Moreover, history demonstrates that speculative knowledge may initially have little concrete utility as it often arises from simple wonderment and curiosity and gains no further industry from its original source. Nonetheless, it can generate a utilitarian meaning and a substantial application far into the future for example, as mathematics has evolved to physics, a discipline which has indeed brought forth the “fruits” of its discoveries to humanity. Mill further emphasized this point as he related the various inventions developed from the discovery of electricity (c. 1746), e.g., the telegraph providing the means of enhanced communication through which the scientific analysis of lightning and the natural properties of magnetism made possible from their study over a century before.

The most discouraging canon of Comte’s thesis in regard to the sciences was that they be limited (as he believed they already were) to their general laws from which they could no more advance. Astronomy for example, had fulfilled its purpose in its discoveries of motion as to the planetary system and any further research would simply be a waste of mental energy and time spent in idle contemplation. Of the other physical and abstract sciences Comte declared they be treated similarly, i.e., that there should be no further cultivation of thought or expectations other than that they should lead to the science following in succession to the highest Science of Society (Comte’s Social Physics). In a more scathing criticism Mill offered that it would not be overstated that Comte developed a “real hatred for scientific and all purely intellectual pursuits” (176)
simply because these would surely challenge his Positive theory and question its validity and reasoning. His plan to guard against any speculative distraction was through education, certainly the proper teaching of the young the various subjects relative to Positivism, e.g., the sciences in their successive series and the selected ancient and modern languages and major poetics of the classical periods necessary for understanding their historical albeit obsolete foundations. To this the most poignant observation Mill asserted: “But they are to be taught all of this, not only without encouraging but stifling as much as possible, the examining and questioning spirit (178).” And as to restraining their study, “The pupils have no business to be over-solicitous about proof. The teacher should not even present the proofs to them in a complete form, or as proofs. The object of instruction is to make them understand the doctrines themselves, perceive their mutual connexion, and form by means of them a consistent and systematized conception of nature. (178).” The object of proof or in a sense applying the abstract reasoning of doubt as had always been the traditional method of rational inquiry, contemplation and learning as it resulted in greater knowledge and truth was in Comte’s system an expression of hostility to established Positive law and ultimately to disavow the Priesthood’s authority. As Mill observed, the High Priest of Positivism preaching from his own Great Book of Humanity considered himself the ultimate judge of thought and of the way in which knowledge should be acquired, i.e., believing that “our mental strength should be economized” (181) and there should be no other intellectual pursuit but that which the Positive system requires.
The concluding commentary by Mill on the grand theory and of its creator was not finally to dwell on the ridiculous as he had earlier termed the systemization of humanity, but rather to remark on the actual necessity of a universal synthesis. In putting this in terms of human “wants and interests” (185) one could equate them to universal laws which in all respects are various and neither always ordered or exist in predictable patterns that according to Comteian science could have been molded to shape his absolute theorem. Additionally, Comte’s Philosophy of History of his own creation unmistakably had underwritten the entirety of his work with regard to the phases, for example of Fetichism which in fact the Positive system was similar. As Mill explained, “The Fetichist thinks not merely that his Fetish is alive, but that it can help him in war, can cure him of diseases, can grant him prosperity, or afflict him with all the contrary evils (188).” In effect, the ‘Worship’ was not the better disposition and course that all would hope for as this Positive Fetish had always been contrary to natural human experience and indeed in conflict with the spiritual spontaneity reflective of all man’s pursuits. The unity and its counterpart universal love that Comte believed would be achieved through systemized reorganization and obedience to a sacerdotal power could only be oppressive especially as it denied any form of thought, speculative, scientific or otherwise to freely search for knowledge and truth beyond its mandates for Order and Progress. As to Comte, he clearly demonstrated an “intellectual degeneracy” (190) as he became convinced that the Religion of Humanity would temper the ills of a disorganized, chaotic world. Regulation and discipline were the cures his priesthood would apply to a
diseased human existence and to Comte’s thinking purity and perfection would be the result. But to his credit Mill was generous in reference to his great intellectual ability similar to those he admired (Descartes and Liebnitz) and in calling him one of superior mind particularly advanced, no less peculiar, and certainly memorable.

A View of Early Twentieth Century NeoPositivism

The popularity of Positivism gained significant ground in the early twentieth century particularly as this drew a distinctive parallel to the eager embrace of modern science and technological advancement. Theories of Relativity (e.g., Einstein’s formulations) and new discoveries in the academic disciplines of Physics and many of the natural sciences marked the early turning point toward the postmodern progressive era. The shift further distant from traditional philosophy including the denunciation of metaphysics was especially prominent in the discourses of modern theorists as their analyses focused on the logic and utility of scientific knowledge considerably in the path of Comte’s Positivist vision of Order and Progress. This brand of epistemological inquiry and research left no trace of its ancient counterpart other than a deep criticism as to its usefulness (upon which it was unanimously agreed that it was in this sense, a colossal failure). The Philosophic Tradition would finally be shelved among the historical archives, the Theological and Metaphysical texts now alike to Comte’s theory claiming the endnotes of the now disintegrated ‘primitive’ and ‘transitional’ phases.
Of the most well-known philosophers of the Positive School begun in Germany and Austria during the 1920s-1930s was founder of the Vienna Circle, Moritz Schlick (1882-1936). His work was extensive well before the formation of the group, his popular essays and lectures focusing primarily on the subjects of Physics and Relativity e.g., *Space and Time in Contemporary Physics* (1917) which won him acclaim from scientist, Albert Einstein. His new approach to Epistemology and Positive Philosophy including the significant treatise, *General Theory of Knowledge* (1918) greatly influenced social theorists, scientists, and political philosophers of this era, [one might describe this as the ‘calm’ period of the 1930s before the great storm of Nazi occupation]. Schlick was revered as a significant intellectual scholar and masterful professor (appointed as Chair of *Naturphilosophie* at the University of Vienna in 1922) particularly for his ideas on Logical Positivism and the claim that traditional philosophy and the metaphysical principles arising from this foundation were meaningless if not absurd in their epistemological applications. Modern empiricism would importantly deny this type of speculative knowledge as it conflicted with formal logic and its statements that could only be verified as true or false. Factual knowledge was the key to answering questions which must also be clearly defined with circumstances identified in order that they yield meaningful answers. Certainly there was no place for metaphysical observation of phenomena in this regard, as Schlick described its principles as simply illustrative of *idealism* which in itself was merely a form of consciousness belonging to the observer and solipsistic in practice [the theory that one’s existence and ideas are the only reliable
This conflicted with the “antimetaphysical purpose of positivism. Idealism and positivism do not go together” (39) nor could there ever be any sub-form alike to Hans Vaihinger’s theory of the possibility of an “idealist positivism.”

Clarified further in his work, “Die Wende der Philossophie” (published in *Erkenntnis* in 1930) Schlick emphasized that “Philosophy is the activity by means of which the meaning of statements is clarified and defined.” Logical Positivism exclusively produced these meaningful statements from methodological applications of mathematics, relying on its testing and verifications of truth in relation to observable and quantifiable phenomena. Emphasized in particular applications and scientific theorems were the distinctions between the unobservable theoretical abstracts and the ‘real’ or self-evident objects that yielded observable data. Brought together in a synthesis effect as part of the deductive process both the ‘analytic’ (theoretical) and empirical (observed) would create a rational alternative or new theory which effectively eliminated the former and thus produced a purely empirical law that explained facts via direct observational methods. This would effectively render metaphysical analysis and its general principles meaningless as these were not part of the calculative equation in verifying statements.

While Schlick’s enthusiastic colleagues of the Vienna Circle notably mathematicians and theorists, Hans Hahn, Rudolph Carnap, Han Reichenbach, and others embraced this new analytic philosophy, they developed further scientific formulas that paved the way for Logical Positivism’s increase in popularity both in Western European institutions and later in the United States where most all of the scholars had emigrated by
the late 1930s. Colleges such as the University of Chicago, UCLA, and Harvard welcomed the modern methodology and its new techniques (e.g., probability theory) that were instrumental in changing the course of the academic disciplines in such a way that they later reflected new designations that had replaced the old, e.g., from Sociology to Social Science, Political Theory to Political Science. Schlick, the most celebrated among the German thinkers served at Stanford as Visiting Professor in 1932, his lectures greatly influencing significant organizations in the field including the American Philosophical Association that published various works on the subject of Logical Positivism.

Modern American social sciences had begun to remodel their programs and curricula in the early twentieth century having gained the perspective of Positivists to carry on the mission of transforming traditional inquiry into utilitarian purpose. The wave of “scientism” (390) swept the academic disciplines with the central aim of producing explanatory, fixed, and, practical knowledge. Studies embracing empirical designs and theoretical rationales were goal-driven and centered on the logical ‘ends’ and final causes (answers) to hypotheses particularly relative to investigations of human behaviors and actions. While the Positive influence served a favored teleological approach to sociopolitical and economic questions, scientific methodology became especially authoritative in the social sciences eventually informing the political and professional spheres. Scientists and scholars gained particular notoriety for their sophisticated statistical applications and these, “provided a desperately needed means of control” (394) as the uniformity, reliability, and precision of methods generated a
dependable evidentiary value for the research performed which in turn stimulated further
development. Scientific technique continued to empower the intellectual community as it
shed the detrimental trappings of metaphysical idealism, as Schlick had described of a
philosophy and its discourse now meaningless and gratefully forgotten. American
sociological scholarship had well-adapted to the rigors of Logical Positivism. Further its
vow to refrain from anything unnecessarily restraining the efforts to achieve pure and
useful knowledge (e.g., values and ethical considerations) was firm as William F. Ogburn
(Columbia) is quoted from his speech to fellow sociologists in 1929:

> it will be necessary to crush out emotion and to discipline the mind so
> strongly that the fanciful pleasures of intellectuality will have to be
> eschewed in the verification process; it will be desirable to taboo our
> ethics and values (except in choosing problems); and it will be inevitable
> that we shall have to spend most of our time doing hard, dull, tedious, and
> routine tasks (431).

From these ‘dull and routine’ tasks a number of imaginative research projects developed
during the period including studies of social behaviors, attitudes, and public opinion
using measurement techniques and data collection methods (surveys and questionnaires).
Case studies also came into fashion along with scientific modeling focusing on
probability and predictive research designed to generate causal explanations of behavior
through complex statistical analysis. Also popular were studies on race relations,
immigrant and ethnic assimilation, minority identities, class consciousness, and cultural
perspectives. Certainly, the political and economic spheres were a rich trove for
Researchers as national issues and events took center stage, e.g., urban-industrial development, the rise of poverty, regional segregation, and rural decline.

The emphasis of Social Science as to seeking causal inferences or in effect best possible answers to social questions also included theories relative to historical and evolutionary change and modern progress. Scientists like Ogburn devised ways of tracking sociological trends which brought into view past events that could provide projections for future development. His report entitled, *Recent Social Trends*, prepared for President Herbert Hoover in 1929 (prior to the Wall Street crash) featured an immense collection of factual information on the early decades in America explaining the processes and virtual motion of the nation’s advancement. It could easily be observed that Ogburn and fellow scientists (e.g., F. Stuart Chapin) also subscribed to scientific Historicism while even shadowing Comte in his vision of creating the progressive Positive Polity. In the path of rapid industrialization and social transformation they believed that civilization had demonstrated a synchronized movement based on cumulative change and historical cycles. Chapin in particular produced several significant works one most notable was the 1928 volume, *Cultural Change*. An extensive project similar to Comte’s theory of human advancement, Chapin traced the trajectory of man’s existence from early origins and antiquity to the “Accumulation of Culture” beginning with primitive man and the rise of language to ancient social institutions. From recorded history the great Western civilizations followed (Greece and Rome) from which to examine demographic change, social conditions, militarism, war and colonization.
Rising industrial growth, the organization of labor, and class struggle marked the modern period where cultural transformation takes shape in the form of cyclical patterns these determining various social reactions in relation to conditions and environment. An interesting area of the study is titled, the “Cultural Lag in the Family” (312) in which Chapin concluded that labor-saving machinery had disrupted traditional foundations involving relationships, attitudes, and “culture traits” (312-315). Assigning numbers to various “material” and “non-material” activities and behaviors (the latter representing traditional religious foundations, family customs, and small community associations), the differences were compared by charting the “Old Environment” with the New where a “Region of Strain” is identified. The numbers (6 through 10) signify marked changes particularly as the “material” culture had evolved through rapid industrial development and the creation of large public organizations and institutions that had reconfigured living patterns and in turn affected and in some instances, dissolved normative traditions.

The methodology applied in Chapin’s thesis on family structure and relationships is especially interesting in view of the various inventive charts, tables, and diagrams illustrating changing phenomena and patterns of interaction (Fig. 29, 322). One figure, a large circle within which increasingly smaller circles representing “weakened” or “preempted” attitudes and sentiments adjusting in size around the centerpoint (Love) display degrees of “Affection” (e.g., Personal Loyalty, Admiration, Respect, etc.). These and various other aspects relative to social harmony and progress, according to Chapin’s estimates demonstrate a “Lag” in between tradition and cultural innovation which
eventually may reconcile through time. Chapin recommended making particular adjustments to the methodology such that the range of observed phenomena be narrowed or “restricted” for controlling studies of social values and environment. This would enhance procedures and provide a “more scientific understanding than ever before (329).” More complex operational controls and scaling techniques in scientific experimentation were emphasized and findings then determined by examining variable frequencies and distributions of phenomena. For its time, these innovations in social scientism influenced later scholars who continued to construct formulas and models for discovering new knowledge of modernizing society.

The “science of politics” as Comte had imagined came of age during this period with visionaries like the reputable Charles E. Merriam who in 1921 called for a change in the discipline of political science, that it must importantly adapt to modern methods of scientific inquiry and theory. While known especially for his advocacy during the Progressive movement and his service as policy advisor to several presidents, Merriam also presided as Chair of various research and public reform commissions and political organizations. He served for several decades as professor at the University of Chicago and was instrumental in the development of the Chicago School, the most recognized and influential political science department in the nation. In his significant lectures of 1939, one titled “Systematic Politics,” he discussed the nature of politics and whether it best dealt with ethics and values or should it focus on practical concerns; “politics deals with both” (79) he concluded, mediating between two conflicting camps and their different
approaches to inquiry. This was “[o]ne of the paradoxes of politics” (81) but that it should above all else be prepared to deal with all matters of social life and importantly “provide for a balance between order and justice, a balance between stability and change, a balance between equality and inequality, [and] a balance between liberty and authority . . . (88).”

Visibly familiar to Comte’s Positive Philosophy and the critical task of social reorganization, Merriam similarly observed a “moving equilibrium of complex social forces which at all times challenges the capacity of states for adjustment, for statics and dynamics as well (89).” To Comte’s embrace of scientists (savants at the highest level of Social Physics), Merriam equally welcomed their scholarship and technical expertise in bringing to bear the special ‘tasks of politics;’ “If they can develop methods by which we can modify and control the human organism and affect its behavior, well and good. When they are all discovered, then we shall be able to reorganize them in a new synthesis (90).” As the Logical Positivists had earlier formulated, this new synthesis would in the sphere of politics better arrive at political truth, knowledge, and finally practical reality. Merriam emphasized that theorists should look forward rather than behind them as centuries of philosophical classicism was admirable but could not adapt to modern-day politics. “Plato with his ideal state . . . . and Aristotle with his city . . . will not help much at this point (92).” Rather, the gains from science would in turn produce social gains and even more significantly reconstruct a better future from its practical inventions.
“Tradition is a good servant but a hard master” (98) declared Merriam as modern theorists agreed.

The important tasks of politics were immediately at hand as Merriam enumerated five instrumental “adjustments” which echoed the excited exhortations of Comte and his blueprint for modern society. Certainly, advanced communications, technological innovation, social organization and productivity, forward-thinking administrative management, and policy development were emphasized in this plan, “a world of creative evolution” described Merriam. Politics especially would turn to the important project and affairs of government and its own reformulation including casting out the old legislative “spoilsman” (98) decidedly having no competence or scientific expertise for modern policy-making. This seemed a familiar refrain of Comte’s disdain for ‘legists’ of the old order that in his view should be ousted and replaced by technical advisors of the state. They would be expected to dismantle the ‘retrograde’ foundations that led to destructive forms of political liberalism and democratic idealism and replace this thinking with practical regulatory legislation. As Merriam asserted, “There are those who still cling to the belief that in order to be democratic we must be inefficient; that a weak government will keep us strong; that incapacity is liberty. These are the slogans that lead to national impotence, to humiliation, and even to annihilation (97).” On this point, a view to international politics was most relevant as it was imperative that leading Western state powers integrate to “bring about the establishment of a jural order of the world (94).” It must be recognized, as Merriam repeated in his treatise [again, a familiar refrain
of political Positivists], that “The state of nature is a potential state of war.” Thus without
the establishment of a greater social order in context of all humanity itself, “there is no
security anywhere in the wide world—only anarchy (94).” This vision for the
postmodern future could not have been more illuminating to the Positivists of the age as
they set their tasks firmly on the foundations and promise of Order and Progress.
REFERENCES


iii THE MAIN PHILOSOPHICAL TENETS OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM. <www.loyno.edu/folse/logpos.htm>


Chapter VII. Conclusion – Observations of Postmodernism

Upon concluding this examination of the Positive Philosophy and Auguste Comte’s System of Positive Polity is to continue to ask further questions on this topic; for example, whether there is some validity to the theory of reorganization and its endeavor to reconstruct nature and in due course, human life. Does the mantra of Order and Progress as the goal of Positivism define the postmodern narrative in relation to a systemized understanding of ‘being’ through the processing of knowledge accountable exclusively to science? Does this mean that original foundations of thought, the Philosophic Tradition, its grounding principles and authority have been lost to modern Positivism arising from the adoption of the Philosophy of History and, if the Tradition’s perspectives on human existence and evolution, on social organization, politics and government have become completely obscured or nonexistent? If this is the case, what does this mean to political philosophy relative to its character, significance and purpose?

There is no question that Positive methodologies insisted upon by Comte as he first attributed these to early theorists, e.g., Bacon and Descartes and since they have become more refined and scientifically precise in observing human phenomena have contributed greatly to knowledge and scholarship. There is further no dispute that progress in the practical sense of the term has become the reality in the contemporary world often as a result of scientific research and its active engagement with industry, commerce, the environment, and political affairs both domestic and global. Moreover, man has not
actually become a purist of Positivism; as contrary to Comte’s ideal he has transcended the presumed limitations of inquiry, as the theory of succession prescribed and by which the speculative imagination has flourished without having strictly followed the Positive model. There is also credit due to the continuous work of Positive theory in establishing the foundations of political order and regime stability to which its principles have been a useful part as many of the early modern thinkers and their discourses illustrate, from Machiavelli to Hobbes and later to nineteenth century theorists, e.g., Hegel. In many respects Positivism has led the way toward human advancement admirably in its practical benefits. It is also to observe that it did not spring immediately from Comte’s vision and design; for even before Aristotle’s applications it had appeared largely in shaping man’s knowledge of the universe through its naturally evolving discoveries and disciplines, e.g., alchemy to chemistry and astrology to astronomy. From ancient to modern, Positivism has existed and consistently in congruence with traditional philosophy along with its intellectual foundations of nature and reason. As this thesis has illustrated in observing the historical trajectory briefly in respect of several centuries of human evolution, long-established political philosophy had changed relatively little until one might call, the Comteian age as earlier described, a time of “profound social, political, and economic change” that would alter the intellectual discourse and perhaps never return to the past as it had once been known.

As de Tocqueville foretold in 1835—“the past has ceased to throw its light upon the future, the mind of man wanders in obscurity.” And in light of this revelation, is
there further truth to Arendt’s twentieth-century perspective? That is to observe that modern man suffers from a “failure of memory” of the now nameless Philosphic Tradition, its interpretation and concepts virtually dissolved and its original spirit an aberration of a past evaporated in the wake of postmodern progress. As a result, Arendt observed, “All the processes of the earth and the universe have revealed themselves either as man-made or as potentially man-made” (89). Essentially, the human world no longer appeals to the transcendent realm of thought in seeking truth. Thus without a true concept of its history and nature it has produced “a society of men who, without a common world which would at once relate and separate them, either live in desperate lonely separation or are pressed together into a mass (89-90).” It can be noted that Comte’s Positivism seemed to suggest this mass conglomeration of man as described here; the whole of humanity defined in relative terms and having abandoned the metaphysical and speculative visions of nature and reason in relation to his being, knows only of himself as man-made, particularly through the applied science of Social Physics would he construct his future. While these questions are framed in abstract theoretical terms, they can be applied to recent observations of the political landscape and how it has been shaped in the postmodern century.

Arendt’s viewpoint was most instructive as she expressed considerable astute perceptions of the contemporary political world. In her analysis she observed that, “[t]ruth and politics are on rather bad terms with each other (227); . . .[t]ruthfulness is not among the political virtues.” Lies, as necessary evils are instead the means (tools) of
politicians and statesmen. Truth is lost in hyperbole and governments have lost their ability to govern because there is no real basis of authority except for history (referring to the Philosophy of History narrative). Thus truth derived through this Historical perspective can be altered; history can be rewritten to fit subjective truth. Further, its authority is refashioned and has been replaced by power, and like Christian morality requires obedience and enforces itself through punishment, coercion and violence. Realistically, it is inherent in man to deliberate on what can be defined as fact, which then can be determined as truth. This breaks with the philosopher’s truth, an understanding of human existence that is made intelligible from the abstract world, the metaphysical landscape of the mind, contemplation, and reason. The philosophical retreats from the active world to the transcendental, the way leading to truth and the moral ground of rational thought. Abstract (moral) truth is distinguished as having no place in the public realm, the dialogue of philosophers (e.g., Socrates) of whom Aristotle warns, “cannot very well be trusted . . . with the common good . . . the down-to-earth interests of the community (245).”

From this refrain and from Arendt’s insightful observations regarding the restructuring of truth and its purpose as to legitimizing the ground of authority in the political realm invites further analysis of postmodern thinker, Jean-François Lyotard. In his seminal 1979 work, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* he reflects on what he describes as a crisis between the once reliable metaphysical narratives of the past and the scientific province which in respect of its pragmatic applications and
progressive discourse has fully rejected the former and instead has set upon its own of course truth-seeking. This obliges it to legitimize itself on its own terms and via its own language, in effect creating a new narrative which speaks of altered realities, a new human consciousness, and of human power capable of redefining life and nature. The postmodern objective is further to make reasonable the assertion of the Philosophy of History alike to nineteenth century Positivists as a valid foundation of political institutions from which society is governed and as well guided by science as the model and most reliable authority. Language and “language games” endorse the distinctive feature of the postmodern political enterprise and as Lyotard describes, “The decision makers, however, attempt to manage these clouds of sociality according to input/output matrices, following a logic which implies that their elements are commensurable and that the whole is determinable. They allocate our lives for the growth of power (xxiv).” The system’s efficiency is most important for realizing this outcome and for what is expected of the maximization of human performance.

In Lyotard’s beginning chapter observing “Knowledge in Computerized Societies” (3) he explains that the many variations of modern technological development, these ranging from telecommunications, various computer languages, cybernetics, data manipulation and storage, etc. have considerably affected the acquisition and processing of knowledge. This has changed both the pace of learning and in this context made information easily available and in large quantities especially useful for creating what could be called “operational knowledge.” This knowledge in effect is the translated
version devised by the user or operator transmitted through a prescribed formula of logic that determines what is true. Lyotard asserts that this knowledge becomes a consumer product and the more that can be processed the more it is likely to be marketed, sold and/or consumed. It is clear that postindustrial countries now thrive in this manner of production and have likewise increased their economic power in the global age through the new and vastly infinite commodity of information. This power has not created unity or equity within states per se as private industry via the marketing of knowledge has overshadowed governments, their regulatory laws shaped in coordination with corporate enterprise and expectations of profit. Decision-making both on a domestic and global level especially as to who controls knowledge, of which type, and how the process of exchange is to be administered raises the obvious; indeed that knowledge is power and so much so that it no longer rests in the hands of anyone but the capitalist elite. Is this also to say that postmodern sociopolitical power and its civil institutions now constitute and depend on the advances of science?; that science also determines truth and justice by its ability to control and disseminate ‘appropriate’ information? And in the Positivist spirit as Comte embraced, it would be to assert that this is all that is expected of knowledge, i.e., that it be usefully applied in the interest of Order and Progress. Further, the scientific community (savants), direct both the operations and the outcomes of the governing elite (capitalists) and eventually the moral attitudes of the working classes, analogous to Comte’s vision, would align with their new Spiritual Order, i.e., the new God of technocracy.
Certainly what is objectionable as Lyotard criticizes here is the displacement of ethics and politics as it had once considered knowledge and truth as something far more than a commodity. Moreover, their earlier connections to Positive science had not depended on “language games” (10) as a method of communication or interaction. These are simply defined as rules that make up the game which in effect must be played on these terms or not at all. No variations (or utterances) that modify the rules are accepted and any ‘moves’ in the game are strictly dictated by their governance. If one thinks about this in terms of language, the game is clearly restrictive to thought and communication excepting of its own perspective. Further there is no objective to win but simply to comply and supposedly this gives the ‘player’ satisfaction in the exercise which is to affirm the social bond. In this context the social is also redefined as a “unicity” (12) which alike to Comteian theory refers to systemized society as a completely integrated whole and as a unified collective, as Arendt referred to as man “pressed together into a mass.” As Lyotard observed, this agrees with postmodern technocrats that fully endorse the process especially in considering social outputs via the input of operational knowledge, i.e., maximizing the performance of language games and players.

One of the quintessential characteristics particularly differentiating knowledge referred to either as scientific or narrative form is the latter’s relationship with social custom. Determining truth, justice and the good in accordance with accepted norms of understanding within the social sphere was in the traditional sense known as “opinion” which was legitimized by consensus and the cultural narrative. There is no stronger
unifying factor than this tradition and given this advantage the foundations of general knowledge remain stable to the extent that man continually develops thought from the “savage” to the “scientific” (19), as Lyotard observes. In short, the narrative falls in between these and accepts the compatibility of both which is to say that neither customary nor contemporary knowledge is superior to the other. Further, this implies no difference in the nature or identity of man as strictly “primitive” or “civilized” (19). Neither in the sense of human development does knowledge follow a defined course of phases in which man arrives at the highest level finally through science as Comte’s Positive System presumes. The narrative form is fluid and accepts both the positive and negative informed language by which it evaluates, approves or disapproves the level of social good that can be obtained. Political institutions and laws based on the knowledge acquired are legitimized in this manner along with the level of competence in actuating their operations. As Lyotard describes, “The areas of competence whose criteria the narrative supplies or applies are thus tightly woven together in the web it forms, ordered by the unified viewpoint characteristic of this kind of knowledge (20).” In this too, is trusted the transmission of the narrative as its authority has been given to its trustees, i.e., competent individuals that rise to the position of passing on accepted knowledge on behalf of the consensus. The narrative neither is limited or narrow in scope as it involves the language of both the speaker and listener, and as a whole the community of knowledge consumers (society) which forms the communicative social bond among all. The exercise is not constrained by the passing of time as the knowledge itself becomes
enriched by its many narrators and interpretative variations and then serves its purpose contemporaneously. By this it can be evaluated continually as trustworthy or in need of alteration (via all intellectual approaches, i.e., imagination, memory, intuition, and science, etc.); thus the narrative remains fluid and consistent with social development and through this process human progress is identified, particularly in its natural state of evolution.

Scientific knowledge also derives from consensus that is by the process of research that produces evidence in support of findings and of which invites debate over the truth or falsity of its claims. It requires a level of competency of both scientist and a group of peers and experts qualified to examine the “truth-value” (25) of scientific statements, these falling within an already determined criterion. Here only one language game is applied to the exclusion of all others. In this way it is quite different from the non-scientific narrative language and its exchange of ideas, as it does not necessarily share communication with any other group nor is it accessible in this way. The scientific process and this form of knowledge are no less powerful however in establishing institutions and consolidating interests that constitute a professional class and of which can thrive absent of greater social interference. It can and often does exist outside of the social bond and is not subject to any expectation other than producing unequivocally correct, “truth statements” and operational knowledge approved by the consensus of scientific experts. Thus, what is judged for example to be a social good by the scientific process cannot be evaluated in the same manner as the narrative form, the two having
different language rules and criteria. In this respect, what one determines as good can be evaluated as bad; what one language discovers and passes down as observed fact, the other has its own perception and knowledge of truth. Neither can both forms of knowledge judge the validity of the other. However with respect to the nature of the narrative form, it is open to various ‘languages’ and discourse; it can accept scientific statements along with all other sources of knowledge despite the inadequacy of fully comprehending them. This recognition is not the case of scientists as they view narrative statements as inherently invalid given they are resistant to evidential proof. As Lyotard concludes, narrative knowledge is viewed by science as a “different mentality: savage, primitive, underdeveloped, backward, alienated, composed of opinions, customs, authority, prejudice, ignorance, ideology. Narratives are fables, myths, legends, fit only for women and children (27).”

Whether this is true or otherwise is not as significant as the greater perspective of knowledge and its controversy. Besides the continuous conflict between Positivism as it has been consistently at odds with metaphysical narratives from the time of Plato forward, Lyotard suggests that science has changed as it no longer seeks validation from the original sources of knowledge. It functions to justify itself especially as necessary to the social sphere yet without any interrelation with its narratives or that it be subject to its consent or criticism. In short, modern science is alike to no other before it as it thoroughly leaves behind traditional philosophy as any kind of foundational authority that would otherwise inspire its questions. It determines these alone and by its own models
and processes decides what to ask and also what is true. It extends to the social and political arenas where it becomes concomitant to its institutions and as chief advisor to the State where it is legitimized as an indispensible function of the governing system. In this way, governmental leaders no longer need ask what neither is just and unjust nor legislate on the basis of original principles as they only need question what is true or false and receive the answers in the form of prescriptions and dictates from the scientific community.

The legitimacy of scientific knowledge as Lyotard observes has not originated among the political authority nor as a utilitarian entity directed solely for advancing State power and objectives. It arises from within the discourse of “Speculation” (33) and its origins have illustrated its unity with philosophical narratives in whatever way these may be linked. At the university level this merging is present as to legitimizing both forms of knowledge as its distribution is greatly liberalized among the body of learners and directed from within and together with its various disciplines. In this way science is not limited to utilitarian value alone nor purely Positive in the Comteian sense as its draws from wide-ranging sources of inquiry and indirect speculation. Further, the language games are similar if not interconnected as to the exchange of knowledge particularly reflecting upon the most engaging of subjects, i.e., humanity. From this foundation both scientific and philosophical narratives constitute a consensus of generally accepted principles such that they are compatible between the practical utility of knowledge and its speculative underpinnings. Lyotard believes in terms of the advantages society receives
from this merging it “allows morality to become reality (36).” In other words, the expectations of society and the State in determining what is just can be supported by scientific knowledge already legitimized as a scholarly authority by which it renders information for practical purposes, e.g., economic development with emphasis on the social welfare.

This relationship has its negative aspects such that the work of science can in itself, become dictatorial as part of the political system and its directives. A specific example of this association materialized in the political rhetoric of leaders rising to power in the early twentieth century. Much alike to the Comteian invention of the Spiritual Power as it oversees all sociopolitical activity of the State through the Positive System, the same ideology distinguished German perspectives during the 1930s of which legitimized the virtues and superiority of scientific knowledge as it unveiled the new consciousness of being and destiny. The collective had at once become aware of itself and its historical mission through the advancement of technology as Heidegger emphasized:

That is why the instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology. Everything depends on our manipulating technology in the proper manner as a means. We will, as we say, "get" technology "spiritually in hand." We will master it. The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control (5).
Since this era of grand treatises asserting the expectations of the political will coming in line with the advances of science and its manipulation as a means through which it achieves its end of human progress, perfection, and ultimately power, it seems that the original narrative respecting nature and reason has met its end as well in postmodern societies. As an authority most popular in the universities, the philosophical or speculative base upon which all inquiry developed including the various sciences was gradually denied the responsibility of theoretical investigation and discourse. It was only expected to reverberate original principles in limited versions of oratory and in its teaching restricted by established narratives judged to be appropriate for its purposes. Essentially traditional philosophy had lost its meaning and function given that it could not actuate itself as a questioner of truth or of what is just; these ideas had been reinvented by science and utilized in language games specific to its investigations of what is true and false. And by way of framing technology for use as Heidegger envisioned, science has become the ‘spiritual’ master in the realm of higher education, the political sphere, as well as throughout a society voraciously consuming its operational knowledge purveyed in endless quantities and by more rapid means of transmission. At this point, one repeats the questions: Is this knowledge valid and reliable and who decides it so? Does this mean the end of traditional speculation and philosophy itself? It would also suggest a truth as to the end of history and of politics as it now relies on scientific explanations arising from both the Philosophy of History and of Positivism, and a
humanity that expects no more from itself other than to construct a world of order and progress.

What is the motivating factor of this preference to rely on technological innovation to explain truth and to effect progress? Lyotard offers an observation of modern capitalism in the sense of profit-making and building wealth that is the driving force of this relationship with science as it relies on its knowledge for efficiency performance in production and commercialization. Scientific research is substantially supported for this reason through corporate funding programs, foundations, and grants both in and outside the university institutions including independent laboratories, all with the prospect of realizing a return on investment through knowledge that will generate greater earnings as a result. Applied research synchronizes significantly with the corporate management model and expectations as to marketing and profit development. In this way, scientific productivity is similar to the business organization and essentially has the same goal. There is no desire for discovering philosophic truth as this new narrative and its language game is fitted better to the activity of inputs efficiently producing outputs for financial gain. And as the corporate world empowers science it also has power over it and to a great extent holds power over the State as it monopolizes this resource through its strength and influence of capital. States have been subordinated to this ever-growing control enveloping all sociopolitical activity and the social bond. One might refer to it then as a coercive force as it has the ability to shape truth and govern by its own decision-making authority and by what it judges as ‘right’ for the State.
and society. As Lyotard describes, “... in postindustrial societies the normativity of laws is replaced by the performativity of procedures (46).” Further, this power legitimizes itself given that the system, of which it controls, i.e., a performance-based efficiency model, speaks the language of science via its tools of technology—operational knowledge generated by the computerization of all significant sectors of society and transmitted over a wide range of the populace.

All postmodern societies seem now to emulate and function as operating systems with specialized subsystems within them that continuously power the greater ‘human machinery’ of the State. An important working part of the whole is the subsystem of higher education which trains in operational knowledge with the specific goal of maximizing performance objectives. One of these relates to global competition where skills necessary to meet demands for power and profit are highly valued if not indispensible to the model of social progress, designed by experts and funded by capitalists protecting their interests that extend over all areas of the globe. Additionally, the State’s governing institutions based on performativity procedures require the specialized work of political scientists and their expertise as professionally trained analysts assessing data and efficiently processing information necessary for increasing the value of inputs and outputs. Communications are essential here in ensuring the cohesion of all sectors of the social system which by computerization the ‘refined’ data in the language of science is transmitted to the public which can then translate messages of appropriate content. In effect, the methodology of political science is legitimimized in the
governing system as it meets the performance goals including expectations of social stability.

In a very profound observation related to education, information, and the new knowledge base of which has changed the dynamic of not only human enterprise but importantly human inquiry and thinking, Lyotard submits, “Data banks are the Encyclopedia of tomorrow. They transcend the capacity of each of their users. They are “nature” for postmodern man (51).” This new nature one could describe as the infinite memory of scientific knowledge and its utility now man’s special treasure conceivably of known truths that can only benefit humanity in all facets of existence. Science itself has transformed nature by creating it in its own image from which man sees his own reflection and understands life through its laws. These are subject to various methodologies as they have been shaped to conform to the new nature’s properties and language regulating all systematically (especially thinking, which as well requires operational knowledge). This allows for experimentation which from there can determine phenomena by controlling and measuring any number of variables and probability outcomes (a traditional method of inquiry). These factors can include observations of uncontrollable events, e.g., catastrophes and paradoxes by which analytical methodologies are altered (an example is game theory) and in effect change knowledge and its meaning to fit the models constructed for their analysis. As Lyotard observes, this work of postmodern science produces, “not the known, but the unknown” (60), which is not to suggest that it is theoretically problematic, as the gain from scientific
activity given all of its methodological variations and outcomes continues also to produce ideas. The difference when comparing the knowledge of the traditional narrative form with that of the scientific is that the latter be verified as factual. And as the data bases are continuously restocked with the collection of scientific information including all of the methodologies that verify and legitimize knowledge, they have become the trusted encyclopedias of the postmodern age, the purveyors of truth on all subjects, including humanity.

One of the important objectives of a properly functioning systematized and computerized society is that its administrators or those that oversee the constant stocking and restocking of scientific knowledge, i.e., universities, consulting agencies, governmental bureaucracies, and think tanks, etc. develop marketing strategies that persuade that the data bases are valid and the need for their content is unequivocal. This is especially attractive to a public having lost familiar narrative forms that once connected it through social communications of various types. Since the knowledge is structured upon a scientific criterion of self-verification and exempt from any other narrative forms, it promises the same for its users. That is, as a link to collective knowledge that is self-verifiable this can ensure as well, a connection to the general consensus that also subscribes to the accepted method of truth-seeking. The scientific language game invites players and an opportunity to communicate in the same lingua franca which forms the new cultural narrative and the social bond. It would seem as expected that unity is achieved through this new medium which mirrors very similarly
the *Social Physics* and *Dynamics* of Comte’s Positive system. As Lyotard remarks, “In this sense, the system seems to be a vanguard machine dragging humanity after it, dehumanizing it in order to rehumanize it at a different level of normative capacity (63).”

Lyotard’s observation is convincing as to the system’s rehumanization process given the transformation of language from narrative to operational forms. If this were the case, it is worth asking how this has occurred since the advent of postmodern Positivism from early twentieth century forward in terms of examining various theoretical models devised and implemented to that end. Further, have these models become essential organizing constructs of the greater administrative bureaucracy that shape and ultimately govern civil society through science-based efficiency and performance mechanisms? What elements describe the outcomes of postmodern bureaucracies in context of this newly defined, “level of normative capacity?”

**A Brief Look at Postmodern Systems Theory**

Humanistic considerations and behavioral concerns came strongly into focus among various theorists in response to the mechanistic arrangement for meeting efficiency goals. The classical model rested on a set of scientific management principles designed to provide for effective use of workers and optimum production within a tightly organized, rule-specific framework. Early experiments measuring worker productivity demonstrated the idea that precisely-managed activities resulted in best performance and peak output. The ideal of precision provided further impetus for managers to develop
plans and techniques including specialized training and supervision for increasing efficiency. To this end, workers could be viewed as machine components existing as units of production in motion within the entire functional apparatus.

Systematic large-scale operations demanded the appropriate technical arrangement of the workforce including dividing work into specialized units, coordination of the subdivisions as determined by the organizational structure, and establishing controlling authority for governing and oversight of the entire process. Luther Gulick’s organizational theory (c. 1930s) included interpretations of human nature as functioning within the limits of individual capacity. Thus, integrating and controlling the specialized working parts of the whole would better achieve efficiency objectives especially when effectively managed by a centralized commanding authority (the chief executive). Gulick advanced ideas in administrative management and technique emphasizing the value of technical specialists as a pure form of efficiency personified. The executive befitting Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy performed in accordance with “impersonal official obligations” typically within a hierarchal structure (Denhardt, 26); “They are subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office (28).” Correspondingly, workers assumed a subordinate role and performed as prescribed by virtue of structural and administrative controls. As was characteristic of this model organization, the human element (personal concerns and values) did not factor into the organizational equation. In effect, the structure defined behaviors, according to theorists.
Structural mechanistic design and efficiency models produced assumptions about human nature that were ill-fitted to reality. As a result of the Hawthorne Experiments\textsuperscript{vii} the introduction of new behavioral concepts, e.g., Barnard’s informal organizations\textsuperscript{vii} and later theories criticizing the Weberian bureaucratic structure as inherently dysfunctional and inefficient,\textsuperscript{vii} new approaches for understanding organizations and human behavior shifted focus toward the strictly rational methodology.

Herbert Simon expressed in his article, “Proverbs of Administration” (1946) that much of organizational theory had been steeped in idealism and “all forms of rhetoric (124).” Theorists were persuasive about their assumptions for developing and implementing working models but they lacked a concrete method for observing and analyzing the actual behavior that could validate their concepts.\textsuperscript{viii} Efficiency was assuredly important as a foremost goal but organizational theory could not rest solely on a single set of principles and “proverbs” of which Simon denounced as flawed in his analysis of earlier formulations. He further stressed the need for creating a scientific rational means for developing ideas. If theories were to be useful they must be operational, corresponding to factual observations rather than from oversimplified generalization. Along with most of the social sciences, Positivism and behavioral theory was on the rise in organizational studies. Simon was most influential in “laying the foundations for a science of man” as he described in his landmark books\textsuperscript{viii} and developed the keynote phrase, “bounded rationality” to describe the decision-making behavior of \textit{Administrative Man}—a semi-rational administrative “satisficer” who favors reasonable
satisfactory solutions in dealing with complex problems over maximizing best possible rationales. This characterization conflicted to some extent with assumptions of *Rational Man*, the totally institutionalized and organized maximizer and *Economic Man*, ultimately motivated by monetary gain. Importantly, Simon’s recognition of the decision-making behaviors of individuals developed new assumptions about human nature. These could be applied to empirical observation and technical analysis of the organizational setting and work in conjunction with earlier formulations and models that emphasized the basic objectives of efficiency and effectiveness. Following in this construct, Cyert and March (1959) provided a good example of neoclassical predictive theory in their illustration focusing on the determination of organizational objectives through various behaviors including aspects of bargaining and coalition formation.

While the more technical methodological approach to organizational theory was strongly in focus at mid-century, behavioral perspectives in administration management likewise claimed the spotlight. Theorists in the human relations school studied organizations from the inside but not simply from a set of generalized operational principles for organizing and directing human activity. Rather, behavioral study turned toward the workings from within the human mind particularly on the subject of motivation in relation to common human needs (e.g., physiological, social, egoistic, and self-fulfillment, etc.). McGregor’s *The Human Side of Enterprise* (1960) explained that conventional management practitioners were mistaken in their assumptions of human nature and consequently, their approaches to directing behavior in the workplace in terms
of managerial policies and programs were also ultimately misguided. These assumptions included Theory X, which claimed generally that humans are by nature, lazy, un-ambitious, inherently self-centered, indifferent, and unintelligent. Further, people preferred to be led as they were by nature, resistant to change and gullible in terms of being the dupes of the “charlatan and demagogue.” Management methods were often conditioned on this theory and responded with either hard or soft approaches depending on the consequences or something in between; as McGregor described: either apply coercion, threat, and tight controls, or in contrast, practice permissiveness and satisfy worker demands, or at best, try to gain advantages with both soft and hard approaches, i.e., be “firm but fair” (561).

McGregor urged the consideration of motivation for understanding human behavior in relation to the task of management. He pointed to several important motivating factors, indentifying for example, the physiological needs (e.g., food, shelter, rest, and exercise). Further, safety and security that is, guarding against threat and uncertainty also explained behavior and ranked as a considerable concern in the workplace;

Arbitrary management actions, behavior which arouses uncertainty with respect to continued employment or which reflects favoritism or discrimination, unpredictable administration of policy—these can be powerful motivators of the safety needs in the employment relationship at every level, from worker to vice president (Shafritz 159).
Social needs (a sense of belonging and association with others, friendship and love) also rated importantly especially as McGregor emphasized, for recognizing that association and social interactivity play a positive role in achieving organizational objectives—contrasting earlier views that natural or tight-knit groupings posed a threat to managerial direction and control.

Of the higher-ranking needs and “of greatest significance to management and to man himself,” explained McGregor (170), are the egoistic needs, these in relation to one’s self-esteem (e.g., needs for self-confidence, independence, achievement, and knowledge, etc.) and reputation (status, recognition, appreciation, and respect). Self-fulfillment and realizing individual potentialities is a key motivator in the workplace environment. When self-development and opportunities for growth and creativity are limited, motivation becomes a struggle. Thus, while management often provides for the ability of workers to attain their lower-ranking needs with offerings of good wages and benefits, adequate working conditions and steady employment, the motivation for workers to put forth a greater effort and perform over and above their responsibilities can still be lacking or basically, non-existent. The behavior would not be unexpected considering management’s inability to recognize that human performance in the modern workplace is motivated through the attainment of higher socio-psychological needs.

McGregor called for a new approach to managing people by dismantling the old Theory X and its inaccurate assumptions of human nature. A new, more positive formulation, Theory Y proposed that human effort as regards work was as natural as play
or rest. A person is by nature self-directed and self-controlled in serving and meeting objective commitments and the consequences of experience explained avoidance of responsibility and ambition rather than this being an inherent human characteristic. Additionally, Theory Y posited that the capacity for imagination, creativity, and ingenuity for problem-solving was broadly distributed among workers (175). Thus, management would best achieve optimum performance and productivity by developing and supporting motivational objectives (creating opportunities for growth and self-development, encouraging creativity, etc.). Further, as a move away from conventional organization, people should be given freedom to self-direct their own work through planning and self-appraisal. This would substantially satisfy egoistic and self-fulfillment needs and strongly contribute to achieving organizational goals.

Evolving from earlier scientific and behavioral research, postmodern structural theorists observed the systematic functions of organizations in terms of the operating environment comparing for example, a classical mechanistic structure with an organic model (Burns and Stalker 1961). Along these lines, systems theory involved examining how both open and closed structures perform considering various interdependent relationships, e.g., the exchange of inputs and outflow of resources and human energy and the stability of these environments (Katz and Kahn 1966). Further, the lifecycle of the modern structure (bureaus) accounting for its “life and death” struggles provided new conceptual insights into the organization’s survival and how it develops various protections for maintaining longevity (189-198).
Described as operational polar extremes (Burns and Stalker 1961) management systems take either of two forms, i.e., the mechanistic or organic. While several distinctions clarify the definitions of each by their differences, the authors first note their similarity as both rational types, in terms of “making best use of human resources in the most efficient manner feasible in the circumstances of the concern (209).” As befits its name, the mechanistic model is machine-like in its operational form and functioning as it exemplifies original models and structure composed of various working parts performing specialized tasks within a standardized whole. Roles and functions are precisely defined and technical methods are attached to specific positions in a generally stable environment. The management structure is hierarchal—authority, control, and communication reside at the top of the hierarchy and interaction tends to be vertical between superior and subordinate (210, (h)). Worker behavior is expected to reflect a level of obedience and subordination to higher-ranking decision-making authority and overall loyalty to the organization.

Conversely, the organic organization, its structure and working parts function as the name implies as a naturally efficient and integrated whole made up of living things (respecting persons as opposed to machine components). Within this natural albeit less stable foundation and process, individual technical knowledge is put to task and “may be located anywhere in the network; this location becoming the ad hoc centre of control, authority, and communication (210).” Thus the individual worker’s role, function, and responsibility are situated among a network or working community and culture.
committed to the organization’s productivity, growth, and ultimately its survival. Relationships are less impersonal as in mechanistic, formal systems. Worker loyalty and obedience are not the prescribed expectations as these are replaced by more natural, motivational inducements, i.e., self-actualization and recognition of personal expertise invested in the social framework. Cooperation with working peers and the development of shared values for achieving organizational goals closely characterizes the less traditional organic model.

As with mechanistic and organic structures various characteristics define open and closed organizational systems. Of the many types of open systems, a basic functional foundation extends to the surrounding environment in which no distinct boundary exists between the internal and external workings of the organization. Essentially, an open system functions much like a live organism’s metabolism, i.e., on the constant exchange of energy sources, in this case human and material, sustaining itself on inputs and generating outputs. The synthesized expenditure of energy creates a repetitive cycle of activity of production and sequentially, growth. Thus the open system recognizes its interdependency on the larger, richer environment for its sustenance and development. As well, it adapts to changes for survival that include arresting the “entropic process” defined by Katz and Kahn (1966) as “a universal law of nature in which all forms of organization move toward disorganization or death (193).” Realizing “negative entropy” requires building and retaining a cache of stored energy, i.e., “fattening” the system in
order to fend off potential starvation periods or crises where resources are scarce and difficult to attain.

The difference in an open as opposed to a closed system is fundamental in that “[o]lder formulations of system constructs dealt with closed systems of the physical sciences, in which relatively self-contained structures could be treated successfully as if they were independent of external forces (191).” This approach correlates to Thompson’s (1967) theory that closed-system preferences evolved from attempts to reduce or eliminate uncertainty, that a determinate system fixing its present circumstances would predict and determine its future state. More realistically however, organizations are “not autonomous entities” (289) and given survival is the ultimate goal they must develop mechanisms to ensure their livelihood in effect by some form of adaptation to the environment. Foremost among these involve protection of the organization’s technical core. In contrast to traditional open-system operations allowing permeable boundaries for working with the surrounding environment, Thompson explains that organizations tend to “buffer environmental influences by surrounding their technical cores with input and output components (297).” The “norms of rationality” assume that buffering in an unsteady environment is beneficial as it “absorbs environmental fluctuations” (298) in which leveling input and output transactions serve to stabilize the organization. Further, the norms provide the forecasting for adapting to future environmental events—this “emerges as a specialized and elaborate activity, for
which some of the emerging management-science or statistical decision theories seem especially appropriate (299)."

One of the most interesting theories, Downs’ (1967) article, “The Life Cycle of Bureaus”vii best describes various assumptions of human nature in terms of the interactions of “zealots”, “climbers” and “conservers”, bureaucrats differentiated by their positions, power, and influence within the bureau. A common element in bureau formation is its early initiation by determined or typically aggressive zealots. Often charismatic leaders, zealots typically lead a band of zealots who focus their attention on social relationships and functions for ensuring the growth and success of the bureau. How the bureau survives is often a result of the behavior of these officials at whichever level they occupy for example, conservers preferring to sustain the organizational status quo while zealots innovate and climbers co-operate in pursuit of promotional opportunities to higher levels of power, income and prestige. Bureaus thus are cyclic in terms of accelerated and decelerated growth largely reacting to the character and movement of personnel. Further, as bureaus grow older conservers as part of the administrative machinery act to modify original organizational goals to ensure personal survival. Unlike men however, age as reflects bureau longevity is less likely to be a precursor to death.

These theories are interesting in revealing certain aspects of the so-called dehumanization to rehumanization process in the workplace environment involving human efficiency, productivity, and performance goals which began to materialize in the
twentieth century. These implementations also speak to perspectives on the greater bureaucratic mechanism in terms of how these relate to whole political systems and their social directives.

**Bureaucracies and Their Motives**

David Osbourne and Ted Gaebler, authors of the 1993 work, *Reinventing Government, How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector* and Ralph P. Hummel in his interpretation of the modern administrative bureaucracy (*The Bureaucratic Experience, The Post-Modern Challenge, 2008*) all strongly criticize the traditional governmental system as inadequate and ineffective for addressing the needs and social concerns of individuals and the public. They agree that the classical and postmodern models of administration (hierarchal, rule-driven, and expertise-oriented) discourage original and/or common sense thinking and tend to dehumanize both bureaucrat and citizen. Their themes suggest that people seem to have become automatons in an outdated or dysfunctional governmental framework that restricts communication, inhibits reasonable solutions to problems, and virtually ignores the means by which particular ends, e.g., social equity are expected to be achieved. The authors agree that the administrative system often fails and there should be change as outlined in their approaches addressing the problems of postmodern bureaucracy. These approaches differ in one aspect of importance here, i.e., framing the debate of the practical versus the philosophical; thus their prescriptions are also divergent for
suggesting solutions to bureaucratic hegemony. While Osborne and Gaebler optimistically recommend a general formula for improving bureaucratic performance via new public management principles, Hummel ultimately denies that any reform or reconstruction will remedy the damage persistently done to human life and the social landscape by the bureaucratic machine; (thus the only solution at best is to avoid refueling it). Contrasting both discussions, Charles T. Goodsell, author of *The Case for Bureaucracy, A Public Administrative Polemic* (2004) empirically defends the modern bureaucracy, casting a favorable light on its accomplishments and potentialities, as opposed to its failings, and as a resolve to confronting its effect on contemporary life.

Osborne and Gaebler do not entirely dismiss traditional bureaucracy for its faults and failings, as Hummel does, conversely citing the system as ultimately disastrous to political, cultural, and social life. The authors are advocates for its transformation rather than its dissolution, finding the new public administration’s values of efficiency and effectiveness in need of fine-tuning by way of a new formulation of managerial principles. This new American *Perestroika* (1) introduces the entrepreneurial spirit to government, one representing innovative opportunity-seeking of officials in maximizing resources that better serve both the public and the bureaucratic system. The general formula and notable ten principles first recognized several defective patterns in traditional government and reversed their approach for example, in the framework of *Catalytic* governmental as “steering” versus “rowing (34).” Rowing refers metaphorically to bureaucrats or organizations focused solely on one mission, objective
or goal and generally using one method of operation. Rowing limits and/or inhibits opportunity for improving performance or steering i.e., considering available alternatives for optimizing resources efficiently. Steering, as a better mechanism frees policy managers from the constraints of one-way rowing. They can choose between a variety of avenues fostering competition between service providers (the principle of Competitive Government) and holding accountable the performance and quality of contracted providers and services.

The new reinvention of government as entrepreneurial enterprise emphasizes empowering both officials and citizens. The authors argue that empowerment as an American tradition is based on a self-help ideal in which people “act more responsibly when they control their own environments than when they are under the control of others (51).” Principle No. 2 (Community-Owned Government) suggests neighborhood groups and organizations should be their own primary problem-solvers. Thus bureaucracy should reject the tendency to create “cases” and dependency and the administration of policy and programs that undermine citizen participation, decision-making, and responsibility. This would not reconcile with Hummel’s claim that the system is by nature a mechanism of control and unavoidably de-empowering to the individual already objectified and depersonalized as client or case.

Several of the public entrepreneurial principles prescribed by Osborne and Gaebler reflect a reworking of traditional governmental practices. Where early bureaucratic systems applied rule-driven procedures for producing outputs, Mission-
Driven government (110) focuses on greater flexibility of rules in order that regulations do not impede innovation and new methods for producing more efficient results. A regulatory barrier to efficiency was the traditional line-item budget system illuminating the problem of bureaucratic waste. The old system encouraged overspending of funds by managers (with the refrain: use it or lose it) and eliminated the possibility of shifting funding to other need-worthy accounts. The new Expenditure Control Budget system empowered managers to distribute allocations appropriately with the overall mission of saving for future projects and investments for their cities. (See Fairfield, CA, 119).

Osborne and Gaebler envision that government officials focus on results, specifically by tracking “quantity, quality, and cost of every service they deliver (143).” Performance measurement is powerful and effective as a learning tool for managers gauging whether success or failure is the outcome of inputs and innovation. The TQM approach is favored as one providing a detailed micro-analysis of system and employee production. Theoretically, it allows both management and staff the ability to pinpoint problems and correct inefficiencies at various levels. Especially as a streamlining measure for tracking costs and budget expenditures the method reduces waste of public resources and facilitates leaders in justifying their decision-making on legislative issues that require public support, e.g., tax increases. This further drives the entrepreneurial model of Enterprising government (195) demonstrating that it is earning a profit rather than spending for getting the job done. Like private industry, profits earned are a result of satisfied customers, in this case the citizen. Public administrators acknowledge that as
a key factor of success ensuring citizen-as-customer satisfaction is their main operational focal point (166). Further, a Market-Oriented system (280) encourages management to strategize for change in the economic and political environment, anticipate problems, and prepare for unexpected situations before they occur (219).

Osborne and Gaebler’s enthusiasm for a new and improved governmental bureaucracy brings with its portrait of reinvention, questions that remain unanswered. If, for example, managers with full council approval are given wide discretion as to their budgetary decision-making and base these on calculated risk and market forces, what happens if major losses occur rather than gains in a system that is results-oriented? Is there also a new paradigm for dealing with loss of the public trust when even the best strategies and professional expertise fail to produce expected outcomes? Isn’t reinvented government just another example of surrendering control to bureaucrats and the machine in an already mechanized, dehumanized environment?

Hummel essentially poses the latter question. His polemic largely casts the postmodern bureaucracy as the demon lurking among us, infiltrating all aspects of conscious existence and knowledge of reality in our daily lives. With respect to Osborne and Gaebler, Hummel’s response is framed in Lyotard’s observation: “Perfect control over a system, which is supposed to improve its performance, is inconsistent with respect to the law of contradiction; it in fact lowers the performance level it claims to raise (20).” Hummel’s argument provides more than skeptical criticism for improving bureaucracy and eliminating its failings; his disagreement is to point out that the bureaucratic
experience itself is damaging to the social world. Further, the critique altogether rejects rational constructs and formulations citing them as obstacles to establishing genuine human relationships. For example, the objectification of workers arranged by their labor in a dehumanizing hierarchal system of production and control transforms them on whatever level into automatons. Hummel describes a certain alien reality, a Reification that defines a form of unconsciousness (40)—one in which man is unaware that he has been apprehended as a product of his environment; he has become a product himself (as Marx earlier theorized). Bureaucracy is at fault: “Begerian analysis shows that the supercession of fundamental human relationships by dehumanized relationships is a condition for bureaucracy’s very existence. All attempts to humanize relationships between a bureaucracy and society must therefore be considered as suicidal or window dressing when they come from within bureaucracy itself . . . (41).”

Hummel paints a portrait of society as totally and fatally bureaucratized, one in which a person has no sense of identity other than that of being a ‘case’ or a unit in the modern organizational world. “While social identity defined the range of my social being (my rights), what I am as organizational identity defines the range of my permissible activity: the size of my cage (52).” Beyond bureaucracy’s replacement of society and substituting individual freedom for a conditionally defined existence, Hummel also claims that human culture, described as the set of values we live by is usurped by bureaucracy in that more attention is given to the means of fulfilling them than reflecting on the values themselves. Essentially abstract concepts, justice freedom, and equality are
replaced by bureaucratic means/ends rationales, i.e., stability, discipline, calculability of results, and impersonal formalism (see Habermas v Weber’s list of values, 57).

Bureaucratic thinking acts as a plague on the social environment, according to Hummel. Functions of individual knowledge and judgment (reason) are lost; “Feeling and emotion are exiled (95).” Further, human language and communication is distorted by the new psychology of bureaucracy that “sees the individual as a chimera, the function of a deficit between what we need and our ability to express it, the uncloseable gap between what we try to say and what existing language allows others to hear (96).” Hummel believes that bureaucracy acts in the public interest much like Nietzsche described, as the Will to Power (1886). Bureau refers to office; kratos means power; in this instance referring to bureaucracy claiming the power to shape the individual’s soul (Hummel 96) and moreover, recreate the social/political landscape. It is again, a demon mechanism robbing people of their natural intelligibility to think, create, and solve as it steals the organic human psyche and replaces it with rational determinism. “Bureaucratic thinking because it does not reflect a natural order of things, can be effective only through force or the threat of force. It is the use of force that demonstrates the poverty of thought (192).” This is to say that bureaucracy suppresses true thinking, imagination, and natural reason. It seeks to control thought by setting rules and establishing norms for acquiring knowledge, better known as “know-how” (194), i.e., the invention of ways to act on thinking through pure or scientific logic. Hummel argues that this “instrumental or
purposeful reason tends to immunize our sensibility to situations (194).” Additionally, common sense is one casualty of strict rationality.

It would follow that Hummel’s opinion corresponds with Weber’s definition of who rules the contemporary polity. “In a modern state the actual ruler is necessarily and unavoidably the bureaucracy . . . (197).” Like thought, culture, social relationships, and human individuality, the political world has also been replaced by the tyrant, bureaucracy. In fact, says Hummel, politics is dead (197) for it has lost its human vitality and its own will and ability to govern. Citing several presidents’ interactions from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush (203-5) with the bureaucratic structure in Washington, it is convincing that agency administration is a powerhouse for predeciding presidential policy-making and controls solutions to already defined problems (205). Hummel charges that bureaucracy manipulates solutions to fit its own interests and these may not either represent the president’s intent or address the public’s concerns. Bureaucrats are here purported to have special powers. They are able to use both time and space (tenure and position) in developing specialized expertise that places legislators at a disadvantage. Further, bureaucrats are technicians treating political issues as matter for scientific research and fact-gathering. With the discovery and perusal of facts, bureaucrats provide pre-formulated answers to political questions. As a result, “[o]verburdened and somewhat intimidated by the material the experts throw at them, they [Congressmen] are delighted when issues can be resolved in apparently noncontroversial, technocratic terms” (quoted from Malbin 1980) (207). Essentially,
politics has for some time been the working realm of both career bureaucrat and whole bureaucracies both public and private. As Hummel laments, increasingly powerful and self-perpetuating, the modern bureaucracy, as Weberian prophesy holds, “. . is a control instrument without compare. . . (209).”

So it would seem is bureaucracy bashing, retorts Goodsell. In its defense, he provides a wide-ranging body of empirical evidence for smashing many of the myths claiming that bureaucracy performs poorly, that public officials as excessive power-seekers are fundamentally oppressive and inflexible. In Goodsell’s opening chapter, Bureaucracy Despised, Disparaged, and Defended, he confronts Hummel’s charge that the “bureaucratization of the world” is destined to destroy individualism by “blocking personal growth and poisoning human relationships (13).” He disputes the assumption that administrators are obsessed with rules and that bureaucracies naturally promote pathological behavior patterns (12) which lead to inherently dysfunctional and dehumanized systems. Further, citizens are not miserably under-represented due to bureaucrats’ biases. Nor is public administration resistant to better performance innovation in efforts to promote citizen satisfaction. As much as the private sector bureaucracies and Osborne and Gaebler’s reinvention approach tout the successes of entrepreneurial management (e.g., Catalytic, Competitive, and Market-driven government) traditional forms have generally kept pace, according to Goodsell’s positive survey outcomes. In a study identifying “Users’ Ratings of Five Federal Agencies” (Table 2-4) the findings indicate, “despite antigovernment rhetoric to the contrary, the
federal government achieves essentially the same degree of satisfaction for its services as corporate America does for its products (30).” In respect of citizen-bureaucracy interaction, Goodsell’s “survey of surveys,” i.e., citizens’ assessment of personal experience with administrative agencies is that most personal experiences are good (31). Opposing this view, Hummel asserts that citizens are simply in denial as a response to their powerlessness in the system; instead they are victims like administrators of a false consciousness believing inaccurately that bureaucracy is a ‘good’ for individuals and society, naturally as they are given no other alternatives.

Goodsell is not deterred by philosophic pessimism. Bureaucracy for theorists like Hummel and Lyotard may be the harbinger of the impersonal, de-sensitized life in the modern world, the final portent of Western social decline and collapse into Weberian totalitarianism. However, the optimist allays bureaucracy’s darker critique. It is difficult to deny that an array of American accomplishments is due to an impressive list of bureaucratic successes in the areas of e.g., Environmental Protection, Public safety, Health and welfare, and Child well-being (Table 2-9, 40). Although “undramatic, hidden, ongoing, and persistent” (41) says Goodsell, bureaucracy achieves and defines the fundamental core of civilized society. Its absence would mean that little progress toward the collective betterment of human life would ever have materialized to such a degree. Bureaucracy is generally misunderstood and regularly derided for its overt failings and often-exposed ineptitudes. It is always an easy target for scrutiny and blame. Goodsell insists however that it is fully deserving of merit and acclaim and it should be
viewed simply for what it is—an ongoing construct of human experience and ingenuity, not without flaws but never lacking the potential to alter and improve itself.

This is not to suggest that Goodsell identifies with Osborne and Gaebler’s reformist camp. “I do not share the enthusiasm of most of my public administration brethren on reform (142).” He believes that changing bureaucracy is not the correct approach, “for that would mean loss of a precious social asset (142).” Goodsell explains in the final chapter, *Fad and Fundamentals of Bureaucracy*, that the reinvention *Business Model* is really nothing new, quoting Woodrow Wilson’s (1887) founding observation: “the field of administration is a field of business.” Nor is it necessarily groundbreaking enough to overturn bureaucracy’s traditional fundamentals. Outlining its four core concepts, (*Market creation, Entrepreneurial conduct, Performance measurement, and Customer orientation*, 149-156), Goodsell presents several counterpoint arguments criticizing the market concept in governance. Scholars, deLeon and Denhardt (2000) share a view that community ideals and communication are lost at the expense of deal-making between public representatives that speak the particular language of “prices” (151). Officials’ rational self-interested choices in competitive markets are theoretically no substitute for political deliberation, negotiation, and common consensus generated in the public realm. Further, Goodsell cites an example illustrating that entrepreneurial decision-making is not infallible nor without controversy. A reinvention snafu (taken from Osborne and Gaebler’s book) described State of Michigan officials that invested
five percent of pension fund assets in venture capital initiatives only to lose more money than could be tolerated. As Goodsell notes, “[T]he practice was quietly dropped (152).”

Goodsell takes Washington Administrator, Hyong Yi’s position that in general, private sector fads and trends tend to come and go in government. Various approaches are “oversold as the answer to all organizational problems (155).” Enthusiastically searching for the Holy Grail, managers are disappointed that there is no quick fix. “The road to improving governmental performance is not a sprint, but a never-ending marathon . . . (155).” Goodsell’s final recommendations include the demonstration project (ongoing experimental reinvention laboratories earlier established under National Performance Review guidelines); the organizational report card; and, external accreditation (described as independent expert advisors to various institutions, e.g., universities, law enforcement, and health care providers).

In sum, there is little to no similarity between Hummel’s critique of the postmodern bureaucracy and Osborne and Gaebler’s assessment other than agreement that it is problematic. The authors’ solutions for improving bureaucratic governance are clearly distinct, one offering a new formulation of principles and techniques for resolving problems, the other claiming that the machine is its own main problem and there is little anyone can do but steer clear of its appetite for consuming the human soul. The discrepancy is largely due to a significant difference in approach; Osborne and Gaebler’s practical view invokes rational problem-solving methods framed in the language of postmodern reorganizational theory. Opposing the Positive alternative, Hummel takes
the more traditional philosophical and moralistic side of the debate in terms of humanistic considerations similar to Lyotard’s defense of the cultural narrative as this relates to the interconnected social bond. This may explain why the former are clearly more optimistic than the latter. While the optimists’ solutions for improving bureaucracy’s ills have been by many accounts enthusiastically embraced, its harshest critic resolves that any solutions are nothing more than witches’ brew. Mediating between reconstructing bureaucracy and advocating for its unlikely demise, Goodsell prescribes a practical recounting of the system’s better attributes with a continued goal of improving and refining the traditional postmodern model. This will earn the public’s appreciation for a much-maligned yet ever-present and valuable bureaucracy.

**A Final Observation**

Despite the reconditioning of humankind seemingly as a result of the replacement of original traditions and a rebirth of philosophy itself engendering a Positivist technical, organizational, and cultural shift, it is still to observe man’s awareness of his ‘unknowing.’ That is to say, that ideas do not spring entirely from the indeterminable unknown nor from relative factual knowledge arising from various epistemological methodologies. Ideas and investigation inherent of curiosity and the inquisitive mind are as timeless as human existence, thinking itself existing as a powerful treasure put to task. The mind only need consult its faculties and imagination both allowing man to wander as de Tocqueville observed in a world of abstraction, as well as to question with authority
by way of his inventions and skill, the nature of his existence, the value of justice, and the way to truth. Whether it is a failure of memory as Arendt asserted or a renaissance of technical knowledge, the search has neither an end as the Historicists and Positivists would believe of truth and politics nor a beginning as the Greeks were aware of the infinite timelessness of the universe through nature and reason. The inspiration of which man possesses belongs to the ageless desire for harmony, whether it is between himself existing in accord with the laws of nature or as a species being finding truth in his social and political reality from which he hopes to find peace.

This is also to recognize the lust for power as it materializes in myriad forms and situates itself in every corner of a world now fully visible via scientific innovation. Everything is observable and observed and all is documented in terabytes of data and observed again. And with the manipulation of cumulative thought man devises his own authority for knowing, from a “new nature” of understanding while accomplishing the objective to control his environment and himself. He does perhaps ‘forget’ to question in the now archaic way of philosophical reasoning because he has devised a methodology that achieves the task more efficiently. This is to suggest that man no longer trusts his senses or the organic mind and its natural perceptions as this reasoning no longer makes itself known in the postmodern age. Further, the will to power is driven by a different perception that is that human perfection looms on the horizon of man’s existence, a prediction and determination of the Positive mind and a system designed to complete the final mission of order and progress for all of humanity. Although recognized as wild in
narrative, as Comte’s vision exemplified, it should not be ignored that there may be some truth to this perspective as postmodern life seems to have entered that final phase of Comte’s invention which demands the dissolution of metaphysical reasoning. As the Philosophic Tradition has retreated to ancient history so has its character been refuted certainly as something positive and rather as an aberration that has “not even a name.” Despite this pessimism, there is a hope and belief that thought will not turn away from questions valuing justice, virtue, morality, ethics, and prudence as it contributes to the notion of the public good. Philosophers, scientists and all would well not dispute the power to question as one reliable certainty of human life:

When the farthest corner of the globe has been conquered technologically and can be exploited economically; when any incident you like, in any place you like, at any time you like, becomes accessible as fast as you like; when you can simultaneously "experience" an assassination attempt against a king in France and a symphony concert in Tokyo; when time is nothing but speed, instantaneity, and simultaneity, and time as history has vanished from all Being of all peoples; when a boxer counts as the great man of a people; when the tallies of millions at mass meetings are a triumph; then, yes then, there still looms like a specter over all this uproar the question: what for? —where to? —and what then?

— Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*— from Lectures (1935)
REFERENCES


