

University of Nevada, Reno

Honor Culture in Brazil: Assessing Intra-Cultural Variation

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
Sociology

by

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December, 2016

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

We recommend that the thesis
prepared under our supervision by

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entitled

Honor Culture in Brazil: Assessing Intra-Cultural Variation

be accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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December, 2016

Abstract

Sociologists and social psychologists often approach honor as a cultural trait belonging to specific countries and communities. An honor culture is defined as a society in which social status is defined by willingness of individuals to use force to defend one's reputation (Black, 2011; Cooney, 2014). Studies in the past have compared countries in order to establish which cultures can be considered as belonging to an honor culture (Vandello & Cohen, 2003); yet, they ignored the intra-cultural variability within countries. The purpose of this study was to systematically analyze Brazil, an honor culture, for intra-cultural variability in honor attitudes and values. To do so, we used data from the Latin American Public Opinion Survey and aggregate individual responses regarding honor concerns into regional data to create an Honor Index for the municipalities represented in the survey. Next, we compared the average responses of each municipality to demographic data and material conditions, such as the average education, violence, urbanization and trust in law enforcement of each municipality, thus analyzing variability of the presence of this type of culture across different regions.

Introduction

According to Julian Pitt-Rivers, honor is “the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society” as well as “his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized by society, his right to pride” (Pitt-Rivers, 1966). In other words, honor is one’s reputation in the eyes of others, it is a measure of social worth. Honor culture has been regarded by some as a cultural adaptation to material conditions (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Others, however, have sought to understand the concept of honor with the help of the concepts of cultural capital and symbolic power (Bourdieu, 2011). Scholars have compared honor culture to cultural capital due to the similarities in the process of acquiring a reputable image before their peers, which grants them a certain influence and respectability (Grzyb, 2016). However, these studies have failed to elaborate on how Bourdieu can explain the fragility of this cultural capital and how it must be constantly defended.

Previous studies have also shown that honor culture is the characteristics of an entire nation; rather, different honor cultures are present in certain locations, contingent on certain conditions, which Nisbett and Cohen (1996) and others (e.g., Henry, 2009) demonstrates to vary across the U.S. Nisbett and Cohen (1996) found that people living in southern and some western parts of the U.S. exhibited concerns that could be classified as being honor concerns. In that sense, Henry (2009), found that honor emerged as compensation for low social class, and it was more prominent precisely in southern parts of the country. Therefore, the conclusions these studies reached is that the United States is a heterogeneous, multicultural nation, and thus it cannot be referred to as having a national, homogenous culture.

Serving as an inspiration for studying honor culture in Brazil, it seemed that this very same approach could also be applied to Brazil, and allow for similar conclusions. This is so is

mostly because we suggest that the historical formation of both the U.S. and Brazil is actually quite similar. Both had a vastly heterogenic immigration pattern throughout their history, with people coming from various cultures in Europe and some in Asia. Another type of “immigration” that happened in both countries was the process that brought several thousand people from Africa to work as slaves in the American continent. After settling, these immigrants made both countries become large multicultural nations.

But their similarities are not only historical. In the socioeconomic level, both countries have massive problems with regard to poverty and inequality. Both countries stand out in the Gini Index ranking, according to data from the World Bank (2013). The U.S. is considered the most unequal country in the Western, developed world, while Brazil ranks at 16th in the world overall in terms of inequality. Both countries also have had diverse economic activities across their territory. For instance, both countries have had regions in which farming cultures were more prominent, and other regions in which herding was more prominent. This is important to the study of honor because research suggested that people in herding cultures tend to have higher honor concerns than in farming cultures due to the fact that herding is a type of economic activity in which one’s property is more subject to being violated than farming (Figueiredo et al., 2004; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).

All this variability is accentuated by the large geographical dimensions of both countries, with the U.S. being the 3rd largest country in the world and Brazil is the 5th. All these differences and inequalities being spread out in immense territories make both countries have great variance in their cultures. Therefore, if the U.S., which is not an honor culture, can have regions in which honor concerns are high amongst the population, could it not be that Brazil, an honor culture, could have locations in which honor concerns were low?

In Brazil, the existence of several frontier-type regions could explain why honor culture exists there. However, most of the research on honor culture in Brazil focuses on specific regions, mostly the North and Northeastern Brazil (Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015), and not on any broad comparison between regions. However, historical studies have shown that Southern Brazil has had communities that valued honor as a measure of social worth (Vendrame, 2013). What are, then, the conditions for honor culture in Brazil, and where is it mostly prevalent?

The importance of the current research is, therefore, to close two main gaps in previous research regarding honor culture in Brazil. Firstly, there is the question of studies about honor culture treating Brazil as a homogenous culture, when in reality it is quite multicultural (Vandello & Cohen, 2003). Secondly, we seek to challenge the notion present in novels, movies, studies and popular culture, that Brazilian honor is concentrated in the North and Northeast of Brazil. To do so, we suggested a systematic approach to measure honor across Brazilian municipalities using survey data and cross it with demographic and socioeconomic data, in order to assess the origins and condition for honor culture in Brazil. The first step to do so is to understand what honor culture is and in what conditions it emerges.

Honor

What is most important about honor is that it depends on individuals meeting cultural standards. By doing so, individuals become honorable and earn respect. In societies that value it, honor is often linked to status; how people behave and how others see them is a measure of their worth.

Individuals can only possess honor or be honorable through the recognition of others. This means that individuals think about themselves in relation to how they believe others see

them. In other words, one's sense of self is interdependent. Honor is, therefore, not something that one is born with, but something that one earns. Since the concept of honor is interdependent, it is much more easily lost than gained. It is precisely because of this that in honor societies, honor can (and must) be defended, even by silencing those who challenge one's honor. This may entail the defense of one's honor and reputation with violent means. The central problem with honor cultures is, therefore, an environment in which folk live constantly under threat of having their reputation and therefore their safety challenged. Violence seems to be the most appropriate and quick response to an insult in order to establish that one is a force to be reckoned with if provoked. This study seeks to investigate what role violence plays in social interactions within cultures and societies which emphasize honor as a high measure of social worth. We seek to understand how honor affects interpersonal relationships, status, and the manner in which those types of societies function.

Honor Cultures

Research has shown that there are societies in which honor plays a central role (Guerra, Gouveia, Araújo, Andrade, & Gaudêncio, 2013), and individuals belonging to these types of cultures are known for holding values and attitudes that are permeated by the concept of honor (Cooney, 2014; Dória, 1994; Johnson & Lipsett-Rivera, 1998; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Thus, the code of conduct in honor cultures is based on reputation and social image of the self in the eye of others; it is the measure of the worth of the individual vis-à-vis the society in which he/she lives (Guerra, Giner-Sorolla, & Vasiljevic, 2012). Miller (1993) claims that honor cultures can only exist in a context of reciprocity, since in honor cultures "there was no self-respect independent of the respect of others" as well as "not just a matter of the individual; it necessarily involved a group" (Miller, 1993). Thus, it is not hard to see why one feature of honor societies is that they

are mainly, although not exclusively, collectivistic. Collectivistic cultures tend to value the interdependence of the self and in doing so, hold values that are only possible in reference to others (Black, 2011; Cooney, 2014; Guerra et al., 2013; Johnson & Lipsett-Rivera, 1998). In addition, both collectivistic and honor cultures are extremely family oriented, meaning that attitudes that affect the reputation of an individual reflect on all the other individuals belonging to the same family, thus affecting the reputation of the family as a whole (Guerra et al., 2013). Societies which possess an honor culture include non-Asian collectivistic communities, specifically those with a Muslim, African and Latin background (Uskul, Oyserman, & Schwarz, 2010). Also, research has identified that there are honor attitudes and values in certain sub-cultures of the United States, mainly the Southern and Western part of the country (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).

Much like any type of culture, the system of honor culture determines to a certain extent the customs and beliefs of a community. Miller (1993) claims that honor manifests itself in these cultures as “more than just a set of rules for governing behavior. Honor permeated every aspect of consciousness: how you thought about yourself and others, how you held your body, the expectations you could reasonably have and demands you could make on others” (Miller, 1993). With that in mind, it is possible to understand why an honor culture entails a type of agency from individuals raised in it which “require a violent response or risk of loss of social standing” (Cooney, 2014). Researchers suggest that since honor is much more easily lost than gained, people whose honor is challenged must respond quickly and violently to establish themselves as someone to “be reckoned with” and regain their honor (Stevens, 1973). In that sense, people who belong to these types of cultures often engage in violent conducts that are guided by honor beliefs; namely, corporal punishment for supposedly inappropriate behavior of family members,

strong reactions towards offenses, and, in more extreme cases, honor killings (Cooney, 2014; Santos, 2012; Souza, 2015; Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015; Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002).

Honor cultures also tend to have strict gender expectations, meaning that the dominant values and beliefs are gender specific. For men, the main value is the appearance of strength and capacity to respond strongly (even violently) to offenses by an outside party whereas for women, it lies on “the need to maintain sexual chastity and social restraint” (Guerra et al., 2013). These attitudes towards female sexuality are especially found in Latino cultures, and are often referred to “Marianismo”, which literally means that women are expected to emulate virgin Mary, both in regards to their sexual chastity and their compassion and forgiveness (Stevens, 1973).

Since these cultures tend to be male dominated or patriarchal oriented societies, the expectation of conduct from women in honor cultures helps understanding how honor in these types of societies is much easier to lose than to gain. Unlike men, women are born with “honor” (sexual chastity), which they cannot earn. However, they can lose it, and losing it makes it difficult to gain it back. Individuals in honor cultures are much more likely to motivate their actions based on these values than in non-honor cultures.

Some theorists have largely explained honor culture with male domination ideology originating from patriarchal societies (Gill, 2006). Societies in which cultural beliefs of men’s superiority are prevalent tend to create material conditions that render women powerless relative to men (Gill, 2006; Hansen, 2002). To understand how and why these values and attitudes emerge, it is important to analyze the similarities between these cultures in order to assess their origins, as well as the conditions in which they originate.

Material Conditions of Honor

Arguably, culture is at least in part a material form of adaptation, a collective response to specific conditions. Indeed, some researchers consider honor culture a system of social regulation that is a collective solution to a problem (Dória, 1994; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Souza, 2015). An important approach is provided by Nisbett and Cohen (1996), who argued that communities had to possess a series of material traits for an honor cultures to arise. The authors argued that these types of cultures had to have two main traits, namely, a scarcity of economic resources, and the absence of efficient law enforcement. Crucially, the authors argued that in honor cultures the benefit of resolving conflict outside the boundaries of the law (illegally) outweighed the costs (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Nisbett and Cohen (1996) proposed that in a violent environment with few economic resources and absent law enforcement people are potentially vulnerable to transgression of others, who might steal their property or who might physically harm them. They argued that this was typical of frontier-like environments with little or no presence of the state, and was typical of herding societies, which had a type of economic activity that was more susceptible to danger (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).

In these cultures, any confrontation with others to protect one's family or property might turn violent. Even when individuals prevail in a physical altercation, they might sustain harm which weakens them for any subsequent altercation. To offset this, it is more efficient to find a way in which open violence can be minimized or even avoided. Nisbett and Cohen (1996) argued that establishing a violent reputation served such a purpose. Of course, establishing such a reputation can be costly, and bears risk. However, once an actor has established in the eyes of others, that they are strong and will act violently against any possible aggression, they minimize the risk of actually having to get involved in a fight.

Nisbett and Cohen (1996) suggested that this dynamic serves as the basis for honor cultures. Individuals find means, violent or not, to signal to others that they follow a certain code, which allows them to anticipate a violent response if the individual is challenged. However, the effectiveness of this deterrence is based on their ability to establish and preserve their reputation in the eyes of others. Typically, this entails establishing oneself as “honorable.” If they are unable to do so, individuals could be at the mercy of transgressors. A similar dynamic can also be observed in prisons and inner cities, in which respect and reputation play a central role in interpersonal interactions (Anderson, 2000).

Anderson describes how young people living in poverty and violent areas develop behavioral tools to survive a dangerous and threatening environment. In that sense, establishing a reputation has a very similar predicament in both inner cities and honor cultures. The difference, however, lies in what Anderson called the “dilemma of the decent kid”, which entails the challenge of individuals being reputable before their peers, while simultaneously behaving as “decent” kids before their families (Anderson, 2000). In honor cultures, however, a man’s honor lies not only in how he behaves, but how his family behaves. Men in honor cultures are not necessarily bound by these contradictions because having a reputation is not contradictory to being “decent”. In an honor culture, a person’s social worth is measured equally in the household and in the streets, and a child acting out is a challenge to the patriarch’s honor more than an affirmation of the child’s honor.

Both these perspectives can relate to Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital, that is, a set of symbolic assets that can determine one’s social status (Bourdieu, 2011). When applying this notion to honor, it is possible to see that people, and especially men, living in societies that carry elements of violence and threat, as well as a general disbelief in state authorities, need to acquire

a specific form of symbolic capital in order to build a reputation. This reputation not only ascribes them social status, but it is also a tool that can shield them from external violence.

The kind of predominant economic activity of a society can also be a predictor for honor culture. Research shows that communities that originate from herding cultures, often in frontier-type areas, are more oriented toward honor more than communities that originate from farming cultures (Henry, 2009; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). In a frontier area in which a person needs to take care of animals in a semi-nomadic life, it is quite possible to find oneself in a situation in which one's main source of livelihood can be stolen or killed. However, farmers are settlers whose property is typically stationary; such populations tend to establish communities, in which neighbors cooperate, and which social rules are enforced.

Nisbett and Cohen (1996) argued that early European immigration to the southern United States occurred primarily from the British Isles, and from areas that were traditional herding societies. Because these mostly Scots-Irish immigrants continued to be herders, they not only brought the seeds of an honor culture with them, but material conditions, such as the vulnerability of assault by others, and by doing so they promoted this cultural pattern. In the absence of an active and present law-enforcement in the early Americas, the solution was the development of the promise of a violent response, that is, the deterrence of transgression against one's person, one's family and one's property. Therefore, in the U.S. South reputation, strength, and symbolic proxies of being "reputable", "honorable" solved a very concrete problem. If people respected and feared one another, they might not attempt to hurt each other. It is possible to observe this cultural pattern in cowboy culture in the Wild West, as described by Courtwright (1996). These descriptions once more appear to show parallels with Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital and symbolic power (Bourdieu, 2011). The appearance of strength and

reputability are similar to Bourdieu's description of symbolic power (2011), meaning that even though a person may not actively subdue or physically influence another person, the symbolism behind their status is an indication of their competence and guarantees them power.

Research shows that regional variation in honor culture across the U.S. depends on the history of immigration, and the presence of herding cultures (Henry, 2009; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Research suggests that there are much higher levels of violence in the Southern U.S. than the Northern U.S., and this is so even when controlling for known predictors of violence such as poverty, race, population density and percentage of males between 15 and 29 years of age (Nisbett, 1993). Nisbett (1993) demonstrated that the South had much higher rates of argument related murders than the North, in cities with less than 200,000 people. This type of violence was also much higher than felony related murders in Southern States. This hints at the main cause of violence in small cities in the South of the U.S.: arguments between acquaintances.

When Nisbett (1993) controlled for the aforementioned predictors of violence, violence was still significantly higher in Southern U.S. states when compared to Northern states. Additionally, there are higher levels of gun ownership in the Southern states which could be an indicator of distrust in law enforcement as a means for protection (Felson & Pare, 2010). People in the Southern U.S. also believe much more strongly than their Northern peers that a person has the right to kill a person who threatens his or her family or property, as well as a much stronger belief in owning guns for self-protection (Felson & Pare, 2010; Nisbett, 1993). It is possible to observe how and why honor cultures could arise under these conditions; a higher rate of violence put together with distrust of law enforcement can lead to the development of an honor ideology as a response to a hostile environment.

Honor Ideology

Having established the material conditions under which honor as a culture arises, it is important to examine ideology of honor, which is reflected in specific ideas about gender relations, self-defense, family, righteous behavior, virtues, strength, courage and the socialization of children. Firstly, honor societies are inherently patriarchal, which that gendered ideas about honor necessarily entail male domination. Moreover, it entails that the family is an extension of the patriarch, which in turn make the family a patriarch's property and a reflection of himself (Hasan, 2002).

Honor is interdependent, and one's own honor is conferred to others, but so is one's dishonor. In a family, a man might be undermined by the dishonorable behavior of his family members, and men are judged whether they can be "the master of their own house." Arguably, this is central to why female honor is based on sexual modesty and chastity. Women, whether they are wives or daughters, are seen as both "owned" by and a reflection of a man, thus becoming, in essence, evidence of his honor as well as a threat to it. This also occurs with male children, but in this case, it is expected that a man's son is strong and courageous, and a sign of weakness or femininity could also undermine the patriarch's power (Cooney, 2014; Dória, 1994; Johnson & Lipsett-Rivera, 1998). Children are seen as reflections of their parents; if a man's child is weak or promiscuous – the former a risk with male children, and the latter with female children - it means that the man (i.e., their father) failed to put them in line, to raise them properly, thus becoming evidence of his worthlessness. This often legitimizes domestic violence because it is effectively a means for a man to "get the wife and kids in line" and ultimately defend his honor in the community. The same logic applies when an outside party threatens a man's honor or when one of his family members does something that compromises his

honorability in the eyes of others; it must be met with violence in order to reestablish the lost honor. In sum, what an individual does and what their family does is critically important in these types of societies, and members of an honor society tend to hold social views that support male domination and strength, virtues and the righteousness of behaviors related to defending one's honor.

This type of ideology has been documented in attitudinal differences between honor and non-honor cultures (Guerra et al., 2012). It has been often argued that cultures of Iberian origins tend to be honor-type cultures, most of which are mostly located in Latin America (Johnson & Lipsett-Rivera, 1998; Uskul et al., 2010; Vandello & Cohen, 2003). Not only do survey responses from people living in these societies reflect concerns about honor, most of these countries fit the criteria for material conditions in which honor cultures are more likely to arise. These include frontier type situations, and economic activities, such as herding, extraction of wood and mining, in which violent disputes are more likely to occur. Also, these countries are mostly considered to be developing countries, as well as having high levels of violent crime and highly inefficient legal systems, filling the criteria for the material conditions expressed by Nisbett and Cohen (1996).

Brazil is a good example of this. Much like its Latin American neighbors, the main reason of Brazilian colonization at first was the extraction of gold, a typical frontier type economic activity which entailed high risks of aggression, from native indigenous communities as well as rival explorers (Furtado, 2007). The geography of Brazil, which was for the most part a dangerous and dense forest, as well as the type of predominant economic activities, provided quite the terrain for the development of an honor culture - like the Southern United States in the 17th and 18th century. During the same period, and even until the early 20th century, Brazil was a

country which was yet to be explored. Strong law enforcement simply did not exist. Brazil, however, is a very large country with a lot of cultural and economic diversity. It has had immigrants from numerous places around the globe, and has had very diversified types of economic activities such as mining, herding and wood extracting as well such as farming (Furtado, 2007). The first three are typical predecessors of honor cultures; however, farming is not. Therefore, it is important to analyze how this diversity affects the argument of Brazil as an honor culture in its entirety.

Brazil as an Honor Culture

Brazil is considered an honor culture, much like its Latin American neighbors. Studies show that Brazilians in fact hold cultural values and attitudes regarding honor concerns, which they historically inherited from Portugal (Guerra, et al., 2012; Johnson & Lipsett-Rivera, 1998; Vandello & Cohen, 2003). Also, Brazilian society has received much immigration from honor societies, mainly Portugal, Italy, Japan and several parts of Africa (Seyferth, 2011). Brazil is also notorious for honor killings, domestic violence and assaults motivated by honor beliefs (Santos, 2012; Souza et al., 2015). Studies have shown that males involved in this type of conduct often justify it by claiming they could not be seen as cowards or “frouxos” (Portuguese word for “wimp”) before their peers (Souza, 2015). Comparative research has shown that Brazilians, in average, tend to show more honor attitudes than countries which are not considered honor cultures. For instance, Vandello and Cohen (2003) looked at perceptions of honor in the U.S. and in Brazil, and discovered that Brazilians tend to see men whose wife had been unfaithful as less trustworthy than Americans. The same effect was observed when referring to domestic violence; Brazilians saw men who engaged in domestic violence as more trustworthy and masculine than Americans did (Vandello & Cohen, 2003). This result is to be expected if one assumes that in an

honor culture, such as Brazil, a wife's conduct is seen as reflection of the husband's ability and willingness to control her.

Studies often use countries as the unit of analysis when dealing with honor cultures (Mosquera et al., 2002; Vandello & Cohen, 2003). If one generalizes a country as being a homogenous culture, there is the risk of ignoring the cultural heterogeneity within a single country. For instance, research within the U.S. has repeatedly shown there are regional cultures, such as the Southern and Western United States, which represent an honor based culture, whereas this is not the case for the Northern and Eastern U.S. (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). This study raises the possibility that giving a country the honor-type stamp without analyzing intra-cultural differences risks leaving a large chunk of the variance unanalyzed. Therefore, the reason for this study is to investigate if there are any differences in honor culture within various Brazilian territories, and if so, what could possibly explain them.

Brazil has a great variety of populations that migrated and formed the country's cultural identity. It is plausible to assume that there are profound differences between its regions, depending on which groups settled where. In Brazil, Portuguese and Africans were the main immigrants between the 16th and 18th century (although the latter were obviously not voluntary immigrants). After that, there was a massive European immigration in Brazil in several parts of the country, such as Germans and Italian in the mid-late 19th century to the South and Southeast, as well as Japanese, Spanish, Syrians and Lebanese during the 20th century to São Paulo, and a brief Dutch occupation in the Northeast during the 17th century (Groesen, 2014; Ribeiro, 1997; Seyferth, 2011). All these different cultures had great influence in the formation and development of Brazil, and the fact that they established and grew in different regions accounts for a great deal of the heterogeneity of that culture.

Darcy Ribeiro (1997) suggests that Brazilian culture is divided into five sub-cultures, each located in separate regions of the country. The “crioula” sub-culture, composed of African slaves and Portuguese colonizers, mainly present in the northeast; the “cabocla” characterized by native (i.e., indigenous) Brazilians and African slaves in the North; the “caipira”, concentrated in the Southeast region of Brazil, especially Sao Paulo, characterized by Portuguese and Italian immigration, dedicated to producing coffee and industry; the “gaúcha” located in the south of Brazil, descending from German and Portuguese immigrants and focused on herding; and the “sertaneja”, located in the inlands of the Northeast and Central parts of Brazil characterized both by large rural areas and large cities.

Research has shown that these sub-cultures in Brazil actually show great levels of variability with regard to values and moral attitudes. According to Dessen and Torres (2002), the sub-cultures identified by Ribeiro (1997) can be characterized by specific group norms that influence the making of culture in those places. The “cabocla” and “crioula” sub-cultures are “characterized by an authoritarian and patriarchal social system emphasizing group norms and group loyalty” (Dessen & Torres, 2002). The “gaúcha” and “caipira” subcultures tend to be composed by “individuals who do not sanction establishment of social norms that perpetuate inequality, but recognize and accept the existence of it” (Dessen & Torres, 2002). Moreover, the “sertaneja” sub-culture would be a sort of “mix” between the last four, much because of the multiple environments of large cities and rural areas. By looking at Dessen and Torres’ argument, we can clearly see that their description of the “crioula” cultures of the Northeast is very close to how other literature describes honor culture.

In Brazil, these features are often ascribed by academics and even in popular culture to the people in the Northeast (Santos, 2012; Souza, 2015; Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015).

It is possible that this is so because the Northeast of Brazil is often associated with a regime known as “Coronelismo”, literally meaning “Colonelism”, a regime of Colonels. This regime was a power structure, which existed in some regions of Brazil between 1889 and 1930, although some features of this political and power structure remained as far as the 1960’s. Its basic feature is the hypertrophy of private power and state power, having as methods electoral frauds and disorganization of public services in favor of private interests (Leal, 2012). On the top of these power structures were people that were known as Colonels, even though they did not possess the actual military title. Although they exerted most of their influence through violence, the power of these “Colonels” resided greatly in their reputation, much like the honor system this paper aim to discuss (Leal, 2012).

Other studies found Italian immigrant communities in southern Brazil to embrace values systems that required, among other things, disputes about challenges against family honor to be resolved violently (Vendrame, 2013). Furthermore, women’s sexuality was also treated as a matter of honor. When a pregnancy out of wedlock occurred, for instance, the situation was resolved by forcing a marriage under violent threats (Vendrame, 2013). Similarly, rape was typically denied, even when a member of one’s family was the victim, in order to avoid tarnishing the family honor. This occurred because a rape victim was considered to be “damaged goods”, and secondly that it made the patriarch appear weak for not being able to protect his family (Vendrame, 2013).

Brazil is also a country with high levels of social and regional inequities. According to the World Bank, Brazil’s Gini Index is currently at 52.9, the 16th highest in the world (The World Bank, 2013). Much of this inequality exists because of stark regional differences. In terms of violence, the state of Sao Paulo (Southeast) had a homicide rate of 13.4 per 100,000

inhabitants, whereas the state of Alagoas (Northeast) had a rate of 63 per 100.000 homicides (IPEA, 2016). Assuming that the material conditions of honor cultures are present in some parts of Brazil, but not in others, it is plausible to assume that there is dramatic regional variation with regard to honor culture in Brazil.

There is a gap in research regarding intra-cultural variances within honor cultures and Brazil is no exception. To be sure, Brazilian literature, popular culture and, to some degree, academic research does reference the fact that the Northeastern states are states which possess a strong presence of the culture of honor (Santos, 2012; Souza et al., 2015). Those regions are generally rural, arid, poor and historically lacking access to basic public services. The gap in research lies, therefore, in the fact that there has yet to be a systematic approach to regional differences in honor culture across Brazil.

The present study seeks to address these questions by systematically analyzing differences in patterns of honor culture across regions of Brazil. Regional differences in honor-type attitudes and behaviors have already been documented across the U.S., though, as a whole the U.S. is probably not considered an honor culture. However, many scholars consider Brazil to be an honor country; yet, they have not explored any variation in such a large and diverse country. Therefore, this study focuses on the kind of cultural differences that exist in the context of different regions of Brazil.

The Present Study

The goal was to use a large-scale representative survey with respondents from different regions of Brazil. We were confident that, because these respondents are from different municipalities it would be possible to characterize these municipalities based on the response of the samples obtained from there. Using established research on honor culture as a guide (Saucier,

et al., 2016; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996), we examined publicly survey data for items concerning attitudes and values indicative of honor culture. To the extent that such attitudinal items reflect a coherent syndrome of an honor culture, they ought to have been correlated. Based on these clusters of items we created an index, which allowed us to categorize each municipality based on the extent of honor culture. Furthermore, we examined the relationship between the score of the municipality with the honor index to material conditions in these municipalities (namely, average education level, average income, urbanization, perception of violence, and so on). Lastly, we tested if these conditions related to presence of honor culture in the predicted way, thus explaining the larger or smaller presence of these honor-based cultural norms and attitudes. To do this, the present study used data from two main sources.

Firstly, we used the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), a survey conducted by the Vanderbilt University, which has the objective of measuring political values and behaviors in Latin America. These surveys collected, among other things, data on Brazilian public opinion about matters regarding honor (e.g. whether or not it is justifiable for a man to hit his wife if she has been unfaithful) thus presenting a very useful tool in the analysis proposed by this study. Similarly, the survey contained questions about paternalistic views of women, which tend to be prevalent in honor cultures, such women are seen as fragile and needing to be cherished (Işık, 2008; Vandello & Cohen, 2003).

Secondly, this study used data from the most recent census in Brazil (2010), collected by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), to address demographic and structural variables, which should be predictors to the responses to honor questions. The way this was done is collapsing answers from individuals coming from the same municipalities in order to observe similarities in responses by individuals living in similar conditions. Next, these data were cross-

referenced with data from the census to investigate whether or not these municipalities fall under the pre-existing conditions described by Nisbett and Cohen (1996) in which honor cultures are created.

With this data, the intent was to create a form of municipal level “honor index” which was to be used to characterize municipalities as being high or low in honor culture. This index was overlapped with what we considered to be relevant predictors of each of these municipalities such as the level of urbanization, average income, education, crime rates, etc. In doing so, we hoped to find any sort of relevant correlations between these relevant predictors and the presence of honor culture in each municipality. One must be mindful that the data obtained from these surveys are not available for all of Brazil, but for only 110 municipalities, thus making it important to analyze how representative of each state/region these data are.

In sum, the attempt made by this study was to systematically analyze the presence of honor culture in different municipalities of Brazil as well as look for similarities between those municipalities that could predict the presence or absence of this honor culture within them. Also, we attempted to answer questions about the association of honor culture with variables such as immigration background, social class, and education. In doing so, we hoped to analyze separately the influence of social background as well as the influence of cultural background on the attitudes of individuals raised or living in an honor-type society. Lastly, we computed correlations between crime rates, general violence indexes and general feeling of safety with honor culture.

Part 1: Construction of municipal-level honor index

Data

To create an honor index, we used public opinion data, which were representative of

different municipalities. Specifically, we relied on a representative survey conducted by Vanderbilt University. The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) performs a biannual survey named The AmericasBarometer, whose goal is to create a measurement of democratic values and behaviors on the American continent. This survey is conducted using national probability samples in 22 countries with over 50,000 interviews (LAPOP, 2012). For the present purposes, we focused on LAPOP's 2012 Brazil installment. This data set comprised interviews with 1500 people from 107 municipalities located in every Brazilian state. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of all municipalities included in the present research. In order to ensure an accurate representation of each municipality according to its population, racial groups, social class, etc. the research used stratified random sampling. From most municipalities, the LAPOP included 11 to 13 respondents (95 municipalities); from some municipalities 24 respondents (5 municipalities), from others 36 respondents (4 municipalities), from one municipality (São Paulo) 71 respondents.

From this survey, we used responses to questions about honor-related issues. Because the conventional concept of honor is disproportionately oriented toward male honor, we also selected response to items measuring benevolent sexism in order to be able distinguish the effects of honor culture, and cultural sexism. Benevolent sexism is one component of Glick and Fiske's (1996) theory of ambivalent sexism. This model holds that many people hold seemingly contradictory beliefs about women, implying that they are fragile and should be cherished and taken care of (benevolent sexism), as well as that they are in various ways inferior to and less deserving than men (hostile sexism) (Dória, 1994; Işık, 2008; Vandello & Cohen, 2003). Sexism items were available in the 2014 installment of the LAPOP, which, similar to the 2012 data set, comprised 1500 respondents from 103 municipalities located in every Brazilian state, with data

having been generated based on stratified random sampling as well.

Honor Variables

From the 2012 LAPOP we identified four items that, based on the literature, reflected concerns and attitudes relating to honor. All four questions asked respondents to imagine a hypothetical scenario. Specifically, respondents were asked whether they approved or understood if a husband beats his wife after she was unfaithful; if a father beats his children in order to discipline them; if a person kills someone who sexually abused their child; and if someone kills another person who threatens the community. These items reflect concerns with the control and punishment of wives who tarnish the honor of the family through their behavior (Vandello & Cohen, 2003); concerns with male head of households demonstrating that they are in control of their families (Cooney, 2014); concerns with revenge in the face of harm to one's family, especially in a situation with weak or absent law enforcement (Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002; Santos, 2012), and concerns with violent removal of threats and defense of the self in one's community (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994). Also, research has shown that, because honor culture is usually linked distrust of local authorities to protect one's community, people tend to approve of citizens taking the law in their own hands (Cooney, 2014; Dória, 1994; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Souza, 2015). All four items clearly related to an approval of violence as a proper means of ensuring personal honor and safety (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). For each scenario, respondents indicated whether they "would approve" (1), "would not approve, but understand" (2), or "would neither approve nor understand" (3). In the total 2012 sample, all four items were substantially correlated, with rank-correlations ranging from Spearman $r = .17$ (first and second item) to Spearman $r = .49$ (third and fourth item).

Sexism Variables

As explained earlier, since our honor items were focused primarily on male honor, we also selected items reflecting sexist beliefs about women, because honor beliefs and sexist beliefs tend to be correlated (Işık, 2008; Vandello & Cohen, 2003). We specifically focused on benevolent sexism which focuses on male beliefs that women are fragile and should be cherished and protected (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Benevolent sexist beliefs are by their very nature evaluatively positive; that is, they seek to convey a favorable sentiment even when they belittle and disempower women. Benevolent sexism exists in contrast to hostile or misogynist beliefs about women, two sentiments present in honor cultures. In honor cultures, men are expected to be the protector and providers; hence, this concept seems particularly suitable for inclusion in the present study.

We generated a municipal benevolent sexism score, similarly to honor scores. To assess benevolent sexism, we used two questions from the LAPOP. The first question asked respondents to what extent they thought that women are, in general, more sensitive and compassionate than men; the second question asked whether they believed that, in the event of a catastrophe, women should be rescued first. In line with Glick and Fiske's concept, both items reflect evaluatively positive sentiments, but also cast women as more passive and less resilient. Respondents rated their agreement on a seven-point scale with 1 'strongly disagree' and 7 'strongly agree,' with questions being substantially correlated with each other, $r = .32$.

Creating the index

To generate a municipal-level index we took advantage of the fact that respondents had been sampled randomly from within each of the 107 municipalities. To generate an honor index, we re-coded the four honor-related items, such that each was dichotomized. Respondents who

rejected the scenario entirely, that is, who neither approved nor understood, received a 0.

Respondents who either approved, or who understood but did not approve received a 1. For each participant, the four responses were combined into scores. All scores from respondents from the same municipality were subsequently averaged, which provided the basis for a municipal-level score. For convenience, the resulting municipality averages were multiplied by 100 such that the resulting municipality honor score could range from 0 to 100. The scores obtained from each municipality ranged from 0 to 89.58, with a mean of 49.97, and a standard deviation of 17.71 demonstrating the expected variability between clusters. The skewness of $-.43$ shows that the distribution is only slightly skewed to the right, which is consistent with the affirmation that Brazilian's in general have high honor concerns, but nowhere near enough to label it as an honor culture as a whole. The honor scores for each of the 107 municipalities are summarized in Table 2.

Likewise, we averaged the two benevolent-sexism responses for each respondent from the 2014 data sets, and subsequently aggregating them to the municipal level, we created a benevolent sexism score. This procedure resulted in benevolent sexism scores for 107 municipalities. The mean of this score was clearly located toward the upper end of the seven-point scale that the original respondents had used, $M = 5.36$ ($SD = 0.66$), ranging from 2.96 to 6.54. Most municipalities were present in both the 2012 and 2014 samples, leaving our final dataset with 110 municipalities total.

Lastly, we examined the association between our municipal honor score and the benevolent sexism score. Other than anticipated, the correlation was small and non-significant, $r(103) = .04$, $p = .73$. This finding did not support the idea that honor culture and benevolent sexism were inherently confounded. Yet, it did provide us with the opportunity to observe

whether community-levels of benevolent sexism would serve as separate predictors of critical consequences of honor culture (see Part 3).

Part 2: Predicting variation in the honor index

Based on the framework proposed by Nisbett and Cohen (1996), our goal was to examine variables predicting variation in the municipal honor index. These authors proposed that honor culture was largely the result of a society adapting to materially and socially challenging circumstances. Specifically, the authors maintained that weak law enforcement would promote individuals not only defending themselves, but also developing a mindset and reputation (“honor”) according to which they would not be challenged. Thus, to extent that the state authority is weak or ineffective in certain municipalities, we expect the honor index to be high. We expected community perceptions of authorities, especially their trust in authorities, to predict lower honor scores. Likewise, community perceptions of danger and low safety should be related to higher honor scores in a municipality.

When resources are scarce, the motivation to defend others and maintain one’s honor should be high (Henry, 2009). A sense of honor is less of a priority among the affluent as there is less pressure to having to protect one’s possession. Therefore, it is expected that honor scores would be higher in less affluent municipalities than in affluent municipalities. Specifically, honor cultures should be high in municipalities with lower average wages, inadequate living situations and low education.

Because honor culture, at least in the rendering of Nisbett and Cohen (1996), seems to be primarily oriented toward men, we also used the sex ratio of Brazilian municipalities as a predictor. Researchers have suggested that hyper-masculine attitudes, which are typical of honor cultures, are expected from communities in which the sex-ratio favors males (Courtwright, 1996;

Mahalingam, 2007).

In addition, we used the general demographic variables such as race, which is closely associated with social class. Brazilian Census data shows that people who self-report as black or multiethnic represent 76% of the 10% lowest incomes and 17.4% of the 1% highest income, which means they are underrepresented among the richest and overrepresented among the poorest, keeping in mind that those two groups represent 53.6% of the total population (IBGE, 2015). Lastly, regarding rural percentage, studies in the United States show that honor attitudes are higher among people living in rural communities, thus motivating us to observe if there is a similar pattern in Brazil (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).

Data

To test these predictions, we examined municipality-level predictors of the honor index. Because the municipality was the unit of analysis, we relied on official census data whenever possible. Specifically, from the 2010 Census data collected by the IBGE, we obtained municipal level data on sex (proportion of men relative to women), and, as a measure of social class and community affluence, the proportion of households with adequate sanitation. From the IBGE we also used data on the average income of men and women, as well as the proportion of rural areas within the municipality. Also, from the IBGE we obtained data on the proportion of different racial groups in each municipality, specifically the proportion of blacks, multiethnics, Asian and indigenous, with the proportion of Europeans/whites serving as the reference category.

Lastly, we picked four responses to questions from the LAPOP survey that inquired about environmental perceptions and concerns of the respondent's community. Specifically, these variables asked respondents the extent to which they thought people from their community were trustworthy; the extent to which they thought their community was violent compared to other

communities; the extent to which they felt safe regarding the possibility of themselves being victims of a crime; and the extent to which they were confident authorities would punish criminals if they were victims of a crime. The rating responses to the questions regarding trust in authorities, trust in people in the neighborhood, and perceived safety from crime were reverse coded from the original. Thus, respondents indicated their responses on a four-point scale with 1 “Not at all trustworthy,” and 4 “Very trustworthy” for the trust questions, and responses to the safety question 1 “Not at all safe” and 4 “Very safe.” Similar, respondents used a three-point scale to indicate their perceptions, which after reversal from the original, amounted to 1 indicating “Not at all violent” and 3 “Very violent.” The use of these variables is consistent with previous research that indicates those attitudes are associated with honor culture (Cooney, 2014; Dória, 1994; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Souza, 2015). Table 1 shows the descriptive data obtained from all the variables used in this analysis.

Results

Table 3 summarizes the results from a regression analysis predicting municipal level honor scores. First, we observed that municipalities with a higher share of households with adequate sanitation had lower honor scores. In other words, poorer municipalities were more likely to have a stronger honor culture. This is consistent with research that argues honor attitudes and honor culture are a form of compensating for lower social status (Henry, 2009). Interestingly, none of the other two variables reflecting community affluence (male average incomes, education) were related to honor culture. It is difficult to explain why the latter variables did not emerge as predictors, even though the direction of the Pearson correlation was as expected. Likely, their effect on culture is weak. Moreover, for men it might be in particular relative income, not the absolute income that leads to a sense of deprivation and need to

compensate. In that sense, predictors such as adequate sanitation might be a more precise predictor, since it reflects environmental difficulties and deprivations, which could present the necessary conditions for honor culture.

Table 3 also shows a substantial association between honor scores and trust in authorities such that municipalities with higher trust in authorities were lower in honor culture. This finding is consistent with the notion that honor cultures originated in part from an environment in which authorities were seen as inefficient or corrupt (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Other variables did not yield any significant effect in this model. Specifically, percentage of rural areas, race and sex ratio did not predict honor scores in these communities, contrary to expectation. Perception of safety had a significant effect on honor scores in the zero order correlations, but those effects disappeared once we used other control variables.

We repeated this regression analysis predicting municipal benevolent sexism scores (see Table 4). The regression analysis showed no significant correlations between honor scores and benevolent sexism, contrary to our predictions. In the zero-order correlations, higher levels of education and adequate sanitation both had negative effects on benevolent sexism, but as we controlled for all other variables, this relationship disappeared for education, though it remained for adequate sanitation. We found higher proportions of adequate sanitation in the municipality to relate to lower levels of benevolent sexism. However, none of the variable relating to authorities or community safety showed any relationship with benevolent sexism. Surprisingly, municipalities with higher proportions of indigenous people were higher in benevolent sexism. This observation is difficult to explain, and might be an artifact, because the share of indigenous people is generally extremely low (mean 9%).

At least equally surprising was the observation that municipalities with more men than

women (a positive sex ratio) exhibited lower levels of benevolent sexism. Again, the cause of this finding is not entirely clear. However, because benevolent sexism reflects a positive sentiment toward women, not a negative one, it is possible that in male-dominated environments (those with higher sex ratios) *negative* attitudes toward women are more prevalent. In other words, based on Glick and Fiske's (1996) distinction of benevolent and hostile sexism, it is possible that municipalities low in benevolent sexism would have scored higher in hostile sexism. Since proportion of adequate sanitation also had a significant correlation with benevolent sexism, this could be an indication that poor material conditions and a poverty environment could be a condition for benevolent sexism attitudes to emerge.

Part 3: The honor index as predictor of community-level characteristics

Having examined possible causes for honor culture, we now attempted to predict consequences of honor culture consistent with the previous literature on the subject. To be precise, we attempted to find a relationship between honor culture, on the one hand, and violence, gun ownership and desire to own guns, on the other hand. Along with our municipal honor score, we employed our benevolent sexism index (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Işık, 2008).

First, violence rates should be associated with honor scores. Research has found that honor cultures are normally cultures in which there are higher levels of violence than non-honor cultures, and honor disputes have been found to be one of the explanations to violence in some regions of Brazil (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Santos, 2012; Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015). Likewise, honor cultures tend to have a higher suicide rates than non-honor cultures, due to the fact that people in honor cultures who suffer from emotional problems such as depression are unlikely to seek help, because they feel this would damage one's reputation before others (Crowder & Kemmelmeier, 2014). This observation motivated us to look for a relationship

between suicides and honor scores.

Regarding gun possession, research has shown that regions with large numbers of gun owners are typically regions in which people also hold honor related attitudes, likely a consequence of people's distrust in authorities and hyper masculine attitudes (Felson & Pare, 2010). Since gun ownership is also a very present feature of honor culture, we attempted to see the relationship between gun violence and honor culture, while controlling for gun ownership.

Data

In order to determine how violence correlates with honor culture, we used data from the Violence Map NGO and the Brazilian Census from 2010. The goal was to observe how the honor score for each municipality predicted violent, deaths and homicides by firearm and sexual violence. Whereas as the homicide/deaths as categories are self-explanatory, sexual violence was defined as every kind of sexual crime, including rape, sexual harassment, sexual assault, sexual exploitation (i.e., pandering), indecency and child pornography (Waiselfisz, 2012). We attempted to observe how these correlations would play out, while controlling for variables such as social class, gun ownership, ethnicity and sex ratio.

When predicting violence, we used four different types of violence as dependent variables, while also controlling for several other potential predictors, such as race, social class, education, etc. These types were: violent deaths (regardless of cause or intent), death by firearm (regardless of whether intentional or not), homicide by firearm, and sexual violence. Violent death is defined by the IBGE as death by external, not natural causes such as car accidents, drowning, suicides, homicides, accidental falling, and so on (IBGE, 2015).

To assess respondents' relationship with firearms, we selected two questions regarding attitudes towards gun ownership from the survey, asking whether the respondent owned a gun or

whether they wished to own one. In Brazil, it is much more difficult and expensive to legally own a gun than in the U.S. Specifically, Brazilian law states that it is illegal for citizens to own and carry guns unless they have a specific reason for needing to protect themselves. But even then, there is a long bureaucratic process to register a gun, including proof of residence, mental sanity, clean criminal record and a BRL91.35 (U\$28.3) tax for registering the gun and an additional BRL1522.49 (U\$471.44) tax to purchase a permit to carry it. With that said, the question regarding the wish to own a gun may present a more solid case than actually owning them, since actual ownership has other restrictions.

Results

Contrary to prediction, the regression analysis demonstrated no significant correlation between honor scores and violent deaths, as demonstrated in Table 5. The proportion of blacks within a municipality only link with honor scores when examining zero-order correlations, but controlling for other variables eliminated this effect. Once again, adequate sanitation and the proportion of multiethnic individuals emerged as significant predictors. Regarding adequate sanitation, the negative association with violent death rates is consistent with the notion that people in poverty conditions are more vulnerable to violence and accidents. However, the strong negative correlation between the proportion of multiethnics and violent deaths is surprising. Multiethnic people are overrepresented in the poorest strata of Brazilian society; however, this analysis suggests that higher proportions of this population is linked to lower violent deaths even though we already control for multiple indicators of social class.

The next regression model, summarized in Table 6, predicted deaths by firearms based on the same variables. Results showed a significant correlation between deaths by firearm and municipal honor scores, similar to previous research conducted in the U.S. (Felson & Pare,

2010). Surprisingly, sex ratio was significant, with higher rates of women (a negative sex ratio) being related to higher rates of gun deaths. Again, inadequate sanitation predicted firearm deaths, confirming the link between economic deprivation and higher rates of violence. Race also had a significant effect, especially the proportion of blacks, even when social class variables such as adequate sanitation, income, and education, were controlled for. Surprisingly, neither proportion of rural areas (i.e. areas with high gun ownership) nor rates of gun ownership themselves had any significant effect in predicting these types of deaths.

The next analysis focused on a subcategory of firearm deaths, namely, homicides by firearm. The extent that violent deaths in general, or deaths by firearm also include suicides and accidental killings, homicide by firearm is a variable that should be most sensitive to honor cultures encouraging violent retaliation in the face of challenges to one's honor (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Courtwright, 1996; Santos, 2012). Table 7 reports the results of this regression analysis. Prominently, higher honor scores were linked to higher rates of homicides by firearms, thus confirming a critical prediction. Unexpectedly, but as in the previous analysis, higher rates of women relative to men (i.e. a negative sex ratio) were associated higher rates of homicides by firearm, though this effect disappeared when control for confounding variables. Other predictors emerged similarly to the findings already reported for the prediction of death by firearm.

A separate analysis for suicide rates yielded unexpected results. Firstly, contrary to our prediction, honor scores did not predict suicide rates. Yet, suicide rates were negatively correlated with all non-white races, indicating that those of European descent are more likely to commit suicide in Brazil. Lastly, gun ownership was highly correlated with suicide rates, which is to be expected, since availability of guns makes committing suicide an easier task (see also Crowder & Kimmelmeier, 2014). Note that suicide rates in Brazil are very skewed (1.774),

meaning that for the most part, municipal suicide rates are very low, regardless of the level of honor culture within a municipality.

Next, we used a regression analysis to predict gun ownership (see Table 9). There was a positive correlation between gun ownership and municipal honor scores; yet, when controlling for other variables, this correlation became non-significant. We obtained the similar results when using adequate sanitation: The negative association with gun ownership did not remain significant once we controlled for other variables.

The share of rural areas within a municipality was a significant predictor of gun ownership. This is consistent with literature showing that people living in rural and frontier-like areas are more likely to own guns (Felson & Pare, 2010; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Under the constraints imposed on gun ownership by the Brazilian state, this suggests that rural populations seem to feel more in need of self-protection. And given the cost of gun ownership in Brazil, this suggests that owning a gun is a high priority for those living in rural areas. This finding is also consistent with the premise of Nisbett and Cohen's (1996) theory of honor culture, namely that the need for self-protection is high when law enforcement is low, as tends to be the case in large rural areas in Brazil, in which several conflicts exist and the state is unable to manage them (Brumer & Santos, 2006). Perception of safety and violence were not significantly correlated with gun ownership. This has to be interpreted in the context of Brazil's stringent laws regarding gun ownership, which make it very difficult and expensive for people to legally own guns. Even though people might feel unsafe, they cannot legally own a gun.

Because gun ownership itself is an exception in Brazil, we focused on people's *desire* to own a gun, regardless of whether people have access to one or not. The pertinent regression analysis is summarized Table 10. There was a strong link between the desire to own a gun and

municipal honor scores, even when controlling for variables such as rates of violence and predictors of social class. Perception of safety and trust in neighbors showed significant correlations with desire to own a gun, but when using control variables those two became non-significant. Actual violent deaths rates had a significant effect on willingness to own a gun, but a surprising effect appeared when using firearm homicide rates as predictors. There was a negative correlation with this variable and willingness to own a gun, which could suggest that perhaps the idea of needing a firearm is be more related to status and subjective perceptions, rather than actual material conditions of violence.

Lastly, to examine the scope of interpersonal violence that honor scores might predict, we examine the rate of sexual violence reported for a particular municipality. There were a number of zero-order correlations, such that mean income, mean education, the share of rural areas, the proportion of indigenous individuals as well as the sex ratio were linked with the incidence of sexual violence. Yet, once all variables were entered into the same regression equation, none of these effects persisted.

Discussion

When Bourdieu first coined the terms symbolic capital, he referred to the manner in which individuals exert authority and competence (Bourdieu, 2011). In honor cultures, an individual's symbolic capital is the acquired honor, the respect one inspires in others. Especially for men, honor translates into a need to project an image of being fearless and a force to be reckoned with, which is the measure of symbolic power. However, the fragility of status in this type of culture cannot be explained by Bourdieu's theory. In Bourdieu, symbolic power is exerted through cultural forms of domination, which are validated by institutions and cultural norm (2011). Although this is partly true for honor cultures in the sense that specific cultural

norms ascribe status, the kind of power obtained through honor is extremely fragile, and is constantly under threat of challenge. The fact that honor is so easily lost when it is challenged explains why it must be so fiercely and violently defended (Grzyb, 2016). With that, we began to look for reasons that could explain the emergence of honor culture in Brazil, and how it affected interpersonal relationships, particularly those pertaining to violence, even symbolic violence.

We created an honor index to test two main hypotheses. The first was to challenge previous studies that treated a country as large and culturally diverse as Brazil as a homogenous honor culture. We believe that a country with a vast and varied immigration history, as well as great differences in material conditions within itself, would likely have a high regional variability in honor concerns. This hypothesis was formulated based on studies conducted in the United States in which high levels of honor concerns existed in locations with specific material and historical conditions (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Much like the United States, Brazil is a large country with material inequalities and similar immigration patterns.

The second hypothesis consisted in testing previous affirmations by previous research that culture and particularly honor culture is an adaptation to a dangerous environment, in which it is vital to be feared and respected, due to constant risks to one's life and livelihood (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994). Since Brazil has several locations with very high poverty as well as high violence rates, it seemed plausible to assume that we could reproduce this study there, and test if those material conditions predicted honor scores. Also, research shows that honor culture cannot only be caused by, but also have consequences such as high violence rates and gun ownership (Felson & Pare, 2010; Santos, 2012; Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015).

Our research found support for our first hypothesis. The data showed that there is great variability between municipalities, as we expected. Brazil is a country of continental dimensions

and large diversity in races and cultures, as well as being massively unequal in terms of infrastructure and wealth. In that sense, it was expected that honor culture might present itself differently in each municipality, depending on the conditions of these municipalities.

When testing our second hypothesis, we managed to confirm some aspects of honor culture as predicted based on the work of Nisbett and Cohen (1996). Municipalities with greater material wealth (assessed via higher proportion of adequate sanitation in the home), for instance, showed lower levels of honor culture, consistent with people of lower social class being more concerned with honor (Henry, 2009). However, the fact that other indicators of social class, specially income and education, did not play any role does not allow the conclusion that material conditions do not matter at all. Rather, it is possible that individuals' material condition relative to that of their neighbors, might orient individuals more toward honor. Future research should examine this possibility.

Consistent with previous research (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994), we found that distrust in authorities predicted honor culture. Note that this predictor was clearly significant, whereas some of the socio-economic predictors were not (see above). This could be an indicator that honor culture in Brazil has more to do with people's perceptions of their social environment than with the material conditions themselves. That is, whereas Nisbett and Cohen (1996) focus on the notion that honor culture exists as an adaptation to a harsh environment, the fact that lack of trust is a predictor suggests that this cannot be the complete story. In this context it is remarkable that some predictions based on the harsh-condition perspective are not born out. Whereas previous research has located honor cultures primarily in more rural areas (which tend to be poorer), the present investigation did not produce any evidence for this notion.

Likewise, when looking at the relationship of honor culture and willingness to own a gun

our results confirmed some assumptions, and contradicted others. Our index of honor culture predicted municipal-level desire to own a gun, even when we controlled for variables that would generally increase people's motivation to arm themselves, such as perception of lack of security and high rates of violence in the community (Felson & Pare, 2010). To be sure, there was an association between the violent death rate in the municipality and the desire to own guns. However, if one assumes that guns may primarily be thought of as facilitating interpersonal aggression, it was peculiar that the desire to own guns was higher in those communities with lower levels of homicides committed through the use of firearms. If guns are to deter gun violence against the person, this finding is not easy to explain. However, it is always possible that people who observe various types of violent deaths around themselves may feel safer if they own a gun, regardless of whether the gun can actually be instrumental in deterring or repelling gun violence. Whereas plausible, this notion is contradicted by the idea that community perception of security and violence were not linked with the desire to own guns.

Arguably, this dissociation from the actual security condition is more compatible with the idea that owning a gun is a cultural goal. Those who own guns may gain social status and feel respected, regardless of their personal sense of security. Recall that Henry (2009) argued that those of low status use honor culture to compensate for their material deprivation. That is, gun ownership might be more about gaining respect. And perhaps gaining respect is more of a priority when individuals live in an environment in which the violent death rate is high, where life is cheap.

Furthermore, the relationship between honor scores and benevolent sexism also contradicted previous research on the subject (Işık, 2008). Municipal honor scores and municipal benevolent scores were not related to one another. However, some scholars would argue that

sexism in Latin America is more prominently hostile than benevolent (Stevens, 1973). This could explain why honor culture in Brazil does not relate to benevolent sexism: Brazilian communities high in honor culture may harbor more demeaning and aggressive feelings towards women (Stevens, 1973; Vandello & Cohen, 2003). Contradictory beliefs on female chastity in Brazil, that is, the feeling that women need to be chaste and pure while at the same time men need to be womanizers might explain this (Dória, 1994; Johnson & Lipsett-Rivera, 1998). People living in honor cultures in Brazil may not see women as to be cherished and needing to be protected, but as potential threats to their honor, as someone who needs to be controlled.

Only one variable in our model predicted benevolent sexism: the sex ratio. However, this correlation was opposite to what was expected. Research shows that such attitudes are usually present in cultures where there are more men than women; that is, men seem to cherish women more (but also relegate them to powerless positions in society) where there are more men around (Guttentag & Secord, 1983). O'Brien (1991) showed that in societies in which sex ratios were low (i.e., there were more women than men), women tended to hold more positions of power and did not perform traditional gender roles. This made men feel threatened and thus tended to exhibit hostile sexist attitudes, which also seemed to translate into higher rates of rape (O'Brien, 1991).

Yet, our model showed that benevolent sexism was particularly strong where there were more women relative to men. It is difficult to explain why this finding emerged. One can speculate that the attitudes used in the present study were indeed perceived as very favorably by women. In other words, in municipalities with more women than men our index might simply show that attitudes toward women were more favorable than in municipalities in which there were more men than women. This, however, would require a re-interpretation of benevolent that

starkly differs from what Glick and Fiske (1996) intended.

The models in which we used honor culture as a predictor of violence produced particularly interesting results. Contrary to expectation, municipal honor scores did *not* predict rates of violent deaths. These deaths were only explained by proportion of adequate sanitation, which could very well mean that people with poor infrastructure are simply more susceptible to these types of deaths, which include accidents, suicides as well as homicides. In this sense, the variable “violent deaths” might be simply too broad a variable to be diagnostic of the effects of honor culture. One could assume that using homicide rates regardless of whether the perpetrator used a gun, another weapon or his bare hands, and that assumption would be correct. Although the IBGE has data on homicide coefficients, they have this information only for states, not municipalities. This is probably so because several homicides are not resolved in Brazil, so it is possible that some of the deaths listed as accidents could actually be murders. With regard to homicides with firearm, it is most likely easier to determine that it was a homicide.

Confirming this idea, municipal honor scores did predict the rate of death by firearm, that is, a variable that focuses on a more specific kind of death that does involve violence directed at people. These findings are strengthened by the fact that we controlled for variables that predicted social class as well as gun ownership. Regardless of social class, when guns are present in a Brazilian honor society, there were more deaths, similarly to the U.S. (Felson & Pare, 2010). Deaths by firearm were also more prevalent in places without adequate sanitation confirming that poor communities are usually more violent. Similarly, our results confirmed that municipalities with a greater proportion of Black individuals showed higher levels of deaths by firearms, even when indicators of social class were controlled.

Census and Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) data shows that people of

African descent in Brazil are widely overrepresented in national statistics of poverty, prison population and homicide victims, as well as underrepresented amongst the wealthy and college educated (Waiselfisz, 2012). Whereas this would suggest that our socio-economic municipal variables (adequate sanitation, education, income) should have explained any effect of this, the fact that the share of the Black continues to predict gun deaths, suggests that other factors might be in play, even those are not assessed in the present study. Perhaps similarly surprising in this analysis was the fact that the rate of gun deaths was greater in municipalities with a greater proportion of women than men. Messer and Sampson (1991) argue that a positive sex ratio (i.e., more men than women) had an effect on family disruption, which had an effect on violence rates. Likewise, Courtwright (1996) argued that societies in which there were high levels of single males tend to be more violent. This means that a sex ratio favoring males should be linked to higher rates of violence; yet, our model showed the exact opposite.

After looking at these two broader categories, we analyzed more specific categories of violence, namely suicides, sexual violence and homicides with firearms. Contrary to previous research on the subject, suicide rates were not predicted by honor scores. In our model, only gun ownership predicted suicides, which is expected. Research has shown that people who come from honor cultures tend to commit suicide more often, because they do not seek help in fear of appearing weak (Crowder & Kemmelmeier, 2014). However, this does not seem to occur in Brazilian honor cultures. There seem to be two main possible explanations for this. Firstly, it is likely that not having easy access to guns discourage people from killing themselves, as other methods of suicide required more planning, more effort and more time to change one's mind. Previous research on suicide in honor culture has focused typically on the southern U.S., whereas it is generally easy to obtain a gun. In contrast, in Brazil acquiring a gun is enormously difficult.

The second explanation is of a cultural and religious aspect. There have been studies that show that people in Protestant communities are more likely to commit suicide than in Catholic communities (Becker & Woessmann, 2011). The explanation is that Protestants tend to live in communities which are more individualistic, whereas Catholics tend to have closer ties to their peers (Becker & Woessmann, 2011). Also, Protestant and Catholic creeds differ in regards to afterlife – Protestants tend to believe that the fate of the individual in the afterlife is already defined, whereas Catholics believe that their deeds define it -, which could discourage Catholics to commit suicide more than protestants (Becker & Woessmann, 2011). The study by Crowder and Kemmelmeier (2014) did not control for religion, so it is possible that there is an explanation for the difference in suicides in honor cultures in Brazil and the U.S. in that sense.

Sexual violence was also not explained by any of our predictors, even though some of them had significant zero order correlations. One odd finding in this model was the direction of the correlation between education and sexual violence. There was a positive correlation, which could be explained by stating that these cases of sexual violence are only the ones who are reported. Most likely, women of higher education tend to report more cases of sexual assault, not because they are victims more often, but because they know the ways and have the confidence to report, whereas poorer, uneducated women might be afraid or might not be able to support themselves without their husband. It is important to point out that none of these correlations held for sexual violence control variables were used in the model.

Though neither suicide rates nor sexual violence correlate as expected, homicide rates with firearms correlated greatly. In fact, all the same predictors for death by firearms were significant for homicides. This is consistent with research that found violence as being one of the main consequences for honor culture and particularly in Brazil (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Cooney,

2014; Souza, 2015; Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015). Brazilian literature on the subject usually refers to honor culture in Brazil as being prominent in the North and Northeast of Brazil, where material conditions are harsher. “Cleansing honor with blood” is a well-known expression for regaining honor through violent means in those regions. However, our study found that honor attitudes exist in the South, where conditions are not necessarily as harsh as in the North and Northeast. Dessen and Torres (2002) for instance, observed that the “cabocla” and “crioula” cultures present in the North and Northeast actually were patriarchal, honor based societies, but did not find this in “gaúcha” cultures in the South.

To be sure, there are studies that have argued that Italian immigrants in the 19th Century in Southern Brazil had a value system that was based on honor which used, for instance, violent methods to reestablish a harmed reputation (Vendrame, 2013). However, our study managed to find current data to support the argument that some municipalities in the South of Brazil also scored high in honor culture. A possible explanation for this is Nisbett and Cohen’s (1996) argument of herding cultures being more prominently honor cultures, since the main economic activities for these regions is precisely herding. Unfortunately, without specific data on municipality’s main economic activities, it is hard to make these assumptions. Further research could benefit from the honor index we created and test for this.

Lastly, honor culture was a strong predictor of homicides. We managed to find that rates of homicides were explained by honor scores, even when controlling for variables of Social class. However, although there have been studies that have used honor as predictors of violence, they tend to focus on specific Brazilian regions, namely, the North and Northeast (Souza, 2015; Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015). Northeastern municipalities of Brazil are broadly referred to as being honor cultures, however this is not based on specific data measuring honor

concerns, but in a general sentiment that these regions are honor cultures. It is possible that much of Brazilian literature in the subject focuses on the Northeast due to its past with the “Coronelismo” system (Leal, 2012). Since these types of societies were very violent and possessed a non-state justice code, as well as a value system based on reputation, it is understandable why these are the first regions of Brazil to come to mind when discussing honor culture in Brazil. Another explanation is that, since honor culture is regarded as being originated from poverty and an absence of the state, these regions are more studied in that regard. The consequences of this is that studies normally do not analyze honor violence elsewhere.

The present study, however, found that a general feeling that authorities are unhelpful also matters in predicting honor culture, even when we control for material conditions. Our model showed that municipalities in the South such as Porto Alegre actually had higher honor scores than Recife, the capital of Pernambuco where studies on honor killings were held (Souza, 2015; Souza, Souza, Bilsky, & Roazzi, 2015). Hopefully, our findings will help further research have a better starting point in discussing honor violence, as well as investigating its presence in regions other than North and Northeastern Brazil.

Limitations

Among the limitations of this study are the fact that the data we used were not intended or this purpose. Although the LAPOP survey is a very extensive survey, it focused only marginally on the topics in which this research project was interested. In the future, research should attempt to create new surveys to more thoroughly describe honor. Also, the LAPOP only gathered data from 110 out of the over 5000 municipalities of Brazil. This lead to some states being much less represented than others, even with proportional random sampling. Even though this data still gives us a good idea about honor culture in Brazil, future research might want to

obtain data from at least 1000 municipalities, in order to have a greater, more representative sample.

Regarding municipal level data, we used adequate sanitation, income and education to assess SES in the municipalities but did not use data such as the Human Development Index (HDI) to assess community development. Future studies may benefit from using this type of data.

Lastly, we did not have data available pertaining to economic activity in a municipality, which kept us from testing for Nisbett and Cohen's (1996) argument of herding and arming cultures. Future research should look into this issue some more to generate a stronger test.

Conclusion

The present study was able to discuss some notions that previous research had not given enough attention to. Firstly, we managed to demonstrate that Brazil, even though it is considered an honor culture, has great variability in that sense. Also, we attempted to reproduce studies that considered honor culture as an adaptation to material conditions. Although some of those notions held, our study showed that at times, the same material conditions were not able to predict or explain honor culture in Brazil. Instead, perceptions and impressions about the environment – which at times were not supported by fact – seemed to have a bigger role in defining honor culture.

Something similar happens when measuring willingness to own a gun, most likely meaning that owning a gun is an ascribed form of social status, since they represent power in a society with high levels of honor concerns and a low proportion of people who actually own guns. Lastly, we challenged some preconceived notions on Brazilian research about honor

culture in the North and Northeastern regions of Brazil. Although they are high in honor culture, this is not exclusive of them. The index we created will hopefully aid future research on the subject, creating a starting point for analyzing consequences of honor culture.

This research hopefully contributed to Nisbett and Cohen's research (1996) by showing that while material conditions do matter to some extent, collective perceptions on authority's competence matter at least equally. Even so, our study strengthened the argument that honor culture is an adaptation to the general circumstances that a community faces, whether they are socioeconomic conditions or cultural perceptions. The systematic test of Nisbett and Cohen (1996) further developed our understanding of Brazil as a country that is typically considered an honor society. Perhaps further research can apply our approach in other alleged honor cultures and maybe reach similar conclusions.

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Table 1

Table of the means, SD, and range for all of the variables used in the study

	<i>M</i>	<i>(SD)</i>	Range	
			Lowest	Highest
Focal variables				
Municipal Honor Score	49.97	(17.71)	0	89.58
Municipal Benevolent Sexism Score	5.36	(0.66)	2.96	6.54
Demographics				
Mean income men	1203.90	(528.03)	468	2907
Mean income women	842.79	(356.02)	374	2111
Mean years education	8.45	(1.50)	4.92	12.08
Urban (%)	84.65	(17.85)	31	100
Sex Ratio	-3.16	(5.60)	-14.30	13
Adequate Sanitation (%)	54.1	(30.2)	0	97.50
Community responses				
Trust in neighbors	2.24	(0.40)	1.2	3.33
Perception of safety	2.10	(0.43)	1.25	3.42
Perception of violence	2.43	(0.35)	1.63	3.00
Trust in authorities	2.86	(0.43)	1.67	3.92

Noted: Positive scores mean more men than women.

Table 2

Listing of all municipalities with honor scores, by state

AC		Aparecida de Goiânia		PB	
Rio Branco	56.25		63.46	São Miguel de Taipu	77.27
		Campo Alegre de Goiás		Alhandra	61.36
AL			64.58	Conde	85.42
Satuba	52.08	Goiânia	56.25	João Pessoa	64.58
AM		MA		PE	
Manaquiri	87.50	Vitória do Mearim	58.33	Santa Maria da Boa Vista	
Codajás	35.42	Imperatriz	66.67		20.14
Itacoatiara	56.25	São Luís	50.00	Caruaru	61.93
Manaus	84.72			Petrolina	37.50
		MG		Jaboatão dos Guararapes	
AP		Sobralia	54.17		72.92
Macapá	54.48	Taiobeiras	38.46	Recife	45.83
		Várzea da Palma	47.92		
BA		Ouro Fino	47.92	PR	
Vera Cruz	35.04	João Pinheiro	62.50	Alto Piquiri	56.25
Riachão do Jacuípe	61.36	Betim	62.50	Matelândia	45.83
Feira de Santana	52.08	Santa Rita do Sapucaí		Londrina	64.58
Salvador	45.83		47.73	Curitiba	56.25
		Divinópolis	62.50		
CE		Araxá	43.75	RJ	
Barreira	29.17	Pouso Alegre	18.75	Belford Roxo	45.83
Pacujá	60.42	Belo Horizonte	34.09	Queimados	25.00
Maracanaú	39.02			Duque de Caxias	72.92
Fortaleza	37.09	MS		Pinheiral	29.17
		Campo Grande	55.30	São Pedro da Aldeia	66.67
DF		Aquidauana	33.33	Volta Redonda	47.92
Brasília	64.58	Corumbá	35.42	Rio de Janeiro	45.28
ES		MT		RN	
Ibatiba	41.29	Nova Brasilândia	43.75	Parnamirim	29.17
Vitória	53.60	Rondonópolis	52.08	Natal	43.75
		Cuiabá	47.92		
GO		PA		RO	
Corumbá de Goiás	52.08	Belém	20.83	Buritis	50.00
Goianápolis	43.75	Capanema	47.92	Porto Velho	52.08
Leopoldo de Bulhões		Benevides	50.00		
	56.25	Barcarena	47.92	RR	
Novo Gama	60.42	Marabá	58.33	Boa Vista	50.00
Campinorte	54.17				

RS		SC		Embu das Artes	16.67
São Gabriel	57.01	Sombrio	39.58	Itápolis	8.33
Santa Maria	82.39	São Bento do Sul	64.58	Carapicuíba	35.42
Caçapava do Sul	62.88	Itapema	47.92	Guarulhos	14.58
Venâncio Aires	89.58	Joinville	70.83	Andradina	16.67
Sant'Ana do Livramento				Ipeúna	14.58
	42.05	SE		Jandira	57.77
Guaíba	51.14	Itabaiana	72.92	Pindamonhangaba	42.80
Sapucaia do Sul	56.44	Laranjeiras	66.67	Indaiatuba	.00
Serafina Corrêa	62.69	Santo Amaro das Brotas		São Bernardo do Campo	
Passo Fundo	72.16		60.42		47.92
Porto Alegre	66.15			São José dos Campos	
		SP			25.00
		Álvares Machado	6.25	São Paulo	53.17

Note: AC = Acre; AL = Alagoas; AM = Amazonas; AP= Amapá; BA = Bahia; CE = Ceará; DF = Distrito Federal (Brasília); ES = Espírito Santo GO = Goiás; MA = Maranhão; MG = Minas Gerais; MS = Mato Grosso do Sul; MT = Mato Grosso; PA = Pará; PB = Paraíba; PE = Pernambuco; PR = Paraná; RJ = Rio de Janeiro; RN = Rio Grande do Norte; RO = Rondônia; RR = Roraima; RS = Rio Grande do Sul SC = Santa Catarina; SE = Sergipe; SP = São Paulo.

Table 3

Regression model, predicting honor scores

DV: Municipal Honor Scores	β	<i>b</i> (<i>se</i>)	<i>p</i>	Pearson <i>r</i>
Predictors				
Mean income men	.08	3.26 (5.17)	.53	-.09
Mean years education	.04	0.43 (1.10)	.69	-.05
Adequate sanitation*	-.34	-0.21 (0.09)	.027	-.23*
Rural Areas	.19	0.21 (0.18)	.27	.15
Black (%)	-.12	-23.63 (21.10)	.27	-.01
Multiethnic (%)	-.24	-15.94 (8.56)	.07	-.08
Asian (%)	-.12	-8.03 (7.89)	.31	-.06
Indigenous (%)	-.02	-1.45 (11.65)	.90	.14
Perception of safety	.11	4.52 (5.46)	.41	.23*
Perception of violence	-.04	-2.28 (-0.04)	.70	-.05
Trust in neighbors	-.03	-1.35 (5.35)	.80	-.19
Trust in authorities**	-.30	-12.38 (4.62)	.009	-.38***
Sex ratio	-.17	-0.58 (0.43)	.19	-.06

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Note. $R^2 = .28$. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for Sex ratio mean more women than men

Table 4

Regression model, predicting benevolent sexism

DV: Municipal Benevolent Sexism	β	<i>b</i> (<i>se</i>)	<i>p</i>	Pearson <i>r</i>
Predictors				
Municipal honor scores	-.03	-0.001 (0.004)	.82	.03
Mean income men	-.02	-0.02 (0.20)	.91	-.19
Mean years education	-.10	-0.04 (0.04)	.35	-.20*
Adequate sanitation*	-.36	-0.008 (0.004)	.023	-.26**
Rural Areas	-.07	-0.003 (0.007)	.70	.13
Black (%)	-.17	1.23 (0.81)	.13	.18
Multiethnic (%)	.25	0.62 (0.33)	.068	.18
Asian (%)	.17	0.45 (0.30)	.15	-.01
Indigenous (%)*	.27	0.88 (0.44)	.05	.09
Perception of safety	-.19	-0.29 (0.21)	.17	-.04
Perception of violence	-.07	-0.14 (0.21)	.51	-.05
Trust in neighbors	-.11	-0.19 (0.20)	.36	-.13
Trust in authorities	.11	0.17 (0.18)	.35	.01
Sex ratio**	-.41	-0.05 (0.02)	.003	-.09

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Note. $R^2 = .26$. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for Sex ratio mean more women than men

Table 5

Regression model, predicting violent deaths

DV: Violent deaths (per 100,000)	β	<i>b</i>	(<i>se</i>)	<i>p</i>	Pearson <i>r</i>
Predictors					
Municipality honor score	-.04	-0.16	(0.39)	.68	.003
Mean income men	.20	31.39	(20.21)	.124	.04
Mean years education	.03	1.25	(4.21)	.77	-.02
Adequate sanitation*	-.39	-0.89	(0.36)	.015	-.16
Rural Areas	.09	0.38	(0.70)	.59	.02
Black (%)	.17	124.39	(81.42)	.13	.22*
Multiethnic (%) **	-.37	-90.83	(33.18)	.007	-.20*
Asian (%)	.05	12.13	(30.14)	.69	.06
Indigenous (%)	-.22	-73.1	(44.47)	.10	-.02
Sex ratio	.05	0.66	(1.61)	.69	.11
Gun ownership	-.11	-134.45	(124.49)	.28	-.08

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Note. $R^2 = .20$. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for Sex ratio mean more women than men

Table 6

Regression model, predicting death by firearm

DV: Death by Firearm (per 100,000)	β	<i>b</i>	(<i>se</i>)	<i>p</i>	Pearson <i>r</i>
Predictors					
Municipality honor score*	.23	0.24	(0.10)	.021	.27**
Mean income men	.18	7.87	(5.29)	.14	.07
Mean years education	-.08	-0.78	(1.12)	.49	-.02
Adequate sanitation*	-.36	-0.25	(0.10)	.013	-.21*
Rural Areas	-.10	-0.13	(0.21)	.52	-.15
Black (%) ***	.42	83.55	(20.97)	<.001	.44***
Multiethnic (%)	.12	8.84	(8.72)	.31	.10
Asian (%)	.12	8.53	(7.80)	.30	-.10
Indigenous (%)	-.04	-4.96	(15.55)	.75	-.14
Sex ratio*	-.28	-1.10	(0.48)	.028	-.26**
Gun ownership	-.04	-13.10	(34.80)	.71	-.03

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Note. $R^2 = .43$. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for Sex ratio mean more women than men

Table 7

Regression model, predicting homicide by firearm

DV: Homicide by firearm (per 100,000)	β	<i>b</i>	(<i>se</i>)	<i>p</i>	Pearson <i>r</i>
Predictors					
Municipality honor score*	.22	0.22	(0.10)	.029	.26**
Mean income men	.18	8.15	(5.27)	.13	.07
Mean years education	-.07	-0.66	(1.11)	.55	-.01
Adequate sanitation**	-.39	-0.26	(0.96)	.008	-.22*
Rural Areas	-.12	-0.15	(0.21)	.46	-.15
Black (%) ***	.40	78.91	(20.89)	<.001	.43***
Multiethnic (%)	.11	7.70	(8.69)	.38	.10
Asian (%)	.13	8.59	(7.77)	.27	-.09
Indigenous (%)	-.04	-4.58	(15.50)	.77	-.14
Sex ratio*	-.26	-1.00	(0.48)	.040	-.24*
Gun ownership	-.04	-14.34	(34.66)	.68	-.03

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Note. $R^2 = .41$. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for Sex ratio mean more women than men

Table 8

Regression model, predicting Suicide Rates

DV: Suicide rates (per 100,000)	β	<i>b</i>	(<i>se</i>)	<i>p</i>	Pearson <i>r</i>
Predictors					
Municipality honor score	.12	0.28	(0.23)	.24	.14
Mean income men	-.01	-0.01	(0.96)	.27	.14
Mean years education	-.11	-0.25	(0.25)	.32	.04
Adequate sanitation	.16	0.02	(0.02)	.27	.14
Rural Areas	.20	0.05	(0.04)	.21	-.02
Black (%)*	-.21	-10.00	(4.84)	.042	-.10
Multiethnic (%) **	-.36	-5.66	(1.97)	.005	-.06
Asian (%) *	-.28	-4.60	(1.79)	.012	-.07
Indigenous (%) ***	-.58	-12.43	(2.64)	<.001	-.27**
Sex ratio	-.01	-0.01	(0.96)	.94	-.11
Gun ownership*	.23	17.91	(7.40)	.017	.25**

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Note. $R^2 = .31$. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for Sex ratio mean more women than men

Table 9

Regression model, predicting Gun ownership

DV: Gun Ownership (%)	β	<i>b</i> (<i>se</i>)	<i>p</i>	Pearson <i>r</i>
Predictors				
Municipality honor score	.18	0.001 (0.00)	.13	.23*
Mean income men	.03	0.004 (0.02)	.84	-.17
Mean years education	.21	0.01 (0.004)	.08	.03
Adequate sanitation	-.18	0.00 (0.00)	.28	-.21*
Rural Areas*	.37	0.001 (0.001)	.044	.26**
Black (%)	-.07	-0.04 (0.07)	.53	-.05
Multiethnic (%)	-.05	-0.01 (0.03)	.70	.01
Asian (%)	.04	-0.01 (0.03)	.75	-.05
Indigenous (%)	-.10	-0.03 (0.04)	.49	.08
Perception of safety	-.002	0.00 (0.02)	.99	-.10
Perception of violence	-.13	-0.02 (0.02)	.29	-.15
Trust in neighbors	-.03	-0.004 (0.02)	.83	-.02
Trust in authorities	.10	0.01 (0.02)	.42	-.01
Sex ratio	-.23	-0.002 (0.001)	.12	.03

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Note. $R^2 = .18$. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for Sex ratio mean more women than men

Table 10
Regression model, predicting wish to own Guns (= DV)

	β	<i>b</i> (<i>se</i>)	<i>p</i>	Pearson <i>r</i>
Predictors				
Municipality honor score***	.46	0.003(0.001)	<.001	.35***
Mean income men	-.07	-0.02 (0.05)	.60	-.08
Mean years education	-.08	0.01(0.01)	.52	-.11
Adequate sanitation	.02	0.000(0.001)	.89	-.11
Rural Areas	.09	0.001(0.002)	.66	.08
Black (%)	.13	0.20(0.20)	.32	.06
Multiethnic (%)	.20	0.11 (0.08)	.19	.01
Asian (%)	.12	0.06 (0.08)	.37	.04
Indigenous (%)	-.07	-0.07 (0.14)	.62	-.01
Perception of safety	.20	0.07(0.05)	.21	.20*
Perception of violence	.18	0.07 (0.05)	.17	.19
Trust in neighbors	-.03	-0.01 (0.05)	.83	-.22*
Trust in authorities	.13	0.04 (0.04)	.31	.08
Sex ratio	-.05	-0.001(0.004)	.76	.04
Firearm homicide rate*	-.43	-0.003(0.001)	.011	.07
Violent death rate*	.37	0.001(0.000)	.011	.21*

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Note. $R^2 = .31$. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for Sex ratio mean more women than men

Table 11

Regression model, predicting sexual violence

DV: Sexual violence (per 100,000)	β	<i>b</i>	(<i>se</i>)	<i>p</i>	Pearson <i>r</i>
Predictors					
Municipality honor score	.05	0.67	(0.13)	.62	.03
Municipality sexism score	.12	4.10	(3.62)	.26	.06
Mean income men	.10	5.33	(6.77)	.43	.24*
Mean years education	.10	1.24	(1.39)	.38	.26**
Adequate sanitation	-.11	-0.09	(0.12)	.49	.12
Rural Areas	-.30	-0.42	(0.23)	.07	-.35***
Black (%)	-.05	-11.80	(27.64)	.67	.03
Multiethnic (%)	.16	13.95	(11.36)	.22	.20
Asian (%)	-.11	-9.41	(10.25)	.36	-.11
Indigenous (%)	.02	2.53	(15.16)	.87	-.24*
Sex ratio	-.14	-0.57	(0.56)	.31	-.26**

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Note. $R^2 = .23$. Income, Education, Rural areas and Sanitation were centered. Lower scores for Sex ratio mean more women than men